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Introduction
Christian SORACE, Ivan FRANCESCHINI, and Nicholas LOUBERE
Here we are in the twenty-first century, among the shipwrecks of utopian voyages, with faded maps to places that no longer exist. Maoist China seems like one such place, with its dreams, aspirations, and terrors, erased under 
the shimmering miracle of capitalist development. But contemporary China is also 
a place of state-backed exploitation of labour that produces cheap commodities for 
global markets, including the electronic goods that have become the prostheses of 
modern life. The language of communism and class struggle has long been relegated 
to the past. When discussions of the staggering inequalities of wealth, corruption, 
and other adverse consequences of post-Maoist capitalism gain momentum, they are 
censored. Moreover, to read Marx and debate the legacy of Maoism in China is not 
permitted outside of highly circumscribed official channels—recently, it has even led 
to the repression and harassment of idealistic students who took Maoism at its word. 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) carefully guards its legacy and vocabulary of 
legitimation. Against what it labels as ‘historical nihilism’ (lishi xuwuzhuyi)—that is to 
say, the rogue circulation of concepts with the potential to inspire and incite new ways 
of being in the world—it presents a story of China’s triumph under CCP rule. 
This edited volume argues that there is much we can learn by revisiting the complicated 
and contested legacies of Chinese communism. The dogmatic reification of Chinese 
communism in China, and its Cold War vilification in liberal democracies, makes 
this critical excavation all the more necessary. We refer to Chinese communism in the 
volume’s title, and not to Maoism, because we want to acknowledge that emancipatory 
ideas in Chinese thought have always been collectively produced. These ideas are the 
result of countless energetic debates that have taken place in different times and places 
in China, across the twentieth century and since. It is precisely because of the massive 
influence Mao has exerted over political thought and discourse in modern China 
that we must remind ourselves all the more not to confine the ideas, aspirations, and 
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promises of Chinese communism to an individual or a time. In this volume, Maoism 
transcends Mao and refers to new ways of thinking, speaking, and practicing politics 
that involved the participation of hundreds of millions of people. And as is well known, 
Mao did not author all of the texts signed in his name. Maoism was the shape Chinese 
communism took for a time, without the two ever fully coinciding. 
This book engages with the idea of communism as it was imagined, promoted, 
preached, and practiced during China’s ‘revolutionary century’—encompassing the 
decades from the 1910s (which culminated in the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and 
led to the establishment of the CCP in 1921) to the onset of the Reform and Opening 
Up era announced in December 1978. The period from 1949 to 1976, during which 
Mao Zedong led the People’s Republic, is a central focus of this book. 
When the CCP obtained control of the state in 1949, China had a predominantly 
agrarian society lacking in developed industry. The political violence of the Republican 
period was exacerbated by Japan’s occupation of the country from 1937 to 1945, and 
by the ensuing Civil War, which ended with the defeat of the Nationalist Party in 1949. 
In the 1950s, China was reliant on Soviet bureaucratic communism, as the fledgling 
People’s Republic struggled to develop economically in the hostile environment of the 
Cold War. What came to be known as Maoism can be understood as a conceptual 
vocabulary and way of thinking about, and putting into practice, the idea of communism 
in the conditions inherited and navigated by the Communist Party during this stretch 
of time. Responding to its context, Maoism was not an abstract doctrine, but a living 
body of ‘thought’ (sixiang) requiring the deployment of theory in practice, and the 
reformulation of theory based on the lessons generated by practice. In its attempt to 
translate and adapt Marxist doctrine to rapidly changing Chinese contexts, Maoism 
invented new ways of thinking and practising politics—of being political—which 
circulated far beyond China’s borders. 
People have not stopped trying to enlist Mao’s discourse for their own cause—to 
selectively cite, interpret, and invoke Mao. Perhaps the most obvious example of 
a selective reading of Maoism is Deng Xiaoping’s historical conclusion that Mao was 
70 percent correct and 30 percent wrong (a verdict that mirrors Mao’s assessment of 
Stalin). In the new era ushered in by Deng after 1978, the Party was unable to reconcile 
the bifurcated image of Mao implied by this 70 to 30 split. On the one hand, Mao was 
to be revered as the founding father of the People’s Republic. That his embalmed corpse 
has been carefully maintained and displayed in a mausoleum on Tiananmen Square 
is indicative of his ancestral significance for the post-Maoist Party. Indeed, people are 
daily reminded of Mao as his visage now appears on Chinese banknotes (and has done 
so since 1999). On the other hand, post-Maoist Party leaders in the late 1970s and 
throughout the 1980s also allowed some public space for critical discussions of the 
Cultural Revolution. Thus, Mao found representation as the provocateur/saboteur who 
during the Cultural Revolution nearly destroyed the CCP through his injunction to 
the people to ‘bombard the headquarters.’ To date, however, the Communist Party has 
proven unable to monopolise how Mao is remembered, as he continues to lead countless 
afterlives in China and abroad.1 As an iconic image, Mao has become a contradictory 
symbol. For his admirers, he stands for mass emancipation, while for his detractors 
he is a cause of mass deaths. Mao has also become a pop culture icon rendered in 
bright colours on Warhol’s silkscreens and even tattooed on the boxer Mike Tyson’s 
 AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM   3
right bicep. Others celebrate Mao as a signifier of youthful rebellion. In the lyrics of 
American Indie band The Mountain Goats: ‘Put on your Chairman Mao coat, and let 
me clear my throat, let’s turn this whole town upside down, and shake it ‘til the coins 
come falling out of its pocket.’ A Mao for all seasons. 
New Interpretive Possibilities
This book seeks to open up interpretive possibilities regarding the Chinese Revolution 
as it was envisaged by the Chinese communists. Put simply, they sought to create a new 
world by destroying an old one. Under Mao’s leadership, the CCP set about establishing 
new modes of organising political, economic, social, and cultural life down to the 
minute details of people’s habits of perception and manners of speaking. How China’s 
revolutionary century is viewed depends to a large degree on one’s mode of relation 
to it: does one look back on it with nostalgia, horror, or ambivalence? Does one turn 
to it out of political fidelity, historical curiosity, or morbid fascination? To approach the 
Chinese Revolution is to stand in relation to it, and to feel something toward it. 
As an edited volume, each author in the book takes up the question of Chinese 
communism from their own perspective and in their own idiom. Even the editors of the 
volume constantly argue with each other about the legacy of the Mao era. We suggest 
that this is one of the book’s strengths. But like every other book, whether edited or 
single-authored, this volume is constructed on the basis of parameters of inclusion and 
exclusion. As editors, we are interested in critical perspectives on the Maoist legacy 
that take it seriously as a revolutionary project. This criterion still leaves a wide room for 
disagreement, but rules out perspectives on Maoism that are presumptively dismissive 
and ideologically entrenched in Cold War mentalities that pass themselves off as 
objective social science. 
Inspiration for the volume comes from a range of positions along the political 
spectrum with regard to Mao’s legacy: from Simon Leys at one end to Alain Badiou at 
the other. Simon Leys—the literary alias of the late Pierre Ryckmans—was one of the 
earliest and most stringent critics of the Cultural Revolution, an attitude that exposed 
him to vicious attacks by other scholars throughout the 1970s. To cite only a brief 
passage from his much-discussed 1974 book Chinese Shadows:
If the destruction of the entire legacy of China’s traditional culture was the 
price to pay to insure the success of the revolution, I would forgive all the 
iconoclasm, I would support them with enthusiasm! What makes the Maoist 
vandalism so odious and so pathetic is not that it is irreparably mutilating an 
ancient civilisation, but rather that by doing so it gives itself an alibi for not 
grappling with the true revolutionary tasks. The extent of their depredations 
gives Maoists the cheap illusion that they have done a great deal; they 
persuade themselves that they can rid themselves of the past by attacking its 
material manifestations; but in fact they remain its slaves, bound the more 
tightly because they refuse to realise the effect of the old traditions within 
their revolution.2 
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Leys’ unsparing condemnation of Maoist communism can be understood as a mode 
of taking the revolution at its own word. In Leys’ despair at the methods used by the 
Maoists we can nonetheless discern a disappointment in which a trace of the communist 
promise still lingers. 
Despair and disappointment do not exhaust the range of reactions that the Cultural 
Revolution has elicited. Many authors have also tried to see fragile revolutionary gains 
that were made and that were then undone by countertendencies within the dynamic 
process of the Revolution’s unfolding. For Alain Badiou, the Cultural Revolution marks 
the end of a sequence of the revolutionary process: a Leninist Party organisation, 
formed as a vehicle of emancipation, descends into extreme violence and chaos in 
a  failed transition of power from the hands of the Party bureaucracy into the hands 
of the people. The impasse that has resulted opens up a space of critical questioning. 
As Badiou puts it: ‘What problems do we and Mao still have in common? In what sense 
is a reading of his texts anything more than an exercise in nostalgia or critique? To what 
extent can Mao’s texts still be a point of reference in our search for a new direction 
for emancipatory politics … ?’3 Badiou’s questions presuppose that we are inescapably 
inheritors of emancipatory traditions with uncertain futures. 
There is no reason why one cannot feel both inspired and disgusted by different 
aspects of Maoism. The legacies of the Chinese Revolution are far-reaching and 
entwined, impossible to unknot into a verdict of ‘for’ or ‘against,’ no matter how 
tempting it is to simplify the world into reassuring positions. Rather than discuss Mao 
from a given position, or even enlist Mao to support a given argument, this volume 
seeks to generate an open-ended project of Chinese communism that allows Mao’s 
legacy to be questioned from different interpretive possibilities. 
The book contains chapters by more than 50 China scholars from different disciplines 
and continents. Each chapter discusses a concept or practice from the Mao era, what 
it signified in its historical context, and what has become of it since. The authors each 
respond to the legacy of Maoism in their own way, to consider what lessons Chinese 
communism can offer today and whether there is a future for the egalitarian politics 
that communism once promised. The book is structured to encourage a diversity of 
views. Instead of grouping the essays according to loosely framed thematic sections, 
we opted for a lexicon-style approach, listing the contributions in alphabetical order. 
We hope that this mode of organisation will invite readers to find their own theoretical 
paths among the various chapters and make sense of it according to their own needs.
Reinvention
There is an unspoken pressure that any hint of a positive regard for Maoism must 
be qualified by an acknowledgment of its violence and the untimely deaths of millions 
of people. This obligatory self-criticism dooms communism to appear as a discredited 
ideology rather than as an arc of possibilities yet to be more fully imagined, let alone 
realised. As Jodi Dean argues: ‘Only by supposing such an impossible, invariant, 
constant, unchanging communism can the appeal to history turn a single instance into 
a damning example of the failed and dangerous communist experience.’4 We typically 
do not hear people say that Christianity is solely reducible to the crusades, and 
American liberalism to the lynching of black people in the South. But the insistence 
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that communism is the violent excesses of its first attempts at realisation, which 
emerged under improbable and embattled conditions, is often asserted by detractors of 
communist thought as an article of blind faith. 
So how do we move out of the present impasse of living amidst a dysfunctional 
capitalism that will sooner or later destroy the planet, insofar as we frequently find 
ourselves being ideologically discouraged from imagining a way out of capitalism? 
Several of today’s prominent philosophers have addressed how our political imaginaries 
are being held hostage to discursive blackmail in which the threat of totalitarianism 
always has the final word.5 But the act of registering this fact also means that we 
must no longer submit to it: that we recognise the urgent need to reinvent egalitarian 
organisations of political and economic life. The present volume is interested in fostering 
this endeavour and is guided by numerous authors who have sought to imagine and 
theorise life beyond capitalism. 
Thus, we refuse to be confined to discussing communism under Mao as a case of 
being either for or against it. This way of structuring things is a setup. You are either 
for Mao and are blamed for ignoring the atrocities that occurred under his name, or 
you are against Mao and already on the side of the capitalists and reactionaries. Kristen 
Ghodsee and Scott Sehon have shown that anti-communist arguments generally 
rest on the hidden premise that if any ideology ‘did many horrible things, then that 
ideology should be rejected.’6 Their response is not to deny the atrocities committed 
in the name of communism but to extend the same logic to all ideologies, including 
capitalism. Nothing in Ghodsee and Sehon’s argument requires countenancing the 
wanton violence of twentieth-century communist regimes. In fact, they suggest quite 
the opposite: that leftists should be the most critical of these betrayals. Their argument 
helps to level the playing field by allowing us to more clearly see the grip that anti-
communism continues to have on our political imaginations and discourses. If one can 
talk glowingly and reverently of the principles of the Constitution of the United States 
with the latter’s history of slavery and genocide, one should also be able to approach 
Mao’s writing as a dynamic blueprint for political organisation. 
Communist afterlives are potentialities as much as they are historical realities. On this 
point, the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead is illuminating: ‘A feeling bears on 
itself the scars of its birth; it recollects as a subjective emotion its struggle for existence; 
it retains the impress of what it might have been, but is not … . The actual cannot be 
reduced to mere matter of fact in divorce from the potential.’7 In a communist sense, 
these potentialities are a free inheritance of thought to anyone who wants to seize and 
use them.
Difference and Repetition 
We hope that this edited volume will become a reference for people seeking to 
understand contemporary Chinese politics and society. In discussing concepts and 
practices of the Mao period, each chapter also traces how they have evolved into present 
governance mentalities and techniques. In the spirit of Maoism as a practice-oriented 
theory, its components have been reassembled and updated to fit present circumstances 
and needs. Several Maoist ideas and turns of phrase lacking a place in the present world 
of capitalist development and social harmony have disappeared from the map (but not 
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without leaving behind traces and virtualities in the present). Just as it was impossible 
to reify Maoism in the Mao era, it is even harder to draw a direct line of causality from 
the Mao era to the present—that is, unless you are the Communist Party and in charge 
of writing and policing official history and orthodoxy. 
Increasingly, scholars in Chinese Studies have argued that it is wrongheaded to 
see Communist Party governance as having changed entirely in the early 1980s with 
the advent of Reform and Opening Up. The ostensible break from Maoist political 
campaigns, ideology, and class struggle was widely celebrated in the international 
media then, at the expense of heeding the ways in which CCP rule continued to rely on 
institutional practices established under Mao. To see Xi Jinping today as dragging China 
back to the dark ages of politics and ideology is to reduce China’s economic transition to 
a caricature and to assume, egregiously, that capitalism is ideology-free. We do not need 
critical theory to unmask the hypocrisy here—even the Chinese government publicly 
describes market transition as a process of ‘engineering’ (gongcheng) and ‘construction’ 
(jianshe) in a way that would have made Karl Polanyi blush.8 The CCP views the world 
and everything in it as an artefact of the political. Its guiding documents unabashedly 
refer to political, economic, cultural, and ecological ‘construction’ as its main tasks, 
positing a world of malleable processes rather than fixed categories.
More often than not, anti-communist argumentation presupposes a state-phobic 
framework—one not shared by most people in China—in which state intervention is 
perceived as undesirable rather than unavoidable, a violation of individual life, rather 
than its infrastructure of support. Critics of communism often cherry-pick which 
instances of state intervention to denounce, and which to dress with pleasant-sounding 
phrases and justifications. The question of intervention on behalf of whom and in 
pursuit of what vision is generally given short shrift. 
A new vocabulary for the analysis and discussion of Chinese politics is necessary. 
Since 2017, China’s state media and CCP propagandists have been talking up the 
‘New Era’ (xin shidai) of Xi Jinping. In Xi’s attempt to reestablish Party legitimacy in 
a postrevolutionary form of ideology that combines Confucian traditions, civilisational 
pride, and socialist core values, the CCP’s language has undergone significant change. 
Nonetheless, there are distinctive ways in which one-party rule under Xi today 
remains guided by modes of communicating and governing that developed under 
Mao. To the extent that the institutional and discursive resources available to Xi and 
his administration are a direct legacy of the Maoist period, we need a basic ‘literacy’ 
in Communist Party discourse to appreciate how the Party-state governs and Chinese 
citizens experience and negotiate the political realities of China’s one-party system. 
Each chapter in this edited volume contributes to this literacy by offering an interpretive 
key to how China has become what it is today. That said, the chapters do not add up to 
a determinable totality. Instead, they trace a fluid set of relations and evolving practices 
over time.
  
Message in a Bottle 
This volume began as a special issue of the open-access quarterly Made in China 
Journal, of which we are the editors. However, as it took shape, and as more people 
became involved, the project grew into a full-length book exploring the origins, lives, 
 AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM   7
and afterlives of the main concepts underpinning Chinese communist thought. It was 
at this point that we were helped by a generous joint publishing arrangement between 
ANU Press and Verso Books, which has enabled the book to appear in two formats. 
It can be downloaded for free and is also available for purchase as a paperback. 
The ethos of the Made in China project is rooted in accessibility. We are committed to 
open-access publication for the simple reason that not everyone can afford to purchase 
books from commercial academic publishers. The business model of academic 
publishing, which involves the repackaging and sale of publicly funded research, has 
reached a critical juncture in an increasingly competitive market. The publishing model 
we have chosen indicates that we are both in and outside this market. Moreover, we felt 
compelled to think outside the confines of traditional academic publishing as we want 
our readers to imagine new political possibilities beyond the capitalism we know. 
Our modest hope is that the volume will help to revive the reading public’s interest 
in what was one of the twentieth century’s most radical, and fraught, undertakings 
to transform and emancipate humanity. We do this in the belief that, as the twenty-
first century portends climate catastrophe, a resurgence in authoritarianism, and 
obscene disparities of wealth, a revival of the communist perspective, freed from any 
dogmatism, is necessary to fight for what remains of the world we hold in common.
8   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
 AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM   9
Xing Danwen, Born With the Cultural Revolution (1995)
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The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. 
You young people, full of vigour and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the 
sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you. The world 
belongs to you. China’s future belongs to you.
Mao Zedong, ‘Talk at a Meeting with Chinese Students  
and Trainees in Moscow,’ 17 November 1957 





Great plans are afoot:
A bridge will fly to span the north and south, 
Turning a deep chasm into a thoroughfare;
Walls of stone will stand upstream to the west
To hold back Wushan’s clouds and rains
Till a smooth lake rises in the narrow gorges.
The mountain goddess if she is still there
Will marvel at a world so changed. 
Excerpt from Mao’s poem ‘Swimming,’ June 1956 
Mao’s poem ‘Swimming’ is a poetic evocation of the glorious changes that were intended to transform the Chinese nation through the collectivisation of agriculture and accelerated industrial production. Written before the 
suppression of the Hundred Flowers Campaign (1957) and the launch of the Great 
Leap Forward (1958–62), the poem signals the way ahead with a sublime utopian 
vision. ‘Great plans are afoot’—natural chasms will be transformed into human 
thoroughfares. These scenes of industrious beauty obscure all traces of the destruction, 
rubble, displacement, and violence of transformation.
In Chinese, the word for ‘aesthetics’ (meixue) is, literally, the ‘study of beauty.’ Still, 
as Haun Saussy points out, this term is misleading for many reasons.1 First, it was 
imported into China only in the nineteenth century by way of Japanese readings of 
German aesthetic philosophy. Further, in the vast skein of traditional Chinese thought, 
there was scant consideration of an aesthetic realm outside of the sovereign jurisdiction 
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of the state. In this sense, Mao Zedong’s famous 1942 ‘Talks at the Yan’an Forum on 
Literature and Art,’ in which he subordinates the aesthetic to the political, represents 
another faithful iteration of this tradition, with a Marxist gloss. 
In this speech, Mao outlines the relationship between politics and art in the context 
of revolution, arguing that there are no absolute criteria for judging the value of art, 
only contextual and pragmatic ones. For Mao, art transforms reality in the process of 
reflecting it: 
Although man’s social life is the only source of literature and art and is 
incomparably livelier and richer in content, the people are not satisfied with 
life alone and demand literature and art as well. Why? Because, while both 
are beautiful, life as reflected in works of literature and art can and ought to 
be on a higher plane, more intense, more concentrated, more typical, nearer 
the ideal, and therefore more universal than actual everyday life. 
Although everyday life is ‘incomparably livelier’ than art, it is also more chaotic and 
complex. Art, so conceived, projects a better version of the everyday present, by which 
the masses can see a likeness of their future. The cultural sphere consists of models 
of behaviour, narratives, colours, sounds, and scenes which awaken revolutionary 
feelings. For Mao, the masses do not need art to remind them of their daily experience of 
‘hunger, cold, and oppression.’ They need art to visualise the possibility of transcending 
their suffering. 
On these grounds, Mao advocates combining political and aesthetic criteria when 
judging a work of art. Revolutionary content with lacklustre form does not stir 
the heart; conversely, an enchanting work of art can be a siren song of reactionary 
politics. For Mao, exemplary art fuses revolutionary content with high artistic quality. 
In addition to touching their souls, revolutionary works of art provide the people with 
representations of their own collective power and future. In this configuration, the fate 
of art and politics are inextricably bound together. 
What falls out of the picture is what Fredric Jameson describes as the ‘implacable and 
sometimes even intolerable negativity’ of modern art, which is a necessary antidote 
to the pragmatism, empiricism, and common sense of daily life, not to mention the 
aesthetic rituals of state legitimation.2 This logic is absent from Mao’s Yan’an Talks. 
In  1942, revolutionary energies were too new and vulnerable to dissipation. They 
needed to be safeguarded by the correct ‘standpoint’ (lichang) and ‘attitude’ (taidu) 
of the artist: 
From one’s standpoint there follow specific attitudes towards specific matters. 
For instance, is one to extol or expose? This is a question of attitude … . Many 
petty-bourgeois writers have never discovered the bright side. Their works 
only expose the dark and are known as the ‘literature of exposure.’ Some of 
their works simply specialise in preaching pessimism and world-weariness.
It is a slippery slope from aesthetic ‘exposure’ to nihilism to counterrevolution. 
To prevent this slippage, Mao limits art to a positive incarnation of political categories. 
Exposure is permissible, and encouraged, only when it is directed at enemies: ‘With 
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regard to the [enemies] … the task of revolutionary writers and artists is to expose 
their duplicity and their cruelty and at the same time to point out the inevitability of 
their defeat.’ Toward allies, ‘our attitude should be one of both alliance and criticism,’ 
encouraging their achievements and chastising their apathy. ‘As for the masses … 
we should certainly praise them’ and patiently educate them to overcome their 
shortcomings. 
After the victory of the revolution, art will continue to be a source of political intensity 
and inspiration for the masses, but similar to the  victims of Pompeii, will also fossilise 
them in the representational forms of state power.
Antonioni’s China 
In 1972, Italian filmmaker Michelangelo Antonioni was invited to China to film 
the sublime achievements of the Cultural Revolution. When it was released in 1974, 
Antonioni’s three-hour-and-forty-minute documentary film Chung Kuo triggered 
a virulent campaign of denunciation in China. Party leaders viewed the documentary 
as a ‘reactionary’ (fandong), ‘anti-Chinese’ (fanhua) attempt to humiliate China and 
denigrate the Chinese Revolution. People were encouraged to pen letters denouncing 
the film, even though it was banned from public circulation and only a handful of 
leaders had actually seen it. Discussion of this anti-Antonioni campaign has since been 
seldom raised. When it is mentioned, it is typically dismissed as a time-capsule of Mao-
era fanaticism. However, I suggest that the discursive rationality and affective energies 
of this campaign offer an interpretive key to official attitudes toward representations of 
China today. 
CCP leaders at the time accused Antonioni of ‘making China ugly’ (chouhua) by 
filming what they regarded to be the embarrassing blemishes of everyday life. For 
them, Antonioni’s film was anything but a beautiful contemplation of the ordinary—it 
was a form of national humiliation. In an editorial published in the People’s Daily on 
30 January 1974, the authors argue that Antonioni’s purpose was ‘not to understand 
China’ but to ‘humiliate it.’3 In response to Antonioni’s defence that he only intended 
to provide an ‘objective recording’ without judgement, the People’s Daily retorted that 
‘each scene itself is a judgment.’ 
The main indictment against Antonioni’s documentary was not what it filmed, but 
what it did not film. Despite China’s revolutionary victory and massive transformations, 
in Antonioni’s film, China seemed to have changed very little, if at all. The lives of 
workers and peasants appeared to have barely improved since the prerevolutionary era; 
they toiled in similar conditions under different masters. According to the People’s Daily 
editorial, in Antonioni’s portrayal, ‘it seems as if China’s revolution has not changed the 
status of Chinese people and has not liberated them spiritually’—a direct challenge to 
the CCP’s legitimating narrative that it freed China from its feudal past. During the 
Mao era, campaigns were organised in which people would ‘speak bitterly’ (suku) about 
the past, and ‘recall past bitterness in order to savour the sweetness of the present’ (yi ku 
si tian) (see Javed’s essay in the present volume). People were enjoined to remember 
and be thankful for their new lives provided to them by the Party. Antonioni’s scenes of 
China’s past haunting its present challenged this logic of legitimation. 
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According to an editorial that appeared in the Guangming Daily on 13 February 1974: 
‘In this way, in the movie, the Chinese Revolution is missing (bu jian), the extraordinary 
changes brought about by the Revolution are missing, the radiant glory of new China 
is missing; instead, all that people can see is only the old China of last century.’4 I have 
rendered bu jian in English as missing to make the translation smooth; however, in 
Chinese bu jian literally means to disappear from sight, implying that Antonioni’s 
camera intentionally did not record the positive aspects of China that were directly in 
front of his camera. The author accused Antonioni of shi’erbujian, which means to not 
see what is plainly there. 
Framed in the unflattering light of Antonioni’s camera, rural China appeared full 
of people for whom the passage of revolutionary teleological time had stopped. In 
the words of the People’s Daily editorial, instead of filming revolutionary advances, 
Antonioni ‘spares no effort to find a withered farmland, lonely old man, weary beast 
of burden, and shabby building.’ What in reality is a ‘poor village,’ in the voice-over 
narration is labelled ‘a desolate and abandoned place.’ In the Guangming Daily editorial, 
the writer is baffled over Antonioni’s scene selections: ‘Instead of displaying industrial 
prosperity, [Antonioni’s camera] is transfixed on the backdrop of an elderly women 
sitting on the ground eating a popsicle.’ Why would he want to film a scene that is 
entirely foreign to Mao’s injunction that art must distil idealised forms of life? 
From the CCP’s perspective, the only possible answer was that Antonioni’s aesthetic 
decisions were politically motivated technical manipulations to humiliate China. 
What could not be imagined was an aesthetic appreciation of the beauty of ordinary 
life. As Mao put it in his 1942 Yan’an Talks: ‘There is in fact no such thing as art for 
art’s sake, art that stands above classes, art that is detached from or independent of 
politics.’ It was impossible for the CCP to consider Antonioni as engaged in anything 
other than aesthetic sabotage. From the CCP’s perspective, Antonioni’s aesthetics were 
an ‘imperialist way of seeing’ (diguozhuyi de yanguang). Ironically enough, after the 
ban on publicly screening Antonioni’s film in China was lifted in 2004, the movie has 
received praise by Chinese audiences, especially of that generation, for its depictions of 
a simpler and more beautiful life.5
Reactionary Formalism 
What is perhaps most interesting about these denunciations is their political critique 
of Antonioni’s formal techniques. ‘Anything good, new, or progressive, he did not film, 
filmed very little, or at the time pretended to film and then later edited out; any inferior, 
old, or backward scenes, he would film without turning the camera away.’ Even when 
Antonioni filmed what the CCP would have regarded as positive aspects of China, the 
editorial accused him of doing so from an unflattering angle. For instance, the footage 
he filmed of the bridge over the Yangtze River in Nanjing was said to have undermined 
this ‘magnificent’ and ‘modern’ structure. This was because the camera was ‘unsteady 
and swayed back and forth’ and even strayed to film someone’s ‘pants drying underneath 
the bridge.’ These intrusions of everyday life disrupted the monumental, revolutionary, 
and romantic longings of the Maoist aesthetic.6 
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The CCP was enraged by more than just the ‘erratic’ style of camera-work. In their eyes, 
Antonioni meticulously edited scenes in a way that obliterated China’s revolutionary 
transformation. In the Imperial Palace’s Exhibition Hall, after filming sculptures of 
‘oppressed workers rebelling’ during the Ming era (1368–1644) and describing their 
‘miserable’ living conditions, the ‘camera shot cuts to a scene of young students sent 
down to the countryside to participate in labour’ insinuating that not much has changed 
between then and now. The voice-over narration concluded that there was no ‘paradise’ 
in the Chinese countryside. This statement probably struck a nerve, as it was quoted in 
several of the essays denouncing Antonioni. However, it is also worth considering the 
European context in which Antonioni’s film was made and received. Across Europe at 
the time groups of young self-styled Maoists fetishised the Cultural Revolution as an 
answer to their political desires (see Lanza’s essay in the present volume). As Jacques 
Rancière reflected: ‘There can be no doubt that we were bending the manifestations of 
the Maoist revolution a bit too quickly to our own desires for a communism radically 
different from the Stalinist one.’7 For the Chinese Communists, however, Antonioni’s 
statement could only be understood as a negation of revolution.
For the CCP, each aspect of Antonioni’s documentary was reactionary. The People’s 
Daily editorial complained about the ‘drab lighting and gloomy and cold tone.’ The film 
lacked the bright colours of revolutionary passion, and instead gave off a ‘gloomy, 
depressing, and unfeeling impression.’ On top of that, the musical score was also 
found to be offensive. Rather than highlighting China’s revolutionary model operas, 
Antonioni used Chinese music to ‘wantonly mock’ the revolution. In one a scene, a pig 
shakes its head in sync with lines from a revolutionary opera that said ‘lift up one’s 
head and stick out one’s chest’ (tai qi tou, ting koutang). Scenes such as this one are 
marshalled as evidence of Antonioni’s malicious political intentions.
Antonioni’s camera recorded China in a way that challenged the official discursive 
and aesthetic frame of representation. The CCP’s response was to denounce the film as 
evidence of Antonioni’s imperialist gaze: you can’t see China because you only see what 
you want to see. He had failed the People’s Republic.
Ridiculing the Sublime 
On 15 October 2014, in an unmistakable emulation of Mao’s 1942 Yan’an Talks, China’s 
leader Xi Jinping gave a ‘Speech at the Forum on Literature and Art.’8 Despite China’s 
rapid transformations over the last several decades, the CCP continues to vigilantly 
guard over—and censor—representations of China that challenge its idealised version 
of itself. Without the larger-than-life figures of revolution and communism as their 
horizon, Xi’s guidelines reduce art to the celebration of Party-sanctioned morality, 
cultural heritage, and nationalist sentiment. 
In Xi’s version, the main purpose of art is to infuse reality with optimism for the 
future:
If literary and artistic creations merely write an account of the current 
situation, reveal an unmediated display of the repulsive side of things, and 
do not extol their bright side, if they do not express ideals and guide morality, 
then they cannot inspire the people to advance. 
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For Xi, art must marry ‘a spirit of realism’ and a ‘mood of romanticism,’ ‘use light to 
disperse darkness,’ ‘use the beautiful and good to defeat the repulsive,’ with the ultimate 
aim of ‘allowing people to glimpse the beauty, hope, and dreams that are in front of 
them.’ 
This definition of art prefigured Xi Jinping’s speech at the Party’s Nineteenth Congress, 
held in October 2017, during which he announced the arrival of a ‘New Era’ (xin shidai) 
shaped by a new ‘principal contradiction’ (zhuyao maodun) facing Chinese society. 
This contradiction results from the nation’s ‘unbalanced and inadequate development 
and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life.’9 Xi used the term meihao when 
referring to a ‘better life,’ thus evoking the idea of an aesthetically pleasing and morally 
ordered life. For Xi, the duty of the artist is to produce visions of the good life, and the 
responsibility of the CCP is to create the socioeconomic conditions for its realisation. 
What his account cannot accommodate are representations that might diminish 
people’s optimism or call into question the CCP’s ability to engineer the future. 
Xi’s speech continues the Party tradition of using political criteria to judge the value 
of works of art, and criticises alternative modes of valuing artistic creation. Like Mao, 
Xi argues against formal aesthetic criteria and the mentality of ‘art for art’s sake’ (see 
also Chan’s essay in the present volume). In his words, ‘the ultimate goal of all creative 
techniques and methods is to serve content … . To depart from this principle, technique 
and method are utterly lacking in value, to the extent of producing negative effects.’ 
Unlike Mao, however, Xi must also contend with the art market as a source of value for 
art as a cultural commodity. Unsurprisingly, Xi saves his harshest remarks for market-
driven sensationalist works of art that ‘ridicule the sublime’ and ‘exaggerate society’s 
dark side’ in the pursuit of profit. He described these works as ‘cultural garbage.’ Without 
formal aesthetic and market criteria to judge the value of a work of art, Xi submits that 
an artwork’s significance must derive from its ability to contribute to the ‘rejuvenation 
of the great Chinese nation’ (zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing). Here, the negative—or 
critical function of art—is conflated with the anti-social, and often interpreted as being 
anti-Chinese.
Politics of Sight 
The politics and contradictions surrounding Antonioni’s documentary film are 
still relevant today. Where is the truth in this melee of representations and mutual 
recriminations of misrecognition? Does one see the material successes of China’s 
economic miracle, its skyscrapers and high-speed rails, or its concentration camps in 
Xinjiang and environmental devastation? In an age of globalisation, the CCP asserts its 
‘discursive rights’ (huayu quan) to ‘tell China’s story well’ (jianghao zhongguo gushi).10 
It  dismisses negative representations of China as the invidious attempts of China’s 
enemies to ‘damage the nation’s image’ and the ‘Party’s image.’ To be sure, there are 
negative representations of China that arguably harbour lingering colonialist desires 
and cold war animosities. However, what the Chinese Party-state is increasingly 
demanding is that the world defer to its control over how China is represented, thought 
about, and discussed as the price of doing business with it. What the CCP offers is 
a future in which the spark of Maoism, which has always been the power of the masses, 
is reduced to the cinders of history.





Bloodline, or lineage, has been a political ideology of many monarchical regimes and aristocratic societies throughout history. The rise of nationalism in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries paralleled the discourse of purity 
and authenticity of one’s blood/race. In the context of national formation, blood is 
a metaphor for race, ethnicity, and sexuality that enacts loyalty, belonging, and national 
consciousness. Blood lineage can be a malleable narrative explaining Self and Other, 
a  rigid disciplining tool reinforcing hierarchy, or a fluid signifier for social groups 
seeking belonging and protection. 
In imperial China, rulers adopted blood-based ties to clarify the hereditary rights 
of power and property, and as a tool for social management in order to distinguish 
between royalty, civilians, and slaves. For example, the imperial Chinese punishment 
of collective responsibility—zhulian jiuzu, literally ‘guilt by association of nine of 
a  group/clan’—and the politics of lineage, or blood relation, played an important 
role in moulding, disciplining, and confining people to the social roles prescribed for 
them. People were expected to stay in their place in society, and transgression of the 
boundaries of their socially or politically ordained bloodlines could be met with severe 
punishment. In Chinese, shizu or zongzu represents a group tied by blood relationships 
as a family or a clan, led by lineage heads (zuzhang), with its family history and 
genealogy recorded as zupu. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, zu 
took on a nationalistic turn when the founding father of the Nationalist Party, Sun Yat-
sen, indicated that Chinese people of the Han or Chinese race (zhongzu) had ‘common 
blood,’ and they should stand together as zhonghua minzu (Chinese nationality) as they 
were facing the threat of national extinction under Western imperialism.1 Following the 
turn of the century and the May Fourth Movement in 1919, the Republic of China was 
founded under the famous slogan—‘Five Races under One Union’ (wu zu gonghe)—to 
unify Han Chinese people and Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Muslims, the major 
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non-Han groups of China as perceived by the Nationalists. Following the Communist 
victory in 1949, the state ethnologists classified 55 non-Han peoples and stressed the 
importance of a unified nationality comprised of the Han as the majority ethnicity and 
non-Han as minorities (shaoshu minzu) (see also Bulag’s essay in the present volume). 
Official discourse aside, popular memories and heroic narratives centred on blood 
lineage also thrived. For example, the Han nationalist imagination proposes a linear 
history of ancient China in which an immutable Han racial identity continually existed 
by virtue of descent from the mythological Yan and Huang emperors (yan huang zisun).
The 1950s: A New Nation-building
After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took control of mainland China in the 
1950s, the discourse of blood lineage temporarily shifted away from national or racial 
concerns to struggles over class identity, but the notion of heritability remained. Under 
Mao’s guideline of class struggle, each individual was labelled with a class identity by 
birth or by family relationships. Despite contradicting the socialist goal of eradicating 
imperial practices, reckoning by blood was effectively institutionalised by those in 
power through the practice of class struggle (see Russo’s essay in the present volume), 
as it inverted and brought into being new categories of people who would benefit from 
the revolutionary order, and those who would be its victims.
During the early 1950s, Mao’s land reform and class-motivated purge of landlords 
virtually removed the authority of reproductive ties between powerful lineage groups 
within rural communities. Throughout China, previous ruling classes saw massive 
socialist transformations: land was confiscated from landlords and distributed to 
landless and poor peasants, and private merchants and capitalist industries gradually 
became state-owned. Blood became a form to assess one’s revolutionary subjectivity 
through family background (chushen) or class labels (jieji chengfen). The ‘good ones’ 
were reproduced and circulated as revolutionary agents within the national body, and 
the ‘bad ones’ were identified as reactionary or bad blooded and outcast. A person’s class 
or family background not only haunted his or her own life, but the lives of their spouse, 
children, and relatives. In Michael Dutton’s words, class-related political problems 
on personal dossiers spread ‘like a virus’ and were inescapable like a ‘blood-borne 
disease.’2 These unfavorable classes were labeled ‘Four Black Categories’ (hei si lei), 
which included landlords, rich farmers, counterrevolutionaries, and bad-influencers. 
After the Anti-rightist Campaign in 1957, ‘rightist’ was also added to the list, making 
‘Five Black Categories.’
In non-Han peripheral regions such as Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Muslim-populated 
Xinjiang, local political groupings, religious authorities, and hereditary leaderships were 
also dismantled during the socialist reform. Following Western intellectual traditions 
of social evolutionism, Party cadres and ethnologists depicted Inner Asian pastoral 
aristocratic houses of power as primitive kinship tribal society (in Chinese buluo, or 
shizu), but also denounced them as ‘capitalist’ since the rich herders were accused of 
accumulating capital in the form of livestock, thereby reproducing oppressive class 
relations in pastoral production. State power materialised in omnipresent institutions 
in these native communities, such as the ‘pastoral office’ and the ‘pastoral production 
cooperative,’ with Han administrators promoting the Party’s work and policies in non-
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Han regions. The discourse of blood lineage operated on the basis of two contradictory 
and yet compatible claims: that pastoral people were backward and in need of 
developmental assistance, and that pastoral political economy was advanced enough to 
create its own capitalist class that could be subject to persecution.
When necessary, the Party-state was tactical and flexible in instrumentalising lineage 
as a political tool among the pastoralists; at other times, the state obliterated those 
lineages when they threatened perceived national interests. As the denunciation 
of local non-Party authorities continued, Party cadres also reflected on their lack 
of understanding of pastoral social structure, especially the great social power and 
influence endowed to lineage heads. They realised pastoral lineage heads were crucial 
targets for cooptation after careful indoctrination. This method effectively assured the 
mobilisation of powerful local leaders to assist in the dissemination of Party policy, 
propaganda, and new modes of socialist animal husbandry. For example, in northern 
Xinjiang, Han ethnologists surveyed the Chinggisid lineage of the Kazakh noble Tore 
clans in detail and evaluated their productivity, eventually restructuring them into 
major production brigades as a form of state ‘socialist primitive accumulation’ (see also 
Hayward’s essay in the present volume).3 On the eve of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, inter-
ethnic relations became tense as increasing areas of pastoral lands irreversibly became 
agricultural with a huge influx of Han settlers into traditionally non-Han regions. As 
the overwhelming scale of socialist transformation in ethnic minority borderlands led 
to resistance in these regions at the end of the 1950s, the Party simply denounced the 
resistance as ‘local nationalism’ (difang minzu zhuyi), a ‘counterrevolutionary’ crime to 
be purged. The ever-shifting target of blood lineage in pastoral regions exemplifies the 
fluid nature of blood in twentieth-century Chinese politics.  
The Politics of Communist Lineage in the Cultural Revolution
During the Cultural Revolution, the idea of blood lineage (xuetong) was revamped 
and gained a sinister level of national popularity. At the same time, Mao’s notion of 
the class line (jieji luxian) opened a path out of one’s background on the basis of one’s 
revolutionary devotedness and political behavior. Those from good family backgrounds, 
called the ‘Five Red Categories’ (hong wu lei) including poor and lower-middle 
peasants, workers, revolutionary soldiers, revolutionary cadres, and revolutionary 
martyrs, declared that they were the legitimate successors of the socialist revolution 
and ‘red by birth’ (zi lai hong). The ‘Five Black Categories’ were expanded to ‘Nine 
Black Categories’ (hei jiu lei) with new additions being capitalists, capitalist roaders, 
traitors, and spies. In 1966, a couplet began to circulate after appearing in the Beijing 
Aeronautical Engineering Institute. It read: ‘A hero’s son is a real man; a reactionary’s 
son is a rotten egg’ (laozi yingxiong er haohan, laozi fandong er hundan).
At first, high officials in the CCP criticised this blood lineage idea and stressed 
that one’s political behaviour or expression (zhengzhi biaoxian) was also important. 
However, in practice, the hierarchal categorisation and political naming prompted 
discriminatory policies aimed at innocent individuals with bad family backgrounds 
or class labels. It stamped indelible institutional marks on the countless bodies of the 
‘Nine Black Categories,’ whose children were euphemistically referred to as ‘teachable 
offspring’ (ke jiaoyu hao de zinü). In fact, they were deprived of any political and social 
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participation rights. Under this regime, they had to earn leniency or better treatment 
through good ‘political behaviour’ such as making a clean break with their reactionary 
parents and family backgrounds. Some cases resembled the imperial penal style of 
‘implicating associates’ in scrutinising the class labels of up to three generations. The 
‘teachable offspring’ were often excluded from opportunities, such as joining the army 
or acceptance to schools. They were subjected to unequal pay and reform through 
labour, and their unbearable humiliation and torture led to numerous unnatural deaths.
Yu Luoke, a young worker from Beijing, made a powerful counterargument to the 
Red Guards’ principle of blood lineage. Having suffered enough from the negative 
impact of his father’s ‘rightist’ background, in 1967 he published the essay ‘On Family 
Background.’4 Quoting Marxist and Maoist theories, Yu pointed out that one’s 
family background should not be equated with political identity and revolutionary 
consciousness. Moreover, the principle of blood lineage could not justify violence 
against people without a good family background—in this sense the so-called ‘Five Red 
Categories’ were actually the oppressors. Yu’s argument shook the foundation of the 
Party’s revolutionary legitimacy by rendering illegible the categories of class struggle. 
Without a clearly identified set of heroes and villains, the machinery of class struggle 
would break down. The Party became desperate for a consolidation of self-identity, 
ideological control, and epistemological certainty. The principle of blood lineage 
came in handy because it isolated people into different categories and stratifications 
and screened the political disloyalties of those who could challenge the Party’s status 
quo. As a result, top officials chose not to follow through with their criticism of blood 
lineage but instead exploited it as a social governing mechanism. Yu’s call for equal 
human rights as intrinsic to socialism eventually touched the sensitive nerves of Party 
authority. In 1970, he was executed for the crime of ‘organising counterrevolutionary 
groups.’
For non-Han pastoral societies in the Cultural Revolution, the system of class 
labelling established new hierarchical political categories that replaced previous ones 
and significantly frayed the fabric of society and family. Mongol landlords who leased 
land to Han peasants were denounced and disenfranchised in the name of class struggle. 
In Tibet, class struggle heightened internal divisions and led to tens of thousands killed 
in struggle sessions and sent to reform through labour. In northern Xinjiang, pastoral 
nomadic nobility formerly protected their lineages by disallowing their women from 
marrying men of lower statuses, at least in principle. This was reversed after Party 
cadres conducted struggle sessions denouncing landlords and aristocrats, and they 
went as far as forcing marriage across class differences. 
Ghosts of Blood Lineage Today
After the Cultural Revolution, the CCP abandoned the principle of blood lineage, but 
the generation who benefitted from it had already attained high positions in powerful 
national-level political and economic organs. Many of them have gone on to earn 
profits for their entire family from corrupt practices and abuses of power capturing 
the prosperity produced through the privatisation of public goods during the reform 
era. Numerous cases have been exposed illustrating the ways in which these second-
generation elites and bureaucrats enjoy above-the-law lifestyles and hold billions of 
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dollars in offshore accounts. It has been an unspoken rule in China that the offspring 
of elite groups inherited their fathers’ privilege, as people have given them nicknames 
such as ‘officialings’ (guan er dai), ‘red second generation’ (hong er dai), or ‘princelings’ 
(tai zi dang). 
The ghost of blood lineage continues to haunt the non-Han regions in the twenty-
first century as a new era of state racism dawns. While pseudotraditional symbols of 
‘Chinese culture’ such as the Han costume movement, Confucian rituals, and virtue 
training schools for women mushroomed in mainland China, Tibet and Xinjiang 
have been increasingly subjected to state-led exploitative development projects at the 
expense of native peoples and lands. A temporary pluralism and multiculturalism in 
the reform era has given way to Han-centred empire-building aiming to root out ethnic, 
religious, and cultural differences as social deviancy and disease. This is simultaneously 
shaped by Western discourses fostered by the US ‘War on Terror’ and global 
Islamophobia. China’s use of this discourse has fostered its own industrial complex 
of ‘terror capitalism’—high-tech Orwellian social control targeted mainly at Turkic 
Muslim and Tibetan populations.5 Up until now, over one million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 
Kyrgyz, and other ethnic minorities have been detained indefinitely in ‘concentrated 
reeducation and transformation centres’ (jizhong jiaoyu zhuanhua zhongxin), without 
indictment or fair trial. On Chinese social media, they are portrayed as ‘terrorists’ 
or ‘religious extremists’ to justify their detention, and their religion as an ailment in 
need of a cure. An official was quoted saying: ‘You can’t uproot all the weeds hidden 
among the crops in the field one by one—you need to spray chemicals to kill them 
all. Reeducating these people is like spraying chemicals on the crops. That is why it is 
a general reeducation, not limited to a few people.’6 The CCP initially shifted away from 
the racial/nationalist discourse of mid-twentieth-century political movements, but it 
has rekindled those flames by explicitly combining the discourse of blood lineage with 
ethnicity in places like Xinjiang. 
This hypercriminalisation process is unprecedentedly aided by cutting-edge 
technologies of biodata collection and surveillance networks. Since the end of 2016, 
a military technology used in national defence was applied in Xinjiang under the name 
‘Integrated Joint Operation Platform’ (yitihua lianhe zuozhan pingtai). Its security 
system instantly gathers data on an individual from multiple sources such as banking, 
medical, and travel histories to analyse, make predictions, and generate lists of suspects. 
Human Rights Watch reports that on this system Uyghurs who have been arrested 
before or deemed ‘unsafe’ are differentiated and their personal dossiers are tagged in 
a different colour.7 Xinjiang residents also have been required to fill out a ‘Population 
Data Collection Form’ and report whether they are Uyghurs, whether they are ‘persons 
of interest’ (beyond a scale of one to five, there exists an extra te, or special security 
level), whether they are relatives of a detainee, relatives of someone being subjected 
to crackdown and punishment, whether they are tagged by the yitihua platform, 
and whether they have contacts abroad and how they are related.8 They also must 
submit detailed information including religious habits, whether they have passports, 
have travelled abroad, and so on. The Party-state’s population control measures have 
metamorphised into a highly organised blood lineage classification system with layers 
of class, political, racial, and geographical inputs. Based on the collected data, officials 
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then categorise people in terms of reliability into three groups: safe, average, and unsafe. 
The collected family information enables the authorities to track down and terrorise 
people even when they are out of China. 
While Uyghur and Kazakh masculinity is ostensibly tamed through carceral 
governance in Xinjiang, women’s bodies are turned into the next frontier for the 
state to deploy its settler politics in sexuality and reproduction. In its initial nation-
making process in the early 1950s, in order to solve the gender ratio imbalance, the 
paramilitary settlers of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps recruited 
thousands of female students, soldiers, and prostitutes from Hunan and Shandong 
provinces to populate the settlements. Following Mao’s dictate of ‘anti-Han chauvinism’ 
and maintaining border stability, inter-ethnic marriage between Han settlers and 
local Muslims was strictly prohibited. Though the Han population kept rising in the 
past decades, low rates of Han-minority marriage are seen as an indication of ethnic 
tension in Xinjiang, while Uyghurs view the avoidance of such interethnic marriages as 
a type of resistance.9 The state turned a hard line in 2014 and started to offer incentives 
to encourage interethnic marriage.10 From 2015 onward, propaganda depicting 
secularised, mass weddings as ‘new fashion weddings’ to illegitimise Islamic nikah 
ceremonies and other native marriage customs as a form of ‘counterterrorism’ work 
has become prevalent. 
From the debate on blood lineage and class labelling, to today’s detention of Muslim 
minorities in Xinjiang, blood is a powerful symbol used by the Party-state to envision 
and sometimes cleanse its political and national body. As the CCP no longer needs 
to mobilise ethnic minorities as a united front (see De Giorgi’s essay in the present 
volume), it has embarked on a mission to establish itself as an ever-expanding Chinese 
nation focussed on Han interests. From imperial China to revolutionary movements 
to the war on terror, the discourse of blood lineages remains a flexible political tool for 
the state. As the marriage of biotechnological surveillance techniques with Mao-era 
political ideas about blood lineage in Xinjiang suggests, the principle of blood lineage 
is still an important concept for understanding Chinese politics and society, and will 
remain so for the foreseeable future.





It is a truism that the Communist Revolution that convulsed Chinese society in the twentieth century effected radical transformations not only in the realm of political economy, but also in the realm of consciousness, beginning with the Chinese 
language itself. The revolution invented a lexicon that midwifed a new worldview and 
a new way of organising social relationships. As the century drew to a close and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) retreated from radical politics, this lexicon—also 
known as Mao-speak—quietly exited public discourse. Among the vanished lingo of 
the Mao era is ‘class feeling’ (jieji ganqing). To a millennial in China today, it may well 
be Martian-speak. What is class feeling?
Like all things Maoist, class feeling needs to be grasped dialectically. On the one hand, 
it is comradely love for brothers and sisters from one’s class. It is a horizontal, fraternal 
feeling that extends equally to all members of the proletariat, but finds its most intense 
and sublime expression in the love for the supreme leader, Mao Zedong. On the other 
hand, it is hatred and resentment for the class enemy, usually belonging to the former 
propertied classes. The Party was well aware that neither feeling came naturally to the 
broad masses. Specifically, it had to contend with three rivals: kin loyalty, romantic love, 
and pity for the down and out. Much of the socialist-era cultural production was geared 
toward combatting the powerful hold of these competing sentiments and engineering a 
new structure of feeling that elsewhere I have called the ‘socialist grammar of emotion.’1 
Underlying this new grammar of emotion was a utilitarian ethics that forthrightly 
rejected bourgeois humanism. Good and evil were defined entirely with reference to 
whatever served to further class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat (see 
Russo’s essay in the present volume). Ends always justified the means and substantive 
goals always outweighed procedural niceties. In what follows, I invoke three examples 
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from the socialist ‘red classics’ repertoire, as well as a documentary account of land 
reforms to illustrate how class feeling was alternatively pitted against or grafted onto 
moral sentiments that the Party deemed passé, philistine, or reactionary.
Beyond Biological Ties
‘The Red Lantern’ (hongdeng ji) is one of the eight ‘revolutionary model operas’ 
(geming yangbanxi) personally shepherded and curated by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing. 
The plot centres on a communist cell’s effort to deliver an encrypted message to 
anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters while evading enemy detection and pursuit. The core 
member of the cell is Li Yuhe who poses as a railway worker. He lives with his mother 
Granny Li and daughter Li Tiemei. When he is betrayed by a turncoat and arrested, 
Granny Li consoles the grieving Tiemei with an account of their family history. It turns 
out that the three of them are not blood relations at all and were instead brought under 
one roof by Yuhe after each was left behind by their martyred kin. Having adopted 
Granny’s surname, they form a fictive family-cum-underground cell united by 
unswerving devotion to the communist cause. Between them there are recognisably 
familial feelings, such as Tiemei’s filial love for her father and Granny’s tender affection 
for Tiemei. But these feelings spring from shared political zeal and commitment, not 
elemental instincts. They are voluntary, reciprocal, and egalitarian, thereby belonging to 
the realm of freedom, not the realm of necessity. They rest on respect, not submission; 
they recognise authority, but abjure tyranny; they inspire sacrifice, not subjection. 
These are the basic ingredients of class feeling. As such, it is imperceptibly injected into 
the domestic sphere, in effect displacing kin-based sentiments from their centrality in 
Chinese moral life. Biological ties were rendered optional, and comradely fealty was 
the only prerequisite for family life under socialism. The corollary is that when a family 
member erred politically or was exposed as a hidden enemy, there should be nothing 
that stood in the way of casting him or her out of the bosom of the family, via the 
scripted act of ‘making a clean break’ (huaqing jiexian).
If the family as the quintessential realm of necessity can be made a voluntary political 
unit, then love and marriage, a hybrid of freedom and necessity, are considerably more 
susceptible to the conquest of class feeling. Romantic love, especially when motivated 
by sexual attraction, is a horizontal feeling that rivals class feeling in intensity and yet 
runs a nearly opposite course. Instead of being diffuse and infinitely expandable, it is 
concentrated and exclusive; instead of honouring shared and publicly celebrated ideals, 
it is driven by inchoate yearnings and private urges; instead of being amenable to top-
down direction, it is obdurate and can be utterly deaf to reason and material principles; 
instead of looking outward (toward comrades) and upward (toward the supreme 
leader), it is oriented inward (toward each other) and downward (toward the progeny). 
At the same time, insofar as it is capable of inspiring the ultimate sacrifice—the giving 
of life itself—it threatens to displace class feeling from supremacy; and insofar as it 
seeks fulfilment in sexual union, ideally sanctioned by marriage, it threatens to dislodge 
the lovers from the fraternal collective, engross them in the business of reproduction, 
and return them to the traditional realm of necessity. The offspring born of their union 
would have to be indoctrinated from scratch and inducted into the fraternal order 
amid all the uncertainties attendant to such an undertaking. 
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The Party responded to this challenge by coopting a narrative formula popular in the 
Republican era called ‘revolution-plus-romance’ (geming jia lian’ai) that typically sends 
a disappointed lover to the battleground as a mechanism for healing and redemption. 
The socialist version demands a more synchronous melding of the twin pursuits, in that 
the lovers must be brought together by political passion rather than erotic attraction 
in the first place. One of them, at the very least, must clearly embody the communist 
spirit, so that the other falls in love as much with a person with idiosyncratic traits as 
with an abstract, lofty ideal.2 Such is the premise of Yang Mo’s celebrated novel Song of 
Youth (qingchun zhi ge, 1958). When the heroine Lin Daojing chooses the communist 
fighter Lu Jiachuan over the bourgeois intellectual Yu Yongze, she is also choosing 
communism over capitalism and aligning herself with the historically inevitable. 
Freedom and necessity are reconfigured to render romantic love almost perfectly 
compatible with class feeling. 
Turning Over
Note that in these stories revolutionary couples rarely settle down to domestic life, to 
preoccupy themselves with rice porridge and diapers. This is because, as an insurance 
against the danger of love nests breaking up the fraternal collective, communist love 
stories are wont to kill off the object of love once the heroine is sufficiently proselytised 
and can stand on her own as a bona fide communist acolyte. Thus Lu Jiachuan is 
martyred mid-plot, so is Hong Changqing, the love interest of Wu Qionghua in The Red 
Detachment of Women (hongse niangzi jun), another revolutionary model opera.3 
The latter work is equally memorable for its archvillain Nan Batian, an evil landlord 
and local tyrant who is the target of Qionghua’s raging hatred and revenge attempts. 
The plotline of a former slave girl who ‘turns over’ (fanshen) by joining the Communist 
Revolution and learns to sublimate her private vengeance into the collective enterprise 
of class struggle is the tried-and-true antidote to the third obstacle to fostering class 
feeling: sympathy or pity for the weak and helpless. Once the former exploiting classes 
are dispossessed, disenfranchised, and subjected to the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
they have the potential to elicit pity in their pathetic state, especially if they happen to 
be one’s neighbours, relatives, colleagues, or teachers. The liturgical drama of fanshen 
ensures that one does not feel sorry for them by keeping alive memories of their 
ruthlessness in the bad old days. 
Fanshen is a communal ritual, street theatre, and people’s tribunal all rolled into 
one.4 It is fundamentally a participatory melodrama that cleaves the world into good 
and evil, virtue and vice, victim and victimiser. No one is a mere spectator: everyone 
has to play a part, on either side. Fanshen dramaturgy consists of narrating past 
pain and suffering (‘speaking bitterness’ or suku; see also Javed’s essay in the present 
volume), pinpointing and confronting the human author of that suffering, accusing 
and denouncing in unison, and sentencing and sometimes executing the villain at the 
finale. The denouement of all fanshen drama is an ecstatic state of purity, liberation, 
and rebirth. It sutures individual peasants into the collective by inscribing contingent, 
heterogeneous grievances and miseries with overarching ideological significance and 
absorbing them into a grand narrative of injustice and redemption. The ideal socialist 
subject is thus not an individual with a private vendetta, but a crusader with a mission, 
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burning with rage and hatred against all enemies of the people. This wrathful class 
subject will not be in danger of wavering or relenting, having completely jettisoned 
the bourgeois notion of universal humanity. In his/her eyes, across the friend/enemy 
(diwo) line there can only be a demon, vermin, or malignant tumour, not a vulnerable 
human being (see Dutton’s essay in the present volume). Lei Feng, the paragon soldier 
canonised for his selfless service ethic and uncompromising love and hate (aizeng 
fenming), gives the most poetic gloss to what it means to have class feeling in his diary: 
‘One ought to treat comrades with spring warmth … and to treat enemies with wintry 
severity.’
 Class Feeling and Worldliness
Red classics like those mentioned above are still beloved by a broad spectrum of 
audiences in contemporary China, and are periodically revived on stage and screen. 
How is it then that class feeling seems to have become thoroughly illegible? For this we 
need to seek not just psychological, but also institutional explanations. In the Mao era, 
by way of a class-based public goods provision regime, the ‘mass line’ and all-pervasive 
propaganda apparatuses (see Lin Chun’s essay in the present volume), the CCP was able 
to build powerful institutional scaffolds to support and sustain class feeling and class 
solidarity against all odds.5 But once these scaffolds fell away as the Party shifted its 
priority from class struggle to economic development, class feeling lost its armature and 
yielded to structures of feeling that meshed better with both traditional family-centred 
values and the resurrected market economy and consumer society. But the reason that 
the Party even succeeded at all in fostering a transcendent structure of feeling that 
held its ground against the countervailing forces of kin attachment, romantic love, and 
humanist compassion is because it managed to subtend it with tribal forms of feeling, 
particularly cryptonationalist ones, while also repudiating and supplanting them. 
Observers have been taken aback by the ferocious eruption of nationalist fervour in the 
post-Mao decades, but they should not be.
Preternaturally cognisant of the difficulty of forging strong emotional bonds on the 
basis  of objective economic interests, the Party grounded class identity in a quasi-
racialised typology of friend/enemy through the system of ‘class designations’ (chengfen) 
that were patrilineally heritable (see Yi Xiaocuo’s essay in the present volume). 
An iconography (posters, sculptures, exhibits, picture books, films) and a dramaturgy 
(model operas, fanshen rituals, mass rallies) were then mobilised to exaggerate and 
intensify the us/them difference at a visceral level (see Ho’s essay in the present 
volume).6 In particular, the Party made abundant use of the political drama of fanshen 
to fuse private sentiments and experiences into abiding hatred for the class enemy and 
boundless gratitude for the saviour, so that no one loved or hated without a reason, as 
Mao intoned.7 Instead of relying exclusively on the rational and the calculating faculties, 
the Party tapped into the spontaneous and primordial depths of mass psychology and 
succeeded in rallying the broad masses to its millenarian vision. Without this brilliant 
emotion work and the groundswell of popular support it produced, Mao’s rag-tag 
army could not have defeated the far better financed and equipped Nationalist forces, 
nor could his regime have hurtled the newly minted People’s Republic through one 
tumultuous campaign after another without fundamentally vitiating its own legitimacy.8 
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William Hinton, the American chronicler of the land reform movement in which 
communist cadres led landless peasants to overturn landlord domination and 
exploitation, posed the puzzle of what motivated the activists to fight on when there 
was little material gain for them: 
My own reaction to the Party Day meeting was one of wonder—wonder at 
the perseverance of these people, especially the stubborn perseverance of 
the local men. What kept them working under such conditions? Why didn’t 
they give up and go home? Certainly it had nothing to do with money. Right 
there in the middle of the meeting the county clerk had come around to ask 
them to sign their monthly vouchers. I knew exactly what each received for 
his work … . At home on the land they could easily earn more. No, they had 
no material incentive to be cadres. Nor was their chosen road a path of glory. 
Only a stubborn devotion to the cause of fanshen made sense as a motive. 
I had never known men who consistently put principle above self-interest as 
these men appeared to do.9 
A few pages later, the remarks of Secretary Ch’en of Lucheng county at another 
meeting suggested a fuller answer:
He swept the room with a long glance and looked straight into the eyes 
of one man after another. ‘I want to ask you a question,’ he said, warming 
up for battle. ‘Why do we live in this world? Is it just to eat and sleep and 
lead a  worthless life? That is the landlord and rich peasant point of view. 
They want to enjoy life, waste food and clothes, and beget children. But a 
Communist works not only for his own life. He has offered everything to the 
service of his class. If he finds one poor brother still suffering from hunger and 
cold, he has not done his duty. Anyone who is concerned only with himself 
lacks the fundamental standards necessary for a Party member. Right now 
several comrades are thinking, “Life is easier at home. Why not leave this 
work and go home?” But think it over. Who led your fanshen? From where 
did the “fruits” come? Such thinking is typical of those who have forgotten their 
class. A good Communist, whenever he meets personal difficulties, thinks 
of others’ difficulties. If you haven’t understood that during the purification 
meetings, you should understand it now. If you want to go home, you can go 
home. But give some thought to your future. Where is the man so benighted 
he no longer has any political needs? Anyone who has no political demands 
cannot be said to be fully alive. Even the most abject villager is upset when he 
cannot join the Poor Peasants’ League. But you Communist Party members, 
have you no political demands?’ [Emphasis added].
As the Party secretary puts it plainly, man does not live by bread alone, and there 
is such a thing as ‘political needs,’ or what Hannah Arendt calls ‘worldliness’—that 
is, the ability to act in the world among one’s peers as a free agent, a political being, 
beyond one’s private existence in the realm of necessity.10 This is fundamental to the 
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meaning of being human (‘fully alive’). However, the Party’s campaign-style politics 
ultimately warped the realm of freedom and action by clothing it in the language of 
devotion and selfless service, failing to recognise that the opposite of selfishness was 
not altruism, but worldliness. The upshot is that that no one was above the suspicion 
of self-interest, hence the repeated crackdowns on corruption, graft, embezzlement, 
and treason during the most heady and idealistic period of communist rule. If initially 
class feeling thrived on the longing to distinguish oneself and make a difference in the 
world, in grafting itself onto tribal feelings and resorting to a racialist logic, it ultimately 
smothered worldliness, thus feeding into post-Mao disillusionment and weariness of 
politics. 
There is a great deal we can learn from the CCP’s experiment in class feeling and class 
politics. At best it provides a historical lesson on how to mount a social movement: 
appeals to the pocket can only go so far if the heart is not stirred. Liberal democracy is 
rightly distrustful of mass mobilisation built on tribal feelings, and strains to balance 
identity politics with the Habermasian model of rational communicative action. 
But it risks losing the masses to demagoguery that promises something far more 
visceral and seductive and galvanising—something akin to the religious experience of 
transcendence (see Davies’s essay in the present volume). Relying solely on material 
interests leaves ample room for populist agitators who know how to stoke righteous 
resentment against all manner of outsiders. We are now daily rattled by the aftershocks 
of a right-wing triumph of mobilisation in the wake of decades of liberal disengagement 
from substantive questions of sentiments and values. It is what Wang Hui has forcefully 
critiqued as the ‘depoliticisation of politics.’11 The question that haunts the progressive 
among us is this: is politics possible without passion? Can we have class solidarity 
without class feeling?





(Translated by David VERZONI)
The concept of ‘class struggle’ (jieji douzheng) was one of the principal paradoxes of the Cultural Revolution (see also Thornton’s essay in the present volume). As  a slogan, it was unfailingly spoken and printed at every turn of that 
tumultuous decade in China; yet, any attempt to examine those events in the light 
of ‘classes in conflict’ encounters insurmountable aporia. No less complicated is the 
problem of how to assess the role of ‘classist’ categories in the Chinese government’s 
official discourse today. In its recently amended Constitution, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) reiterates its hallowed role as ‘the vanguard of the working class’ (gongren 
jieji de xianfengdui). Both issues—a critical reappraisal of the Cultural Revolution, as 
well as an analysis of the role and relevance class plays in CCP ideology—are cut from 
the same cloth. The thread that stitches them together is the notion of the ‘dictatorship 
of the proletariat’ (wuchanjieji zhuanzheng), which I will elaborate in this essay. 
Smashing the State
The conceptual origins of class struggle certainly predate Marx. Indeed, not only did 
Marx candidly admit that he had borrowed the phrase from ‘bourgeois historians and 
economists,’ but even Lenin later pointed out that ‘not a single educated liberal’ would 
have trouble admitting the existence of class struggle.1 What was new in the Marxist 
view was how to do away with ‘society divided in classes’ through a specific process 
called the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’ This conception of dictatorship was not a new 
form of permanent rule, but a transition to an altogether different political horizon that 
would end class conflict and lead to the extinction of the state itself.
The question of how to assess the discourse of class struggle during the Cultural 
Revolution requires a close examination of the concept of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. In particular, in this essay I will consider the Cultural Revolution as 
30   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
a laboratory of mass politics that attempted to test this key concept of revolutionary 
culture. It was definitely not a coincidence that the revolutionary decade that had 
started in 1966 drew to a close in 1975 with a political campaign that focussed on 
the theoretical study of this concept, in a reckoning pursued with tenacity but never 
completed.
What was the dictatorship of the proletariat? Drawing a line of thought from Marx 
to Lenin and then Mao, this phrase designated a space of invention within which 
organised communists attempted to implement the goal of downsizing the state’s 
bureaucratic-military machinery. Far from being a particular ‘form of government’—
Marx was notably critical regarding the idea of a ‘future state’—the dictatorship of 
the proletariat indicated the set of political experiments aimed at dismantling—or 
‘smashing’ (zerbrechen), as Marx put it—the state apparatus as an entity separated from 
society, and dispersing its functions among the people.2
When, in the early months of the Cultural Revolution, Mao told the Red Guards 
that all of them had ‘to be concerned about the affairs of the state’ (guanxin guojia 
dashi), he expressed the spirit of the dictatorship of the proletariat perfectly. One of the 
fundamental components of the original agenda of the Cultural Revolution was initiating 
a series of political inventions that would entrust the carrying out of state functions to 
the ‘concern’ (guanxin) of the masses. Yet, putting the dictatorship of the proletariat into 
practice as a form of mass politics required a critical rethinking of what the socialist states, 
starting with the Soviet Union, had become. More specifically, the Cultural Revolution 
called into question the fact that in all the dictatorships of the proletariat of the twentieth 
century, state functions had become the prerogative of a special echelon of Party officials 
instead of being dispersed among the common people.
Although the Cultural Revolution never managed to complete this exhaustive 
account and reinvention of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a historical enterprise, 
it articulated a set of questions that recasted older problems in a new light, requiring 
further conceptual investigation and practical experimentation. A core issue among 
these was that of the relationship between the abolition of private ownership of the 
means of production and the prospect of the extinction of the state.
Principles of Authority
I define ‘authority’ in the elementary sociological sense of the ability to command 
obedience. Viewing the state as a set of ‘apparatuses’ obscures its essential role as the 
crystallisation of the general principle of authority in a given socio-historical world.3 
While Marx was surely right in describing different modes of production—slavery, 
feudalism, and capitalism—all modes of production are held together by a bond of 
authority by which subordinates obey their superiors. The state is better conceptualised 
as the form of authority that is dominant within a society, rather than a set of discrete 
‘places’ and bounded institutions. Although the form and phenomenology of authority 
vary depending on the society, authority installs the general principle of obedience.
Authority has assumed a variety of dominant forms in human societies—personal, 
transcendent, charismatic, and so forth. Yet the relations of authority dominant in the 
modern world differ from all previous others because they are based on a singular 
tenet of capitalism—the buying and selling of labour power as commodity. Labour 
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power as a commodity—and the subsequent freedom of the capitalist to buy it or 
not depending on the self-valorising demands of capital—is the foundation of the 
relationship between command and obedience in the modern world. In this sense, 
private ownership of the means of production is first and foremost the exercise of an 
unconditional authority over the masses of wage earners. In other words, it is the ability 
to have decision-making power over the lives of those who are valued only as sellers 
of labour power. In the historical bourgeois society the buying and selling of labour 
power is the atom of authority’s elementary structure. The current trend towards an 
increasingly precarious workforce aims at restoring the unconditional authority of 
the wage relation by eliminating the vestiges of constraint a century of working class 
politics imposed on the domination of capital.
Given this modern form of authority, what did Marx mean when he argued that 
abolishing private ownership of the means of production would not only signal a break 
with capitalist society but also play a preliminary role in the process of dissolving 
the state? Abolishing private ownership of the means of production entails not only 
an end to the commodification of labour power, but also the disappearance of the 
general principle of authority in bourgeois society. Thus, if the state constitutes the 
set of powers needed to command obedience in given socio-historical conditions, 
abolishing the commodification of labour power deprives the state of an essential 
function by suppressing capital’s unconditional authority. Marx, Lenin, and Mao saw 
that abolishing private ownership of the means of production was a prerequisite for 
every communist political strategy. In fact, the abolition of capitalist private property 
inherent in every proclamation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the twentieth 
century bore the seeds of the process that, according to Marx, was supposed to ‘smash’ 
the state and eviscerate a crucial pillar of authority of bourgeois society. Once deprived 
of the freedom to purchase labour power in the marketplace, that entire system of 
governance would be irreparably altered. 
Filling the Void
What are we supposed to think of the socialist ‘exception’ to capitalism that lasted 
approximately two-thirds of the twentieth century, especially now that the ‘rule’ 
of labour power commodification has been fully reinstated globally? The current 
discourses of totalitarianism and despotism that dominate most historiography of 
socialism provide little help in understanding what socialism was in its aspirations, 
victories, and failures. The crux of the matter is how to assess, without a blueprint, 
the actual consequences produced by the dictatorships of the proletariat that appeared 
in the twentieth century—the abolition of private ownership and the ensuing end to 
the commodification of labour power. Given that the very conceptual coordinates that 
supported this abolition have been undone, such a reassessment is no easy task.
Yet, it is surely inadequate to dismiss the entire enterprise as unrealistic, as a mere 
utopian impulse, and violent imposition on reality destined to deliver only disastrous 
results. True, the results were more than equivocal. However, the abolition of private 
ownership was underpinned by a detailed analysis of the real conditions of capitalism 
and informed by an open-ended logic that would lay the groundwork for political 
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experimentation on a grand scale. The decision to do away with labour power as 
a  commodity was, in fact, a risky and challenging endeavour, the results of which 
should be assessed vis-à-vis the aims of the political project to which it belonged.
Abolishing the commodification of labour power was not an end in itself—it was only 
the first step of a project aimed at drastically reducing the functions of the state. Indeed, 
without pursuing or extending experimentation that would limit the state’s machinery, 
the results produced by that first step could not but turn into the opposite of what it 
aimed to accomplish. Yet, this is a conclusion that can be drawn only ex post facto, and 
only if we take into account the experimental nature of these processes. In this context, 
our categories are still provisional. The assumption that we can make, however, given 
the historical record of the dictatorships of the proletariat in the twentieth century, is 
that the evisceration of the state due to the abolition of private property released a kind 
of ‘reactive’ energy that filled the very void left by this process. The ‘halved’ state was in 
turn ‘duplicated’ by the Communist Party, with the latter replacing the former principle 
of authority based on the commodification of labour power with a new authority to 
command obedience as the party that represented the ‘vanguard of the working class.’
Working Class and Vanguard
This new principle of authority, however, was as much ‘ideological’ as it was 
‘organisational,’ in the meaning that Franz Schurmann gave to both concepts.4 It was 
grounded in a thorough restructuring of industrial organisation whereby the factory 
became a fundamental element of state administration and the worker a kind of entry-
level functionary. The role of the institutional paradigm of the industrial work unit 
(danwei)—based on the model of the Soviet kombinat—is well known (see also Kevin 
Lin’s essay in the present volume). A Chinese hospital, university, even a department 
store, shared the same administrative structure as a factory, because they all were 
modelled on it.
The interrelationship between working class and vanguard played a key role in the 
reorganisation of industrial production. It was also a notably ambivalent relationship. 
Installing industrial labour in the sphere of state administration was envisaged as a way 
to dissolve capitalist authority over wage slavery. Yet, labour’s very inclusion in that 
sphere, and the substitution of capitalist authority with that of the vanguard of the 
working class, ended up reconstituting the entire apparatus of the state that the abolition 
of private property was supposed to have smashed. Indeed, the new organism was even 
more inflexible than the previous one, since it had to fill the void that the abolition 
of commodified labour power had left in the general principle of authority. Once we 
account for these peculiar circumstances, it is possible to reassess the references to 
‘class’ (jieji) during the Cultural Revolution, as well as their reiteration in the current 
discourse of the Chinese authorities.
The persistent references to class during the Cultural Revolution can be taken as 
a symptom of the insurmountable impasse that had arisen between the working class 
and its vanguard in the socialist state. The obsession with the concept symptomatically 
masked the questioning of its real political value by the people who were supposedly 
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its subject. The proletariat—which, along with its dictatorship, was supposed to be the 
political subject leading to the dissolution of the state—had become an integral part of 
a process of reconstructing the state’s bureaucratic machine. 
It is remarkable that during this revolutionary decade the issue of the working class 
was approached from the perspective of critical reappraisal of the very organisation 
of industrial labour. One of the most significant political questions posed during the 
Cultural Revolution was what made the socialist factory different from a capitalist 
one. True, authority was no longer invested in the commodification of the workforce. 
Yet, the question that Mao and the Maoists raised ever since the late 1950s—the 1960 
‘Constitution of Anshan Iron and Steel Company’ being one example—was that the 
workers themselves should be able to devise new forms of political experimentation, 
otherwise the industrial danwei would simply end up reiterating subordinate workplace 
relations just like those of the capitalist factory. 
At stake was precisely what Marx had argued at length in his anatomy of the 
organisation of the modern workplace in chapters 14 and 15 of Capital: how to 
subvert the ‘technical division of labour’ whereby the factory command subsumes 
the ‘intellectual powers of production’ expropriated from the workers, who are then 
relegated to mere ‘socio-functional detail’ as simple accessories to the array of machine 
tools. That fundamental structure of factory despotism in the industrial danwei relied 
on the ambiguities in the relations between the working class and its vanguard, instead 
of converging in the unconditional authority of the capitalist. 
As a result of these unresolved tensions, the political import of the issue came 
explosively to the fore with the 1967 January Storm in Shanghai. All the ambiguities in 
the relationship between the CCP and the working class emerged when the Headquarters 
of Revolutionary Rebel Workers (geming zaofan gongren silingbu) announced that they 
had organised themselves independently of the Party-state apparatus. For this reason, 
the Shanghai Party Committee fiercely opposed their very existence. No real analysis of 
that crucial episode can be formulated in the terms of class conflict. There was no deep-
seated division of social condition between Rebels and Scarlet Guards, the loyalists 
that supported the Party authorities. The real divide was to be found in the concept 
of the working class itself. While the January Storm still calls for much research, it 
was undoubtedly the episode that smashed the preceding principle of authority under 
which the CCP was the only political organisation possible, as the self-proclaimed 
vanguard of the working class. At that point the industrial danwei could not continue 
to operate as before—it had lost its ability to command obedience.
How to deal with the decline of authority from that moment on became a crucial 
issue that marked the entire revolutionary decade. For the Maoists, the way forward 
was to organise a series of experiments aimed at a political rethinking of the socialist 
factory, an agenda that included the need for a thorough transformation of its technical 
organisation. Wherever they were strong and well-organised—as in Shanghai and in 
the Northeast—they promoted remarkable experiments like the ‘worker universities’ 
(gongren daxue) and the ‘theoretical contingents of workers’ (gongren lilun duiwu).5 
One such model was the University of the Machine Tool Factory in Shanghai. Set up 
in 1968 to close the gap between executive responsibilities and shop-floor duties, it 
trained worker engineers to design components as well as work on the production 
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lines. By 1973, theoretical contingents appeared in factories where the Maoists were 
most active. They argued that theoretical work, including the study of philosophy, 
history, and economics, should be an integral part of shop-floor duties.
The Party apparatus responded to these experiments with lukewarm detachment 
that soon turned into passive resistance. The executive cadres of the industrial danwei 
no longer possessed the stature needed to assert their unconditional authority and 
were at a loss about what to do. Any pretence of reestablishing the former order was 
impracticable and a new order had yet to be invented. Lacking a clear principle of 
authority in the factories, the political system wobbled on unstable foundations. 
Putting Things Back in Order
The coup d’état of 1976 imposed a solution. ‘Put things back in order’ (zhengdun)—
the keyword of Deng Xiaoping’s programme from 1975 on—was code for the 
suppression of political experimentation of any kind in the factories, labelling it as 
‘disorder,’ ‘anarchy,’ and ‘factionalism.’ Yet, this first preliminary step towards the ‘new 
order in China’ in no way restored the former principle of authority that the Cultural 
Revolution had smashed. Deng’s strategic acuity was to grasp immediately that such 
a restoration was impossible and that new approaches had to be found in order to 
command obedience. In truth, the means employed were anything but new. In the end, 
capitalism’s main principle of authority was revived: the exploitation of commodified 
labour power. The lives of millions of migrant workers in the ‘world’s factory’ is now 
regulated by the principle of buying and selling labour power as a commodity in one of 
the world’s most flexible labour markets. 
What is new about the ‘Chinese miracle’ of the past four decades is the fact that 
the CCP has maintained its claim to be ‘the vanguard of the working class’ alongside 
the often brutal exercise of capitalist authority. Obviously no one really believes this 
claim, let alone the ones who proclaim it loudest. Yet, it is not just a litany. It is an 
assertion with a precise organisational thrust—an injunction that the CCP remains 
the only legitimate political organisation in China, and that no independent political 
organisation of wage-earning slaves can be tolerated. The category ‘working class’ is an 
essential component of the government’s discourse, albeit shorn of its political value. 
It is clearly retained as cautionary principle of interdiction, a warning prohibiting any 
incipient form of worker political existence.
We can even predict that the stability of the Chinese government is assured as long 
as the dualism holds: on one side, the capitalist principle of authority regulates the 
lives of wage earners; on the other, the self-styled ‘vanguard of the working class’ 
acts as a  preemptive censor to prevent the emergence of any political organisation 
independent of the Party. The former is, to a certain extent, a given in that it reiterates 
the basic rule governing the modern global social condition; the latter, however, is 
a fiction that can retain its grip only with subsequent developments of more or less 
esoteric formulas that amplify its hold—such as the Three Represents (san ge daibiao), 
Scientific Development (kexue fazhan), Harmonious Society’ (hexie shehui), and the 
latest, China Dream (zhongguo meng). It is hard to imagine how China’s political elite 
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can craft a governing discourse without resorting to enlarging, and emptying, the range 
of slogans. To pretend that the dreams of a billion and a half people can coincide with 
any unifying dream is a perversion that would make the Marquis De Sade blush. 
For a new politics for workers to emerge in China, workers themselves will have to 
invent original forms of independent organisation and critically reappraise the political 
value of the entire history of modern labour politics. If the main barrier against the 
political existence of workers is the reference to a mummified working class enshrined 
in official discourse, nothing that is politically novel will be able to come into being 
unless there is an explicit, conscious effort to keep this fiction at bay.






Despite collectivism’s maligned and misunderstood status today, at the time of its implementation in the Mao era, it was seen as a necessary solution to achieve a scale of food production that could feed China’s massive population. 
Collectivism was a revolutionary idea and a potential solution to underdevelopment. 
To understand this, it is important to grasp the background conditions of China’s 
complicated land-tenure system inherited by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
when it came to power in 1949. First, China has been forced to rely on just 7 percent 
of the world’s arable land to feed between one fourth and one fifth of the world’s 
population. Second, in most of southern China, mountains and hills were cultivated 
to grow food in terraced plots not suitable for large-scale mechanised farming. Third, 
in large areas of rural China, communities had been (and continue to be) based on 
lineage or clan villages.1 Finally, although land reform in the early 1950s allocated 
land equally on a per capita basis, it was feared that without collective reinforcement, 
this equality might revert to well-trodden historical disparities between landowners 
and the landless—a prospect that was anathema to communist ideology. Collectivism 
was viewed as an attractive option with which to overcome these constraints, develop 
agricultural production at a scale that could feed China’s masses, and evengenerate 
a surplus for industrial development. 
Land Reform in the Mao Era 
Land reform involved confiscating land from larger landowners—identified as the 
class categories of landlords and rich peasants—and redistributing it to households 
on a per capita basis. Land reform was central to the CCP’s ideology, and the violence 
of the land seizures and struggle sessions was justified by the need to emancipate the 
peasantry from their oppressive landlords (see Javed’s essay in the present volume).2 
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Due to the existence of lineage villages, the implementation of these ideals was not 
homogeneous. As a result of historical heritage, villagers in one village could end up 
controlling more, or less, land than their neighbours.
In spite of widespread mass support, this form of household ownership of land did 
not last long. Immediately after 1949, China faced two grave structural challenges: how 
to look after the poor and the disadvantaged in rural areas and how to obtain enough 
food to feed the increasing urban population while at the same time accumulating 
capital for industrialisation. Based on their understanding of the current conditions, 
and their conceptualisation of how development should unfold, the Chinese leadership 
in the mid-1950s came to the conclusion that collective farming was the most rational 
approach to address macroeconomic development and serve the needs of the people—
the majority of which were poor, illiterate peasants struggling for survival. A collective 
could look after the poor and disadvantaged, and provide essential services such as 
health care. It was hoped that collective land ownership would guard against the 
recreation of unequal class dynamics in the countryside by making it impossible to 
transfer land from the poor to the better off. It was also seen as a way to mobilise labour 
power in order to achieve large-scale infrastructural projects—such as irrigation—
despite the limited technology available at that time, while also increasing the state’s 
capability to extract food to feed the urban sector, as well as capital surplus from 
farmers to develop industry at a faster rate. 
It could be argued that collective farming succeeded in fulfilling all of these tasks. 
By the end of the Mao era, the Chinese people were reasonably healthy and educated. 
Life expectancy increased from a mere 39 to 68 years. Though life remained spartan, 
inequality had been reduced dramatically. Irrigation infrastructure had been improved 
beyond the CCP’s wildest expectations. By the end of the 1970s, China had become the 
sixth largest industrial power in the world, whereas in 1949 the country’s industrial 
capacity was on par with that of a small nation like Belgium. But these successes were 
not achieved without costs. There was a constant shortage of daily necessities and living 
standards remained low. The most disastrous cost was the famine that followed the 
Great Leap Forward (1958–62), when the Chinese authorities rapidly organised the 
‘people’s commune system’ (renming gongshe zhidu) across the country and encouraged 
people to put into practice many fanatical ideas, such as setting up backyard furnaces 
to make iron and steel.3 Although the famine resulting from the Great Leap Forward 
is used by many to discredit collectivism tout court, this is an unfair reduction of the 
possibilities of collective organisation to one of its most extreme manifestations. 
Life in the Commune
When the commune system was initiated in 1958, it was organised according to the 
logic of ‘the bigger, the better,’ based on the assumption that larger communes were 
better equipped to mobilise resources to achieve large-scale projects, and that disputes 
among villages would disappear in the vastness of collective life (see Tomba’s essay in 
the present volume). A commune was set up by combining several villages into one 
administrative unit. These assumptions were flawed. In a large commune of several 
thousand households or more, it was difficult to manage and supervise production 
activities. This administrative failure was largely responsible for the decrease in food 
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production during the crucial planting season of 1959. In the early 1960s, having 
learned a costly lesson, the commune system was downsized, a change that led to 
certain improvements in management and supervision. The system in this new form 
lasted until the early 1980s. Within one ‘commune’ (gongshe) there were ten or so 
‘production brigades’ (shengchan dadui), each one of which was comprised of ten 
or so production teams (shengchan xiaodui). A team would normally consist of ten to 
twenty households, depending on the size of a village. A village of more than thirty 
households would most likely be divided into two teams. Each team would have a five-
person leadership group, usually composed of a team leader, an accountant, at least one 
woman member, a person responsible for the granary, and a work point record keeper. 
In this structure, the production team would be in charge of managing the land 
under its control. Everything produced on this land was shared by team members 
after deduction of taxes and levies paid to the state, and all the production activities 
were arranged by the team leadership. With this system, supervision and monitoring 
were easier and more transparent. Within one team, the contributions of each member 
to the collective were recorded and rewarded according to a so-called ‘work point 
system’ (gongfenzhi). All villagers received an equal amount of staple food on a per 
capita basis, with the only difference being between adults and children. To those 
households that contributed more than the worth of what they had received, the 
leadership applied the principle of ‘to each according to one’s work’ (anlao fenpei) by 
either giving cash converted from the value of the earned work points at the end of the 
year, or by distributing non-staple food like oil, sugar cane, or fish from public ponds. 
The households that had contributed less would not be able to receive these products. 
Every year, all team members would assemble to evaluate each other’s contribution 
to the collective, taking into account age, strength, work attitude, and gender. This 
evaluation would then be quantified through a ten-point system. Those villagers who 
received the highest score would usually be assigned the hardest work, but women were 
usually assigned less arduous manual labour, like pulling a wheel barrel or ploughing 
the paddy fields. 
The commune leadership would not intervene in day-to-day production activities. 
Usually, they enforced policies and disseminated political messages from the centre. 
They were also responsible for the promotion of specific programmes—such as those 
on health and hygiene, and on how to use new technologies. As a result of reforms of 
collective structure and management, by the end of the 1970s, there were already signs 
of improvement in the life of Chinese farmers. By the middle of the 1970s, another 
development also contributed to improving the rural situation: the establishment of 
‘commune and brigade enterprises’ (shedui qiye). Contrary to mainstream historical 
narratives of a lost decade of economic stagnation, companies of this kind actually 
originated during the Great Leap Forward and increased during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966–76). These Mao-era experiments in rural production were precursors 
to the creation of township and village enterprises (TVEs) developed in the 1980s 
after decollectivisation. Although TVEs are praised by scholars for contributing to 
lifting China’s rural areas out of poverty, their origin in Mao-era collectivism is often 
conveniently erased from the historical narrative. 
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The Afterlife of the Collective
As a rural development model, collective agriculture was a mixture of success and 
failure. According to William Hinton, one third of the communes of the Mao era 
performed well, one third did very badly, and the rest fell in between.4 Nowadays, 
however, communes are painted with the brush of failure, erasing the differences 
between them and their underlying potentials. It is almost entirely forgotten that the 
practice of combining collective life with private initiatives, such as the ‘household 
contract responsibility system’ (jiating lianchan chengbao zeren zhi), originated in 
different parts of the country in the Mao era.5 Praised for bringing about the end of the 
collectives and initiating rural economic reform, the contract responsibility system did 
not necessitate the undoing of the collective system. The outcome was not historically 
inevitable and, in hindsight, was perhaps lamentable. In fact, there are still a few 
hundred villages that have resisted the pressure to dismantle the sources of their power, 
and remain collective until this very day.6 While the end result of the economic reforms 
initiated by Deng Xiaoping was in fact the restoration of household farming and land 
redistribution, it has to be pointed out that the dismantling of the commune system has 
not entailed the total abandonment of collective agriculture. Land is still collectively 
owned, and households only maintain the land use rights distributed to them. 
Those who pushed for dismantling the commune system argue that production 
output during the Mao era remained low because the system of collective farming 
tolerated ‘free riders.’7 Arguments and evidence against such an economic rationalist 
position are too complex to be presented here, so I will only mention two facts that in 
my opinion undermine such an approach. First, due to Cold War era sanctions imposed 
by Western powers, China was forced to ‘transform itself through its own efforts’ (zili 
gengsheng) (see Yang’s essay in the present volume), and pursue the price scissors 
strategy of keeping the price of agricultural produce low while setting the price of 
industrial goods high in order to accumulate capital to invest in industrial development 
and modernisation efforts. Second, technology, such as hybrid rice crops and chemical 
fertilisers, was not available at that point in China. Without the technology of industrial 
agriculture, collectivisation attempted to increase food production on limited arable 
land for a massive population. 
The Collective Roots of Today’s Economic Miracle
It is easy to dismiss collectivism without understanding its political economic goals 
and the circumstances under which it was developed. The economic development and 
wellbeing of China’s rural population today were built on a foundation of collectivism. 
Ironically, China’s economic ‘miracle’ of the reform era can also be explained as a result 
of its collective past. The collective ownership of land has provided a large well-educated 
but cheap labour force that has allowed China to become the ‘factory of the world’ over 
the past three decades. And it is this very same collective land ownership that to this 
day supports the families of hundreds of millions of migrant workers. In China, there 
are hardly any urban slums because collectively owned land acts as a social security net. 
If there is no work to be found in the cities, migrant workers can always return to their 
hometowns. They can also leave their families, children, and elderly relatives on the 
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familial plot of land. If farmers were dispossessed from their land and without jobs in 
the city, today’s China would face the spectre of proletarianisation on a scale of which 
Marx and Mao could only dream. 
There are two major issues today that are used as rationale for the wholesale 
privatisation of land. One is the prevalence of predatory rural land grabbing, 
a  situation in which state agents and developers work together to seize land from 
farmers for commercial development. While this phenomenon has seen some signs 
of easing recently and is mainly limited to areas next to urban centres, it is often used 
as an argument for privatisation in the belief that once the land is privatised, the title-
holder will be properly compensated. The second issue is related to efficiency and 
scale economy, and is based on the assumption that only privatisation can allow the 
market to play its full role in increasing competition, and thus boosting agricultural 
productivity. These two issues remain extremely controversial in China today. And it 
could not be otherwise, since a decision on whether land remains collective may well 
decide the future direction of the entire country.8






In contradistinction to Marx, who often appeared to use the concepts of ‘contradiction’ and ‘antagonism’ interchangeably, Lenin instead at times attempted to systematically distinguish between the two, suggesting that under a socialist society 
it would be possible to maintain non-antagonistic contradictions.1 This notion of non-
antagonistic contradictions was subsequently theorised not only by Stalin but also by Mao 
Zedong, beginning as early as the 1930s and continuing after the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). First, in August 1937, a month after his seminal speech ‘On 
Practice’ (shijian lun), Mao Zedong delivered a second lecture titled ‘On Contradiction’ 
(maodun lun), which marked his first extended engagement with the topic that Slavoj 
Žižek suggests is ‘arguably Mao’s central contribution to Marxist Philosophy.’2 Both 
speeches were initially prepared for the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in 
Yan’an for the purpose of promoting correct Marxist thinking and opposing ‘dogmatism.’ 
Although transcripts of the speeches themselves do not exist, a formal version of each 
work was subsequently published in the early 1950s and the two texts have come to 
be regarded as paradigmatic illustrations of Mao’s status as a Marxist theoretician. 
In particular, ‘On Contradiction’ grapples with a question that would subsequently prove 
to be one of the biggest challenges for the Chinese communist regime itself—namely, how 
to handle internal dissent within a socialist society. 
Universal vs Particular
The published version of ‘On Contradiction’ opens by citing Lenin’s distinction 
between a metaphysical and a dialectical worldview. Mao explains that whereas 
a metaphysical worldview treats things as unitary, isolated, and static, a dialectical one 
instead views things as being in dynamic interaction with each other while also being 
characterised by internal contradictions. Under a dialectical perspective, moreover, 
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progress is achieved through a reconciliation of external and internal contradictions 
(through a Hegelian dialectic), which generates new ‘things’ and a new set of external 
and internal contradictions. 
In ‘On Contradiction,’ Mao is specifically interested in the differences between what 
he calls the ‘universality’ and ‘particularity’ of contradiction, noting that while the 
former is widely recognised and has been extensively studied, the latter ‘is still not 
clearly understood by many comrades.’ He first outlines the notion of the universality 
of contradiction, and particularly the contention that all development is predicated on 
‘a movement of opposites,’ but emphasises that ‘each form of matter’ is shaped by its 
own specific contradictions. It is precisely in Mao’s focus on these latter particularities 
that we find his attempts to apply the generalised logic of dialectical materialism—as 
developed by Hegel, Marx, Lenin, and others (see Pang’s essay in the present volume)—
to the specificities of twentieth-century China’s sociopolitical situation. In particular, 
Mao notes that what he calls China’s ‘bourgeois-democratic revolution’ has passed 
through several distinct stages over the two or three decades preceding his speech—
including the 1911 Revolution, the regime of the Beiyang Warlords, the First United 
Front, the Revolution of 1924–27, the Second United Front, and the War against 
Japanese Aggression—and argues that each of these stages was marked by its own 
specific internal contradictions that need to be analysed on their own terms. 
Although Mao initially delivered the original oral version of ‘On Contradiction’ at 
a time when he and his fellow communists were surrounded by enemy forces ranging 
from the Nationalists (with whom they had been engaged in a civil conflict) to the 
Japanese (who were attempting to invade China), by the time the piece was finally 
published in the first volume of his Selected Works in April 1952, the Japanese and the 
Nationalists had already been defeated and the PRC had just been founded. In  this 
context, the essay’s focus on internal contradictions rather than external enemies 
reflected the need to shift from carrying out the revolution itself, to maintaining 
a  sense of revolutionary purpose under a socialist system. The underlying question, 
in other words, involves how to negotiate the transition from ‘revolution’ (geming) 
to ‘continuous revolution’ (jixu geming)—or, what would later come to be known as 
‘continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.’ Although it was 
not until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 that Mao first called for 
a continuous revolution—a concept closely related to, yet distinct from, the notion of 
a permanent revolution, as initially developed by Marx and popularised by Trotsky 
(see Galway’s essay in the present volume)—this sentiment of wanting to maintain 
a  revolutionary energy even after the Communist Party had seized power could be 
traced back to the early years of the PRC.3 
Two Sets of Contradictions
On 27 February 1957—five years after the publication of ‘On Contradiction’ and 
almost 20 years after the initial oral version of that work—Mao delivered another 
speech titled ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,’ which 
noted that:
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Never before has our country been as united as it is today. The victories of 
the bourgeois-democratic revolution and of the socialist revolution and our 
achievements in socialist construction have rapidly changed the face of the 
old China. A still brighter future lies ahead for our motherland. 
For Mao, however, the fact that China was now unified did not mean that contradiction 
was no longer relevant. Instead, he distinguished between what he characterised as 
‘contradictions between ourselves and the enemy’ (diwo maodun), on one hand, and 
‘contradictions among the people’ (renmin neibu maodun), on the other (emphases 
added), specifying that in this instance he was primarily concerned with the latter. 
He further explained that, in contrast to contradictions between the self and the enemy, 
which must be resolved by drawing a distinction between the two, contradictions 
among the people may be resolved by drawing a distinction ‘between right and wrong.’
Even as it attempted to explain how to handle the contradictions that might exist 
within a socialist society, ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People’ 
simultaneously pivoted around a crucial conceptual contradiction of its own. On the 
one hand, Mao listed various types of contradictory relationships that he claimed one 
might find ‘among the people’—including contradictions between individuals whose 
thinking is characterised by right and left ‘deviations,’ between those who are active 
supporters of the new cooperatives and those who are dissatisfied with them, between 
the working class and the former bourgeoisie, between the interests of intellectuals from 
the old society and the current needs of the new society, and so forth—and he suggested 
that in every instance one should strive to ‘resolve’ (jiejue) these internal contradictions, 
which is to say to eradicate them. On the other hand, however, near the end of the piece 
he offered his now-famous discussion of the need to ‘let a hundred flowers blossom, 
[and] let a hundred schools of thought contend,’ stressing the importance of creating 
an environment in which different perspectives could productively coexist. In contrast 
to the preceding advocacy of the need to eliminate contradictions, this latter section 
instead recommended that ‘contradictions’ taking the form of critiques of government 
policies and limited strikes be permitted, and even encouraged. 
In fact, in this piece Mao asked whether Marxism itself could be criticised, given that 
it was already ‘accepted as the guiding ideology by the majority of the people in our 
country.’ He answered his own question in the affirmative: 
Certainly it can. Marxism is scientific truth and fears no criticism. If it did, 
and if it could be overthrown by criticism, it would be worthless. In fact, aren’t 
the idealists criticising Marxism every day and in every way? And those who 
harbour bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas and do not wish to change—
aren’t they also criticising Marxism in every way? Marxists should not be 
afraid of criticism from any quarter. Quite the contrary, they need to temper 
and develop themselves and win new positions in the teeth of criticism and 
in the storm and stress of struggle. Fighting against wrong ideas is like being 
vaccinated—a man develops greater immunity from disease as a result of 
vaccination. Plants raised in hothouses are unlikely to be hardy. Carrying 
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out the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools 
of thought contend will not weaken, but strengthen, the leading position of 
Marxism in the ideological field.
Mao then noted that when ‘unmistakable counterrevolutionaries and saboteurs of 
the socialist cause’ expressed ‘non-Marxist’ ideas, the solution was often ‘simply [to] 
deprive them of their freedom of speech.’ However, when he asked whether it would be 
productive or beneficial to attempt to similarly ban ‘incorrect ideas among the people,’ 
he answered his own question in the negative: 
Certainly not. It is not only futile but very harmful to use crude methods in 
dealing with ideological questions among the people, with questions about 
man’s mental world. You may ban the expression of wrong ideas, but the 
ideas will still be there. On the other hand, if correct ideas are pampered 
in hothouses and never exposed to the elements and immunised against 
disease, they will not win out against erroneous ones. Therefore, it is only by 
employing the method of discussion, criticism, and reasoning that we can 
really foster correct ideas and overcome wrong ones, and that we can really 
settle issues.
This emphasis on the value of discussion and of the energetic exchange of ‘correct’ 
and ‘incorrect’ ideas, in turn, articulated the central premise of the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign, in which the Chinese people were encouraged—and often were even 
explicitly required—to publicly voice critiques of government policies. 
Deriving out of some recommendations that had been made by Zhou Enlai in 
early 1956, the Hundred Flowers Campaign was a bold gesture for China’s nascent 
communist regime. Although Mao had obviously hoped that the campaign would 
reinforce perceptions of the strength and stability of the government and Party 
leadership (on the logic that only a firmly established leadership would encourage 
critiques of its own policies), there was nevertheless considerable internal concern 
about the Campaign’s destructive potential. In fact, in March 1957, the Minister of 
Culture—author Shen Dehong/Shen Yanbing, who is better known by his aptly chosen 
penname, Mao Dun, which deliberately puns on the Chinese word for ‘contradiction’—
turned the Campaign’s call for critiques of government policies on its head, with an 
article critiquing the Hundred Flowers Campaign itself (a critique for which he was 
subsequently dismissed from office). 
Although Mao’s ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People’ 
speech was first delivered on 27 February 1957, shortly after the launch of the Hundred 
Flowers Campaign in late 1956, by the time a revised version of his speech was published 
in the People’s Daily in June 1957, Mao had already become concerned by the disruptive 
potential of these criticisms. He officially suspended the Campaign a month later in July. 
Indeed, not only was the call for dissident voices and points of view officially called off, 
but the Hundred Flowers Campaign was also quickly followed by its own antithesis, in 
the form of the Anti-rightist Campaign that actively targeted and persecuted those who 
had critiqued government policies when it was permitted. In this way, Mao’s attempt to 
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encourage an environment of ‘non-antagonistic contradiction’ became, instead, deeply 
antagonistic, and laid the groundwork for many of the regime’s repressive campaigns 
that would follow.   
Moreover, it should be noted that Mao’s delivery of the original version of 
‘On  Contradiction’ in 1937 coincided not only with the CCP’s establishment of the 
Second United Front with the Nationalists, but also with China’s signing of a non-
aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Although the non-aggression pact was negotiated 
by China’s Nationalist government—which had hoped to use the pact to strengthen the 
nation’s strategic position in response to the threat of Japanese invasion—it also ended 
up having important ramifications for the PRC’s relationship to the Soviet Union in the 
early 1950s, when the Soviet Union was an important ally of the PRC. However, Mao’s 
advocacy—not only in ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People’ 
but also in some earlier articles dating back to late 1956—of direct criticism of the Party 
and the government was in direct contradiction with current Soviet policy, and was one 
of the factors that contributed to the subsequent Sino-Soviet split that unfolded during 
the late 1950s and 1960s. The Sino-Soviet split, in turn, was emblematic of a central 
contradiction within Maoism itself, in that even though Maoism explicitly drew on 
a line of theorisation that extended from Marx and Engels to Lenin and Stalin, the 
Chinese state nevertheless increasingly diverged, in political terms, from the model of 
the Soviet Union. 
New Contradictions
Even after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, and the subsequent shift to a partially 
capitalist economic model with the launch of economic reforms in the late 1970s, 
the issue of contradictions has remained as relevant to contemporary China as ever. 
One author who has been particularly interested in examining and interrogating 
these contradictions is Yan Lianke. His 2004 novel Lenin’s Kisses, for instance, revolves 
around a harebrained plot by a local Chinese official to purchase Lenin’s preserved 
corpse from Russia, and install it in a newly built Lenin mausoleum in the official’s 
home county in central China.4 The work’s premise is that the Chinese bureaucrat has 
read that the Russian government is in dire financial straits and can no longer afford 
to maintain the corpse in its current position in Moscow’s Red Square. He therefore 
comes up with the idea of bringing it to China and using it as a tourist attraction to 
raise money for the residents of his county. Through this fictional plotline revolving 
around an attempt to install a Lenin mausoleum in central China modelled on the Mao 
Mausoleum in Beijing, Yan’s novel comments on the apparent contradictions not only 
between contemporary Maoism and a Marxist lineage leading back through Lenin to 
Marx himself, but also between the original Maoist regime and the trajectory that the 
PRC has taken in the post-Maoist era. 
In addition to the fictional purchase of Lenin’s remains in Lenin’s Kisses (for which 
Yan Lianke lost his position, which he had held for years, as a professional author 
under the employment of the Chinese army), Yan’s novels have explored topics ranging 
from China’s rural AIDS epidemic to the Anti-rightist Campaign, the Great Leap 
Forward, and subsequent Great Famine in the late 1950s. The work that engages most 
explicitly with Mao Zedong’s notion of contradiction, however, is his 2001 novel Hard 
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like Water.5 Set during the Cultural Revolution and revolving around an adulterous 
affair between a soldier in the People’s Liberation Army, Gao Aijun, and the daughter 
of a local bureaucrat, Xia Hongmei, Hard like Water explores the intersections 
between revolutionary and libidinal passion. The novel incorporates an abundant 
amount of Marxist and Maoist discourse, ironically redeploying it to comment on the 
hyperrevolutionary affair of the protagonists. One work from which the novel quotes 
extensively is Mao Zedong’s ‘On Contradiction,’ and at a critical moment in the plot, 
just as Xia Hongmei’s husband catches her and Gao Aijun in flagrante delicto, the 
narrator remarks: 
Just as this extraordinary event was unfolding, a subtle contradiction 
developed out of this special condition. While the old contradiction had 
been resolved, a new contradiction emerged, as the earlier secondary 
contradiction was transformed into a primary contradiction. 
Although this dialectical process of generating new contradictions through the 
resolution of earlier ones has a very specific meaning in the novel, it nevertheless aptly 
describes the general trajectory of modern China. 





(Translated by Rebecca E. KARL)
In the course of China’s socialist history, during that period we are accustomed to calling the ‘Mao era’—or the 1950s to the 1970s—‘culture’ (wenhua) was without a doubt an extraordinarily important social category of practice. It is a crucial 
keyword that provides an entry into or an explanation for the history of that period. 
Even when we take the twentieth-century history of the international communist 
movement as a baseline, or when we consider the various countries of the socialist 
camp in the postwar period, the high level of self-consciousness and the variety of 
practice in the creation or construction of a new culture of socialism in China’s socialist 
history is particularly prominent and striking.
This is, of course, a result of Mao Zedong’s designs for and conceptualisation of 
‘new China’ and a ‘new society.’ At the same time, it follows from the fact that the 
Mao-era phase of Chinese socialist history coincided exactly with a crucial phase in 
the advancement of China’s modernisation. Hence, if we see 1949 as the moment at 
which the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) achieved a completely 
sovereign, modern, nation-state and also a national state committed to socialism, then 
we can appreciate that what this polity faced from then on was the final unravelling of 
a millennium of dynastic governance as well as, at the same time, the ongoing two-sided 
and dual task of determining a modern and a socialist culture under the leadership 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The enormous social transformations of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to a great extent underpinned Chinese 
society’s subsequent radical turn in politics and culture. This not only is demonstrated 
by the fact that it was indeed the 1919 May Fourth New Culture Movement and not 
the 1911 Republican Xinhai Revolution that genuinely inaugurated modern Chinese 
history, but it is further expressed in the ways in which the practice of new culture 
exhibited modern China’s complete rejection of and rupture with premodern culture. 
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For this reason, ‘new culture’ (including new language) was transformed into a political 
practice and social rhetoric adopted by ‘young China.’ The practice and rhetoric were 
two sides of the same coin. 
Culture as Modern Problematique
Indeed, the problematique of culture in the Mao era cannot be seen as a mere 
extension or elaboration of the democratic revolution or the processes of modernisation 
already in progress long before 1949. The relation of culture to the course of socialist 
transformation and the construction of socialism must be seen separately. That is, in 
the radical culture of socialism, sensuous cultural thematics were entirely rewritten 
through the new idioms of Mao-era Marxist emphases on class revolution and the right 
[of the oppressed] to rebel; class equality through the overturning of class hierarchy 
(represented by Mao’s saying: ‘the most humble are now the most noble’); and historical 
materialism featuring the centrality of the subjectivity of the [revolutionary] people 
(renmin).
To be sure, the need to promote and popularise Marxism among the people and 
throughout society created the ongoing importance of new rounds of state institutional 
involvements in translation, publication, and distribution networks. These operated 
at an unprecedented scope compared to the previous efforts at westernisation and 
modernisation. Raising the literacy of the whole populace; opening adult educational 
courses for peasants and workers; efforts to simplify Chinese characters: all of these were 
on the table and implemented to one degree or another. They all offered a foundation 
for the modernisation of society and culture. And yet, in the midst of all this, not only 
was the historical materialism of Marxism propagated, but even more importantly, 
the complete rewriting of Chinese history through the historical materialist method 
was included in school textbooks, thus producing a profound and broad impact on 
society. In addition, there was wave after wave of folk songs and dances popularised by 
the spread of education; and, meanwhile, transformed folk art and folk performances 
were pressed into service to help animate and mobilise political movements and social 
change (see also the essays by Barlow, Javed, and Lee in the present volume). At the 
same time as this popular culture incorporated certain aspects of the modernisation of 
cultural resources drawn from traditional China, a path also was opened to the creation 
of class culture and the new culture of socialism. Perhaps it is unnecessary to add that 
during the Mao era, almost every important political incident or social turning point 
had some single or group of cultural overtures or harbingers: from the discussions over 
the traditional classic Dream of the Red Chamber or the critique of the movie Life of Wu 
Xun and whether these texts could become important and prominent components of 
socialist transformation all the way to the debate over the new historical drama Hai Rui 
Dismissed from Office, whose critique was the opening act of the Cultural Revolution, 
or the discussions about the old classic The Water Margin and the criticisms of the 
novel The Builders. These latter discussions were part of the roll out of the Cultural 
Revolution and the last chapter of the Mao era.
Throughout the establishment in the 1950s to 1970s of the culture of socialism 
and the institutional mechanisms through which this new culture would operate, 
China directly borrowed the systemic structures of the Soviet Union. Among the 
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more important of these were literary journals, writers’ associations, and the system 
of movie production studios, all of which manifested the deep influence of Lenin’s 
cultural thinking and the theory of the ‘socialist new person.’1 And yet, the difference 
between China and the Soviet Union resides in the fact that China’s new culture 
was also, to a certain degree, an extension of the Republican era cultural thematic 
of ‘transforming the national character.’ Even if the cultural thematic of socialism 
extended that of the Republican period, there was also a very important difference: 
under socialism, new culture was not to be based upon the theme of the ‘individual’ 
derived from Euro-American logics of human nature. That was a cultural imagination 
that had been proposed by the modernising Republican nation-state as the alternative 
to the long-persistent premodern Chinese family-clan ethics. By contrast to both the 
premodern and the individual cultural logics, Mao Zedong and the CCP promoted 
socialist education, thought reform, and mass culture and art in part, of course, to 
disseminate socialist ideology, but also as levers intended to dislodge the hugely 
dominant premodern Chinese cultural disposition towards hierarchical order, or that 
logic that formed the class and social status basis for the production of the ideology of 
obedient people or slavishness. In this regard, the most exemplary Maoist expression of 
class consciousness was: ‘Where there is oppression, there is opposition.’ The simplest 
expression of the Maoist theory of class struggle can be encapsulated in the saying: 
‘The teachings of Marxism … in the end can be summed up in one phrase: it is right 
to rebel!’ 
Culture of Socialism
The culture of socialism of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s was simultaneously a culture 
of revolution and rebellion; it was a culture aimed at undermining the value judgements 
on superiority and inferiority, high and low, good and bad of traditional China. It was to 
become a class culture; in other words, it presented an opening to an equality of practice. 
The focus and dynamic plotting of socialist or historical materialist historiography took 
the centrality of peasant revolts against dynastic rule as its narrative centre, not the rise 
and fall of dynasties. It was within this historical contextual gambit that new Chinese 
culture attempted to instantiate the social, historical, and cultural subject of ‘the people,’ 
which was concretely anchored in the just-emerging social categories named by the 
trinity ‘worker/peasant/soldier’ (see also Guan’s essay in the present volume). 
Perhaps we could say that in the Mao era, one of the most prominent characteristics 
of the CCP’s state-cultural practice was its leading promotion of the art and culture of 
workers, peasants, and soldiers. In this regard, many highly politicised sites functioned 
as mechanisms to nurture producers of ‘mass culture.’ These included various state 
institutions, factories and mines, villages and people’s communes, military installations 
and others. All of these helped introduce new writers and artists to the cultural scene, 
thus fundamentally altering the class composition of culture producers as well as the 
class nature of the audiences for art and culture. At the same time, the relationship 
between audiences for and producers of art and culture also changed. This can 
be considered as a totalising attempt to create new culture as part of the project to 
simultaneously create the ‘new person’ and vice versa.
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And yet, we could also say that, within the context of a global political perspective that 
takes 1989 as the historical moment at which the socialist camp disintegrated and the 
international communist movement was completely defeated, the reforms initiated by 
the Party-state in the 1980s represent not only a political failure but, perhaps primarily 
and at the very least simultaneously, a cultural failure. The implosion of socialism—or 
maybe it was just defeated without a battle—is one piece of evidence for this proposition. 
If we for the moment bracket a discussion of the role of political economics in this 
‘grand failure;’ if we bracket the fact that, internal to many socialist countries (including 
China), the task of building socialism was at the same time and foremost the task of 
realising modernisation within the context of the global capitalist system; if we bracket, 
as well, critical reflections on Leninist theories and practices of ‘state and revolution;’ 
then I believe a precipitator of the internal combustion of socialism and the socialist 
camp was a dynamic within socialism which cannot be encapsulated by its lack of actual 
economic development or its paucity in material life, but rather, more precisely, it can be 
understood through the gradually accumulated tension between a revolutionary party 
and the realities of governing, between revolutionary culture and the requirements 
of ruling. China in the Mao era, with its systemic social-cultural logic of revolution/
rebellion, oppression/resistance is particularly indicative of these tensions. On one side 
were the uniquely broad, continuously promoted social mobilisations—‘the violent 
and tempestuous mass movements’2—whose logic of revolution/rebellion inserted 
itself deeply into the hearts of the people; and on another side was the anxious global 
situation of the Cold War, for which the process of modernisation and industrialisation 
was most urgent and because of which socialist countries implemented internal order, 
coerced obedience, direct political pressure, and all-around surveillance policies. 
In the midst of all this, the paradoxical aspect of the articulation of the culture of 
socialism was in its preservation of revolutionary or communist ideals, which were 
then ‘translated’ or ‘transplanted’ into expressions of loyalty towards the Party (the 
revolutionary party? the ruling party?) and the state (the national state? the socialist 
state?). Revolution/rebellion/overthrowing of the old society and vanquishing the 
oppressor were all parts of a mainstream expressive value system as well as part 
of a  personal or social promise about the future. This promise was soon closed off 
by a past that receded into history even as the promise was projected into a future 
imaginary and vision, which then was rendered into a unique kind of suspension of 
reality. Continuous calls for mass movements and the uninterrupted summons to 
social mobilisation facilitated the accumulation of the cataclysmic capacities of society 
(see also Li’s essay in the present volume). In these processes, both intimate social 
organisation and harsh social supervision coexisted as a condition of social life itself. 
Such social capacities, on the one hand, could be turned to serve for the requirements 
of modernisation, industrialisation, and other experiments in economic construction. 
And yet, those processes also could not completely deplete or free up the amassing 
of social energy, thus inevitably leading to the extremity of social (cultural) tension. 
This situation perhaps helps explain how the Cultural Revolution could be ‘launched’ 
from ‘top-to-bottom’ and then, instantaneously, burst forth from ‘bottom to top,’ thus 
making it very difficult to summarise the movement exclusively as a ‘top to bottom’ 
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event. This can also perhaps help explain how in the first year of the Cultural Revolution 
the young student/red guard movement exploded onto the scene with two absurdly 
mismatched slogans: ‘the right to rebel’ and ‘boundless loyalty.’
Culture and Future Scholarship
In short, in the 1950s and 1960s, there was a self-contradictory and paradoxical 
condition to political culture and political economics that, in the end, created a huge 
tension within socialist countries, tugging at them and finally causing them to implode. 
For this reason, to encapsulate the Cultural Revolution is, in reality, to encapsulate 
the terminus of the Mao era. Yet, ironically, the 1976 Tiananmen Square mass protest 
movement deployed the classic forms of socialist mass culture and art: a movement on 
the Square for popular poetry and singing. Meanwhile, the cultural form of clearing 
accounts for the Cultural Revolution was through ‘scar literature,’ along with a wave of 
publishing whose major constituents had themselves emerged from the mass art and 
literature movements animated by and through the advent of worker/peasant/soldier 
writers. 
Of course, any further discussion of these topics would need to be more complex. 
It would, at minimum, require a consideration of the fierce debates among cultural 
producers about how capitalist-bourgeois culture functions as a potential force 
undermining the establishment of socialist culture, not to mention an exploration 
into the narrative form that requires collectivist action to be undertaken by individual 
heroes. Ultimately, such complexity would have to deal with an investigation into the 
contradictory relationship between the universals of historical materialism and 
the particularities of China.
Chinese socialist cultural experiments of the Mao era profoundly rewrote Chinese 
society and culture, as well as the psychological structures of the Chinese people and 
their social life. These revisions have created a unique inheritance for a still-evolving 
modern Chinese culture. Perhaps these legacies could yet open another path towards, 
or another entry into, an alternative society or an alternative cultural practice.






Few episodes in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remain as politically sensitive as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (wuchanjieji wenhua da geming, hereafter referred to as ‘Cultural Revolution’). Its significance 
is so bitterly contested that only days before the Party’s sixtieth anniversary in 1981, 
the Sixth Plenary Session of the Party’s Eleventh Central Committee saw fit to adopt 
a lengthy and carefully worded resolution in hopes of sealing the book on the Cultural 
Revolution and Mao’s role in it. To that end, the 1981 ‘Resolution on Certain Questions 
in the History of the Party since the Founding of the PRC’ unequivocally declared the 
entire decade from 1966 to 1976 to be ‘an extraordinary leftist error’ initiated and led 
by Mao Zedong. As to his motives, the Resolution asserted that the Party Chairman 
had been ‘labouring under a misapprehension’ in his later years that propelled him into 
action that ‘led to domestic turmoil and brought catastrophe to the Party, the state, and 
the whole people.’ 
This vehement denunciation was quickly followed by a thoroughgoing three-year 
campaign to not merely repudiate, but to ‘totally negate’ (chedi fouding) the Cultural 
Revolution as an aberration standing apart from, and outside of, the ‘normal’ course 
of PRC history. Individuals and collectives at every level of Chinese society were called 
upon to study the Resolution and related official documents, to engage in criticism and 
self-criticism, and, finally, to root out the ‘three kinds of persons’ (san zhong ren) in their 
workplaces and communities—those ‘followers of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, those 
seriously affected by factional ideas, and the “smashers and grabbers” of the Cultural 
Revolution.’1 The chief result of these strenuous collective efforts to obliterate the late 
Maoist past, as Alessandro Russo observed, produced ‘an almost total intellectual block’ 
that made it utterly impossible to comprehend the Cultural Revolution both inside and 
outside of China ‘beyond the familiar “horrors of totalitarianism.”’2
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But cultural revolution (wenhua geming) as a form of political practice has a history 
in the PRC that extends beyond the final decade of Mao’s life. The term appeared 
frequently in Party documents and Party-run newspapers well before 1949 to denote 
the Party’s core pedagogical mission, when the term was used interchangeably with 
‘cultural construction’ (wenhua jianshe) to refer to the regime’s efforts to eliminate 
illiteracy with the goal of widening political participation through reading, writing, 
and debating about matters of civic interest. Such references continued throughout the 
1950s and mid-1960s, with the vast majority drawing parallels either between Party 
activists and the literati standard-bearers of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, or with 
the Soviet cultural revolution that had been carried out from 1928–31 under Stalin’s 
leadership. 
It was during the Great Leap Forward (1958–62) that cultural revolution emerged as 
a set of practices in the realm of mass politics. The previous decade of education work 
was roundly criticised for having neglected politics and the needs of ordinary workers, 
and a vast effort to eliminate illiteracy within five years was undertaken nationwide. 
Overtaken by the extreme deprivations of the Great Leap period, these efforts were 
largely abandoned and many reversed, along with the raft of equally ambitious plans 
for which the Great Leap is known. Yet it was this earlier project of mass empowerment 
through educational reform to which activists initially returned in May 1966, with 
Mao’s support. Despite the tumultuous political upheavals of the late 1960s and 1970s, 
a series of grassroots experiments were nonetheless carried out in a strenuous attempt 
to recentre education work around the mass line (see Lin Chun’s essay in the present 
volume), at every level of Chinese society. 
Although cultural revolution has not disappeared entirely from contemporary Chinese 
discourse, it has been largely superseded and supplanted by ‘cultural development’ 
(wenhua fazhan), ‘cultural creation’ (wenhua chuangzao), and ‘cultural construction’ 
(wenhua jianshe). At the same time, the broader normative context within which the 
practice was undertaken has altered dramatically. Whereas cultural revolution during 
the Mao era aimed to transform illiterate workers and peasants into revolutionary 
political subjects capable of exercising the ‘four great freedoms’ (sida ziyou)—speaking 
out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing big character posters—
the post-Mao project of cultural construction seems designed chiefly to refashion 
ordinary Chinese citizens into the compliant subjects and refined citizen-consumers 
of a consolidated and stable CCP-led regime. The abandonment of the term in post-
Tiananmen Chinese political discourse represents another manifestation of how the 
post–Mao Party-state has successfully appropriated and transformed Mao-era methods 
of mobilisation in order to generate a new politics that disarticulates the Leninist 
power of the Party-state from a positive vision of the future based on revolutionary 
transformation.
Culture Revolution before the Cultural Revolution
In April 1933, following the collapse of the First United Front with the Nationalist 
Party, the CCP’s provisional central government promulgated a set of guidelines on 
education policy. Party committees at all levels were enjoined to focus on cultural 
education, and on raising the class consciousness of workers and peasants so as to 
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enable mass mobilisation and the deepening of class struggle throughout Chinese 
society. Cultural revolution, as it was envisaged by the early CCP leadership, entailed 
the dismantling of traditional Han Chinese cultural norms informed by Confucian 
paternalism that instilled obedience to authority. In a cultural context in which literacy 
had always been inextricably intertwined with political power, the project of mass 
education was inherently revolutionary, reversing long established patterns of authority 
in Han Chinese society. Grassroots Party committees at the district and township levels 
were tasked with designing and implementing anti-illiteracy campaigns to not only 
educate, but also to empower, ordinary Chinese workers and peasants by challenging 
traditional beliefs and assumptions. In January 1934, Mao reported that cultural 
revolution was successfully being carried out throughout the Communist-controlled 
revolutionary base areas as a key means of increasing the levels of popular mobilisation 
in revolutionary struggle.3 
The initial appearance of the term in the People’s Daily came in a 1947 editorial 
celebrating the May Fourth Movement of 1919 for having launched China’s first cultural 
revolution.4 Within the span of a few months, this was followed by an article translated 
from Russian in which the author invoked the term cultural revolution to describe 
the transformation of education and leisure activities that attended collectivisation. 
Soviet peasants in the 1920s, the author asserted, ‘began to live rich and cultured lives.’5 
For the next several years, the People’s Daily published several dozen articles each year 
either detailing the ongoing cultural revolution in China that was said to have begun 
with the May Fourth Movement, or extolling the Soviet socialist civilisational project 
as a model. In some cases the two themes were conjoined, as in a November 1957 
editorial by Kang Sheng proposing that, following from the success of the May Fourth 
Movement, China’s success in emulating the Soviet experience of cultural revolution 
depended in the first instance on the elimination of illiteracy as quickly as possible, and 
the cultivation of intellectuals from within the ranks of the proletariat.6 The concept, if 
not the actualised practice, of cultural revolution would therefore have been abundantly 
familiar to the readers of the People’s Daily during the period of the first Five-year Plan 
(1952–57). 
Yet, as the decade of the 1950s came to a close, the concept of cultural revolution 
underwent a significant shift. In his 27 February 1957 speech ‘On the Correct 
Handling of Contradictions among the People,’ Mao made two assertions important 
to the practice of cultural revolution moving forward. The first was that although the 
ideological struggle between the forces supporting socialism and those supporting 
capitalism would persist in China for some time, the use of ‘crude coercion’ to 
resolve such struggles would be counterproductive: it was only through ‘the method 
of discussion, criticism, and reasoning that we can really foster correct ideas and 
overcome wrong ones’ (see also Rojas’s essay in the present volume). The second was 
that, in the handling of contradictions among the people, ideological and political 
work must be strengthened sufficiently to support the CCP’s policy of educating the 
labouring classes within the context of both socialist consciousness and culture, so that 
they would be empowered to participate in that struggle in the ideological field. Both 
dictums quickly came to inform the Party’s work of carrying out cultural revolution, 
which began to diverge from both past practice and the Soviet model. At a national 
conference convened by the Education Ministry in March and April 1958, specific 
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guidelines for carrying out cultural revolution were drawn up, which included five 
‘great tasks:’ a sweeping nationwide literacy campaign, an expansion of elementary 
education, the establishment of agricultural middle schools, improvement of teacher 
training, and a complete overhaul of the educational system to meet the needs of 
socialist construction. The outline determined that, moving forward, a fundamental 
aim of all schools would be to demolish capitalism and establish socialism while relying 
on the Party’s leadership and following the mass line.7 
One month later, at the Second Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress in May 1958, 
Liu Shaoqi asserted that in carrying out the simultaneous development of political, 
economic, and thought ‘lines’ in accordance with implementing socialist revolution, it 
was also essential to further advance a technological revolution alongside a revolution 
in culture. Several days later, on 9 June, the People’s Daily announced ‘the cultural 
revolution has begun,’ and proclaimed that ‘cultural revolution is a movement to totally 
transform the culture of all labouring people.’8 The movement immediately shifted into 
high gear.
The familiar rallying cries of the Great Leap Forward included ambitious plans to 
not only boost both agricultural and industrial production to the extent that China 
would be able to catch up with Great Britain in five years, but also make equally 
impressive gains in the areas of education, cultural production, and the technological 
and scientific enskilment, particularly for workers and peasants (see Callahan’s essay 
in the present volume). In preparation for the nationwide literacy drive, in February 
1958, the National People’s Congress promulgated the ‘Scheme for the Chinese 
Phonetic Alphabetic System,’ thereby reorienting the national curriculum around 
the use of pinyin to facilitate basic literacy. A few months later, with the Great Leap’s 
production drive underway, groups of university students and teachers, as well as 
literate cadres and employees of state bureaucracies, were organised into anti-illiteracy 
teams and dispatched to the countryside. The teams organised intensive adult literacy 
and cultural enrichment classes, often directly in the fields, in order to take maximum 
advantage of the brief rest and meal periods taken by commune members. Communes 
in Guangdong’s Yangjiang county pioneered a ‘four cultures goes to the fields’ effort 
that involved leading peasants in singing and acting, playing musical instruments, 
singing folk tunes and mountain ballads, and taking books and newspapers into the 
fields where they were tending crops.9 Guangdong’s model Lechang county organised 
an all-out effort to saturate the lives of county residents with printed texts. Transcripts 
of morning radio broadcasts were affixed to bulletin boards alongside newspapers, and 
in two of the market towns in the county, anti-illiteracy activists patrolled the markets 
to make certain that signs were affixed to all items of produce for sale, and that all 
sellers produced written bills of goods, so that consumers could familiarise themselves 
with the characters for items of produce that they normally consumed.10 
Beyond remaking ordinary workers and peasants into literate subjects, the movement 
further aimed to transform them into politically active and engaged agents capable of 
sustaining democratic and participatory politics at the social grassroots. In August 1958, 
the Guangzhou Municipal Party Committee insisted that, once workers and peasants 
had attained basic literacy skills, they apply them in the exercise of their ‘four great 
freedoms’ in order to inspire mass enthusiasm, as well as to help ‘everyone understand 
the responsibility of each individual during cultural revolution, so that all are happy to 
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teach and ready to learn.’11 In July 1958, the Southern Daily reported that Guangdong’s 
Xifu commune had become known as a ‘big character poster village’ because the 
community had taken to resolving its social conflicts through the composing and 
public posting of literally thousands of handwritten texts.12 In addition, the formation 
of civic associations and social organisations that would enliven exchange and debate 
was encouraged. For example, in 1959, the Guangzhou municipal Culture Department 
called for an associational revolution to enrich worker’s lives beyond the confines of 
the factory floor. The Culture Department subsequently reported a five-fold increase 
in the number of clubs established over the previous year—a total of 2,885 opera clubs, 
singing groups, dance troupes, and intellectual salons had formed in Guangzhou in 
1958, and the Department anticipated that the number might increase five-fold again 
before the end of 1959.13
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
This burst of grassroots activity was relatively short-lived: as the disastrous economic 
consequences of the Great Leap programme set in, cadres at all levels refocussed 
their attention and resources on the more pressing goal of economic recovery. 
At China’s elite universities, the Great Leap educational reforms had involved efforts 
to increase student and staff participation in administrative decision-making, to favor 
students from worker-peasant-soldier backgrounds in the admissions process, and to 
strengthen the role of the Party and politics in schools (see also Schmalzer’s essay in 
the present volume). However, beginning in 1961, universities began rolling back these 
efforts. Political viewpoint and class background were downplayed, both in university 
admissions and in faculty hiring and promotion, and the Great Leap’s egalitarian aims 
were replaced with meritocratic policies. Beneficiaries and supporters of the Great Leap 
reforms were sidelined; despite their bitter disappointment, many of them continued 
to agitate for the reinstatement of the Great Leap’s educational reforms on university 
campuses across the country.14
These left-leaning students and young lecturers, many of whom had participated in 
and benefited from the ‘education revolution’ (jiaoyu geming) of the Great Leap Forward, 
welcomed the first salvos of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The 16 May 
Notification issued by the Party Central Committee called once again to ‘open wide’ 
(fang) a process of radical educational reform that would allow ‘all people [to] express 
their opinions freely, so that they dare to speak, dare to criticise, and dare to debate.’15 
Familiar themes and slogans raised during the Great Leap returned: there were calls to 
revolutionise both the content and delivery of education, allow the formation of new 
groups at the social grassroots, and the waging of great debates and public discussions, 
often through the vehicle of the big character poster. Yet, the locus of power quickly 
shifted away from the orderly mobilisation of social forces by the Party in 1958 to 
a complete usurpation of that leading role and agenda by self-proclaimed rebel activists 
only eight years later. The driver behind this change was Mao himself. In 1961–62, 
in his reading notes on the Soviet text Political Economy, Mao noted the stubborn 
persistence of ‘conservative strata’ and ‘something like vested interest groups’ in socialist 
society—groups that had benefitted from certain institutions and would therefore 
resist alterations to existing arrangements.16 By 1966, Mao had determined that these 
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forces formed ‘a bunch of counterrevolutionary revisionists’ that had ‘sneaked into the 
Party, the government, the army, and various cultural circles,’ and called for them to be 
criticised, repudiated, and expelled; the Party’s Central Committee acquiesced, and the 
call went out to the grassroots to allow ‘all people express their opinions freely,’ and for 
all to dare to speak, criticise, and debate, and hopefully to expose the revisionists from 
within their midst.17
Unsurprisingly, many of the initial targets in May and June 1966 were the so-called 
‘bourgeois academic’ and cultural authorities that were seen to have reversed the 
ambitious initiatives introduced during the Great Leap. The forms in which those 
criticisms were delivered followed the patterns of the earlier cultural revolution, 
including the rapid formation of grassroots associations, the staging of vast public 
debates in public squares and auditoriums, and the reappearance of big character 
posters to criticise ideological opponents. The critical difference, of course, was that in 
1966 the Party had moved from the instigator of cultural revolution to one of its chief 
targets, firmly in the crosshairs of the revolutionary masses. 
One brief but illustrative measure of how thoroughly the practice of making cultural 
revolution shifted out of the hands of the Party-state in 1966 is the number of official 
and unofficial publications during this period. In the mid-1960s, the  number of 
official  newspapers in publication fell from 343 in 1966 to 43 in 1967; the number 
of official journals likewise declined from 191 to a mere 27. At the same time, 
however, there was an explosion of new mass media produced by independent mass 
organisations: between 1966 and 1969, at least 5,000 new self-published broadsheets 
sprang into existence to disseminate news and the political views of various grassroots 
groups not managed by the normal channels of Party-state control.18 Mass associations 
likewise flourished: although many Party-state offices and organisations had suspended 
their operations by early 1967, independent mass organisations of every shade and 
stripe flourished at the grassroots, including not only the grassroots Red Guard and 
rebel student groups, but also spontaneously formed poor peasant associations, 
workers’ pickets, and Mao Zedong Thought study societies, to name a few. Enjoined 
by Party leaders to ‘join up,’ over time these myriad groups pledged their allegiance to 
various coalitions, dispatched delegates to meetings and assemblies, and participated in 
congresses organised at superordinate levels in a fevered flurry of associational activity. 
Despite the tumultuous political struggles that subsequently came to define the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution, elements of the earlier pedagogical project endured 
not only in the form of the ‘worker-peasant-soldier universities’ (gongnongbin daxue) 
and the ‘workers propaganda teams’ (gongxuandui) of the 1970s (see also Russo’s essay 
in the present volume), but also perhaps most significantly in the vast rustication 
campaign that dispatched 17 million urban Chinese youths into the countryside to 
be reeducated (zai jiaoyu) by the poor and lower-middle peasants beginning in 1968. 
Reversing the pattern of the 1958 cultural revolution in which teams of students and 
teachers brought literacy and cultural enrichment to workers and the peasantry, the 
purpose of the rustication campaign was instead to teach urban youths ‘proletarian 
virtues,’ instilling in them a love of hard labour and a Spartan way of life, and an interest 
in politics and class struggle—in short, to transform them into ‘peasants with a socialist 
consciousness and culture.’ Most would stay in the countryside for more than a decade.19
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From Cultural Revolution to Cultural Construction
 
How are we to understand the transition from the sweeping upsurge from the social 
grassroots in 1966 to the Party-controlled modes of cultural governance that we see 
today? Interestingly, references to the practice of cultural revolution in official media did 
not cease with Mao’s death, nor even with the consolidation of Deng Xiaoping’s control 
over the Party-state in 1978. Instead, references to the practice of cultural revolution 
appear in official media throughout the 1980s, albeit with far less frequency than 
during previous decades. This trend is even more salient after the suppression of the 
1989 protests, when the term ‘cultural revolution’ in the sense of an ongoing process or 
practice all but disappears from official discourse in favor of more robustly managerial 
terms like ‘cultural development,’ ‘cultural creation,’ and ‘cultural construction.’ As Wang 
Hui has suggested, the suppression of the mass protest in 1989 can perhaps best be 
understood as the end of the political sequence that began with the ‘Asian Sixties’ in the 
PRC—a period during which people’s movements across Asia challenged the Cold War 
and the Western-dominated capitalist world order.20 The closing off of the sequence and 
its more radical possibilities with the brutal suppression of the 1989 demonstrations in 
Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and across China announced the inauguration of a new 
cycle characterised by a ‘depoliticised or anti-political political ideology’ that enervates 
popular political participation and forms of mass activism. The transition from mass 
practices and discourses of cultural revolution to the Party-managed processes of 
‘cultural construction’ mirrors the Party’s own transformation from a revolutionary to 
an administrative party that is absorbed into the state apparatus.
The intent of the post–Mao Party-state’s project of cultural construction is detailed 
in the China Youth Daily Ideology and Theory Department’s pivotal 1992 manifesto, 
‘Realistic Responses and Strategic Options for China after the Soviet Upheaval,’ which 
laid the responsibility of creating ‘a brand new, sufficiently ecumenical culture resting on 
Chinese traditional culture’ in the hands of the Party.21 This signal document, composed 
by high-ranking and influential Party technocrats in the wake of the Tiananmen crisis, 
urged central Party strategists to regard ‘creative transformation of traditional Chinese 
culture [as] a rich spiritual resource for safeguarding the socialist system, protecting 
the interests of the state and nation, and promoting the cause of modernisation.’ 
Historically, one chief resource of the Mao-era Party-state was its considerable power 
to mobilise mass participation and enlist the resources and energies of social forces 
to achieve ideological and practical ends. Yet in its transition from a revolutionary to 
a ruling party, the CCP has replaced Mao-era practices of cultural transformation with 
a broader depoliticising project of cultural governance driven by the legitimation and 
perpetuation of the existing state system.22 Whereas the mass mobilisations that took 
place under the banner of revolutionising culture during the Mao era aimed to enlist 
the power and creativity of the masses in the building of a revolutionary new socialist 
order, post-Mao efforts at cultural construction aim to maintain and consolidate the 
power of the contemporary Party-state, rather than to develop direct democratic and 
mass participatory politics. 






In his epic three-hour-long speech to open the Nineteenth Party Congress on 18 October 2017, Xi Jinping emphasised the establishment of a comprehensive xiaokang shehui—which official translators rendered as ‘moderately prosperous 
society’—as the first of four strategies for the ‘new era of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.’1 He repeated the term xiaokang shehui 18 times during this exceptionally 
long speech, making it a goal for his tenure and almost synonymous with the rise of 
China. Still, the concept has been in use throughout China’s reform period and much 
earlier, as intellectuals have repeatedly raised it as a future step on the country’s path 
to utopia. 
Xiaokang and its close relative datong are distinctly Chinese terms that successive 
generations of intellectuals have adapted from classical Confucian discourse to fit 
Marxist and, subsequently, Maoist and post-Maoist teleologies. This adoption plays 
a role in Party-state legitimacy by forging a continuity between past Chinese traditions 
and a future Chinese utopia. Emphasis on the establishment of a xiaokang society 
highlights the success of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in leading China 
along a path that is distinctively Chinese. Although the terms have a long history in 
Confucian texts, intellectuals returned to and developed the concepts in the twentieth 
century, opening them up for adaption to define today’s China. Ubiquitous in current 
Party rhetoric, due to their long-standing role in Chinese intellectual thought, xiaokang 
and datong convey messages about the role and authority of the CCP that go far beyond 
their classical meanings.
Classical Usages
Xiaokang and datong most famously appear in the ‘Li Yun’ chapter of the Book of 
Rites, one of the Confucian classics compiled in the Han Dynasty. As one of the most 
admired sections of one of the most popular books in history, the ‘Li Yun’ has received 
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regular attention for close to 2,000 years. The concepts have managed to maintain 
much of their original meaning as stages on the path to utopia, yet their adoption into 
the contexts of modern ideologies has created new implications.
The second and third paragraphs of the ‘Li Yun’ describe the periods of datong and 
xiaokang, and are the key to their modern influence. The opening line of the section on 
datong indicates its importance: ‘When the great way was followed, all under heaven 
was for the common good’ (dadao zhi xing ye, tianxia weigong). The spirit of the clause 
is unmistakably egalitarian, as is the entire passage, but the ambiguous nature of the 
text allows for considerable variation in interpretation. The ‘Li Yun’ described the 
utopia of datong as a past world which had no borders, no crime, no waste, no need 
to adhere to the classical relationships, and no unnecessary suffering. It was a world in 
which all felt safe, secure, and provided for. Modern Chinese intellectuals interpreted 
tianxia weigong, or ‘the world is for all,’ as an indication that the age of datong was 
a world without private possessions.2 This was an effort to draw upon the authority of 
a classical text to legitimise a political programme, but it was not removed from the 
context of the terminology.
Xiaokang was more complicated to appropriate into modern usage. It was a world 
in which ‘all under heaven is for [private] families’ (tianxia weijia). The text also 
explained that, unlike in the age of datong—a meritocracy in which those most worthy 
were appointed as officials—in a xiaokang society families maintained monopolies over 
government posts and, thereby, over wealth. The age of xiaokang was, however, only 
inferior when compared to the age of datong. Ritual and principle, walls and moats, 
as well as the five relationships, were necessary to maintain order and harmony in 
such a time, but nevertheless it was a period of relative peace. It is the comparison 
between datong and xiaokang that is important for our reading of the ‘Li Yun’ and for 
understanding the usage of the two concepts in modern China.
In translation, the terms have a number of iterations, indicating their complexity, but 
also revealing the assumptions and politics of the translators in their understandings 
of Confucian thought. James Legge’s 1885 translation of the Confucian classics as part 
of The Sacred Books of China has had the greatest influence as a reference for later 
generations of translators. However, his rendering of datong and xiaokang respectively 
as ‘the grand union’ and the ‘small tranquillity’ has not been passed down.3 ‘Grand 
unity’ has come closer to being a standardised translation for datong, and remains 
in use. 
In French, Séraphin Couvreur (1835–1919) offered a more comprehensive translation 
of datong as ‘the grand union of universal brotherhood’ (la grande union ou la fraternité 
universelle), but chose a judgement-laden translation of xiaokang as ‘the imperfect 
tranquillity’ (tranquillité imparfaite).4 This is not very different from the translation as 
‘lesser prosperity’ favoured by Theodore de Bary in his recent renditions.5 Translating 
these passages in the twentieth century, it was difficult to avoid connecting the classical 
concepts to modern political theories of capitalism and communism. The passages lent 
themselves well to the politics of the time, and were crucial conceptual resources for 
Chinese intellectuals during that time.
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The Return to Datong in Modern China
The term datong gained new significance in the twentieth century, largely through 
the efforts of the extremely influential reformer and intellectual Kang Youwei. Kang 
reconceptualised Confucianism from a religious perspective, emphasising ren—
‘benevolence’ or ‘love’—as the basis upon which to build civilisation. He saw datong as 
the ultimate realisation of ren.6 
In The Great Unity (datong shu), Kang discussed the future datong as a utopia in 
which states will no longer exist; families will be completely different, as men and 
women will be equal and same sex marriage will be accepted; robotic birds will take the 
place of servants; and animals will be treated well by a world of vegetarians. Although 
often full of radical compassion in a way unlike other literature of his contemporaries, 
Kang and his book were products of their time, and included terrifying prescriptions 
for the elimination of the black race through a centuries-long programme of eugenics. 
Kang’s utopia was both highly imaginative and deeply troubling.
However, although Kang was responsible for the reemergence of the terms datong 
and, to some extent, xiaokang in modern Chinese intellectual discourse, the concepts 
were larger than Kang and exceeded his own definitions of them. With the rise of 
communism and materialist understandings of social evolution, intellectuals preferred 
to see class consciousness and social change as dictated by selfishness, rather than 
benevolence (ren). 
Although disagreeing with many of his core assumptions and conclusions, Mao 
appreciated Kang Youwei’s vision and referenced it in his speeches and writings. In his 
1949 essay ‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,’ Mao explained: ‘Kang Youwei 
wrote The Great Unity, but he did not, nor would he be able to, find a way of achieving 
datong. The republican states of the capitalist classes are found in foreign countries, but 
China could not have such a state because the country was oppressed by imperialism. 
The only way [to datong] is through the People’s Republic led by the working class.’ 
The appropriation of Kang’s Confucian views to a modern Chinese teleology did 
not happen quickly. Despite Mao’s occasional use of the terms, datong and xiaokang 
were not key elements in early Maoism, and only became ubiquitous during the reform 
period that began with the rise of Deng Xiaoping after the Cultural Revolution. 
Since then, Party elites have regularly invoked the terms to frame China’s progress 
through the lens of a specific historical and economic period. The prosperity 
associated with xiaokang was identified as a goal through the Four Modernisations 
(si ge xiandaihua), the defining thought of the Deng Xiaoping period, beginning in 
the late 1970s. Discussing China’s modernisation with Japanese Prime Minister 
Masayoshi Ōhira in 1979, Deng utilised the concept of xiaokang to differentiate the 
Chinese path of development: ‘The Four Modernisations that we hope to realise are 
a Chinese Four Modernisations. Our conceptualisation of the Four Modernisations is 
not like your conceptualisation of modernisation, but is a xiaokang family (xiaokang 
zhi jia).’7 Although vague, this rhetoric was important as it allowed Deng to discuss 
capitalist modernisation while avoiding capitalist discourse, a defining moment in 
neoliberalism. From this moment, xiaokang became an essential part of ‘socialism with 
Chinese characteristics.’ 
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At the Sixteenth Party Congress, held in 2002, Jiang Zemin announced that 
‘comprehensive xiaokang’ (quanmian xiaokang) would be achieved by 2020—a promise 
strongly reasserted by Hu Jintao in his speeches at the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Party Congresses in 2007 and 2012.8 This goal later became a key part of Xi Jinping 
Thought, definitively established at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 2017, as he has 
repeatedly declared a ‘decisive victory in attaining comprehensive xiaokang society’ as 
the objective for his next five years in power. Looking back through these speeches, 
the rise of xiaokang is striking, but its role in rhetoric outweighs the importance of 
its content. Alongside terms such as modernisation, marketisation, and development, 
Wang Hui points to the popular usage of quanmian xiaokang as an example of the 
depoliticisation of politics in contemporary China due to the careful avoidance of 
discourse related to the modern political ideologies of capitalism or communism.9 
An Epitome of Chineseness
The rise of xiaokang and datong as key concepts for the CCP embodies discursive, 
practical, and theoretical messaging that the CCP is communicating to its domestic 
audience. Respectively, these messages indicate that the Party is the epitome of 
Chineseness; that the current priority of the Party is to address inequality; and that 
the Party still aspires to communist ideals, polished and sundered from the turbulent 
politics of the Mao era. 
Discursively, the use of classical concepts indicates that China’s modernisation and 
path through history is unique to China. The nature of this uniqueness is left unclear, 
but the use of a China-specific terminology is crucially supportive of the nationalist 
discourse and of the idea of a ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics,’ notions from 
which the Party derives much of its authority. This discourse signals that Western 
institutions, definitions, and practices cannot be imported into China because they will 
fail to take root in Chinese conditions.
Secondly, China’s current affluence is a notable achievement, but it must spread to 
all people in all walks of life, eliminating poverty by 2020. This is what is indicated 
by quanmian xiaokang, and denotes the Party’s resolve to significantly reduce the 
inequality that has increasingly plagued the country in recent decades.
Finally, xiaokang reveals the position of China on the route to the utopia of datong. 
Xiaokang is an imperfect society, troubled by inequality, selfishness, and a lack of public 
spirit, but defined by a moderate prosperity in which all are adequately provided for. 
The theoretically identifying feature of xiaokang, however, is its penultimate nature and 
subordination to datong, revealing the communist utopia as the ideal still animating 
Party leadership.
English-language readers of Xi Jinping’s speech at the Nineteenth Party Congress 
may have been confused by his repeated emphasis on a ‘moderately prosperous society,’ 
but for Chinese speakers the concept conveyed fundamental messages about the Party’s 
role and authority in the twenty-first century.





While the teaching of ‘dialectical materialism’ (bianzheng weiwuzhuyi) is part of secondary and university curricula in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), young Chinese citizens probably consider it a hackneyed, dogmatic, 
and fussy logic. After all, their job is simply to mechanically recite official definitions 
and methods instead of engaging intellectually with them. From this point of view, the 
ossification of the term indirectly demonstrates how Chinese communism is deprived 
of an afterlife in China. In this essay, I will put dialectical materialism into a historical 
context and explore how this once very powerful concept has degenerated into such 
a cliché. More importantly, I will investigate how this concept might still be productive 
for our current political understanding. 
 
A Brief Genealogy of Dialectics
Dialectics as a Western philosophical concept can be traced back to ancient Greece, 
where good citizenship and social relations were grounded in dialogue, from which 
agreements and disagreements arose. The idea of dialectics gained a new life in the 
nineteenth century thanks to Hegel, whose dialectics of Aufhebung (sublation) describes 
how oppositional elements, in the forms of thesis and antithesis, engage in struggle 
with each other and then synthesise into a whole that in turn becomes a new thesis 
from which another Hegelian triad forms. Hegel believed that continual dialectical 
development leads ultimately to the fulfilment of absolute spirit. In his opinion, it was 
this ‘becoming’ that allows us to transform ourselves in order to reach the ultimate 
ideal. 
Hegelian theory was then borrowed and challenged by Marx, who developed his 
own theory of dialectical materialism. In Marx’s theorisation, until we reach a classless 
society, each intermediate historical stage entails the exploitation of the lower classes 
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by the dominant one, a situation that motivates the former to struggle against the latter. 
Bourgeois capitalism is exemplary of this kind of dynamic: while the bourgeoisie needs 
to exploit the proletariat for its own capital accumulation, at the same time it also 
supplies proletarians with some education, such as general working and organisational 
skills, to facilitate their participation and integration in the production process. In the 
end, however, education enhances the political consciousness and skills of the workers, 
making them more likely to ultimately overthrow the dominating class. To quote the 
famous words of the Manifesto of the Communist Party: ‘What the bourgeoisie, therefore, 
produces, above all, is its own gravediggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are 
equally inevitable.’1 This famous statement implies that history progresses according to 
its own laws, which cannot be altered by anyone, no matter how powerful. 
Engels further elaborated this Marxist historical view by referring to the natural 
sciences.2 He came up with three laws of dialectics. The first is the law of the unity 
and struggle of opposites, according to which opposites condition each other. The 
second is the law of the passage from quantitative to qualitative change, referring 
to the qualitative change of physical phenomena triggered by enough intensity of 
quantitative changes. The third is the law of the negation of the negation, which poses 
the controversial question of whether a negation, which still retains traces of what it 
negated, itself requires negation for the radically new to emerge.3 Together these laws, 
supposedly supported by physical and biological sciences, not only define class struggle 
as the engine of history, but also illustrate the universal manifestation and development 
of all matters.   
One detrimental effect of Engel’s overemphasis on the scientific dimension of Marxism 
is that it turns the original theory of history, which featured an important role for humanity, 
into one deprived of human inputs. It was when Marxism took on the halo of science that 
it came to claim a totalising understanding of human history. Via the combined efforts 
of many intermediate thinkers and the various Leninist parties of the 1920s and 1930s, 
Engel’s laws of dialectics gradually evolved into the orthodox doctrine of dialectical 
materialism in the Soviet Union.4 Through Soviet-trained revolutionaries, this doctrine 
of linear evolutionary historical progress was then exported all over the world, including 
China, as a theoretical resource for legitimising the allegedly inevitable communist 
revolutions in other countries. The mechanical understanding of dialectical materialism 
being taught in the PRC over the last half century was also a result. 
The notion of ‘historical materialism’—which has largely been seen as interchangeable 
with dialectical materialism—came into being in this same historical context. It is clear 
that Marx developed a materialist conception of history, but he never separated society 
from nature. Engels deliberately provided Marxism with the additional non-humanistic 
dimension of natural sciences, implicitly arguing for the superiority of the studies of 
sciences to the studies of history. Stalin integrated this reading into official discourse. 
In 1938, in Dialectical and Historical Materialism, he wrote that the studies of nature 
and society should be clearly differentiated to become two Marxist doctrines:
Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party. 
It is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena 
of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is  dialectical, 
while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of 
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these phenomena, its theory, is  materialistic. Historical materialism is the 
extension of the principles of dialectical materialism to the study of social life, 
an application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the phenomena 
of the life of society, to the study of society and of its history.5
According to this authoritative definition, dialectical materialism is the basic Marxist 
doctrine that should be used to understand nature—i.e., everything—while historical 
materialism is a branch of dialectical materialism devoted specifically to the study 
of human society and its history. This genealogy of the term is important for us to 
understand the specificity of Maoist dialectics. 
Maoist Dialectics
Based on the state-commissioned work of the Chinese Marxist thinker Ai Siqi, since 
the 1960s most Chinese Marxist theorists have adopted the Stalinist differentiation, 
considering dialectical materialism as a term that encompasses all kinds of science, 
and historical materialism (lishi weiwuzhuyi) as specifically designated for the studies 
of human history.6 However, Mao Zedong, although being much more interested in 
history and the humanities than natural science, mostly used the term dialectical 
materialism. What I would like to emphasise here is that Mao’s fascination with human 
history made his dialectical materialism a doctrine much less rigid and contained than 
Stalinism. If there is a legacy of Maoism which might still be useful for our current 
political actions, I believe it is his sensibility regarding the unpredictable nature of 
history.  
Mao’s historicism is heavily marked by a deep conviction that the wilful human subject 
can change history. The major structure of Mao’s dialectical materialism is precisely the 
struggle between humans and history. The Maoist subject is ‘poor and blank’ (yiqiong 
erbai), and history is the stage on which he or she struggles. Mao announced: 
Apart from their other characteristics, the outstanding thing about China’s 
600 million people is that they are ‘poor and blank.’ This may seem a bad 
thing, but in reality it is a good thing. Poverty gives rise to the desire for 
changes, the desire for action, and the desire for revolution. On a blank sheet 
of paper free from any mark, the freshest and most beautiful characters can 
be written; the freshest and most beautiful pictures can be painted.7 
To Mao, it is the poverty and blankness of the Chinese people that allows them 
to engage in the most spectacular historical upheavals.8 Being ‘poor and blank’ and 
deprived of all identity tags, the Maoist subject becomes an empty vehicle ready to be 
invested with revolutionary will, so that he or she can engage in the most ferocious 
struggles and bring seemingly impossible historical transformation to fruition. We can 
understand this rhetoric as one particularly constructed for the Great Leap Forward, 
which therefore is highly historically confined. But we can also approach this Maoist 
subject theoretically as the one who performs the negation, instead of allowing 
negations to be performed on him- or herself. This Maoist hero is not invincible, and 
under Mao’s dialectical materialism there is a subtle fatalism. People do not act on 
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history unidirectionally, but rather engage in a dialectical struggle with it. Dialectical 
materialism did not provide Mao with a clear historical direction. Instead, it enlightened 
him to the exact opposite, so that it was the courage and the will of the people against 
an uncertain future that made them so heroic. 
In the 1930s, when Mao’s basic philosophical worldview was already formed, he 
clearly identified himself as a student of the orthodox Marxism developed in the Soviet 
Union. As he admitted to Edgar Snow, his famous 1937 lectures on ‘On Contradiction’ 
and ‘On Practice’ were written in response to a request from the Anti-Japanese Military 
and Political College in Yan’an for philosophy lectures for its students. Still, while 
written on commission, these lectures show that besides being interested in orthodox 
Soviet theories, Mao was also most invested in two notions: contradiction (maodun) 
and practice (shijian) (see the essays by Rojas and Aminda Smith in the present volume). 
In both lectures, Mao works out the core dialectical mechanism of his understanding 
of dialectical materialism: ‘dialectical’ as historical laws and ‘materialism’ as human 
practices. He made clear that it is the constant arising and resolution of contradictions 
that make up historical forces, and that there is undoubtedly a universal law, which 
is the continuous confrontation of opposing forces. However, according to him, it is 
impossible to predict what these antagonistic clashes will lead to, because historical 
reality is built up through a myriad of human practices, and is therefore unstable. What 
we can do is to learn from history how contradictions have formed, developed, and 
transformed. While we cannot predict the future, these historical patterns can still 
guide our future action. 
Reading history was one of Mao’s most devoted pastimes. He studied not only all the 
major historical Chinese texts, but also a variety of alternative histories, historical novels, 
family histories, and local gazettes. Mao was particularly interested in understanding 
the circumstances and fates of historical figures, and he frequently referred to historical 
details in his political speeches, poetic expressions, and everyday conversations. It could 
be argued that Mao was drawn to the dialectic because he already believed in constant 
transformation. The mechanical teleological view of the progression from feudal to 
bourgeois capitalism and then socialism is seldom mentioned in Mao’s writing. Instead, 
he displayed more interest in the struggles of the people, whether these might or might 
not lead to a better future. 
A Distaste for Grand Narratives
Being so captivated by history, Mao disliked any grand narrative. He frequently 
asserted that no ‘theory’ (lilun) can really explain history. The universal law, in other 
words, is only a form within which practice and knowledge interact, but it does not tell 
us where history goes. In his lecture on dialectical materialism, which is considered to 
be the blueprint for his two lectures on contradiction and practice, Mao emphasises 
that the universe is open, so that there is no end to history.9 Similarly, he never 
conceptualises an end to the revolution, and instead insists that revolution must be 
continually carried out in order to keep the power structure open.10 With so much 
emphasis on ‘practices,’ Mao’s history can only be an unfinished one. Mao’s unyielding 
confidence in the human spirit rests on an awareness of the ruthlessness of historical 
forces. In his ‘Reading Notes on the Soviet Union’s “Political Economics,”’ Mao openly 
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criticises Soviet Marxist orthodoxy for focussing too much on historical laws, and 
Soviet textbooks for always ‘[starting] from laws, tenets and definitions, an approach 
which has all along been opposed by Marxism.’11 Instead, he argues that one must 
perform empirical analysis before principles and tenets can be discovered and verified. 
In Western liberal societies and postsocialist countries alike, the rigidity of the concept 
of dialectical materialism describing historical progression as governed by universal 
laws has attracted many criticisms. A new generation of leftist critics, particularly 
those from the Frankfurt School, has challenged the teleological dimension of Marxist 
dialectics, claiming that such universalisation prevents us from seeing history as open 
and contingent. For example, Adorno has argued that the ideal formulated by Hegel 
can only be conceptualised retrospectively, when changes have already happened. Any 
attempt to theorise a universal without acknowledging particulars as unpredictable is 
naïve.12 At the same time, dialectical materialism as a philosophical concept continues 
to be discussed and explored among sympathetic critics, allowing the idea to gain new 
lives.13 In contrast, this has not happened in China yet, because the ruling Communist 
Party continues to see this doctrine as a part of its founding myth, and therefore 
considers any serious questioning and revamping of it to be a challenge to its ruling 
authority.
For this reason, one of the few available ways to reconsider the heritage of Marxism 
and socialism in China is to revisit Mao’s understanding of history. This is not, once 
again, to turn Mao into a cult, but rather to critically—and strategically—engage with 
his struggles with, on the one hand, the imported Soviet orthodox, and on the other, the 
petrification of a Party corrupted by power.14 This might help us face the more insecure 
and authoritative Chinese Communist Party of our time. By deliberately adding 
physical and biological sciences to Marxism to reinforce its universal application, and by 
further separating dialectical materialism and historical materialism, Engels and Stalin 
transformed Marxism into an orthodoxy in which the current Chinese government 
is still deeply entrenched. Mao, instead, rescued the political dimensions of Marxism, 
encouraging us to be ready to face, build, and eventually be defeated by an open future. 






In socialist China, working people did not view their jobs as merely a means of making a living. A job meant an honourable vocation, and workers were endowed with dignity. In the 1920s, socialist thinkers Li Dazhao and Cai Yuanpei proclaimed 
that labour was sacred, because the working class would take control of their destiny 
in forging a society free from exploitation and oppression. But a look at the working 
conditions in China today will convince anyone that labour has fallen from grace 
to become a curse and a nightmare. Jia Zhangke’s film A Touch of Sin (2013) offers 
a vignette of labour in the hellhole of a Foxconn factory. Rows and rows of workers 
bend over the task of assembling iPhones and submit to repetitious movement for long 
hours. The employees hardly have any breaks, communication, or social life. Living 
in a dormitory like a labour camp, roommates do not get to see each other as they 
work different shifts. Vibrating with jarring electronic sounds, the whole factory seems 
to be a huge device swallowing up workers—body and soul. This dystopia explains 
the despair of young workers, who jump, one after another, from the building to their 
death (see Pozzana’s essay in the present volume). By contrast, in the socialist past, films 
often depicted factory workers taking pride in their work and being committed to their 
community. But in Zhang Meng’s postsocialist film The Piano in a Factory (2010), the 
proud workers of a socialist steel plant disperse after the factory is shut down, scraping 
out a miserable living by performing in a gig band, or by trafficking or peddling. 
The Dream of Non-alienated Labour
Although literary and film works depict the new wretched of China’s contemporary 
industrial wasteland, it is difficult to find outrage or outcry. Critics and workers seem 
to be resigned to dehumanising labour as the norm of capitalist production. I think this 
resignation stems from the lack of an alternative vision, and from the forgetfulness about 
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the veneration of labour in socialist China. In her fieldwork on the industrial rustbelt 
of northeast China, Ching Kwan Lee compares today’s labourers with the working 
class in the past.1 The workers interviewed recall, in protest and anger against today’s 
precarious conditions, their fond memories of socialist labour. Regarded as the leading 
class, factory workers enjoyed job security, relatively equal income, medical care, and 
a pension. Working together to solve concrete technical problems in collective projects, 
they developed comradeship and solidarity. The workers were equal with technicians 
and managers, and participated enthusiastically in work processes. Everybody was 
eager to contribute wisdom, experience, and energy. Equality and participation meant 
the sharing of power and fostered pride in being masters of the new society. Most 
importantly, the workers were able to see the purpose and meaning of their work. They 
were passionate in the belief that they were creating a new economic and social order 
in which individuals would thrive with all others. It is this type of meaningfulness that 
has the potential to give labour beauty and dignity.
Working with a purpose is distinct from alienated labour. It is not just work to feed 
oneself, and the fruits of this labour do not result in profits for capitalists. We can take 
a page from Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over China to see the glimmers of what labour 
could be under revolutionary conditions.2 In a chapter entitled ‘They Sing Too Much,’ 
Snow depicted the workers as full of pride and joy working in factories in the township 
of Wuqi in Yan’an. Mostly young women from impoverished villages, the workers 
had little to warrant any joyful smiles: their pay was very low and living conditions 
primitive, their meals consisted of millet and vegetables, and their dormitory was 
a cave house with earthen floors. But working under the principle of ‘equal pay for 
equal labour,’ they appeared to be the happiest and proudest people the journalist had 
encountered. Lacking in cultural resources, they treasured the rare opportunity of 
learning and education. They valued their ‘two hours of daily reading and writing, their 
political lectures, their dramatic groups.’ Everybody competed vigorously for the small 
prizes in sports, literacy, writing, and productivity. 
Puzzled by the incongruity between material squalor and mental happiness, Snow 
found answers by recalling child workers in foreign factories in the China ruled by the 
Nationalist Party: ‘You have to contrast their life with the system elsewhere in China’ 
to understand the joy of labour in Yan’an. In hundreds of factories elsewhere, ‘little 
boy and girl slave workers sit or stand at their tasks twelve or thirteen hours a day, and 
then drop, in exhausted sleep, to the dirty cotton quilt, their bed, directly beneath their 
machine.’ A Western-educated engineer, who quit his foreign firm in Shanghai to come 
to Yan’an, expressed similar bewilderment. Dedicated to productivity and efficiency, the 
engineer complained about so much ‘horseplay going on’ while everybody was happy, 
and wondered why the young women workers spent so much time singing. Constant 
singing, Snow writes, sums up ‘a great deal about the youthful bravado of these young 
women workers.’ The workers felt they were working for themselves and nobody was 
exploiting them. Compared with their past lives, the new working life was one ‘of good 
health, exercise, clean mountain air, freedom, dignity, and hope.’ It is no wonder that 
singing, joy, and laughter are the natural and spontaneous expression of this work ethic. 
Revolutionary culture aimed ‘to shake, to arouse, the millions of rural China to their 
responsibilities in society; to awaken them to a belief in human rights, to combat the 
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timidity, passiveness and static faiths of Taoism and Confucianism.’ The revolutionary 
labour ethos encouraged the workers to work for the ‘reign of the people,’ a life of 
justice, equality, freedom, and human dignity. 
The Joys of Collective Labour
Fast forward to today. Zhang Meng’s The Piano in a Factory recalls similar joy and 
beauty in collective labour. Like thousands of his coworkers, the protagonist Chen 
Guilin has been laid off from the state-owned steel plant. During his divorce, he seeks 
to build a piano with scraps of steel, so that his daughter will stay with him. The piano is 
more than a musical instrument. Chen’s wife has ample means to purchase a piano for 
her daughter, who will go with whoever offers her this possession. Although the laid-off 
coworkers have each gone their disparate ways, they answer Chen’s call and look forward 
to working together again. They come in order to exercise their own ingenuity and 
creativity, and to reconnect emotionally. An ambiance of jouissance and warm feeling 
suffuses the process of building the piano. In creating something new and deploying 
their talent and skill, the workers are rediscovering a collaborative ethos that had been 
previously fostered in the socialist steel plant but has since lain dormant—wasted. They 
experience camaraderie and solidarity. In socialist labour, workers are masters of the 
production process and free from alienation, a condition of estrangement from one’s 
body and mind. They are able to exercise the essential powers, capacity, and creativity 
worthy of a productive human being. 
In Marx’s analysis, private property makes people one-sided because it exists as 
capital and commodity. In commodity exchange, the structure of feeling is very much 
truncated, confined to a one-dimensional sphere of existence. A life based on private 
property is about seeking possession and enjoyment of private property. Such a life 
has little social and emotional resonance with fellow human beings. In Grundrisse, 
Marx mocks Adam Smith’s claim that the producer of the piano has nothing to do with 
the piano player: ‘The piano would be absurd without the piano player.’3 If the piano 
as a commodity ‘reproduces capital’ and if ‘the pianist only exchanges his labour for 
revenue,’ where are the piano’s aesthetic functions that ‘produce music and satisfy our 
musical ear?’ Marx is invoking the essential link between piano maker and pianist, 
worker and artist, alienated labour and the labour that fulfils the spiritual and bodily 
potentials of a human being. The Piano in a Factory picks up Marx’s hints. The piano 
being built by the workers escapes the fate of being a mere commodity and a  sign 
of capital. In its creation, the labour is unalienated, self-directed, and voluntary. 
In labouring, the workers rediscover their essential creative powers—their intelligence, 
knowledge, passion, and skills previously acquired as steel workers. Their minds and 
bodies are activated and emancipated from their entrapment in private possession and 
in labouring for capitalists. The building of the steel piano becomes a process by which 
the workers come together to form a new working community and to realise their 
human and artistic potentials. The piano is no longer a thing, but an aesthetic, affective 
focal point into which the workers pour their emotion and camaraderie. 
Working together unites piano maker and piano player in The Piano in the Factory, 
which echoes Snow’s episode of female workers singing at work in Red Star Over China. 
The film presents extended episodes of singing, dancing, and performance, intimately 
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associated with the technical as well as emotional tenor of piano building. The socialist 
labour involved in this endeavour envisions workers with well-rounded personalities 
transcending the one-dimensional individual confined to a narrow sphere of activity 
through the capitalist division of labour, efficiency, and productivity. The socialist 
worker has the potential to become accomplished in any branch of the technical and 
cultural spheres. While the same Chinese word gang (steel) is present in both gangqin 
(piano) and gang de qin (a piano made of steel, as the original title of the movie 
reads), making steel and making music are after all very different activities. But this 
combination is what the workers ought to be. They are not only producers of material 
goods but also creators of culture: the piano maker should be a piano player. 
Workers as Artists
The unity of worker and artist, of mind and body, of mental and manual work in the 
mix of steel and music entails a socialist motif: art is to serve working people—workers, 
peasants, and soldiers. It is to enrich their cultural life, foster a collective ethos, and raise 
their consciousness. The workers, instead of being passive consumers, should have the 
opportunity to actively participate in cultural activity and creation. It is by no accident 
that Chen Guilin, his girlfriend, and other workers are excellent amateur artists. They 
might have been on the steel plant’s art troupe or propaganda team engaged in mass 
cultural activities on a regular basis. 
By highlighting the workers’ artistic performance, the film suggests that the socialist 
workplace is a site for manufacturing material as well as cultural goods. Cultural 
activity provides for and nurtures an ambiance that meets the emotional, aesthetic, 
and intellectual needs of workers. By extension, socialist culture is to serve and educate 
the working people by forging and spreading new ethoses, new knowledge, and new 
artistic forms. The film gives testament that factory workers in the past had access to 
musical education and actively participated in music events. In the film, the workers 
team up with a Soviet-educated engineer, and apply book knowledge and foreign 
language proficiency to piano research and building—proof of power sharing on the 
factory floor and cultural accomplishment. In light of this, it is worth pausing to think 
about factories in the present. One wonders how many of these factories have a library 
like the one in the film, how many talented workers have a chance to perform and sing 
in the workplace, and how many can tackle high-tech engineering problems and read 
foreign languages? Culture and education in today’s China are becoming a prerogative 
of the privileged few, not an equal right open to all citizens, much less to labourers. The 
film’s director Zhang Meng complained that while he made this film for unemployed 
and laid-off workers, they could not afford to go to the cinema to watch it.
The Piano in a Factory conjures up images and scenarios of the socialist workplace 
and the dignity of the workers. Swept under the rug by the neoliberal market imperative, 
these images stage a magical comeback in the midst of the industrial wasteland and 
against the ruinous effect of capitalist labour. They are a source of critique, and a gesture 
of protest. This invocation of the imagination alerts us to what labour could be like in 
a world where workers enjoy equality and dignity, possess a well-rounded personality, 
and are producers of material products as well as creators of artworks. 





In his 1942 speech ‘Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing,’ delivered at Yan’an, Mao Zedong critiqued Party discourse that was full of cliché but lacked concrete substance. He argued that such discourse constituted yet another kind of ‘eight-
legged essay’ (baguwen), the formulaic standard for imperial examinations, and 
identified the ‘formalism’ (xingshizhuyi) of this discourse as being out of touch with 
the masses that comprised both its ostensible audience and object. Formalism in short 
order crystallised an objection to all manner of impertinent convention, feudalistic 
ritual behaviour, aesthetic ornamentalism, and empty rhetorical abstraction. In the 
Soviet Union, the aesthetic currents of the Russian Formalists that flourished in the early 
years of the Bolshevik Revolution had already been proscribed by Stalinist orthodoxy.1 
Crucially, the epithet ‘formalist’ expressed how elitist forms of expression and behaviour 
often indexed social and political privilege. Mao’s hostility to calcified institutional 
practices, and his suspicion that such attitudes only cemented elitist privilege, lent the 
term a strong affect of political resentment; he identified elitism not just in the old 
feudal ruling classes and urbanised intellectuals, but also as forming in the privileged 
attitude among many within his own revolutionary movement. Just a short time earlier, 
in another speech entitled ‘Rectify the Party’s Style of Work,’ he had criticised the 
Party’s ‘style of work’ (zuofeng) for promoting selfishness and dogmatism. Formalism 
prevented Party members from thinking of their own endeavours as integrated with 
the Party’s work and the people as a whole. Mao’s reference to the imperial eight-legged 
essay to figure both stereotyped Party writing, but more essentially, forms of self-
centred conduct, implied that Party behaviour and discourse were essentially ‘textual’ 
in nature. As such, they corresponded to forms and styles whose relationship to mass 
politics could be assessed.
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Form and Content
Anti-formalist sentiment derives from the culture of Chinese modernity as a whole; 
in the late 1910s, the New Culture Movement’s iconoclastic attitude toward all varieties 
of premodern, ‘feudalistic’ (fengjian) norms of ritual behaviour was in keeping with 
the egalitarian aspirations of thinkers and reformers of that period. Liberal Hu Shi and 
radical Chen Duxiu alike proclaimed the need for Chinese literature and art to abandon 
outdated classical forms and adopt styles and genres in keeping with the modern age. 
While drawing on this tradition, Mao nevertheless charged urban intellectuals with 
saying one thing and doing another—while they upheld an image as agents of change, 
they remained hopelessly tied to their social privileges. 
However, Maoist formalism encompasses more than a critique of elitist snobbery 
and empty rhetoric. The question of the proper relation between ‘form’ (xingshi) 
and ‘content’ (neirong) constituted an epistemological problem that Mao, who was 
intensely studying Marxist philosophy during the Yan’an period, sought to resolve. The 
relationship between ‘form and content’ was but one of many dialectical antinomies 
that appears throughout Marxist parlance. Its roots stretch as far back as German 
idealism, in particular the philosophy of Hegel. Indeed, the spirit of Mao’s critique of 
formalism did not consist of a disavowal of all forms, but rather an exhortation to 
bring form back into a productive relationship with real social content. Formalism as 
a philosophical problem thus brought into its orbit such categories as literature, politics, 
and education—to wit, all forms of knowledge and cultural production.
The philosophy of Hegel iterates time and again the dynamic unity of form and 
content; they are not separate entities but two aspects of a dialectical whole. Content 
denotes undifferentiated, immediate existence in all its potentiality, while form 
expresses its internal structure as an organised self-reflection. The distinction between 
form and content is not absolute; rather, it can be grasped as how we perceive a thing 
in an immediate and total manner, as an essence, but also mediated through intelligible 
representations, so it emerges as appearance. As knowledge of reality proceeds in 
a dialectical perpetuum mobile, the distinction between form and content never remains 
static—they always appear relative to one another in a process of endless progression. 
Whereas ‘idealist’ philosophers such as Hegel identified real ‘content’ with notions of 
universal ‘Spirit,’ later materialists, including Marx, dispensed with such idealism as 
the basis of knowledge. Ultimate reality was not to be located in universal concepts 
and abstractions, but within the material world. Marxist philosophy locates the roots 
of knowledge within the processes of human labour. Real content, then, was not to be 
found in abstract concepts, but within the material forms of social life. 
Overcoming the Domination of Form
That form and content are but two aspects of an integrated whole strikes at the crux 
of the problem of formalism—what happens when forms (of knowledge, of art, of 
philosophy, of behaviour, etc.) become alienated from their social content? As social 
life constantly progresses through struggle, the forms through which we mediate 
knowledge of social life should also change. But what happens when abstract form, 
through repetition, replication, and imitation, takes on the appearance of concrete 
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materiality, thus occulting the real content from which form ostensibly derives? What 
happens when form takes on a life of its own and forgets its very origins in the content 
that has been elided? To endlessly replicate forms, conventions, and institutions that 
have long outlived their social shelf-life can thus only serve one possible purpose: the 
maintenance of social privilege. 
Under Mao’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP), then, formalism as a term of 
denunciation was meant to correct the dominance of mere form over social content. 
Content was seen as the primary criterion against which all forms were to be judged, and 
all had to conform to the CCP’s vision of what social content ought to be. In practice, 
what the campaign against formalism ensured was the prohibition against the formal 
autonomy of academic disciplines and cultural production. The constant need to justify 
all intellectual and aesthetic activity on the basis of its ostensible relation to concrete 
social reality constituted a political imperative that brought serious consequences to 
those who committed the sin of formalism.
The rise of a ‘model’ (mofan) culture in the aesthetics of the People’s Republic, however, 
demonstrates how the Communists sought to align innovative aesthetic forms that not 
only reflected real social content, but could also shape utopian forms of social life to 
emerge in the future.2 In his 1942 ‘Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art,’ 
Mao himself argued that such art ‘ought to be on a higher plane, more intense, more 
concentrated, more typical, nearer the ideal, and therefore more universal than actual 
everyday life.’ Model types were distinct from formalism in that there was a putative 
organic link between these forms and real social transformation. If model forms did 
not reflect a current social reality, then they could potentially instigate a process by 
which they would eventually materialise. 
The imperative that all aesthetic forms reflect an undeniable social content tended 
to result, ironically, in the formalisation of social life into shopworn conventions. 
How is it possible to encapsulate the complexities and vicissitudes of social life into 
a few sanctioned forms? As Jason McGrath has noted, the more rigid the ideology 
and aesthetics of the Cultural Revolution became, the more model operas became 
untethered from social life and started to ‘drift’ into formulaic convention.3 In the guise 
of resisting formalism, Maoist culture often ended up imposing its own readymade 
representational formulas on the social world (see also Sorace’s essay in the present 
volume).
A New War against Formalism
The end of the Mao era undoubtedly brought fresh air into domains of knowledge and 
cultural production that had become moribund as a result of anti-formalist attitudes. 
To a certain extent, starting in the 1980s, academics and artists were granted a formal 
autonomy they had rarely experienced. Western modernism, with its emphasis on 
formal sophistication, flourished in Chinese literary and visual arts. The achievements 
of Chinese writers, artists, and intellectuals of the postreform period confirm that 
a degree of formal autonomy in their respective disciplinary domains was not only 
healthy for their intellectual and cultural development, but could also provide new 
perspectives on ever-changing social realities.
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But the reintroduction of the market economy has created class differences that exist 
not simply on a material level, but on a formal one as well. Urbanites and migrants, rich 
and poor, elite and common, have grown increasingly alienated from each other, not 
simply in terms of wealth, but also in terms of dress, language, and styles. Since Mao’s 
death, education has reverted to extremely competitive modes of standardised testing 
which seem only to replicate the domination of elites, approximating the eight-legged 
essays of the imperial examination system that Mao hated so much. State bureaucrats, 
while nominally professing the communist creed, behave more like genteel aristocrats 
than committed cadres. Postmodern Chinese art garners top dollar on the market, 
seemingly more tied to the accumulation of cultural capital than the reflection of social 
conditions. Popular resentment against the emergence of a new social hierarchy has 
continued to spill over into outbreaks of discontent. 
It is no wonder, then, that under Xi Jinping formalism has reemerged as a target. 
Critiquing the Party’s increasing alienation from the people it serves, in 2013 Xi 
declared formalism as one of the ‘four forms of decadence’ (si feng) to be opposed, along 
with ‘bureaucratism’ (guanliaozhuyi), ‘hedonism’ (xianglezhuyi), and ‘extravagance’ 
(shemi).4 His critique of formalism echoes Mao’s own criticisms of selfishness within 
the Party’s style of work. Xi has sought to channel popular discontent with a Party 
perceived as hopelessly out of touch; by bringing back rhetoric against formalism, he 
seems to suggest that the Party should return to its populist roots, and that its formal 
gestures correspond to a sincere commitment to social life. 
But what is missing from Xi’s critique of formalism is the dynamic interplay between 
ideological form and social content—one fuelled by the ever-churning internal roiling 
within social life. Mao’s critique of formalism was connected to the necessity of 
recognising continuously changing social conditions and contradictions, and how they 
foster new forms of knowledge that aid in analysing them. Mao thrived upon, if not 
relished, the kind of social upheaval that made visible new roads of political possibility. 
Xi has abandoned class struggle in favour of consolidating national unity. However, 
railing against the sins of formalism while trying to tamp down any kind of grassroots 
social struggle ensures that this critique will remain stuck in the logic of formalism—
an ironic cliché. 





‘Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question germane to the revolution.’1 Found at the very beginning of Mao’s Selected Works, these words would remain as key pillars of the thought of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) throughout the years of Maoism. They appeared a few years 
before the rustication process that transformed the CCP into a distinctly telluric Maoist 
revolutionary force.2 They were also words written some time before Western theory 
discovered the centrality of the friend/enemy dyad to the concept of the political 
through the work of Carl Schmitt. While friend and enemy were never used by Schmitt 
as an exhaustive definition, he, nevertheless, came to regard it as being at the ‘essence 
of the political.’3 In terms of understanding not only modern Chinese history but also, 
at a more general theoretical level, the very concept of the political, this friend/enemy 
dyad is, then, central.4 
Schmitt may have theorised the friend/enemy binary, but Mao lived it. The Maoist 
years were built on this knife edge and it was not until the death of Mao and the arrest of 
the radical Maoists that the question of friend and enemy would give way to the binary 
of profit and loss. Along with this shift, attitudes toward Mao and his revolutionary 
ideas also changed. His fall from grace, both in China and in the West, was spectacular. 
In China, Mao was brought down from his ‘sacred pedestal’ by a combination of official 
criticism of his (later) radical years and, as economic reform kicked in, by a gradual 
commodification and trinketisation of his image.5 If the Chinese critiques brought the 
Chairman back to earth, Western reassessments sent him straight to hell. ‘Marx, Mao, 
and Marcuse’ had once been a slogan chanted by Western leftist students in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Not anymore. By the turn of the century, that slogan was but a distant and 
embarrassing memory.6 Revelations of tens of millions of deaths in the Great Leap 
Forward, coupled with tales of fear, horror, and cruelty during the Cultural Revolution, 
had turned the image of Mao, even among Western radicals, on its head. As a result, 
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‘Marx, Mao, and Marcuse’ became ‘Hitler, Stalin, and Mao.’7 As the moral opprobrium 
that had once been reserved for Hitler and Stalin crept into Western understandings 
of Mao, in the antimony of good and evil, Mao became almost universally vilified and 
disdained—and depicted as evil manifest. 
Translated into a political form, good and evil became freedom and tyranny, and it 
was in this form that it became a key dyadic pressure point of Western politics. It was 
this politicised moral grid that came to define who ‘we’ in the West were by showing 
us what we stood against. Faced with such an overwhelmingly powerful and morally 
defining binary distinction, it became almost impossible to think of Mao and Maoism 
outside the shadows of this unholy good/evil binary and immoral triumvirate of 
twentieth-century dictators. 
At the Heart of the Political
Paradoxically, in Maoist China it was a similarly structured intense binary antagonism 
that would reduce the space to think outside the category of class struggle. In terms of 
political theory, however, the key difference between the Maoist binary of friend and 
enemy and the Western binary of good and evil is that Mao takes us directly to the heart 
of the political. As Carl Schmitt explains:
A definition of the political can be obtained only by discovering and defining 
the specifically political categories … . Let us assume that in the realm of 
morality the final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics 
beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable. The question 
then is whether there is also a special distinction which can serve as a simple 
criterion of the political and of what it consists. The nature of such a political 
distinction is surely different from that of those others. It is independent of 
them and as such can speak clearly for itself.                                    
The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can 
be reduced is that of friend and enemy.8
From 1927 onwards, Schmitt’s theoretical work turned on this question, which 
he claimed, ‘denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an 
association or disassociation.’9 For Schmitt, this friend/enemy dyad was not only the 
specific political distinction to which all political actions and motives could be reduced, 
but it was also a particular form that would manifest as the political in ‘the most 
extreme antagonism.’10 Indeed, according to Jan-Werner Müller, Schmitt came to think 
of the political as ‘purely a matter of intensity,’ and it was at its most intense, Schmitt 
would later write, in the ‘telluric partisanship’ of Mao Zedong.11 It was Mao’s telluric 
partisanship, derived from years of rustication, that came closer—‘closer than Lenin,’ 
Schmitt tells us—to what he called ‘the core of the matter,’ and the core of the matter for 
Schmitt was always the political.12 
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In circling around Schmitt’s concept of the political and a Maoist political practice 
predicated upon an intensification of the friend/enemy dyad, this encounter becomes 
not just a history of a nation-state or Party, and far more than a simple record of tyranny. 
Read together, Mao and Schmitt lead to broader conceptual questions as to the nature 
of the Schmittian political as it congeals into a form of Maoist governmentality.13 
Registered in this fashion, the Maoist historical moment opens onto a radically 
different understanding of both Chinese political history and how to approach the 
concept of the political. Put simply, while this is a concrete, culturally, and temporally 
specific moment, creating a unique and irreproducible political form (Maoism), it 
nevertheless opens onto a broader conceptual question but only after (Western) political 
philosophy articulates it. These questions gain form in  material practices rather than 
purely text-based conceptualisations, and focus on the affective, and not simply the 
rational dimensions of human life. Engendering these sorts of practices, technologies, 
and machinery, Maoism attempted—sometimes murderously—to develop a system 
based on tapping into affective energy flows and transforming these flows into political 
energy through a process of intensification. This is where the grid of class struggle 
would provide Maoism with a mechanism to intensify (see Russo’s essay in the present 
volume).
Manufacturing Emotions
While class struggle was ever present, the state machinery operated to intermittently 
press forth with rhythmically pulsating political campaigns that intensified as the 
category of enemy was deepened and extended. Such campaigns were an attempt to 
harness and channel political intensity. To work with intensity is to work off affect. 
Hence, Maoism was attempting to design machinery to channel ‘affective,’ as well as 
cognitive knowledge forms in order to produce a revolutionary intensity which would 
manifest not just with words, but with the evocation of feelings registered by lumps in 
the throat, goosebumps on the skin, or the pounding of a revolutionary heart (see Lee’s 
essay in the present volume). In other words, it attempted to develop technologies to 
focus the revolution on a process of ‘touching people to their very soul’ by instituting 
an economy of sacrifice.14
To produce this sacrifice, a form of governmentality emerged around the production, 
channelling, and harnessing of political intensity, which would be produced by framing 
the abstract question of friend and enemy in the language of class struggle. Through 
struggle, the abstraction of the dyadic form became an existentially felt knowledge and 
the machinery of the Party-state was redesigned to channel that knowledge and energy 
into the struggle and into personal sacrifice.
That these Maoist experiments failed—and sometimes failed spectacularly with the 
loss of millions of lives—is without question. Moral opprobrium is in order, but it needs 
to be put into context. Here was a new, revolutionary political practice (Maoism) that 
attempted to manage the social through the channelling of affectivity. These very early, 
sometimes very rudimentary, devices and technologies were attempting to harness 
and direct an affective flow and turn it into an intensity that would build toward an 
economy of sacrifice. This stands in sharp contrast to the government of flows within 
liberal market economy-based democracies and it took many struggles to arrive at this 
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point. In its earlier manifestations, capitalist market expansion saw a litany of abuses, 
famines, and deaths—colonialism, imperialism, and slavery. While we seldom affix the 
word ‘murderous’ to this form of government, it must be remembered that the new 
technologies of capitalism spread, not just through scientific advances, but by forcibly 
creating new markets through imperialism and colonialism, and by producing and 
trading in any commodity on a mass scale, be that opium or slaves.15
Viewed in this light, the Maoist experiment needs to be recognised as a complex 
and fragmentary set of lessons that, despite all the problems, threw up technologies, 
machines, and questions about the political that are currently difficult to ignore. 
Faux Friends
It would, no doubt, be tempting to try to address the complexity of Maoism by 
adopting the binary of tyranny and freedom. Indeed, in drawing attention to the link 
between Mao and Schmitt, I have possibly supplied critics with new ammunition. 
After all, someone could point out that Schmitt, a Nazi Party member, praised Mao, 
the left-wing tyrant. To suggest, however, that the two extremes are comparable is 
a  misunderstanding based on the fact that while these ‘extremes’ may theoretically 
and practically direct our attention to the affectively based elements in the production 
of the political, they certainly do not share a political viewpoint. In other words, the 
operations of such regimes rely on the capture of political intensity, whereas liberal 
democracies try to extinguish these intensities or dissipate their effects through market 
forces. Whereas Maoism attempted a Cultural Revolution as a means to develop 
machines of intensification, neoliberal democracies used the Culture Industry as 
a means to limit or dissipate those same energy flows. 
The singular intensity of Maoist class struggle was replaced by a dispersion of this 
energy as it was transformed into a million desires that actually took the form of one 
single desire for the commodity. These two distinct modes of being political still revolve 
around the friend/enemy distinction, but do so in different ways, taking us well beyond 
both Schmitt and Mao. Whereas Maoism agglutinates energy, channelling it toward 
an intensity, liberal democracy attempts to stave off such intensities by dissipating and 
transforming them into material desires.16 As this liberal agenda now gives way to 
a right wing populist surge worldwide, it would indeed be ironic if the use of Schmitt 
to explain Mao now led to an understanding of Maoist technologies that, theoretically, 
help us understand the emergence of the Alt-Right. 




In recent years, we have witnessed renewed scholarly attention to the phenomenon that usually goes by the name of ‘global Maoism’—that is, worldwide interest and admiration for the radical politics China embraced in the 1960s and 1970s. With 
few notable exceptions, depictions of Maoism outside China—and especially in ‘the 
West’—almost universally highlight the infantile fascination for a poorly understood 
reality, the quasi-religious pilgrimages to the land of ascetic communism, and the 
immediate reversal of judgments when the ‘truth’ was revealed and communes were 
shown to be, at best, Potemkin villages. Even when the study’s declared intent is to 
take ‘Western Maoism’ seriously, Western Maoists still tend to be depicted as unwitting 
orientalists, whose fascination with China was a youthful phase in a process of 
development towards better, more respectable politics—human rights, feminism, gay 
rights, etc.1 As one former French Maoist famously quipped, that China existed only ‘in 
our heads.’2 As a figment of the Euro-American imagination, ‘that China’ could point 
the way to more mature discoveries, but it had only a dreamlike existence.
While we should not ignore the naïveté, the ignorance, and the orientalism that 
characterised the reconfiguring of China in the long 1960s, there is a certain amount of 
smug certainty in the presumption of having now a more objective, finally uncorrupted 
view of Maoism. It is certainly not the case that the ideological lenses of triumphant 
capitalism are less thick than those which framed the rosy views of the 1960s. More 
importantly, I believe that the denial of any political and intellectual value in the 
experience of global Maoism obscures, rather than frees, our own understanding of 
that historical moment, in China and abroad. We should continue asking why Maoist 
China operated as a significant point of reference for activists in completely different 
situations—from Africa to South America, from Paris to Oakland—and why it was 
precisely Maoism that provided a vocabulary and a syntax for many of the political 
struggles of the long 1960s. In this essay, I will highlight what was valuable in the 
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sympathetic perspective towards Maoism, and what we can learn by taking seriously 
people who engaged the Maoist experience on its own terms. Does it do any good to 
have (Maoist) China in our heads today?
Pathological Alterities 
In my book The End of Concern, I trace the history of a group of young US professors 
and graduate students—the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS)—who 
came together in the late 1960s, united in their criticism of US policies in Asia and of 
the complicity of the field of Asian Studies in those policies.3 While not Maoists, most 
CCAS members were nevertheless sympathetic to Maoist China, in particular to the 
experiments of the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward, which they saw 
as pursuing an alternative path to both American capitalism and Soviet dirigisme—‘an 
egalitarian development, an industrial development without dehumanisation, one that 
involves everyone and affects everyone.’4 To that extent, they stood in radical opposition 
to the general academic consensus in the US. 
In the late 1960s, the social sciences (as well as public opinion and, one could argue, 
the US government itself) were dominated by Modernisation Theory, an approach 
that evaluated societies according to their position along a supposedly ‘typical’ path 
of development—with contemporary US society at the pinnacle, and socialist states 
depicted as having embarked on a deviant, ‘pathological’ trajectory. Modernisation 
theorists like Walt Rostow joined the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and 
directed a foreign policy actively fostering—and often imposing—the ‘correct’ model 
onto other nations.
In this academic and political context, Asian Studies occupied a peculiar place: the 
field was constituted, like all area studies, in the immediate postwar period, primarily 
through direct government intervention, and it remained largely defined by the Cold 
War imperative to ‘know thy enemy.’ Then, immediately after its establishment, Asian 
Studies became one of the main targets of McCarthyism, as a first round of attacks, 
focussed on the ‘loss of China,’ was directed against the scholar Owen Lattimore and 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, which, since 1925, had been the most important 
international NGO promoting research about and relations between the countries of 
the Pacific Rim.5 The McCarthy purges defined the early history of Asian Studies in 
the US, not only through overt persecution, but more subtly, through the self-imposed 
silence of an entire generation of scholars, who learned to constrain their questions. 
Imperialism and colonialism were never mentioned as factors in the historical trajectory 
of Asian nations; at best, as in the work of leading China historian John K. Fairbank, 
‘the West’ appeared as a naturally emerging challenge, to which ‘the East,’ because of 
its cultural obduracy and traditional mentality, could not respond. Modern Chinese 
history was, according to Fairbank, the often tragic process of a civilisation divesting 
itself of difference to fit the needs of modernity.6 China, from the perspectives of Area 
Studies and Modernisation Theory, could either persist in its obstinate (and ultimately 
pathological) alterity, or accept reality and become ‘like us.’
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An Alternative Vision 
This was the regime of academic thought to which CCAS reacted, spurred not only 
by their opposition to the Vietnam War—which they argued was abetted by the silence 
of their teachers—but also by their sympathy for the Maoist experiments of the Cultural 
Revolution—experiments not only dismissed by, but de facto invisible to, the then-
current academic consensus. Coherently, members of CCAS directed their criticism 
and, at times, their mocking derision first and foremost at the ideological assumptions 
behind the dominant US attitudes towards Asia. For example, they pointed out how 
the field was incapable of producing an analysis of Maoist socioeconomic change 
that exceeded the narrow focus on economic growth, thus making experiments that 
conceived of economic change as only ancillary to radical political transformation 
completely unintelligible. More damningly, CCASers showed how their opponents 
had actually made invisible the economic growth that was happening under socialism: 
because Modernisation Theory deemed socialist human relations to be fundamentally 
incompatible with economic growth, any economic growth taking place under 
Maoism had to be explained away. Similarly, they chided the field’s inability to give 
any consideration either to the revolutionary agency of the masses or to the contents of 
their revolutionary effort, arguing that the dominant analyses rested on studies of elite 
politics and bureaucratic forms, with change coming only from the top down with the 
Chinese people being reduced to ‘objects to be administered.’7 
The political biases that the CCAS uncovered were hidden under a thick ideological 
discourse, one that continuously asserted the neutral location of the (American) 
academics who studied China and the objective character of their knowledge. Thus, 
completely unwarranted assumptions about capitalism, modernisation, development, 
and the production of knowledge were peddled as objective, rational principles with 
which to judge Asia and Asian people. The blindness of the profession towards Maoism 
revealed a much more profound one towards the profession’s own constitution and 
ideological framework. The CCAS’s critique then predated—albeit in a much less 
theoretical fashion—that of Said’s orientalism and of postcolonialism.8 
CCASers did not limit themselves to a critique of the dominant ideology but also 
offered an alternative vision, one based on the recognition of the political reality of the 
Chinese experiments. This meant evaluating Maoist China in terms of its own goals 
and its own methods for attaining them, thus recognising their validity. Contrary to 
any academic pretension of political neutrality, a true understanding of Maoism could 
come only from a certain degree of political sympathy (in the sense of ‘feeling together’), 
and from the acknowledgement that Chinese people were subjects with whom political 
and theoretical experiences could be shared. Politics, or the ‘commitment to the need 
for revolutionary change’ in Asia, was the prerequisite for a concomitant ‘re-orientation 
of the scholarship and teaching in the field.’9 If Maoism could potentially represent the 
search for a more humane, more egalitarian alternative to existing forms of development, 
then those alternative practices could only be understood through a different scholarly 
approach, one that rejected the technocratic/culturalistic framework of the existing 
social sciences. Accepting the value of these revolutions required first and foremost 
a drastic shift in the very structure of intellectual thought. In that, CCAS was part of 
a larger movement of dissent within the academy, often framed around the same terms.
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Rediscovering Maoist China Today
That larger movement left a profound mark on academic, intellectual, and pedagogical 
practices, as it was connected to the emergence of postcolonial studies, gender studies, 
and critical theory in general. But the contemporary relevance of the approach to 
Maoist China in the long 1960s is much more in question. Yet, I would argue that there 
is plenty in that perspective—as mesmerised, fanciful, and naïve as it certainly was at 
times—that is still significant, or rather newly relevant, to how we study Maoist China 
today. 
First, if, as in the case of the CCAS, we understand political sympathy not as silly 
nostalgia for a revolutionary era, but rather as the need to engage Maoist politics as 
politics, then that should in turn lead us to accept that the history of Maoist China is 
a history of political subjects at all levels. Despite certain recent efforts, the history of 
Maoism largely remains split into two parallel lines: the old, Cold War focus on the 
intrigues and sophistry of Party leaders at the top, and, at the bottom, the voices of 
‘the people,’ who, it is alleged, either lived ordinary lives or were dragged into frenzied 
mass movements and divided into opposing camps, as either victims or perpetrators.10 
One way to avoid this dichotomy might be to engage with the actors in our sources—
whether that is Mao or a lowly cadre—by taking their pronouncements, their beliefs, 
and their language seriously. Seriously, but not uncritically. Which means not assuming 
that those who professed Maoism were either duped or lying.11 
Secondly, unlike the CCAS generation, historians of the Maoist period have been 
temporarily enjoying a relative abundance of new materials, in either archival or 
‘garbological’ collections. This has unfortunately coincided with a resurgence of an 
often uncritical empiricism, where sources are mined for nuggets of facticity, allegedly 
capable of revealing the ‘truth’ of life under Maoism.12 In this context, the CCAS’s 
attempted evisceration of our presupposed neutrality and ‘objectivity,’ their incessant 
self-examination of the scholars’ own projections, might be a useful reminder for 
a younger generation to avoid reproducing old blinders or inventing new ones. 
Finally, while we have largely moved away from the Cold War discourse on China, 
in recent years, orientalist tropes of ‘Asian values’ or ‘Chinese characteristics’ have been 
deployed—in China and elsewhere—to articulate differences within a triumphant 
global capitalism. The CCAS’s critique of Western perspectives should alert us to how 
China is still, in many ways, trapped between its unredeemable difference or its drive to 
‘become like us.’ And the CCAS’s recognition of political subjectivities across borders 
might suggest to us a more productive way of engaging with China, as well as our own 
relationship to that location.





When I graduated from university in 1966, I sincerely believed what I was taught, 
that I was a brand-new bolt to be used in the construction of the great mansion 
of communism. I was willing to be put wherever my country needed me,  
and I was prepared to stay in place my whole life.
To me, Mao was like God. I believed that he was not only the great leader  
of the Chinese people, but also the great leader of people throughout the world.  
I feared the day when he would no longer be with us. I really hoped there’d be a 
scientific breakthrough that’d enable young people like us to give up voluntarily  
a year of our own lives, to add a minute to his. That way the world would be saved.
Dai Qing, 19951
I have sometimes used these remarks in a course I teach on modern Chinese history to illustrate the extent to which young people were in thrall to Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution. They also appear as the first of three epigraphs 
in Frederick Teiwes’s essay, ‘Mao and His Followers,’ which I regularly set as required 
course reading. Echoing Teiwes, I tell my students that the epigraphs exemplify Mao’s 
stature in a totalitarian Party-state system, in which ‘virtually all members of the body 
politic became the Chairman’s followers, willingly or not, with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm.’2 
Reading Dai Qing’s remarks this way translates her enthusiasm for Mao’s revolutionary 
vision into a delusion. Dai Qing herself wanted to be read this way. She discussed her 
youthful wish to extend Mao’s life to highlight by contrast how, upon regaining her 
senses, she ‘didn’t shed a single tear when Mao died. I felt I’d been cheated. I’ve never 
visited the Mao mausoleum. It is so disgusting.’ Comparing Mao with Deng Xiaoping, 
she said: 
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Mao had the personality of a romantic poet. Deng’s is that of a pragmatist. 
He is not a puritanical theoretician or an idealist. He is different from Mao 
in that he knows that when people are hungry they need to eat. They can’t 
live on poetry.3 
While Dai wanted to convey the necessity of the reforms launched by Deng, her 
characterisation of Mao as ‘romantic,’ ‘puritanical,’ and ‘idealistic’ was not entirely 
negative. Moreover, there is something wistful about her comment—‘They can’t live 
on poetry’—as if she were wondering what might have happened if people could live 
on poetry. 
At any rate, it is generally through poetry, including song lyrics and religious uses 
of poetic language in chants, mantras, and prayers, that senses of the sacred are given 
expression. Geoffrey Hartman provides the helpful observation that: 
The sacred has so inscribed itself in [poetic] language that while it must be 
interpreted, it cannot be removed. One might speculate that what we call 
the sacred is simply what must be interpreted or reinterpreted, ‘A Presence 
which is not to be put by.’4 
What does it mean to write about ‘immortality’ in relation to communism, Mao 
Zedong Thought, and people’s experiences of life under Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) rule in Mao’s time and since? A pat answer would be that immortality is 
a figment of the imagination. One could always trot out the Cultural Revolution chant, 
‘May Chairman Mao live ten thousand years, a hundred million years!’ (mao zhuxi 
wansui wanwansui), as an example of how dangerous it is to believe in immortality. 
Yet, to dismiss the Cultural Revolution as totalitarian brainwashing prevents us from 
engaging with people’s reverence for Mao productively, as a certain experience of the 
sacred, however disfigured. 
As Dai Qing’s remarks make plain, she wanted Mao to live longer because ‘that way 
the world would be saved.’ The ‘immortal,’ as longevity, is bound to the ‘sacred’ as that 
which endures and grants meaning and purpose to otherwise mortal lives. A prosaic 
reading of Dai’s remarks confines us to see how Mao was exalted and worshipped. 
A poetic reading allows us to dwell on how people were genuinely inspired by Mao 
to defend communism as a sacred cause: how communism—as interpreted by Mao 
through Mao Zedong Thought—became a certain ‘Presence which is not to be put 
by.’ The frequent posthumous references to Mao and his legacy in mainland public 
discourse as ‘undecaying’ (buxiu) gestures to something incorruptible that remains 
worthy of commemoration, despite the violence and extreme suffering of the Maoist 
years. 
Undecaying 
Hartman took his figuration of the sacred from William Wordsworth’s ‘Ode on 
Intimations of Immortality.’ Wordsworth’s poetic formulation of ‘a Presence which is 
not to be put by’ alludes to the sacred as a truth that commands our attention: one 
we cannot escape except through childlike oblivion or wilful denial. Immortality for 
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Wordsworth was the spiritual dimension of human existence: ‘We respect the corporeal 
frame of man, not merely because it is the habitation of a rational, but of an immortal 
soul.’5 This description is akin to the Chinese idea of immortality as the ‘undecaying’ 
hence ageless truth that the sagely embody, in life and after their death. The difference 
is that whereas the Christian tradition led Wordsworth to intimate a godly presence 
in human nature, the Chinese idea of buxiu is directly focussed on human continuity. 
Both, however, point to immortality as an idea borne of existential reflection on death 
as intrinsic to life. The immortal, whether as ‘a Presence which is not to be put by’ or as 
buxiu, articulates a human preoccupation with all that precedes and succeeds us; with 
what is, or has turned out to be, indestructible despite mortal brevity. 
The earliest extant appearance of buxiu is in the classic Confucian text Zuo 
Commentary (circa fourth century BCE), where the term was used to describe the 
sagely who are remembered for generations to come because they have ‘established 
their virtue, their deeds, and their words’ (li de, li gong, li yan). Simon Leys has observed 
that this ancient Chinese understanding of immortality meant that ‘life-after-life was 
not to be found in a supernature, nor could it rely upon artefacts: man only survives 
in man—which means, in practical terms, in the memory of posterity, through the 
medium of the written word.’6 Immortality, in the sense of an undecaying reputation, is 
a matter of human judgement. The Zhuangzi, a classic Daoist text, offers the following 
criteria for judging who among the dead ought to be remembered: 
Those who come before us but who have not explored the depths of 
knowledge to be worthy of their years are not our predecessors. Those who 
do not distinguish themselves as humans do not provide a path for [other] 
humans to follow. Those who do not produce a human path are thus called 
worthless people.7 
These Daoist criteria accord with the Confucian understanding of history as the 
ongoing textual transmission of life’s lessons and moral truths. To read Mao’s legacy 
against this longue durée context of instructive Confucian and Daoist stories (told and 
retold) of sagely and skilled humans is to be led to ask if there are things about Mao that 
have not ‘decayed.’ To understand immortality in these Sinophone terms requires us to 
consider the extent to which Mao’s textual remainders remain in some way constitutive 
of how mainland Chinese experience their lives and articulate their feelings and goals.8 
But let me first recall an influential 1919 essay by China’s leading liberal thinker Hu 
Shi titled ‘Immortality: My Religion’ to highlight the significance of buxiu in modern 
Chinese thought.9 To transpose premodern buxiu into a modern democratic idiom, 
Hu employed two concept-metaphors, ‘lesser self ’ (xiao wo) and ‘greater self ’ (da wo). 
He described China as an ‘immortal society,’ the permanence of an evolving ‘greater 
self ’ to which mortal humans are bound and to which they must contribute as ‘lesser 
selves’ over their lifetimes: 
This ‘lesser self ’ that is me [wo zhege ‘xiaowo’] has no independent existence. 
It has direct or indirect relations of mutual influence with an infinite number 
of other ‘lesser selves,’ the whole of society and the world as a totality … . 
All kinds of causalities past and present, created by an infinite number of 
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‘lesser selves’ and an infinite number of other forces, have become a part 
of the ‘lesser self ’ that is me. This ‘lesser self ’ that is me, combined with 
various causalities past and present will be passed on to future generations 
to constitute an infinite number of future ‘lesser selves.’ From one generation 
to the next, an unbroken chain is formed, drop by drop, an incessant 
torrent results to become the ‘greater self ’ … . Although the ‘lesser self ’ 
will die, the conduct of every ‘lesser self,’ the sum of its merits and flaws, 
its every word and deed, no matter great or small, true or false, good or 
evil, is preserved in that ‘greater self.’ That ‘greater self ’ is thus the stele and 
the ancestral hall commemorating virtues past, the book of judgement and 
posthumous titles indicting crimes committed that generations of filial sons 
and loving descendants cannot alter. Because this ‘greater self ’ is immortal, 
the endeavours of all ‘lesser selves’—every word and deed, gesture and idea, 
merit and flaw—become equally immortal. This is none other than the 
immortality of society, the immortality of the ‘greater self.’
Accordingly: 
The ‘lesser self ’ that I am at present must shoulder an immense responsibility 
not only for that eternal ‘greater self ’ that has always preceded me but also 
for that ‘greater self ’ that is eternally in the future. Thus, I must always 
contemplate: in what ways can I best apply myself to ensure that the present 
‘lesser self ’ is worthy of the ‘greater self ’s’ eternal past and does not bring 
calamity to the eternal future of the ‘greater self?’ 10
These passages from Hu indicate the ease in modern Chinese intellectual discourse 
of reading buxiu as an ever-changing—hence never-decaying—world to which one 
belongs and helps to renew. A similar idea is implicit in Dai Qing’s self-reference as 
‘a brand-new bolt to be used in the construction of the great mansion of communism’ 
albeit far more narrowly and rigidly articulated. Whereas Hu conceived of an ever-
evolving ‘greater self,’ constituted as much by the flaws as merits of countless ‘lesser 
selves,’ communism for Dai Qing was synonymous with Mao, the ‘greater self ’ with 
which all ‘lesser selves’ must form a perfect union. The popular Cultural Revolution 
slogan—attributed to the soldier-martyr Lei Feng—that one must desire to be 
‘a revolutionary screw that never rusts,’ illustrates a similarly drastic reduction of the 
greater to mean the eternal machine of communist revolution that one must serve 
as a perfect cog. The more deterministic da wo becomes, the less room there is for 
variations in individual xiao wo agency. During the Cultural Revolution, we could say 
that the idea of buxiu shifted from a sense of ‘never-decaying’ historical change to an 
Orwellian ‘endless present’ in which Chairman Mao was always right.11 
Decaying 
The feverish chanting of Cultural Revolution slogans lasted for as long as the Party-
state was able to devote energy and resources to sustaining Mao’s vision of continuous 
revolution. A decade after Mao’s death in 1976, with post-Maoist economic reforms 
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underway, the Beijing novelist Wang Shuo became a bestselling success with his parodies 
of Maoist discourse in works such as The Operators (Wanzhu, 1987), ‘An Attitude’ 
(Yidian zhengjing meiyou, 1989), and Don’t Treat Me as a Human Being (Qianwan bie 
ba wo dang ren, 1989). The farcical treatment of Maoist discourse in mainland China 
from the 1980s is analogous to the parodic uses of official language known as stiob 
which flourished in the Soviet Union from the late 1970s. Wang’s characters speak 
in ways that echo Alexei Yurchak’s description of stiob as requiring ‘such a degree of 
overidentification with the object, person, or idea at which this stiob was directed that it 
was often impossible to tell whether it was a form of sincere support, subtle ridicule, or 
a peculiar mixture of the two.’12 
Yurchak’s highlighting of the ambivalence in stiob is important. In China as in the 
Soviet Union, playful, sardonic overidentification with the language of the Party gave 
people a sense of social communion and solidarity in post-Maoist times, based on their 
prior experience of Maoist sociality. What Wang and others parodied was the discourse 
taught and approved by the Party that became linguistically ordered around Mao 
Zedong Thought in the Cultural Revolution years. This was a discourse shaped, among 
others, by Lin Biao (Mao’s one-time successor before Lin’s purge and death in 1971), 
Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife), and her fellow-members in the Central Cultural Revolution 
Small Group formed under Mao’s orders in 1966. Mao’s own words, conversely, have 
largely been spared this profane treatment.13 This distinction between the Party’s Maoist 
formulations and actual ‘quotations from Chairman Mao’ (Mao zhuxi yulu) is crucial. 
Because the Party’s formulations derived their authority from Mao, they were never 
and could never have been equal to the Chairman’s, as it were, unique authorial voice. 
The Party’s foundational motto, ‘Serve the People’ (wei renmin fuwu) is an interesting 
case in point (see Karl’s essay in the present volume). Its authority derives from the 
title of a short speech that Mao delivered on 8 September 1944 to eulogise Zhang Side, 
a communist soldier who had died in an accident three days earlier while making 
charcoal.14 Much of Mao’s speech highlighted the CCP’s commitment to always ‘have 
the interests of the people and the sufferings of the great majority at heart’ such that 
‘when we die for the people, it is a worthy death.’ Today, when protestors seek to hold 
the government accountable on any number of issues, they invoke this motto both 
seriously and as a jibe. The Beijing-based writer Yan Lianke’s darkly humorous 2005 
novel Serve the People depicts a love affair during the Cultural Revolution in which 
the characters aroused each other by using ‘Serve the People!’ as their private code 
word. In doing so, Yan does not so much diminish as dramatise the affective force of 
the slogan as part of people’s everyday communication and interaction.15 Even when 
parodied, the motto, as Mao’s word, retains an inexorably normative rightness.
Earthly Immortality
In saying all this, I am not sacralising Mao. Rather, I want to highlight the ways in 
which his words have continued to enjoy a commanding presence in mainland public 
discourse. They are often what people reach for when they want to express their desire 
for a transformative politics. When student protestors at Tiananmen Square staged 
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a hunger strike in May 1989, they issued a manifesto that began with lines from a 1919 
essay by Mao: ‘This country is our country, this people our people: if we don’t speak out, 
who will? If we don’t take action, who will?’16 
When the highly regarded artist and social commentator Chen Danqing addressed 
a packed audience at Guangxi Normal University in 2011, he mused with stiob-like 
ambivalence that he ‘missed Mao very much.’ This was because people no longer 
knew how to be idealistic to the point where ‘because of your foolish ideal you’re even 
prepared to give up your life without regret and you might even laugh as you’re about 
to die.’ He continued:
Be truly fearless for there’s nothing to fear. That’s what Chairman Mao 
taught me. Don’t be afraid of heaven, earth, or capitalism … . He taught us 
to fear nothing. The culture today tells us to be ever fearful, to be good and 
obedient.17
Using Mao’s language to evoke an ideal attitude is clearly different from quoting Mao 
Zedong Thought. In these post-Maoist evocations that render Mao’s words serviceable 
for a variety of purposes, he has been restored, as it were, to ‘lesser self ’ status. For 
this to happen, Mao had to first be adjudged as fallibly human. The Politburo’s 1981 
Resolution did just that by determining Mao’s leadership as having been 70 percent 
correct and 30 percent wrong. Stories about Mao’s private life and habits have also 
become part of this ‘humanising’ process. There have been stories too of his irritation 
with being worshipped. For instance, at the million-strong rally of 18 August 1966, 
Mao reportedly replied to a Red Guard’s declared wish that ‘Chairman Mao live forever’ 
(zhu Mao zhuxi wanshou wujiang!) with the quip: ‘Even long life comes to an end!’18 
Mao, as an object of endless discussion, of stories publicly told and shared, has 
become demonstrably buxiu in Hu’s modern sense of a ‘lesser self ’ whose words and 
deeds, gestures and ideas, merits and flaws contribute to the ‘greater self ’s’ ongoing 
metamorphosis. Hannah Arendt’s defence of ‘earthly immortality’ as a necessary 
transcendence of ‘the life-span of mortal men’ resonates with Hu’s understanding of 
buxiu. In Arendt’s words: 
The common world is what we enter when we are born and what we leave 
behind when we die. It transcends our life-span into past and future alike … . 
It is what we have in common not only with those who live with us, but also 
with those who were here before and with those who will come after us. But 
such a common world can survive the coming and going of the generations 
only to the extent that it appears in public. It is the publicity of the public 
realm, which can absorb and make shine through the centuries whatever men 
may want to save from the natural ruin of time.19 
As literature, Mao’s evocations of immortality are not discordant with Arendt’s 
or Hu’s.  He saw unceasing change as a fundamental law of human existence. Mao 
expressed this idea lyrically in 1949 in his heptasyllabic classical-style poem, ‘The 
People’s Liberation Army Has Taken Nanjing.’ The poem’s last two lines, which draw on 
Daoist images of cosmic mutability, read: 
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If Heaven had feelings, it too would grow old,     
 Seas thrice turned into mulberry fields: that’s the way of the human world.20 
In 1958, he stated more prosaically: ‘Disequilibrium is normal and absolute, whereas 
equilibrium is temporary and relative.’21 Among the stories that have surfaced about 
Mao in recent years there is one concerning his 5 April 1954 visit to the Ming Tombs 
north-west of Beijing in the company of several ‘democratic personages’ (minzhu 
renshi).22 As his companions lamented the tombs’ state of disrepair and recommended 
to Mao that the tombs be restored to their former glory, Mao reportedly replied: 
The desire of these emperors to be immortal [buxiu] is both laughable and 
tragic. They built monuments to themselves using the blood and sweat of 
the labouring people, which is simply despicable. A true monument is built 
in the accounts of history. When established in the hearts of the people, it 
becomes a great monument; only then can it be called immortal. We should 
not be wasting our efforts on restoring ruins. That they are ‘ruins’ is their 
historical reality. People should come here to think about history and to see 
historical change.23 
These remarks do not appear in either the collected works of Mao or the six-
volume Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong: 1949–76 published in 2013.24 Official 
verification, however, is not the issue here. Rather, it is that citations of Mao are not the 
monopoly of the Party. 
Though few would wish to return to the totalitarian conditions that enabled the 
cult of the Chairman, in mainland public discourse, Mao’s passion for revolutionary 
change is often fondly remembered. For a large majority of people who experienced 
the Cultural Revolution as children, adolescents, and young adults, their erstwhile 
intense identification with Mao’s communist vision was, and remains, a powerful 
formative experience.25 Among them are senior Party officials born in the 1940s and 
1950s, including the incumbent CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, whose time in 
Liangjiahe village as a rusticated youth from 1968 to 1975 is presented by the Chinese 
state media as both character-building and shaping his leadership style. Yet like other 
post-Mao leaders since Deng Xiaoping, Xi has used Mao’s sayings to defend CCP rule 
as necessary and enduring. Discipline and stability are what he favours when speaking 
in his own voice. For instance, when Xi addressed students at Peking University on the 
95th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement in 2014, he said: 
Living one’s life is like buttoning up one’s jacket. If the first button is not 
fastened correctly, the rest will never find their rightful place. The buttons of 
life should be fastened well from the very beginning.26 
These words bear no trace of Mao. 
 






Since 1978, it has been fashionable, both inside China and around the world, to speak of the Maoist era as a period of near lawlessness, during which basic institutions of justice and adjudication essentially ceased to function in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), whether for purposes of criminal punishment or civil 
dispute resolution. In this telling, China had some form of traditional or capitalist legal 
system prior to 1949, and later recovered from the Maoist dark ages to reestablish a new 
rational developmentalist legal order that could underpin a new form of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, and eventually help give rise to a socialist market economy, 
while preserving the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power. The (re)construction 
of the legal system is thus central to the CCP’s ideological narrative of the reform era, 
even as critics abroad continue to decry China’s alleged rule of law shortcomings and 
pine for greater change (see Trevaskes’s essay in the present volume). Both the Party 
and its critics base their perspectives on an assumption that whatever legal order 
existed prior to the Revolution was destroyed or suspended, but not replaced, during 
the subsequent three decades. Both narratives make this explicit in claiming that no law 
functioned at all during the ‘long Cultural Revolution’ (1966–76). Unfortunately, such 
breathless teleological accounts misjudge and misconstrue the Maoist legal system that 
actually existed and functioned between 1949 and 1978.
Maoist Justice 
Maoist justice did not operate in a manner most legal scholars are trained to spot. Law 
was not essentially conservative,1 but rather functioned as a vehicle for mobilisation 
and an arena for political contestation.2 Critical to this was the fact that the polity—the 
set of politically empowered actors—was constantly contested and in flux, with dire or 
deadly consequences for any that might lose out in the high-stakes battles of Maoist 
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politics.3 Indeed, we can characterise Chinese law in the Maoist era as a ‘mobilisational 
legal regime,’ in which unsteady members of a divided polity regularly intervened in 
legal processes and adjudication in order to advance their own transformative political 
agendas. This stands in contrast to the ‘rational pluralism’ most rule of law perspectives 
assume ought to exist in what they define as well-functioning legal orders, where the 
polity is open and contested but adjudication remains free from political influence. 
It also differs from what I call ‘rule by law’ and ‘neotraditional regimes’ that we can 
observe in contexts where unified hierarchical polities either permit the formally 
rational adjudication of cases or intervene heavily into the legal process to protect their 
own interests.4 
The one force that prevented any devolution into outright and open conflict over the 
first 30 years of the PRC’s existence was Mao’s periodic charismatic intervention.5 Such 
interventions did not render the law or the operation of courts and legal institutions 
predictable or formally rational in Weberian terms. Maoist law thus retained 
a  thoroughly mobilisational character, with its unsettled polity taking an active role 
rather than promoting the ‘rational pluralism’ many legal scholars use as a touchstone 
(though this rarely exists, even at the times or in the places they tend to look to as 
rule of law paragons).6 If we recognise the law’s mobilisational nature in Maoist China, 
with its fractious and contested polity and heavy intervention by non-legal actors into 
the process of adjudication, we can analyse its legal order in a more dispassionate and 
objective manner, without endorsing it on normative grounds or condemning it as 
tyrannical lawlessness.
Law and politics did not manifest the same way in all courts or institutions across all 
of China at all times. Instead, we see differentiated patterns in rural versus urban areas 
and across time.7 Further, civil dispute resolution in areas other than family law was 
largely neglected, though not entirely absent.8 Family law was among the first priorities 
for the new regime after seizing power in 1949 and the implementation of the CCP’s 
Marriage Law has received a great deal of attention.9 Still, criminal law was the main 
focus of the CCP regime in its early days and throughout the Maoist period and is my 
main focus in this essay.10 Of course, criminal law in a revolutionary context carries 
some special connotations and enjoys an expansive scope. Criminals are defined as 
hostes to the new order, not simply ‘bad elements’ or ‘deviants.’11 Maoist mobilisational 
criminal law, therefore, served a critical function of rooting out and suppressing 
‘antagonistic’ contradictions through the application of legitimate state violence or 
coercive force (see Rojas’s essay in the present volume). Any other conception of law 
was at best secondary, if not reactionary or simply irrelevant.
The overall construction and reconstruction of legal institutions after 1949 was rapid. 
In cities, the CCP took over existing Republican courts where they existed and ensured 
that at least all prefecture-level cities (dijishi) had a functioning basic legal apparatus. 
In the countryside, there were fewer existing legal institutions to work with. The CCP 
often had to make new ones, more or less from scratch. In many places, only crude 
institutions of criminal justice could be established quickly. Chief among these were 
the so-called ‘justice sections’ (sifake) that many local governments set up for handling 
routine cases and ‘people’s tribunals’ (renmin fating) that operated under the direction 
of land reform teams for the ‘mass adjudication’ (gongshen) of alleged land reform-
related crimes.12 Overall, the preferred political method for implementing the new 
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system was the mass campaign (see Li’s essay in the present volume).13 This proved 
highly destabilising to more or less intact urban institutions, but provided resources 
and political impetus for the construction of previously absent or moribund rural 
ones.14
Eventually, all courts were regularised and brought into a nationally unified system 
under the 1954 Constitution and the Organic Law of People’s Courts enacted the 
same year. This created what has become China’s familiar four-level judicial system, 
with basic-level courts (jiceng fayuan) in every county or urban district, intermediate 
courts (zhongji fayuan) in every prefecture or equivalent city, a high court (gaoji 
fayuan) for each province or directly administered municipality, and the Supreme 
People’s Court (zuigao renmin fayuan) in Beijing as a court of final appeal. In each 
court, civil and criminal sections hear each type of case and every trial is presided 
over by either a single judge (for petty crimes or minor disputes) or more properly 
a three-judge panel (heyiting), comprised of a ‘presiding judge’ (shenpanzhang) and 
two associate judges—one of whom usually acts as the ‘principal adjudicating judge’ 
(zhushen faguan) with primary responsibility for determining the verdict and legal 
reasoning.15 Court personnel are appointed and overseen by the CCP’s political and 
legal affairs committee (zhengfawei) at the equivalent level, while court budgets are 
allocated by state fiscal organs (caizhengju/ting/bu) at the equivalent level.16 Also at 
each level, a procuratorate (jianchayuan) and public security bureau (gonganju/ting/
bu) were established to oversee investigations and prosecutions as well as police work 
and stability maintenance, respectively—resulting in the now-common acronym of 
gongjianfa to stand for the whole legal apparatus.
Though these institutions indeed grew into something resembling their modern 
forms between 1954 and 1978, their operation throughout the Mao era continued to 
be subjected to pervasive intervention by powerful and contending political actors—as 
well as by Mao and his underlings themselves, asserting his charismatic authority—
throughout the period. The manner and degree of intervention was different across 
specific moments over those several decades, however. Indeed, we can see a clear 
periodisation, in which land reform and the CCP takeover characterised legal politics 
between 1949 and roughly 1957, with a distinctly different pattern arising during the 
Great Leap Forward. This was followed by a period of relative calm and consistently 
harsh rectification during the early 1960s, before a decidedly new and novel framework 
emerged during the Cultural Revolution that remained (through various twists and 
turns) in place until Mao’s death.
Specific Manifestations
Immediately after the establishment of the PRC, the CCP set to work building and 
rebuilding legal institutions in the countryside. This took place in tandem with land 
reform (1950–52) and the upheavals it caused. Indeed, for the next 30 years, the roots 
of a great many criminal cases could be traced directly to the land reform period and 
to issues dating back to before 1949. Many counties established justice sections by 
1952 and most had seen widespread mass adjudication of land reform claims against 
‘counterrevolutionaries’(fangeming), ‘land bandits’ (tufei), and ‘illegal landlords’ (bufa 
dizhu), as well as alleged agents of the old regime. In addition to such cases, a high 
100   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
proportion of otherwise routine crimes were imbued with political content to facilitate 
their prosecution—for example, by calling a rapist or burglar a counterrevolutionary 
or bandit.
Also during this period, basic institutions of criminal adjudication and punishment 
grew up in the rural areas. ‘Reform through labour’ (laodong gaizao) camps and factories, 
prisons, and institutions capable of dispensing capital punishment and other penalties 
were all established, alongside at least proto-courts. The content of prosecutions 
remained overwhelmingly political and politicised. But the institutions and workings 
of justice began to come into being. Thus, on the eve of the enactment of the Organic 
Law and 1954 Constitution, most of rural China already had the makings of a legal and 
criminal justice system, albeit one that had grown up under the mobilisational politics 
of land reform and its immediate aftermath.
The situation in cities was markedly different. There, already existing courts were 
turned upside down through purges of judges and other officials during the many 
campaigns, such as those to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, the Three Antis, and Five 
Antis. Without the highly skilled and experienced, if politically suspect, old regime 
officials, urban courts and other institutions had difficulty continuing to function. 
Many cities resorted to mass rallies in the early 1950s to prosecute hundreds or even 
thousands of criminals en masse (sometimes punishing them—occasionally even by 
execution—immediately afterward). Once the campaigns subsided somewhat and the 
new institutional framework was enshrined in foundational laws, the urban courts 
returned to more or less routine functioning by the mid-1950s.17
The relative calm of the First Five-year Plan period (1953–57) was disrupted, 
however, in both cities and rural areas, by the Anti-rightist Campaign of 1957 and 
especially the Great Leap Forward (1958–62). Courts in the countryside became more 
heavily politicised during this period than any other, prosecuting multitudes of alleged 
counterrevolutionaries and punishing them very harshly, quite often for crimes related 
to their pre-1949 conduct or alleged misdeeds during land reform.18 Also during this 
period, ‘reeducation through labour’ (laodong jiaoyang), a form of administrative 
detention that allowed police to detain people without judicial recourse for up to 
three years for minor offences, became a favoured tool of public security bureaus, and 
appears (particularly in the early 1960s) to have been used to deprive many newly-
urban workers of their urban residency and relocate them back to their ‘home’ villages.19 
In the cities, the Great Leap Forward years were also a time of intense politicisation 
and political competition in the legal system, though most of this played out in the 
prosecution of workers for economic crimes related to cheating or undermining the 
aims of the new planned economy.20 Those alleged to have stolen supplies, sold ration 
tickets, or shirked official duties came in for especially harsh punishments. But so did 
those who were accused of undermining the Great Leap’s radical mobilisation through 
‘reactionary speech’ (fandong biaoyu)—for example, in questioning unrealistic plan 
targets or criticising excesses—or other misdeeds or omissions of thought or ideology.
During the 1962–66 period, both city and countryside saw reduced political 
intervention into most cases and an increased use of reeducation through labour to 
handle petty crimes and send would be migrants into cities back to rural hinterlands. 
The lack of much political intervention during this time actually reflects a decreased 
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use of formal legal processes and institutions as much as anything else. The Socialist 
Education Movement played out very strongly through the Chinese political system 
and legal apparatus, just not as clearly through direct and overt prosecution.
The Cultural Revolution years are often erroneously assumed to be a period during 
which law and the legal system ceased to operate or function.21 This is completely false. 
In both cities and rural areas, courts and other legal institutions continued to operate. 
Overall, the Cultural Revolution certainly led to many urban judges and officials being 
displaced and a much less predictable implementation of justice in cities,22 but in some 
rural settings it actually produced a far more professionalised legal order than might 
otherwise have been present, precisely because of the involvement of military cadres 
and ‘revolutionary committees,’ as well as the entry of rusticated youth and other urban 
intellectuals into many rural settings.23
Ultimately, by the end of the Maoist era the Chinese legal system was much more 
institutionalised in its form and regularised in its functioning than it had been in 1949. 
This was due primarily to the consistent assertion by Mao and his allies of his charismatic 
authority and claims to absolute leadership of the general revolutionary direction. 
The persistently mobilisational character of Maoist justice, however, resulted as much 
from the contestation of other rival political currents fighting for power as any ‘Mao in 
Command’ ideal. In fact, had Mao’s authority been more ironclad and the polity been 
more stable, it seems likely that we would have seen the emergence of a more settled 
legal order in China well before 1978. Yet, on the eve of reform, Chinese politics was as 
fractious as ever and the mobilisational character of Chinese law remained unchanged, 
despite all of the great upheavals in Chinese society more broadly.
The Rise of the Reform-era Hybrid 
Importantly, the advent of the reform era in 1978 did not mean a sudden break from 
the Maoist order or a comprehensive embrace of Anglo-American or Western models 
of a rule of law. Instead, the major changes that did occur were the fixing of polity 
membership and a conscientious decision on the part of Deng and other leaders to foster 
the development of a market economy. This led to a distinctive hybrid legal regime that 
persists to this day, in which criminal law is characterised by neotraditionalism—in 
which entrenched powerholders intervene pervasively into legal processes to protect 
their interests—while civil law, especially in the commercial sphere, was marked by 
what I term ‘rule by law’—in which a stable polity refrains from intervening into 
adjudication of specific cases.24
Once the struggle against the Gang of Four was complete and Hua Guofeng had been 
effectively outmanoeuvred, the new order led by Deng Xiaoping faced two essential 
tasks: keeping itself firmly in power, preventing any challengers, and promoting the 
market economic development they promised as China’s salvation and pathway to 
modernity. The first required pervasive intervention into the adjudication of criminal 
cases to ensure that any potential challengers to the new market order or, more bluntly, to 
the power of Deng and his faction, lost and were effectively sidelined or eliminated. The 
second necessitated the rollout of more predictable and formally rational adjudication 
processes and venues for civil dispute resolution to underpin a new system of contracts 
and market relations. We can see this pattern from at least the early 1980s forward, with 
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the imposition of campaigns like ‘strike hard’ (yanda) in criminal law alongside new 
systems of arbitration and legal clarification in areas like torts, contracts, and property 
law.
Indeed, without continued extralegal authority for the coercive apparatus,25 China’s 
leaders could not be confident in their ability to maintain power in the form of a polity 
stabilised since 1978. At the same time, without ‘tying the regimes hands,’26 China could 
never facilitate the development of markets on the scale or of the nature envisioned by 
Deng and his successors. Neotraditionalism and rule by law thus went hand in glove in 
the reform era’s particular developmentalist authoritarian order.
Reassessing China’s Legal Regime
In sum, Mao’s charisma helped prevent a breakdown of law or degeneration into a true 
bellum omnium contra omnes during the first three decades of the PRC. At the same 
time, his lack of total authority and the continuing high-stakes conflicts and struggles 
that characterised politics in the Mao era prevented any hardening of the polity’s 
boundaries or full routinisation of formally rational legal processes or adjudication. 
What prevailed was a highly idiosyncratic and astoundingly long-lived mobilisational 
legal regime, in which law definitely existed and legal institutions absolutely functioned, 
but in which law was always both a tool and a venue for political mobilisation and 
contestation. Understanding Maoist China’s mobilisational legal politics on their own 
terms is thus critical to avoiding mischaracterisations or assertions of lawlessness or 
obfuscations caused by trying to evaluate its legal order against some explicit or implied 
rule of law standard or template.





Images of work were a key genre in Maoist visual culture. There were images of people smiling as they worked to build an industrial base for socialist China, but also of people whose countenance expressed total absorption in work by 
either focussing completely on the object they were producing or staring intently at 
their colleagues during meetings or training sessions. In these photos, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) was often not immediately visible—Party members did not 
wear clothing that distinguished them from ordinary people—but its ‘spirit’ (dangxing) 
was present in the gaze of the workers and energy transmitted through their gestures. 
The accompanying texts further emphasised that the CCP was always beside them, 
guiding workers forward into a radiant future. 
Since that promised socialist future had not yet come, people expectantly laboured 
away at laying railroads, forging factories, and bringing new lands under the plough. 
In  visual representations of workers engaged in these practices, there are no traces 
of tensions between workers of different socioeconomic positions, backgrounds, or 
competences.1 The developmental process of transforming China from an agrarian 
country into an industrial powerhouse appears to involve absolutely no coercion. 
In the imagined world of Mao era labour, no government official ever forces recalcitrant 
workers to perform their job against their will. No administrator ever reprimands 
or punishes workers for being lazy, dragging their feet, or disobeying orders.2 
In  photographs, the CCP and Chinese workers seem to be seamlessly connected. 
China’s socialist revolution looks to be a complete success, and as Vladimir Lenin 
dreamed would happen, the division between state and society had withered away.3 
According to official propaganda, the will of the Chinese people and the CCP had 
become one and existed together in perfect harmony, as they enthusiastically walked 
together on an ever-triumphant developmental road towards socialism (see also 
Franceschini’s essay in the present volume).4 Workers broke production records, 
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national economic output ascended higher and higher, and Chinese socialism grew 
stronger and more prosperous by the day. The Party-state allocated fairly the fruits 
of labour, and everyone was content with what they gave and received from socialist 
China. The mass media, thus, contained no images highlighting the administratively 
managed urban-rural divide or the preferential treatment given to state-owned 
enterprises, such as more welfare guarantees.5 In my study of Maoist visual culture, 
I have rarely encountered mass media photos of Party administrators paying workers 
for their labour-time even though the reception of wages by urban workers and work-
points by rural labourers was a managerial ritual that punctuated everyday life.6 
Dam, ‘Long Live Chairman Mao!’ (early 1970s)
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Compensation, Community, and Socialist Reciprocity
Despite attempts to erase the difference between the Party and the workers, Mao-era 
images still contained traces of their differentiation. This political divide is perceptible 
in photos of local Party representatives giving work units (danwei, see Kevin Lin’s 
essay in the present volume) material objects, such as an apartment block, a hospital, 
a cultural centre, or a radio.7 More than a wage, these objects, and how they were 
given, resembled a gift granted to the collective group rather than to one individual 
or family. The Party did not bestow a work unit with a new apartment block because 
of a contractual obligation but on the basis of a generalised reciprocity.8 There was 
an expectation that the Chinese people were part of the same shared endeavour, and 
individual contributions would even out over time like drops accumulated in a vast 
ocean. The Party presented a group of workers with a new material object, not because 
of their economic performance but as a symbol of the Party’s unconditional concern 
for their wellbeing and gratitude for their ardent commitment to China’s socialist cause. 
In line with Maoist China’s productivist ethos, most images did not depict consumer 
goods limited to the consumption of an individual, family, or particular work unit. 
The Party’s gifts were electrical lines bringing power to large undifferentiated areas, 
stockyards full of machinery laying in wait to raise national productivity, or railroads 
shuttling around passengers and freight for the good of the entire Chinese people.
In return for its generosity, the Party demanded altruism. People were not supposed 
to act like bourgeois subjects who worked only on the basis of material incentives 
or in pursuit of personal fame. Images in the mass media made it look as if China 
had already realised the communist ideal of workers motivated by their commitment 
to the collective good. Within the phantasmagorical realm of Maoist imagery, the 
disappearance of any contradictions between the Party and labour render the term 
‘command economy’ misleading, since the Party no longer needed to give ‘orders’ to the 
Chinese people who already knew in their hearts what needed to be done. 
Dead Labour and the Socialist Pastoral
But workers’ power is also augmented by the prosthesis of machinery and technology. 
What Karl Marx called ‘dead labour’ are the material objects of production that are 
used to achieve even higher levels of economic output.9 Monumental dead labour, such 
as factory complexes and hydroelectric dams, was a recurrent motif in Mao-era visual 
culture as a testament to China’s rise as an industrial power (see the image on page 
104). Thanks to labour’s collective efforts, new railroads were traversing mountains 
and linking the totality of the nation into a cohesive whole. Dams were looming high 
above riverbeds and pumping electricity into power grids. Factories were sprouting up 
all over, and assembly lines were churning out ever-larger quantities of standardised 
industrial goods.10 
Some images of monumental dead labour just showcased the machinery. Others 
depicted different relationships between labour and machinery. One kind of image 
staged the moment when workers began to use a machine for the first time, such as 
a tractor, and locals gathered around and gazed with joyous wonder at the new industrial 
world emerging before their very eyes. Other human-machine images depicted workers 
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at home in their new machine-bodies and technologies. There were no intimations 
that the industrialisation of work was an alienating process that subjected labour to 
a disciplinary regime in which administrative personnel regularly monitored workers, 
evaluated both their political and economic performance, and compiled dossiers on 
their activities that often determined their future career trajectory.11 Visual language 
rendered the socialist machine-human nexus as a source of empowerment, efficiency, 
and productivity. 
Zhang Wenjun, The Xin’an River Power Station (1964)
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But there are also more ambivalent images in which labour was dwarfed by a large 
piece of machinery that took up most of the visual field. The diminutive size of the 
workers might seem to suggest their insignificance compared to industrial machines, 
which tower over them and have productive powers far beyond their bodies. Yet, these 
images could also imply the potency and ingenuity of human labour to invent such 
mammoth industrial creations. Though the latter was probably the meaning the Party 
intended at the time, the images also registered the feeling of being crushed beneath 
immense industrial embodiments of dead labour. 
In classic mountain-water paintings, massive mountains and rushing rivers soar 
above  small homes and puny people, suggesting the relative triviality of human 
endeavours compared to the spatial awesomeness and temporal durability of the 
natural world.12 In  contrast, many Mao period photographs were of construction 
sites in which the natural environment did not soar over labour. Instead, workers 
were in the foreground, as they ‘worked hard to move forward’ (lizheng shangyou) 
Chinese development. Photos of this sort were saturated with the Maoist view of 
industrialisation as a heroic militarised process in which workers were fearless 
soldiers whose industriousness and spirit of ‘self-reliance’ (zili gengsheng) enabled 
the Chinese people to dominate the natural environment (see the essays by Yang and 
Lora-Wainwright in the present volume). Even in the images of nature conquered and 
industrial modernity achieved, there was no tinge of the industrial gothic aesthetic, 
so pronounced in Western art, which revels in portraying humanity’s technoscientific 
inventions as prying open Pandora’s box and unleashing uncontrollable monsters.13 
In the painting of the Xin’an River Hydropower Station (see the image on page 106), 
hydroelectricity is not a jarring alien force whose introduction does violence to the natural 
order and strikes fear into the viewer. Instead, the painting is an example of the Mao 
era’s industrial pastoral aesthetic in which industry was not a destructive imposition on 
nature but a beautiful improvement, undertaken by what Zygmunt Bauman has called 
a ‘gardening state’ which removes unwanted impediments to progress from society and 
the natural world and cultivates what state agents see as best for the whole national 
community (see Sorace’s essay in the present volume).14 Maoism’s industrial pastoral 
aesthetic permeated paintings of factories too. For instance, in Xu Xingzhi’s Steel Forests 
(see the image on page 109), smokestacks emit exhaust without causing concern. Not 
only was there no indication that air pollution was harmful, but factory exhaust was even 
seen as a visually pleasing mist that added colour to the skyline. 
Tightly connected to this positive view of industrialisation was imagery of CCP 
leaders. Photographs in mass media figured leaders as a special kind of worker: they 
were the diligent political shepherds of Chinese socialism.15 Normally, central-level 
officials fulfilled their role as guardians of the Chinese nation from a distance and 
interacted with work units through the medium of documents, newspaper columns, 
radio addresses, and news clips. The mass media, however, made the public aware that 
though CCP leaders might be far away, the Chinese people were always on their minds, 
and they were at every moment tirelessly working to advance socialism. Newspapers 
and magazines were awash with photos of CCP leaders serving the socialist project. 
They held meetings to discuss issues of national import and hammer out policies 
that would improve the lives of every citizen. Another common picture of the Party-
leader-as-worker was a top official going on an inspection tour of different parts of the 
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country. On inspection tours, high-ranking officials incarnated the ideal of the mass 
line (see Lin Chun’s essay in the present volume). Visiting the grassroots showed that 
the centre still strived to be close to the people and held the masses’ interests in their 
hearts, despite their busy meeting schedules. 
The Afterlives of Maoist Labour
With the passing of the Mao era, new ways of depicting labour emerged. 
One  emblematic example is the photograph of a tile-making factory distributing 
televisions to individual workers in 1984 (see the image on page 109). Like images 
from the Mao period, nearly everyone in the photo is smiling and content with how 
Party officials are compensating the Chinese people for their labour. Mao-era slogans 
also still line factory walls and exhort workers to ‘work hard on moving forward’ the 
Chinese economy. But like the letters that compose this slogan the meaning it held in 
the Mao period was beginning to fade as China entered the reform era.
The other contents of the photo foreshadow what hard work would come to mean 
in postsocialist China. The viewer’s eye is not drawn to the collective, as the faces in 
the background are blurred. The spectator’s attention is instead pulled toward the 
individual man at the centre of the scene confidently walking forward. Local Party 
representatives are also not distributing goods that will be available for use by all the 
members of the work unit. Only the individual man is receiving a television as material 
compensation for his hard work. If the man wants to allow his coworkers to enjoy 
together the pleasures of the silver screen, it is up to him and his family because the 
television is theirs—it does not belong to the collective. 
Here, we can see the decomposition of the public life of Mao’s China, as work units 
transformed into capitalist companies concerned about not just maintaining their 
bottom line but outperforming their competitors and turning a profit in emerging 
markets. With this transition, work units expended fewer funds on group cultural 
events to fill the non-working hours of Chinese labourers. With such collective 
activities gradually becoming passé in the post-Mao era, the social life of labour became 
more privatised and centred on the family and individual.16 The man at the core of 
the photograph walking off with his own personal television also signals the advent 
of a new capitalist regime of social stratification in which it is viewed as normal that 
some Chinese workers earn higher wages which enable them to accumulate more 
material goods and attain a higher socioeconomic position than their compatriots. 
The television at the heart of the photograph, however, is not only a sign of the new 
capitalist times coming into view in China. As a Chinese-made television, it is also 
a marker of what the CCP had accomplished under Mao. It had acquired the ability to 
mass produce televisions, and that feat depended on a variety of industries. Mines were 
required to extract metals needed for electrical circuits and wires. A petrochemical 
industry was necessary to generate plastic coverings to encase wires and enclose 
the television. A body of technicians and engineers was also vital to the design and 
manufacture of the television. This photo of a man carrying off a television to his home 
can thus be read as both visually representing the fruits of the Maoist developmental 
state, while pointing towards a future in which Chinese labour would produce the 
miracle of economic reform and further erase itself from the picture. 
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(1) Xu Xingzhi, Steel Forests (1962)       
(2) A worker receives a televison at a tile-making factory in 1984






What should we call them? We can call them people’s communes or not call them 
people’s communes. My opinion is that we should call them people’s communes … . 
People’s communes are both large and communitarian. Many people, large territory, 
large-scale production, large-scale services.
Mao Zedong, 19581
Mao Zedong’s coining of the slogan ‘large and communitarian’ (yida ergong) accompanied the launch of the people’s communes (renmin gongshe) in 1958.2 In the language of Maoism, collectivism had come to include a territorial 
aspiration, and the success of the communes depended on their size (see Gao’s essay 
in the present volume). More than one hundred years earlier, in 1845, Friedrich Engels 
had instead emphasised how collectivism aimed at creating new, efficient spaces for the 
working class: 
And then the preparation of meals—what a waste of space, ingredients, 
labour, is involved in the present, separate households, where every family 
cooks its little bit of food on its own, has its own supply of crockery, employs 
its own cook, must fetch its own supplies separately from the market, from 
the garden, from the butcher and the baker!3 
In the same Elberfeld lecture, Engels was keen to call attention to Robert Owen’s 
1,650 square-foot residential block used to concentrate and enhance working-class 
labour power. 
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Besides the mundanity and technicality of Engel’s vision and the grandiosity and 
focus on the wider territory that Mao expressed from the beginning of the Great Leap 
Forward, this different way of thinking about how to build collectivism also signals one 
of the less researched ways in which Maoism diverged from Bolshevism. Mao wanted 
communes to be big, something that could inspire awe in the imagination of the masses. 
It was about conquering the territory, extending the reach of the state. Only then would 
it be communitarian. Efficiency was a very distant priority for the Great Helmsman. 
The large territorial units were to replace the artificial division between cities and 
countryside (yida), while a large group of people were to collectively own the means of 
production (ergong): this was the double engine of communist transformation. The very 
size of the communes, sometimes as large as a county, and where means of production 
where in the hands of a local government at times hundreds of kilometres from 
agricultural sites, became one of the reasons why they failed. Already in August 1959, 
after the Lushan Conference revealed the first cracks in the leadership regarding the 
Great Leap Forward, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exposed the exaggerations 
of the communes and suggested a prudent return to a more ‘natural’ collectivism—one 
that relied on cooperatives and production teams.
Just a Leftist Mistake?
The ideology of ‘large and communitarian’ went down in history as a ‘leftist mistake’ 
(zuopai cuowu). Nonetheless, it continues to signify one fundamental difference 
between the two main forms of socialist organisation: the efficiency-seeking Soviet 
version, and the territorial concerns of the Chinese version that aimed at seizing 
control of the collective strengths of a largely rural society. Notwithstanding the many 
contradictions, when pointing our gaze at a longue durée history of socialist China’s 
developmental ideology, it seems clear that maintaining control and shaping physical 
territory is still a high-priority strategy. The two most significant attempts to reshape 
China—the communes and the current urbanisation drive—while undoubtedly 
different in ideology and form, are ultimately territorial projects of a state constantly 
obsessed with the patrolling of the shifting geographical and human borders between 
cities and the countryside. Through them, the state—admittedly different states with 
different priorities at different historical moments—is attempting to control increasing 
chunks of the country’s vast territory and impose a nationwide rationality. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the rationale underpinning the communes was the need to 
control the prices of agricultural products to facilitate industrialisation and the transfer 
of resources from agriculture, of which China had plenty, to industry, of which China 
had little. Today, it is about imposing the rationality of the planning state as a means 
of resolving the messy territorial, environmental, and property rights uncertainties of 
the still existing collectives. In both cases, it was a state-directed project that implied 
the advantages of control—state-owned communes were the plan then, rationalisation 
through state-owned land in the cities is the goal now. Both imply that, once the state 
becomes involved, size is increased and the larger scale allows for rational decisions 
taken by a higher planning authority. The traditional reliance on large ventures that 
project the power of the state onto the territory, and limit the wasteful private use of 
land, survives the otherwise obvious differences between the two campaigns. No doubt 
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one was aimed at gaining control of the countryside, the other of cities; one had the 
goal of gathering productive forces, the other of assembling the consuming masses; 
one was aimed at rationalising consumption in a low-resource environment, the other 
to allow a growth in the value of land and the real estate built on it to support the 
expansion of cities. Yet, in both cases there was a reliance on ‘large,’ where size and scale 
allowed for the implementation of common priorities. 
The other implication of ‘large’ is integration. When the CCP launched the ultimately 
unsuccessful extension of communes to the cities in 1959—the so-called ‘urban people’s 
communes’ (chengshi renmin gongshe)—they were supposed to ‘become the unifying 
organisation to integrate production, trade, distribution, and public services and to 
unify the politics of gong nong shang xue bing (workers, peasants, traders, intellectuals, 
and soldiers).’4 When Shanghai communised in the same year, planners hailed a new 
era of integration with three emphatically stated goals: a) turn the isolated areas of the 
municipality into ‘planned industrial and agricultural areas’ where the two activities 
support each other; b) change the former separation between industrial and cultural life; 
and c) eliminate the existing separation of urban and rural in planning the territory.5 
Talks of an integrated development of cities and their hinterland have been one of 
the main goals of current urbanising trends: among many urban slogans about the 
sustainable city, chengxiang yitihua, or the integration of the industrial periurban with 
the hypermodernity of the inner cities, remains one of the main—and most elusive—
goals of today’s planners. 
A Spiritual Connection
The second objective of the original slogan was never abandoned and contributes to 
the CCP’s grip on power today by establishing the connection between the territorial 
and the spiritual objectives of a policy campaign. In 1958, ergong was meant to 
signify a movement towards a more communitarian society, where the cohesiveness 
of communities would overcome their lack of resources, where nature would be the 
ultimate enemy, and growth a utopian benchmark that could only be achieved through 
struggle. Today the CCP has hardly abandoned the goal of controlling the motivation 
of individual citizens, and mounts campaigns in which the good citizen is a righteous, 
law-abiding, and high-consuming human being. The reward is no longer a utopian 
communist society for all, but a more ordinary place among the social elites. Faith in 
the Party’s authority is an element of that righteousness and a condition to be part of 
this new elite. While gong, the public community of collective memories, may not be 
the ultimate goal anymore (despite attempts to revive it), controlling the definition of 
public good remains central to any ideological efforts of the Party. 
In this process of transformation the officially promoted and reward-based 
conception of morality has changed radically. In 1960, the goal of the communes was 
described as ‘reforming radically the lifestyles of the masses, ultimately eliminating 
the distinction between cities and countryside, between industry and agriculture, and 
between manual and intellectual labour.’6 When planning communes in the city, for 
example, it was imperative that the new communist way of life be inscribed in the new 
spaces: 
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In the old cities, the design of services and residential areas was influenced 
by a certain idea of ‘family’ that still reflected capitalist privilege and 
focussed on individualistic lifestyle. For example, houses were planned with 
an apartment for each family, with each apartment featuring its own kitchen 
and stove. Once the door was closed, the home became a sacred, undisturbed 
space, where women were bound to cooking, raising children, and other 
home chores. Two doors faced each other or neighbours lived one above 
the other but they would never visit even if their chickens and dogs could 
hear each other’s calling (jiquan xiang wen, er laosi bu xiang wanglai). These 
buildings of one-family-one-house where households cook meals on their 
own are incompatible with the collectivisation of life and the socialisation 
of service labour.7 
The gong that this description suggested was a utopian approach to the atomisation 
and the alienation (see Ou’s essay in the present volume). The critique often heard by 
voices nostalgic for a more collective life usually emerges in the context of lifestyles that 
can be characterised by today’s gated communities and privatisation of governance in 
new real estate residential communities.8 It remains, however, a fact that lifestyles even 
today are not the expressions of individual choice but rather of individuals willingly 
buying into a certain aesthetic, packaged by the developer of a large community with 
the approval of the local state that is keen to use new residential settings to attract 
‘high-quality’ citizens. It is not uncommon for developers to sell a specific lifestyle and 
even to register its trademark, and for local developers to reproduce the same language 
associated with campaigns of the state.
Yida ergong is a lost slogan, one that reminds us of a different age of China’s 
modernisation. Yet, da, intended as the need to shape the territory and to project the 
power of the state on it, and gong, a public good around which the building of a social 
coalition is possible that justifies the ideology of the ruling Party, are both still pervasive 
in today’s China. 




Yoshihiro ISHIKAWA and Craig A. SMITH
Up to a certain point in time, the histories of communist parties in any country can be seen as sequences of ‘line struggles’ (luxian douzheng). ‘Line’ is a specialised term that indicates a specific direction or guiding principle for 
political activities and is directly linked to whether or not a path is deemed revolutionary. 
However, it must be noted that the expression’s use in politics and political movements 
was nowhere to be found during the time of Marx and Engels. It was not until the 
twentieth century that this expression became of common usage, specifically during 
the revolutionary activities of organisations such as the Lenin-led Communist Party 
and the Comintern. Moving from theory to practice, Marxist theorists saw that the 
success or failure of a given activity was inextricably related to its guiding principle, 
therefore particular political directions came to be referred to as ‘lines.’
Walking the correct line was no easy task. Taking up a radical guiding principle 
that had drifted too far from reality would inevitably lead to tremendous sacrifices, 
oppression, and conflict. Conversely, accepting the status quo and following more 
moderate principles would be to completely lose any possibility of revolution. Generally 
speaking, the official histories of communist parties would record these as leftist or 
rightist ‘deviations’ resulting in an incorrect line.
China is no exception to this. The 1945 ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the 
History of Our Party’ not only established perspectives on the correct line according 
to Mao Zedong’s revolutionary policy, but also identified left and right deviating 
lines. This understanding of history as line struggle continued to restrain the Chinese 
official representation of history until the death of Mao. Since then, the term has all but 
disappeared as changes to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership have gradually 
come to be called ‘power struggles’ (quanli douzheng), in which lust for power, rather 
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than ideological principles, appears to exert influence on the direction of the CCP. This 
essay outlines the appearance of the term ‘line struggle,’ its usage, and its disappearance 
into the shadows of history.1 
A Genealogy of Line Struggle
In China, the understanding of history as line struggle appeared in the 1930s, when 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union exerted considerable influence on the CCP. 
Still, it was only after the establishment of the People’s Republic that this view of history 
became dominant, achieving a prominence that would remain until the death of 
Mao Zedong. With the onset of the reform era, former proponents of this discourse 
acknowledged the terrible force that it had exerted, and the Party deliberately and 
expeditiously stopped all use of line in official documents. 
The Chinese term luxian is a translated equivalent of the English term ‘line,’ the Russian 
‘линия’ (linija), and the German ‘linie.’ This modern Western intellectual concept 
is rendered into the same Sinitic characters in Japanese, in which it is pronounced 
rosen. It is well known that in many cases modern conceptual terminology—which 
was imported into China and Japan from the West—was first translated into Japanese 
and then flowed into China during the late Qing Dynasty. Key ideas from Marxist 
theory, as well as early Chinese socialism, also entered Chinese lexicons and conceptual 
frameworks through translation from Japanese. However, in the case of line, it was not 
a simple matter of the Chinese term luxian being acquired from the Japanese term 
rosen. First, we must outline the process of how line came to be a Sinitic concept.
The formulation of line into the two Sinitic characters of luxian did not occur in 
Japan, but was an effort of China’s left-wing activists. Logically, before the term line 
could be discussed in the context of a revolutionary movement, a large movement had 
to exist. Although research into Marxist theory was advancing in Japan in the 1920s, 
the concept remained meagre and limited in practice. Japan’s socialist movement was 
restricted and obscured by severe repression by government officials, and the idea of 
line failed to develop to any degree under this climate. However, for the CCP, it did have 
an impact upon, and power over, the degree to which leadership could be criticised 
during pivotal events. It exhibited considerable influence in determining the course 
of the revolutionary movement under Chen Duxiu’s leadership and the First United 
Front with the Nationalist Party (guomindang, hereafter GMD). It was also prominent 
shortly after this, during the period in which the Party fell under Li Lisan’s leadership, 
demonstrating power over the extent of the military occupation of Changsha in the 
summer of 1930. Due to these controversies, the Comintern then used line to discuss 
the appropriateness of developments in the CCP. 
The translation of line as luxian appeared early on. One of the first instances of the 
usage of this term can be found in the documents from the CCP meeting that took 
place on 7 August 1927, which formally dissolved the First United Front with the 
GMD. The meeting severely criticised the leadership of Chen Duxiu for the haphazard 
compromise with the GMD, labelling it as an ‘unprecedented, compromising, and 
opportunistic line.’ After this use of line as rebuke, the term came to be employed as 
a suffix after the name of the Party leader who was pushing for that specific kind of 
political strategy. An early example of this can be seen in the ‘Li Lisan Line’—a temporary 
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push for urban uprisings and attacks on cities by the Red Army in 1930. In November 
of that same year, the Comintern sent a letter to the Central Committee of the CCP. 
It said that the error of ‘Comrade Li Lisan’s political line’ was in opposition with the 
Comintern’s line for being ‘non-Bolshevik, non-Leninist,’ with the Russian term linija 
translated as luxian. Incidentally, at that time in Japan the term rosen was only being 
used to indicate routes of railways or other transportation methods. In due course, the 
political usage of the term line would appear even in Japan, but for a long time the Li 
Lisan Line was referred to as the ‘Li Lisan Course’ (Ri Rissan kōsu).2
Therefore, it could be said that luxian was a political concept that directly entered 
the Chinese lexicon from Soviet Russia. As the CCP kept up its fight through shake-
ups and redesigns at every twist and turn of the revolutionary movement, whenever 
a new leadership group came into power, they would criticise the decisions of their 
predecessors as ‘so-and-so’s line.’ This became a normal occurrence at every transfer 
of power and thus the line struggle historical perspective came to be, constructing 
a historical narrative based upon the validity of the line of successive leadership groups.
 
From Stalin to Mao
The formation of this unique historical perspective had a tremendous impact 
on communist movements worldwide, as can be seen in the so-called ‘Stalinist 
encyclopedia,’ the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), 
commonly known as the Short Course. This book’s most outstanding feature was 
its treatment of the successive internal line struggles throughout the history of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Those occasional struggles served to validate 
the righteousness of Lenin and Stalin. Although this book is now seldom discussed, it 
influenced not only the Soviet Union, but also the global leftist socialist movement that 
included China. From an intellectual perspective, it was not only the guiding principle 
of the communist movement, but it has also exerted influence on history, political 
science, and other related fields. The degree of the book’s extensive influence should be 
revisited and reappraised.
In China, Mao Zedong’s admiration for the spirit of the Short Course led to the 
publication of successive texts that varied markedly, starting with the adoption of the 
‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party’ in the Seventh Plenary 
Session of the Sixth Central Committee of April 1945. No other communist party 
anywhere in the world adopted its historical narrative into such a resolution. The four 
periods of line struggle between an incorrect line represented by the Party leadership 
of the time and a correct line centred upon Mao Zedong have since then become well 
known. The four incorrect lines that were formalised through this Resolution were: 
a) the right-opportunist line of Chen Duxiu; b) the left-deviationist line of Qu Qiubai; 
c) the left-adventurist line of Li Lisan, and d) the left-opportunist line of Wang Ming. 
Accepted to this day, this Resolution stipulates a Chinese historical narrative that posits 
these four as mistakes in Party history, in contrast to the persistent advance of Mao 
Zedong along the correct line. Among these, Wang Ming himself was a regular user 
of the term line, and he even once released a pamphlet titled: ‘Two Lines: The Struggle 
for the Further Bolshevisation of the Chinese Communist Party.’ Wang Ming and his 
followers, known as the ‘28 Bolsheviks’ or the ‘Returned Students’ due to their studies 
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in the Soviet Union, were ardent followers of the dogmatism of the Soviet school. 
Concerning the Stalinist historical perspective on line struggle, Mao and Wang were 
disciples of Stalin in equal measure.
There are reports that Mao Zedong, who was effectively the author of the Resolution 
on History, also raised the alarm over the casual use of the term line struggle. The 
Resolution was being drafted at the Politburo meeting that took place in November 
1943. It was the very meeting that was held to criticise the Wang Ming Line, when, 
according to the Chronicle of Mao Zedong Thought, the official chronology of Mao 
Zedong’s thought and discourse, Mao was recorded as stating that: ‘The History of 
the All-Union Communist Party seldom mentions the term “line,” yet our Chinese 
comrades enjoy chewing over the word. It would be best if we used it sparingly.’3 It is 
not possible to verify either the authenticity of these words or Mao’s true intentions at 
the time, which appear paradoxical in several ways. First, the use of line as a suffix was 
widely popular at that time, largely because of Mao himself, and his request for people 
to refrain from using the term in the future was in tremendous contradiction with his 
own behaviour. Secondly, the Short Course that Mao referred to above, was none other 
than the canonical text from which the term line proliferated. Finally, in the 27,000 
characters of the 1945 Resolution on History, the term line appeared no fewer than 186 
times.
After this, the identification of incorrect lines in the Party history of line struggle did 
not decrease. On the contrary, the usage of the term only increased after 1949, with Gao 
Gang, Rao Shushi, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and Lin Biao all falling from power due to 
their ‘incorrect lines.’ By the early 1970s, there were ten such incorrect lines.  
Known as the ‘ten great line struggles,’ these incidents provided a summarised 
historical narrative of the development of the CCP.4 Needless to say, Mao Zedong himself 
was the main proponent of this discourse. During his Southern Tour in August of 1971, 
he explained: ‘The correct or incorrect nature of the line determines everything … . The 
line is the guiding principle … . Problems with the line are problems of principle, and 
I will not allow anyone to transgress my line.’ On various occasions, he declared that 
the line was everything.5
In his political report at the Tenth National Congress, held in August 1973, Zhou 
Enlai publicly detailed the discourse of the ten great line struggles. Identifying and 
criticising each of the embattled leaders—all former comrades of his—he avoided 
becoming the target of the eleventh line struggle. The ten great line struggles held such 
prominence after that Congress, but they would no longer be raised shortly following 
Mao’s death three years later.
Into Oblivion
In order to summarise the disorder of the Cultural Revolution and to recompose 
Party history, at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1981 
members adopted a second resolution on Party history, entitled ‘Resolution on Certain 
Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of 
China.’ In this document, the Party recognised the mistakes that Mao Zedong had made 
in the final years of his life, offering evaluations of both his successes and his failures. 
The final text totalled 33,000 characters. Although it is considerably longer than the 
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original 1945 Resolution, it employed the term line only 22 times. Using the previous 
conception of line that had long been overly stressed, the new Resolution asserted that: 
‘Normal disputes between Party comrades have been recognised as errors of line.’
Concerning this remarkable change, Hu Qiaomu—who was involved in the drafting 
of both resolutions—explained: 
That [1945] Resolution had its faults … . We can say that the perspective of 
historical change as the history of line struggles began with that Resolution. 
The history of the Party retreated behind the curtain, leaving only the history 
of line struggles on the stage. This was a tremendous mistake.6
Before the Comintern raised criticism of the Li Lisan Line, the CCP rarely 
used the term line. It did not appear in any of the documents from the 
Second Congress to the Sixth Congress. Beginning in the period of Wang 
Ming’s leadership, Party members used the term abundantly, and its usage 
became ever sacralised and mysterious. The [1945] Party’s Resolution on 
History cannot be reduced to the history of line struggles. It is difficult to 
estimate how many comrades have been harmed by the terms line error and 
line struggle.7
In this text by Hu Qiaomu, we can see that he made a mistake in his attribution 
of the first usage of the term, which, as noted above, can be found as early as 1927. 
Also, by asserting that Wang Ming was behind the initial popularity of line, he made 
no reference to Mao’s responsibility. In spite of these misrepresentations, the 1981 
Resolution recognised that the concept and label of line had come to play a negative 
function in Party’s history. Moreover, this text is of particular significance as it was the 
first to frankly state that this was due to the 1945 Resolution. Thus, in accordance with 
the 1981 Resolution, the Party resolutely set forth policy that no longer succumbed to 
the discourse of line struggle or line errors, and as a consequence, although Chinese 
leaders continue to mention the importance of following the correct line, now the term 
line struggle has all but faded from vocabulary.
However, one should not forget that in order to discount this discourse and unite 
the entire Party’s understanding of history, the Party had to alter its historical narrative 
and resort to the use of yet another resolution in the post-Mao era. Once again, history 
was caged through a resolution of the Party. One resolution followed another, and now 
this history too must be locked away. To this day, what should be written about Party 
history, and what must not be written about Party history, remains the sole prerogative 
of the Party itself.






In post-Mao China, the concept of the ‘mass line’ (qunzhong luxian)—consulting the masses, interpreting their will, and implementing policies in their interests—has been widely reviled in public and academic discourse. As the transformative 
objectives of the Mao era fade into obscurity, all that is remembered is the violence 
of oppression and persecution, which is condemned in retrospective judgment. Still, 
whereas in English, with an air of elitist condescension, the term ‘masses’ conjures up 
the loss of individuality in an indistinct crowd of people, during the Mao era, to be 
part of the ‘revolutionary masses’ was to belong to a collective political subject, which 
amplified one’s sense of individual worth and glory. Today, China’s ordinary people 
could only dream of such substantial and symbolic respect. In addition to its association 
with Mao-era chaos, the mass line rings anachronistic in an age of conservative 
governance which, regardless of the political system, attempts to contain ‘excessive’ 
democratic desires. How do we approach the mass line in times of mass dispossession, 
degradation of the public, and waning belief in popular power? If by returning to the 
lessons from history, the true nature of the present can be accessed and transformed, 
then the relevance of the mass line lies in its noble conviction as an unfinished project: 
ordinary people can be proud of themselves as direct producers of both material and 
cultural wealth in the collective mastery of their own destiny. 
China’s Lost Mass Line 
The mass line was an innovative concept and a powerful tool of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) as it struggled to seize and consolidate power. As is typical for 
political ideals, it is an ideological commitment as well as a working method. By design, 
it entails a dynamically interactive bottom-up and top-down process of ‘from the masses, 
to the masses,’ in which the leadership collects scattered views from below and turns 
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them into systematic positions and experimental policies, the effects of which are then 
investigated, debated, and fed once again back into the system. This process of ‘pooling 
the wisdom of the masses’ (jizhong qunzhong zhihui) through solicitation, aggregation, 
articulation, and adjustment repeats itself in an endless cycle. Instead of the competing 
‘interest groups’ of liberal democracies, this form of politics and governance seeks to 
integrate public preferences for sound policymaking while minimising cleavages and 
mistakes. Meanwhile, in the communist tradition of rural mobilisation, the Party must 
attend to every detail of the basic needs and interests of the population, as the core of 
its social contract with the people, described in the popular analogy of a fish-in-water 
or seed-in-soil relationship. Institutionally, the mass line is also a novel adaptation of 
the Leninist principle of democratic centralism which aims at balancing deliberation 
and discipline, and avoiding bureaucratic dogmatism and blind commandism. When 
not confined to inner-Party operations, the mass line emphasises popular input based 
on the premise of the sovereignty of the people.1 
I have been using the present tense not because mass line politics exists today, but 
because it is a normative model. For the same reason, an analytical distinction between 
the rhetoric and utility of mass line is necessary. Historically, Party building, the united 
front, and armed struggle were taken as the three ‘great magic weapons’ of the Chinese 
Communist Revolution (see De Giorgi’s essay in the present volume). The mass line 
was imperative for achieving them all—as the benchmark for Party programmes and 
groundwork, as the baseline and pathway to the alliance between workers and peasants 
at the core of a wider rallying front, and as the epitome of the people’s war (see Guan’s 
essay in the present volume). Class- and state-building in the red base areas prior to the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) depended on the mass line, so did 
the war effort in Korea in the early 1950s and the subsequent socioeconomic transitions 
throughout the Mao era. The effective mass movements to alleviate illiteracy, improve 
sanitation, eliminate endemic diseases, and so on, were good examples. Mass line-style 
accumulation of both capital and labour also featured in China’s socialist build-up of 
infrastructure and industrialisation. 
The CCP, claiming to have no special interest of its own, took the motto ‘to serve the 
people’ as another catchphrase to indicate the mass line (see Karl’s essay in the present 
volume). ‘We the people,’ however, were not a given but had to be forged through 
revolutionary socialisation. It involved painstaking tasks at the grassroots fulfilled by 
the Party’s foot soldiers, work teams, and activists mobilised by the ‘mass organisations’ 
(qunzhong tuanti), i.e. various wartime local associations and later branches of the 
official trade union, women’s federation, and youth league as arms of state corporation 
(see Perry’s essay in the present volume). The famous Yan’an way of raising consciousness 
favoured peasant art forms and networks in indigenous dialects to popularise a Sinified 
Marxism. The ‘continuous revolution’ that followed 1949 went farther ideologically: 
school classes should include productive and scientific labour; regular folks could 
become philosophers through mass learning (qunzhong xue zhexue); and ‘emperors, 
ministers, and generals’ (diwang jiangxiang) should be replaced by commoners who 
would then ‘occupy stages of the superstructure’ (see Schmalzer’s essay in the present 
volume). Mao concurred with Marx that theory can be a material force for winning 
over the masses. In this sense of self-confidence and self-reliance of a liberated nation, 
the Chinese people had stood up in 1949 and placed their country on equal footing 
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with the nations of the world, long before the so-called rise of China credited to its 
market economic ‘miracle.’ Not only did their revolutionary victory have an immense 
impact on the third world, but it also inspired a whole generation of intellectual rebels 
in the global 1968 (see the essays by Lanza and Teng in the present volume). 
Still, actual tensions between centralism and decentralisation, mobilisation and 
participation, and guidance and spontaneity or vanguardism and populism posed 
a serious challenge, both conceptually and operationally. Mass line politics was often 
overshadowed by either increased Party control or willful voluntarism. What was 
designed to provide a two-way flow of information and exchange became a conduit 
for the imposition of the Party line or the lawless anarchism of mass movements. 
Such contradictions could only be partially made up for by the Maoist assertion that 
educators must be educated by the masses, as well as the call for constant criticisms 
and self-criticisms within the Party. Mao’s decision to mobilise the masses to attack 
the Party-state itself was also doomed from the beginning. However, the belief in the 
entitlement and creativity of ordinary men and women in constructing socialism while 
remaking themselves, in the intrinsic good of their public and political participation, 
and in their right and ability to expel the old and new ruling classes, transcends 
traditional liberal hostility towards popular power, denounced as ‘mobocracy’ or 
a hotbed of totalitarianism. That is, according to the mass line, power is not handed 
down from above but attainable only by the masses through their own daring struggles. 
The mass line is the creation and lodestar of the Chinese Revolution. The masses, like 
the revolutionary classes and the people, are made through revolutionary practices. 
If we stick to its original vision, waves of arbitrary victimisation and policy blunders 
would appear not as the by-products of the mass line but its very betrayal. It would thus 
be fair to draw the lesson, dearly paid for by countless sacrifices, that only when the 
Party is ideologically and practically faithful to its traditional mass line, can it triumph 
against all odds; otherwise it fails, regardless of how the failure might be self-deceptively 
packaged or perceived. 
From the Paris Commune to the Angang Constitution and Beyond
Marx’s visionary assumptions about the Paris Commune loom large in the 
background. The ‘utopia’ of removing distinctions between governors and governed, 
and the regular selection of administrators by lot with a constant leeway of their being 
recalled, was glimpsed in the Paris Commune as within the realms of possibility. In the 
legislative bodies of the PRC, for example, the people’s deputies (renmin daibiao) are not 
professional politicians. They come from all walks of life and go back to their individual 
professions when the Congresses are not in session. If only the National People’s 
Congress was truly ‘the highest organ of state power’ as proclaimed in the Constitution! 
If only the deputies who sit on it and its local bodies were truly representatives of the 
people and empowered as lawmakers! The relatively recent phenomenon of the super-
rich and bureaucrats dominating the institution violates the original design but does 
not nullify its promise. 
What connects the Paris Commune to the mass line is self-governing or participatory 
governance in workplaces and residential communities, which is qualitatively superior 
to money-fuelled electoral politics. An active citizenry and high-intensity politics 
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were indeed hallmarks of Chinese socialism. If certain ‘bourgeois rights’ were deemed 
unavoidable in a transitional period to communism, Mao nevertheless insisted on the 
role of labour in managing government, enterprises, cultural institutions, and public 
affairs.2 In his critique of Stalin’s political economy textbook, Mao remarked that the right 
to state management was missing from the 1936 Soviet constitutional rights of workers 
to employment, paid leave, education, and security in old age and sickness (adopted 
in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948).3 In his words, 
this absent right should be labour’s ‘biggest and most fundamental right in a socialist 
system.’ Without it and its institutionalisation, other rights cannot be guaranteed. This 
point has been abundantly vindicated by the postsocialist ruins. Familiar axioms such 
as ‘labour’s dignity’ and the working population as ‘masters of society’ have vanished 
under a bureaucratic-market dictatorship (see the essays by Wang Ban, Meyskens, and 
Franceschini in the present volume). The catastrophic consequences of losing even an 
imperfect workers’ state are laid bare in front of our eyes.
Convinced that human agency and socialist potential had been stifled in the Soviet 
Union, Mao’s attempted remedy focussed on curbing bureaucratisation, material 
incentives, and rigid divisions of labour. His alternative was social empowerment by 
‘walking on two legs’ (liangtiaotui zoulu), which meant liberating popular energy in all 
sectors, at all levels. In what came to be known as Mao’s ‘7 May Directive,’ he envisioned 
communal socialism, in which labour would have a collective purpose, enabling each 
individual to perform several roles, thereby fulfilling Marx’s promise of emancipated 
human creativity. The commune would engage in industry, agriculture, commerce, 
education, healthcare, and defence simultaneously. Its members would practice united 
labour together, freely debate politics, as well as enjoy leisure, while creating new 
people and society. Mao however did not elaborate on how to arrange intercommunal 
relationships (as a global problem), which created a major hurdle to fostering equality 
between local groups and workers from outside of the community. 
Mao was also firmly for industrialisation and a strong advocate for economic 
democracy. The eminent Angang Constitution, proposed in 1960 for the Anshan 
Steelworks and other large state firms, introduced egalitarian approaches that required 
managers to join workers on the shopfloor, workers to partake in executive decisions, 
and technicians to contribute to both undertakings. The scheme promoted multiskilled 
practitioners and smooth horizontal and vertical communications. Fluid hierarchies 
and shared responsibilities would, in turn, boost morale and efficiency. However 
short-lived, the experiment pioneered a mass line managerial revolution against 
both statist and capitalist ‘sole-head systems’ (yizhang zhi) and Taylorism. Economic 
democracy involved democratic planning and budgeting, equal pay for equal work, and 
mechanisms of public control over the surpluses in a model of production for needs 
rather than profits. This ambition of countering capitalist primitive accumulation as 
‘nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of 
production’ is what ultimately underscored the mass line in the sense of labour gaining 
freedom and power (see also Hayward’s essay in the present volume).4 
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Politics in Command
In China’s market transition, the conditions in which the mass line had flourished 
are gone. Its brief return in the official vocabulary under Xi Jinping’s direction a few 
years ago sounded hollow and ended abruptly. A first explanation is obvious: the 
relationship between the Party and masses has radically changed. After all, we are 
talking about a different Party whose remaining communist identity contradicts its 
non- or anti-communist direction and conduct. The alienation of officials from the 
masses is now an everyday experience in Chinese society. Despite his own failures to 
institutionalise worker power, Mao repeatedly predicted the scenario of ‘a nation-wide 
counterrevolutionary restoration, when the Marxist party becomes a revisionist or 
fascist one, and the whole of China changes its colour.’5 With the masses out of the 
picture after the Cultural Revolution, families of the ‘red aristocracy’ and the new elites 
have enriched themselves at an unprecedented speed and scale by devouring state 
resources, and colluding public offices with private (domestic and foreign) capital. The 
early, popular enthusiasm and mandate for reform collapsed when a new ‘comprador-
bureaucratic capitalism’ (one of the main enemies of the Communist Revolution) 
emerged. Anti-graft campaigns have been plainly selective and left the root cause of 
corruption and degeneration intact. Above all, the loss of the mass line implies that 
the Party and government are no longer supposed to be publicly supervised (see also 
Andreas’ essay in the present volume). Chinese rulers refuse the popular demand to 
transparently declare their personal assets, for example, which is routine in capitalist 
democracies. Deprived of their ‘right to rebel’ (zaofan youli), the masses cannot 
question or resist Party decisions in any form. 
Second, by the same logic, the transformation of social and class relations renders 
any organised class politics a sheer impossibility. Without a ‘leading working class’ 
(constitutionally designated) in the first place, the majority of Chinese workers, who are 
rural migrants often on subcontracted or precarious jobs, are hardly a conscious class 
force. The ‘labouring people’ no longer signal a powerful political category. Instead, 
they are viewed through the lens of negative signifiers, such as ‘vulnerable groups’ 
(ruoshi qunti) prone to ‘mass incidents’ (qunti shijian) that threaten social stability. 
In Beijing’s ruthless campaign to expel migrants from the outskirts of the capital in 
the freezing cold in the winter of 2017, the abusive reference to them as a ‘low end 
population’ (diduan renkou), and the violent treatment of many of them as nothing but 
cheap, disposable commodities sparked a national outcry.
Yet, the blurred nature of the Party-state continues to prevent class consciousness 
from forming by occupying the symbolic space through which it could be articulated. 
The Party also cracks down on any sign of collective organisation and action. Labour’s 
dilemmas lie in whether to accept or reject the nominally communist regime and its 
arbitration, and whether to rely on ever distant state protection or attempt to collectively 
organise itself while running the high risk of being repressed. As such, labour vacillates 
between a waning hope of empowerment and the harsh reality of powerlessness, as 
shown in 2018 in the police pursuit of students supporting workers’ unionisation at 
the Shenzhen Jasic Technology factory. The state-capital coalition severely limits the 
Party-sanctioned legal channels. These channels are utilised only because workers are 
robbed of a socialist state that functions as an institutionalised class power committed 
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to their wellbeing and recognition. At best, depoliticised litigations and lawsuits seek 
isolated legal redress while thwarting the political representation of class interests or 
ferment of insurgency. The notions of judicial independence and formal procedures 
presume a ‘normal’ polity that protects capitalist private property and order, in contrast 
to the mass line presuppositions that subject legality to the fundamental morality 
of social justice (see Hurst’s essay in the present volume). Given China’s profound 
revolutionary inheritance, neither the rule of law prioritised in the state agenda nor 
political democratisation as a liberal yearning can be legitimately accomplished without 
reinstating this moral substance. 
A third explanation is that the Party’s current ideological position is incompatible 
with the mass line, as reflected in the lack of persuasiveness and cultural capital of the 
Party’s people-centred rhetoric. Under Deng Xiaoping’s interdiction against ‘arguing’ 
(bu zhenglun), decades of a state-sponsored commodification and single-minded 
growth have nurtured a monoculture of money fetishism, consumerism, and political 
cynicism. Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ has so far produced no reorientation while at the same 
time endorsing a superficial and even deformed Marxism. Exemplary is his depiction 
of the contradiction facing Chinese society as ‘between unbalanced and inadequate 
development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life,’ rolled out at the 
Nineteenth Party Congress.6 Evaded outright is a basic class analysis of China’s actual 
contradictions: its exploitative productive relations, structural inequalities, as well as 
class, gender, ethnic, and regional disparities and conflicts. The fact that 60  million 
children are left behind in dilapidated villages by struggling parents working 
faraway as urban subalterns alone taints any socialist decoration. This deliberately 
apolitical formulation will not revive the pride of labour but only further encourage 
developmentalist greed, waste, rifts, and resource depletion—both at home and abroad.
One may argue that due to the Party’s suicidal departure from its founding creeds, 
we have witnessed a historical defeat of the CCP by capitalist global integration. But 
things are not all fixed. The regime is still capable of responding to popular pressure 
on certain issues, such as improving general welfare and government services, as 
shown in a few celebrated policies of ‘accurately’ identifying and eradicating poverty or 
‘greening’ the environment. Such policies may have nothing to do with socialism, and 
their implementation is far from free of biases or mismanagement. Neither poverty nor 
pollution is yet treated at its root cause and hence inevitably keeps being reproduced. 
However, the message of ‘politics in command’ resonates in its absence and urgency, 
in the midst of China’s ongoing neoliberalisation (as others are phasing it out) as seen 
in its virtual privatisation of land, opening the commanding height industries and 
the financial and security sectors to private tycoons and foreign investors, relentless 
overaccumulation and overseas adventure, as well as the recentralisation of personalised 
and repressive power. The possibility of a transformative politics in an age of illusion 
as well as despair depends on the most imaginative and fruitful legacies of the Chinese 
Revolution and experimental socialism being critically relearned. Confusions, retreats, 
and setbacks notwithstanding, the future is open. A new popular and historical subject 
could be remade in a countertransformation of society and its structure of feelings and 
values. The mass line is dead, but its lessons and aspirations live on. 





‘Mass supervision’ (qunzhong jiandu) was a central pillar of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) mode of governance during the Mao Zedong era. The term referred to practices designed to make individuals in 
positions of power accountable to those below them. Although it was used in connection 
with old elites from pre-1949 society, the main target was always the CCP’s own cadres. 
The Party maintained elaborate systems of internal discipline and top-down control, 
but it found these to be insufficient, and so from its earliest days Party leaders mobilised 
rank-and-file Party members and ‘non-Party masses’ to monitor communist cadres, 
denounce violations of Party policies, and criticise malfeasance and abuses of power.
After taking power, the new regime organised an array of systems to lodge grievances 
and report official abuses as well as other methods to facilitate continuous monitoring 
of cadres from below. For the most part, however, mass supervision took place 
through periodic political campaigns rather than these routine channels. The Mao era 
was punctuated by a series of mass movements carried out under the rubric of mass 
supervision, culminating in the Cultural Revolution (see also Thornton’s essay in the 
present volume). It should be emphasised that although these campaigns required the 
active participation of workers, peasants, and other citizens, the latter did not initiate 
the campaigns or determine their objectives. Mass supervision was a CCP project 
designed to meet Party goals.
In this essay, I will first briefly discuss the aims, targets, and forms of mass supervision. 
I will then provide an overview of the major mass supervision campaigns during the 
Mao era, before noting enduring practices today. A key focus will be on a fundamental 
problem entailed in mass supervision efforts—the lack of autonomy of those expected 
to monitor and criticise the cadres who exercised authority over them—and methods 
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employed to address this problem. My understanding of how these methods were 
implemented and my assessment of the results are informed by a ten-year investigation 
into the evolution of governance practices in Chinese factories.1 
Aims, Targets, and Forms
Mass supervision was the quintessential element of the CCP’s conception of 
democratic participation. Mao succinctly expressed this in his famous conversation 
in 1945 with Huang Yanpei, a prominent education reformer. At a meeting with 
communist leaders at their insurgent headquarters in Yan’an, Huang presented his 
hosts with a pointed question about the fate of victorious revolutions in China’s past:
What I’ve seen conforms to the saying, ‘Things flourish suddenly, but they 
also degenerate quickly.’ At first people pay close attention to everything, they 
work extremely hard and are willing to go through all kinds of hardships. But 
later, as the situation improves, this spirit gradually degenerates and over 
time people develop inertia … . Throughout history, either the government 
falls into the hands of eunuchs, or reforms fail after a reformer is dismissed, 
or officials becomes corrupt, but so far no state has been able to escape this 
cyclical law. Gentlemen of the Communist Party … . I hope you can find 
a way to escape this law.
Mao replied: ‘We have already found a new road to escape this cycle. That new road 
is democracy. Only when the people are allowed to supervise the government, will the 
government not dare to become complacent.’2
Mao’s conception of democracy, shared by other Party leaders, was quite restricted. 
The CCP insisted on an absolute political monopoly; it did not allow competing 
political parties and it exercised tight control over all economic and social institutions. 
Moreover, popular participation was limited largely to the basic levels of society, far 
from the realm of central policymaking, which took place at higher echelons of the CCP. 
Within this constricted framework, however, mass supervision was expected to play 
a critical role, keeping communist cadres on the straight and narrow and compelling 
them to listen to the concerns of the population they were to govern.
The mechanisms of mass supervision were designed to elicit exposure of a wide variety 
of proscribed behaviours by communist cadres, including corruption, favouritism and 
nepotism, inefficiency and waste, privilege-seeking and selfishness, a variety of political 
offences, and official misconduct prompting citizen grievances. The most important 
target of mass supervision, however, was bureaucratic work styles (guanliaozhuyi 
zuofeng), which in the CCP’s lexicon referred to cadres being isolated from the masses, 
imposing harsh rules and regulations, managing in an arrogant and autocratic fashion, 
stifling criticism, complaints, and suggestions from below, and refusing to attend to the 
concerns of masses or involve them in local governance. Party leaders recognised that 
the problem of bureaucratism could not be effectively remedied through the Party’s 
systems of top-down control.3 Such bureaucratic controls were not only ineffective in 
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curbing bureaucratism, but were counterproductive because they exacerbated cadres’ 
proclivity to turn their gaze up, rather than down; to prevent cadres from becoming 
aloof from the masses, supervision from below was indispensable.
The CCP made workplaces—rural production brigades and urban work units 
(see Kevin Lin’s essay in the present volume)—the main sites through which it governed 
the populace and fostered popular participation. These workplaces, therefore, became 
the principal locations for mass supervision. This was true both of the periodic mass 
supervision campaigns as well as the everyday mechanisms, which included reporting 
systems (such as anonymous letter boxes), petition and grievance systems, the election 
of basic-level leaders, the practice of leaders reporting to mass meetings, the creation of 
teams of rank-and-file representatives to monitor leadership bodies, and the election of 
representative congresses to supervise workplace leadership.
Efforts to make mass supervision effective confronted a fundamental problem: 
urban workers and villagers had little autonomy from the cadres they were expected 
to supervise. Local cadres enjoyed great power, which was reinforced by the Party’s 
determination to maintain a political monopoly. Party organisations in villages and 
work units left little room for autonomous activity and, despite official prohibitions, 
raising criticisms of local cadres often brought retribution. Mao and other Party leaders 
were acutely aware of this problem and the purpose of organising mass campaigns 
was to overcome popular reticence by providing official support for raising criticisms. 
Mao was responsible for initiating all mass supervision campaigns, including major 
movements in which Party authorities dispatched outside work teams to mobilise 
villagers or workers to criticise local cadres (see Perry’s essay in the present volume). 
Although outside work teams introduced a degree of autonomy from local Party 
officials, the Party organisation remained in charge. On two occasions, however, Mao 
went around the Party organisation to inspire more freewheeling criticism. In the 
following sections, I will review the various methods of mobilisation employed in mass 
supervision campaigns and assess the results.
Origins and Early Campaigns
The CCP’s practice of mass supervision had both domestic and foreign roots. It was 
informed by the traditional Chinese system of lodging complaints (gaozhuang), in which 
people were encouraged to report malfeasance by ‘corrupt officials’ and ‘evil gentry’ to 
higher authorities through petitions that ultimately might reach the emperor.4 It was 
also informed by Soviet traditions, many of which were borrowed by the CCP, along 
with the term mass supervision itself.5 The Party’s own practices were developed while 
it was an insurgent organisation, ensconced for decades in remote rural base areas. 
In order to maintain support in the villages it governed, Party leaders sought to prevent 
local cadres from abusing their power by conducting periodic Party rectification 
campaigns (see Mertha’s essay in the present volume). In 1947, they experimented with 
‘open door’ rectification, dispatching Party work teams to organise villagers to criticise 
shortcomings and transgressions of local Party cadres. In his classic first-hand account, 
William Hinton described how this campaign was carried out, with each village cadre 
compelled to face village-wide meetings and ‘pass the gate’ in order to keep his or her 
position.6 Li Fangchun subsequently documented the vast impact of this campaign and 
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the severe psychological and physical violence to which rural cadres were subjected.7 
Commenting on the campaign, a senior communist leader wrote in his diary that the 
Party seemed to be ‘waging revolution against itself.’8
After the CCP took national power in 1949, the practice of mass supervision was 
given prominent sanction in the new regime’s first Constitution, adopted in 1954, which 
declared: ‘All state organs must rely on the masses of the people, keep close contact 
with the masses, listen to the opinions of the masses, and accept the supervision of the 
masses.’9 Starting in the early 1950s, Party leaders launched a series of mass supervision 
campaigns, the most important of which was the Three Antis Campaign (sanfan 
yundong), directed against leaders of state-owned enterprises and state agencies. Many 
communist cadres became targets of this campaign, but during these early years their 
offences were generally construed to be the product of corruption by old elites and the 
influence of traditional ideas and practices. As these campaigns were an integral part of 
the effort to consolidate communist power at the expense of old elites, it was also not 
difficult for central authorities to trust local Party organisations to manage them. For 
instance, concerns that Party cadres in charge of a particular factory had developed 
close ties with incumbent factory leaders or had become entrenched in local networks 
of corruption could readily be dealt with by sending in outside work teams to mobilise 
workers in the factory to investigate.10
This was no longer the case after the socialist transformation was completed in 
1956. The Party Rectification Campaign carried out in the spring of the following year 
exclusively targeted Party cadres, who were by then fully in charge of all institutions. 
Under these conditions, Mao decided to unleash a more autonomous type of mass 
supervision that did not entail the tutelage of Party-dispatched work teams. In the 1957 
Party Rectification Campaign, the culmination of the Hundred Flowers Campaign 
launched in 1956, he invited professionals, intellectuals, and students to organise their 
own meetings and activities to criticise the communist cadres in charge of schools, 
government agencies, and enterprises. This was a risky move that ended in disaster, as 
many of those who spoke up did not limit their criticisms to Mao’s intended agenda, but 
raised more fundamental critiques of the new regime. Communist cadres responded 
with alarm and indignation, and Mao was compelled to support a harsh backlash, the 
Anti-rightist Campaign, which condemned hundreds of thousands of those who had 
spoken up to years of punishment and discrimination.11
In the years that followed the debacle of 1957, Mao continued to mobilise criticism 
of communist cadres, but he retreated to the more conventional work team method. 
Moreover, in order to avoid the dynamic that emerged in 1957, which pitted old elites 
against new elites, he never again mobilised popular criticism of communist cadres 
without at the same time targeting old elites. In subsequent campaigns, although Party 
cadres were always the main target, old elites were also subjected to attack.
The Four Cleans
In 1962, Mao launched the Four Cleans Campaign—formally known as the Socialist 
Education Movement—the broadest, deepest, and most protracted effort since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China to reign in malfeasance and bureaucratic 
practices among Party cadres. The Campaign lasted for more than four years and 
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mobilised huge numbers of workers and peasants. The purpose, Mao declared in the 
initial guidelines for the mobilisation, was to criticise cadres who had been ‘acting like 
bureaucrats and overlords divorced from the masses,’ compelling them ‘to directly face 
the masses and resolve the abnormal relations that have existed between cadres and the 
masses for many years.’12
During the course of the Campaign, Mao’s evaluation of the maladies that afflicted 
the CCP officialdom became more jaundiced, and in early 1965 he supervised the 
drafting of a new set of guidelines that identified the main target as ‘those in positions 
of authority inside the Party who are taking the capitalist road.’13 Later that year, 
responding to a report by the leader of a work team assigned to direct the movement in 
an agricultural machinery factory, Mao elaborated on the ‘capitalist roader’ (zouzipai) 
theme with startling words. ‘The bureaucratic class,’ he wrote, referring to officials of his 
own Party, ‘is a class sharply opposed to the working class and poor and lower-middle 
peasants. These leaders who take the capitalist road have become, or are becoming, 
the capitalists who suck the workers’ blood. How can they sufficiently understand the 
necessity of socialist revolution? They are the targets of our struggle and the targets of 
the revolution.’14
For Mao, the Four Cleans Campaign became a critical test of the work team method. 
The revised 1965 guidelines emphasised that ‘cadres must have supervision from above 
and below, particularly mass supervision’ adding that ‘in the Four Cleans Campaign 
we must work together with the masses to find effective means of supervision.’15 As is 
evident from retrospective ethnographic accounts of the Campaign in factories as 
well as villages, the Four Cleans work teams were, in fact, very effective in curbing 
cadre corruption.16 Because the teams were not under the leadership of local Party 
committees, they were in a position to organise villagers and factory workers to 
criticise their superiors, and to undertake harsh, systematic, mass-based investigations 
of unscrupulous behaviour by local cadres. On the other hand, the top-down nature 
of the work team method only reinforced the hierarchy of authority and culture of 
tutelage that underpinned the maladies associated with bureaucratism. As Mao became 
increasingly preoccupied with the latter, which he saw as fostering the development 
of a new bureaucratic class of Party officials, he decided to abandon the work team 
method.
Already in January 1965, Mao issued a sharp critique of the methods employed by the 
Four Cleans work teams, using language that presaged the radical approach he would 
take during the Cultural Revolution. ‘When you go to develop a mass movement, when 
you go to lead a mass struggle, in the midst of the struggle the masses are going to do 
what they want to do, and then in the course of the struggle they’ll create their own 
leaders,’ he insisted. ‘In short, you have to rely on the masses; you can’t rely on the work 
teams. The work teams don’t understand the situation, or in ignorance they become 
bureaucrats and obstruct the movement.’17 In a postmortem delivered two years later, 
he declared that the movement had ‘failed to solve the problem because we did not find 
a form, a method, to arouse the broad masses to expose our dark aspect openly, in an 
all-round way and from below.’18
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Rebel-led Mass Supervision
The Cultural Revolution was in many ways a direct continuation of the Four Cleans 
Campaign, but it featured a much more radical effort to introduce autonomy into mass 
supervision. Although Mao allowed Party leaders to once again send in work teams 
when he launched the movement in the spring of 1966, he immediately commissioned 
newspaper articles and radio broadcasts that called on the masses to ‘educate 
themselves and liberate themselves.’ A few weeks later, he demanded the removal of 
work teams, accusing them of having ‘encircled and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled 
opinions differing from their own, imposed a white terror, and felt very pleased with 
themselves.’19
Mao subsequently called on students, workers, and peasants to form their own 
‘fighting groups’ (zhandoudui) to criticise Party officials in their schools, factories, and 
communes. In factories, this turn of events had a polarising effect, spurring the rise of 
both ‘rebel’ (zaofan) organisations, which directed their fire at the Party organisation 
and pledged loyalty to no one but Mao, and conservative organisations, which defended 
the factory Party organisation. This led to fierce factional struggles in workplaces across 
China.20
The stakes of the conflict increased dramatically in January 1967 after Mao called 
on rebels to ‘seize power’ (duoquan). He first endorsed rebel efforts to take control of 
Shanghai’s newspapers, declaring: ‘The seizure of power at two newspapers is a national 
question and we should support their rebellion.’ He cautioned, however, that the 
old leaders of the newspapers should not be discharged: ‘I am not in favour of their 
dismissal; let them remain at their posts and be supervised by the masses.’21 He relayed 
the same message a few days later after rebels, backed by his emissaries, overthrew the 
Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. ‘Taking over is great, but those who take over 
should only be in charge of politics (zhengwu), not regular administrative functions 
(yewu),’ he instructed. ‘Regular administrative functions should still be taken care of 
by the original staff. We should only be responsible for supervising them.’22 The new 
‘revolutionary committee’ (geming weiyuanhui) structure that Mao eventually endorsed 
followed this logic: ‘mass representatives’ (qunzhong daibiao), who were to be drawn 
from the ranks of rebel groups and remain at their original posts, were to supervise 
veteran cadres, who would occupy managerial positions. Despite Mao’s insistence 
that seizing power should only be a means of reinforcing supervision from below, the 
ensuing violent factional struggles for power greatly complicated and in many ways 
eclipsed the original project.
His inflammatory rhetoric notwithstanding, Mao’s goals during the Cultural 
Revolution were not as radical as many observers (and participants) imagined. He had 
no intention of fundamentally changing the state structure or overthrowing the CCP; 
his aim was to shake up the Party organisation and challenge the officious, bureaucratic 
airs of Party cadres. The methods he introduced, however, were quite radical considering 
that until then the CCP had insisted on exercising a complete monopoly on political 
activity. Because the rebels were self-organised and largely independent from the Party 
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organisation, they were especially capable of breaking down the authority of the local 
Party hierarchy, and opening up Party cadres to a torrent of criticism from below. 
The impact was lasting; the authority of Party officials never fully recovered.
The Cultural Revolution, however, ultimately failed to establish an effective long-
term model for incorporating autonomy into mass supervision. The autonomy of the 
rebel groups was compromised in two critical ways. First, they were compelled to 
operate within very narrow political and ideological constraints and the scope of the 
issues they were permitted to raise was limited. While they were encouraged to attack 
cadres’ privileges, corruption, and authoritarian and bureaucratic ways, economic 
demands were off limits. Organisations so constrained could never truly represent the 
masses of workers and peasants. Second, the rebel organisations were only allowed 
a momentary existence. Once Mao’s blessing was withdrawn, they were compelled to 
disband and subsequently faced a backlash far harsher than the Anti-rightist Campaign. 
Mao recognised that effective mass supervision required organisations that were not 
under Party control, but he was not willing to permit the permanent establishment of 
autonomous organisations.
Remnants of Mass Supervision
Today, mass supervision continues to be part of the principles formally underpinning 
the CCP’s model of governance, but the practices associated with the slogan have 
changed in fundamental ways.23 This has been evident in the ongoing anti-corruption 
drive launched by Xi Jinping in 2012. The masses have been called upon to participate, 
but there has been little semblance of the mass movements of the past, when cadres 
were hauled before mass meetings in every village and factory. Instead, the Campaign 
has largely been carried out by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and 
supervision from below has mainly taken the form of individuals reporting abuses. 
Moreover, as in all recent campaigns that have targeted cadres, the focus has been on 
corruption. The main preoccupation of the Mao era—the abuses of power identified as 
bureaucratism—are of little concern.
The dynamics of mass supervision, however, extend beyond official channels. 
A wide variety of other avenues for grassroots complaints about cadre behaviour have 
emerged, including unofficial websites on which citizens vent frustration and anger 
about cadre corruption and abuse of power. The resulting scandals have become 
a highlight of Chinese political life. One indication of the extent to which the concept 
of the mass supervision continues to inspire popular political thinking in China can be 
found in a manifesto issued by organisers of ‘Jasmine’ pro-democracy rallies in 2011, 
which featured as its central demand that the government ‘genuinely fight corruption 
and accept the supervision of the people.’24 Thus, although the tumultuous mass 
movements of the Mao era are fading into the past, the idea of mass supervision, rooted 
in longstanding Chinese traditions and forged into a mainstay of popular participation 
during the first decades of the communist era, has become an enduring feature of 
China’s political culture. 






(Translated by William SIMA)
‘Mobilisation’ (dongyuan) is a fundamental concept in contemporary Chinese politics. It denotes the use of an ideological system by a political party or regime to encourage, or coerce, members of society to participate 
in certain political, economic, or social objectives, in order to achieve large-scale 
centralisation and deployment of resources and manpower. In China, the modern 
understanding of politics by mass mobilisation originated in the First United Front 
between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (guomindang, 
hereafter GMD) in 1923. Believing that the success of the Chinese Revolution 
depended on close unity between the government and all social organisations, Sun 
Yat-sen, the founder of the GMD, stressed the importance of awakening the masses, 
advocating a policy of ‘alliance with the Soviet Union, alliance with the Communist 
Party, assistance for the peasants and workers.’ With this policy, Sun sought to fashion 
the GMD into a modern political party rooted in mass mobilisation. Yet, it would be 
the CCP that eventually came to exemplify and refine mobilisation politics in modern 
China. During the War of Resistance against Japan, the Civil War of the late 1940s, and 
in successive social movements after 1949, mass mobilisation was a critical ideological 
mechanism through which the CCP achieved its political ambitions. 
In their classic study Politics in China, James Townsend and Brantly Womack describe 
the advent of a ‘Chinese model’ or ‘Maoist model’ in Western political science since the 
1970s, which emerged in response to a recognised need to view China’s political system 
as sui generis rather than with reference to ‘developing country’ models, the Soviet 
Union, and other imperfect comparative paradigms.1 They identify four key elements 
in the Chinese/Maoist political model. First, it aims to achieve national independence 
and self-reliance, avoiding economic or political dependence on other states (see Yang’s 
essay in the present volume). Second, it seeks comprehensive development of all sectors 
of society and the economy, with emphasis on agriculture, through centralised planning. 
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Third, it emphasises mass mobilisation and participation as techniques for achieving 
social, economic, and political goals. In such a context, the destabilising effects of mass 
campaigns on bureaucratic institutions are regarded as healthy, or at least acceptable, as 
is any damage to intellectual and technical skills that accompanies the glorification of 
mass movements. Finally, the Chinese political model insists on continuous revolution 
for the purpose of avoiding the restoration of capitalism, including in cases where 
capitalist tendencies are evident within the Party itself (see Galway’s essay in the present 
volume). However, rather than conceiving of mobilisation as a distinct element within 
the Chinese model, as Townsend and Womack do, in this essay I will argue that it 
would be more fitting to see mobilisation as essential to all the elements of the model.
Governance by Mobilisation
The 1937–45 War of Resistance against Japan was the critical period for the 
ascendency of the CCP, for Mao Zedong’s ideas on the people’s war, and the maturation 
of a political system rooted in mobilisation (see Guan’s essay in the present volume). 
Mao understood war to encompass driving away imperialism and building a new 
nation out of the old. For this to be realised would require nothing less than the full 
mobilisation of the Chinese population. In his classic treatise ‘On Protracted War,’ 
first delivered as a series of speeches at Yan’an in May and June 1938, Mao described 
mobilisation in the following terms: 
A national revolutionary war as great as ours cannot be won without 
extensive and thoroughgoing political mobilisation … . [Mobilisation] 
is indeed of primary importance, while our inferiority in weapons and 
other things is only secondary. The mobilisation of the common people 
throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, 
create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other 
things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the 
war. To win victory, we must persevere in the War of Resistance, in the 
united front, and in the protracted war. But all these are inseparable from 
the mobilisation of the common people … . To mobilise once is not enough; 
political mobilisation for the War of Resistance must be continuous. Our job 
is not to recite our political programme to the people, for nobody will listen 
to such recitations; we must link the political mobilisation for the war with 
developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, and 
make it a continuous movement. This is a matter of immense importance on 
which our victory in the war primarily depends. 
Thus, for Mao war was a phenomenon encompassing not only armed conflict, but 
also national independence, political renewal, and the reconstruction of society and 
culture. Throughout the War of Resistance and the ensuing resumption of the Civil War 
with the GMD after 1946, the CCP successfully mobilised large numbers of peasants 
to enlist in its regular army, or to join people’s militias, guerilla detachments, and 
local-level self-defense groups acting in concert with the regular army. From the early 
1940s, the CCP launched a Production Campaign for self-sufficiency in agriculture and 
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the production of common items, with rectification (zhengfeng) and thought reform 
(sixiang gaizao) serving as crucial political mechanisms for achieving consensus among 
Party members, and unity with the masses (see the essays by Cheek, Mertha, and Yang 
in the present volume). Self-sufficiency and ideological rectitude safeguarded the CCP’s 
growth during wartime. 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the communist 
regime adapted the ideology and methods of mass mobilisation it had developed during 
wartime to political administration, the economy, and society. From 1950 to 1953, 
the Land Reform Movement, the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, the 
Campaign to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the Three Antis Campaign (against 
corruption, waste, and bureaucratism), and the Five Antis Campaign (against bribery, 
tax evasion, theft of state assets, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state 
economic intelligence) were all deeply rooted in mass mobilisation. So too were the 
campaigns of the late 1950s and 1960s, including the Four Pests Campaign (aimed at 
eradiating mice, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes), the Great Leap Forward, and the 
Down to the Countryside Movement at the start of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, 
it may be said that from 1949 until the beginning of the reforms in the late 1970s, the 
communist regime embodied a politics of governance by mobilisation. Below, I outline 
three key features of this model of governance.
The Mechanisms behind Mobilisation
The Party serves as the core and propellant of mobilisation politics. The late University 
of Chicago-based political scientist Tang Tsou famously described a ‘concentric circle 
structure’ in China’s CCP-led political system, with 
the Party secretary standing at the center, the Party committee forming the 
inner circle, and the general membership forming the next one outward. 
The Party as a whole … sought to influence, guide, penetrate, and control the 
social groups and institutions around them, mobilising and organising the 
social strata, groups, and individuals which had never been actively involved 
in the political process or had formerly remained passive and inert.2 
This concentric circle structure, Tsou writes, ‘proved to be an efficacious instrument 
for carrying through a social revolution and reshaping the social system.’ 
In the early years of the PRC, the function of mobilisation in carrying out mass 
movements can be seen in just such terms of a concentric fanning out, from the 
Central Committee to cadres in provincial- and regional-level Party committees, 
thence downwards to activists engaging directly with the masses at the grassroots. This 
is illustrated in a December 1951 report from the CCP North China Bureau to the 
Central Committee, recommending the Three Antis Campaign to be carried out ‘on 
a grand scale, with tenacity of lightening and the swiftness of wind.’3 Mao circulated 
this Report as an exemplary text on how the Three Antis Campaign should be 
enacted nationwide. It stipulated that policies and directives be issued in a top-down 
fashion throughout all Party representative committees, cadre committees, people’s 
representative committees and in Party and non-Party political, economic, and military 
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organisations. It recommended that inspection committees made up of Party and non-
Party cadres and activists be established at all levels, overseen by a senior Party official; 
these committees should be responsible for rectifying the sort of ‘erroneous thinking’ 
that hindered the project of opposing corruption, waste, and bureaucratisation. The 
Report insisted that mobilisation spread ubiquitously at all levels, ‘leaving out not 
a single small organisation or individual.’ 
If we survey movements and campaigns from 1949 up to the Cultural Revolution, it 
is evident that centre-led mobilisation generally progressed through a number of steps: 
a) propaganda was formulated and inculcated among the people; b) high-level cadres 
shaped propaganda and facilitated its spread, mobilising from the centre downwards; 
c) exemplars of effective political action were fostered and encouraged through inter-
group competition and education sessions; d) ‘psychological warfare’ (gongxinzhan) 
was used to enforce mass education movements; e) short and longer duration political 
campaigns intersected and overlapped, driven by a process of continual mobilisation. 
Mass Mobilisation and the Mass Line
As a mechanism of political action, mobilisation requires efficacious propaganda 
techniques and a constructive relationship between the Party and masses. Mass 
mobilisation involves working with the masses to develop the ‘mass line’ (qunzhong 
luxian), an important concept for the CCP during and after its coming to power (see 
Lin Chun’s essay in the present volume). Mao’s thinking on the ‘people’s war’ advocates 
having faith in the masses, relying on the masses, mobilising and organising the masses 
to create the ‘vast ocean’ in which to drown the enemy, as he outlined in his treatise ‘On 
Protracted War’ noted above. This attitude of relying on the masses is perhaps what 
most strongly distinguished the CCP from the GMD in their approaches to war; the 
GMD, by contrast, emphasised reliance on the standing army, the government, and 
conventional forms of warfare. Indeed, willingness—or lack thereof—to stir up popular 
sentiment and mobilise the masses was perhaps the most fundamental difference in the 
approach to governance between the two parties.
However, having faith in and relying on the masses, learning from and returning 
to the masses is merely the ideal situation of the mass line. The mass line only works 
effectively when those in power take account of the best interests and aspirations of 
the masses, when the masses recognise that the Party is sincerely representing them, 
and respond by embracing and upholding the Party’s policies. While it is the Party 
that stages mobilisation, the subjective position of the masses—their feeling that they 
really are ‘masters of their own affairs’—is the essential basis for successful mobilisation 
politics. At numerous points in the history of the PRC, the mass line has failed to 
achieve this ideal. 
Administrative Mobilisation in the Era of Reform 
China’s transformation after 1979 is often expressed in terms of a shift from ‘revolution’ 
to ‘modernisation.’ With the new leadership under Deng Xiaoping pursuing economic 
reform and bureaucratic professionalisation of the government administration, and as 
citizens embraced private ownership and individual self-consciousness, politics by large-
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scale mass mobilisation gradually became a phenomenon of the past. In contemporary 
China, the government, at such times when it requires organised popular participation 
on a large scale, typically issues administrative orders and offers material incentives to 
participants. Such ‘administrative decree-style mobilisation’ is especially visible in two 
main areas.
The first is crisis mobilisation. The state regularly mobilises the Party, government 
administration, and military to coordinate closely with social forces in emergency 
rescue and crisis alleviation. The successful response to the 2003 SARS epidemic and 
the May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake are notable recent examples of administration-
driven mobilisation.4 In a recent study of the Wenchuan earthquake, Christian Sorace 
demonstrates how the CCP claims to have engineered a secular ‘miracle’ (qiji) on the 
basis of mobilising the entire Party-state apparatus and ‘Party spirit’ (dangxing) of its 
cadres to complete the reconstruction in under two years.5 Thus, mobilisation is praised 
as key to the success of the reconstruction effort, while remaining a carefully controlled 
and orchestrated affair. 
The second is education campaigns. The Party communicates developments in 
ideology and policy implementation to wider society through what may be termed 
‘mobilised education drives.’ Recent examples include the 2015 Three Stricts and Three 
Genuines Campaign (san yan san shi yundong), which exhorted strictness in ‘moral 
cultivation, the use of power, and in the exercise of self-discipline,’ while ‘planning and 
working in genuine ways and genuinely striving to be a decent person.’6 In 2016, the 
Two Studies and One Action Campaign (liang xue yi zuo yundong) pressured CCP 
members to study the Party constitution and regulations, study the serialised speeches 
of Party leaders, and strive to be good Party members. Designed and directed by the 
Central Committee and implemented downwards, these education campaigns aim to 
defuse pressure away from the centre; committees at all levels are required to ‘maintain 
discipline among Party members and effectively lead the rank-and-file.’ Whereas 
during the Maoist period mobilisation was based in mass participation, contemporary 
campaigns such as those outlined above rely on the media to communicate policy 
from the centre. While often regarded as a tiresome formality of public life, they are 
nonetheless an effective means for the Party to shape the behaviour of its members, 
and of wider society.






What was a museum (bowuguan) in Mao’s China? In 1952, a Shanghai Museum guidebook explained that New China’s heightened political consciousness required attendant opportunities to study culture.1 According 
to its directors, there was also a demand for museum visits from an increasing number 
of mass organisations, such as workers’ groups and schools. Citing Mao Zedong’s 
writings on the historic greatness of the nation, the role of antiquity in building New 
Democracy, and the place of China in world civilisation, officials announced the 
Shanghai Museum’s guiding principles: to teach China’s cultural traditions, to utilise 
ancient culture to develop the new, and to cultivate patriotism in service of socialist 
construction. ‘The museum is part of society’s superstructure,’ declared director Shen 
Zhiyu in 1960, ‘the goal for establishing museums is to carry out mass education in 
patriotism, socialism, and communism.’2 A museum in China—from the Mao era to 
the present—has been a political classroom.
Writing on the rise of museums in nineteenth-century Europe, sociologist Tony 
Bennett described ‘exhibitionary culture’ as a complex: a system in which knowledge 
projected power and in which viewers were part of the display, both subject and object 
of the exhibition.3 In the Mao years, the Shanghai Museum participated in all forms of 
exhibitionary culture—not just the fine art for which it is famous for today. While its 
permanent display showcased art by dynastic era, it also mounted special exhibitions 
to accompany political campaigns, including exhibits on revolutionary artefacts, on 
the history of Shanghai, and on the transformation of class from old to new China. 
During the Cultural Revolution, its workers collected contemporary objects like the 
placard of the Shanghai People’s Commune, anticipating that such artefacts would be 
the displays of the future. In these ways, the museum encompassed many functions. 
It was also a memorial hall (jinianguan), a display hall (chenlieguan), and an exhibition 
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hall (zhanlanguan). Its objects were mostly artefacts (shiwu), but also cultural relics 
(wenwu), which included a special subcategory of revolutionary cultural relics (geming 
wenwu). 
Museums were not new to Mao’s China. In the nineteenth century, foreign museums 
were founded in Shanghai’s international settlements, and in 1905 reformer Zhang 
Jian established the first Chinese museum in the city of Nantong. The Nationalist 
Government had its own museums, including memorial halls that displayed the 
possessions of revolutionary martyrs. While some May Fourth intellectuals criticised 
museums as warehouses for old things, their Republican-era boosters explained that—
as in the Soviet Union—museums could be used to spread ideology and transform 
the people’s consciousness.4 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began planning for 
a Museum of the Revolution as early as 1930 and used small-scale exhibits in its rural 
base areas for mass education.5 After coming to power in 1949, the state established 
museums to reflect and project its political legitimacy. Beyond this, exhibitions became 
part of the Party’s propaganda repertoire, deployed to mobilise the masses. As tools 
in China’s Communist Revolution, museums have served politics, displays have been 
curated at the grassroots, and objects have served as evidence. 
  
Museums as Politics
Museums in Mao’s China were first and foremost the expression of a political 
narrative. In the 1950s, Chinese cultural officials followed the Soviet model of 
museums as ‘living textbooks.’ The Lenin Museum, for instance, arranged its rooms 
according to the chapters in Stalin’s History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(Bolsheviks). Inspired by visits and by handbooks of Soviet museology, Chinese curators 
followed suit, presenting Chinese history according to Mao’s 1940 essay, ‘On New 
Democracy’ (see Blecher’s essay in the present volume). Further, as a ‘living textbook’ 
the revolutionary history museum would always be incomplete, a work in progress; 
as Wang Yeqiu of the State Bureau of Cultural Relics wrote in 1950, chapters would 
continually be added until the arrival of communism.6 Hence the Shanghai Museum’s 
collection of Cultural Revolution artefacts: this was the age of permanent revolution.
In addition to the narrative of the past, museums provided a script for the current 
moment. Archival materials from the 1960s show that at the First Party Congress Site—
the memorial established to commemorate the CCP founding in 1921—the official 
imperative was to serve the present (wei dangqian zhengzhi fuwu) (see the image on 
page 143). Exhibits were constantly updated to accord with contemporary politics, 
leading to a dizzying number of exhibition texts at the height of the Cultural Revolution, 
when scripts were continuously revised to include the latest political enemies. Docents 
themselves memorised scripts according to their audience—domestic visitors vs. 
foreign dignitaries—and also prepared lists of typical questions and appropriate 
answers. Even local and ad hoc exhibits had political scripts; in campaigns such as the 
Socialist Education Movement and the Cultural Revolution, display boards and docent 
texts presented visitors with the words, slogans, and quotations to attack alleged class 
enemies.7 
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In these ways, exhibitionary culture functioned as a kind of political signalling: in an 
era of tumultuous politics, when words could both accuse and incriminate, museum 
scripts were the latest Party-approved text. No wonder that even if exhibition attendance 
was required, people paid attention: a visit included copying text to teach others in turn; 
individuals requested visits to exhibits to try to understand the Cultural Revolution as 
it was breaking out; and out-of-town Red Guards went first to the local Red Guard 
Exhibition to understand the movement at the grassroots. In Elizabeth Perry’s study 
of the mining town of Anyuan, the Party secretary of its Chairman Mao Memorial 
Hall noticed Lin Biao’s absence from Beijing’s Great Hall of the People before news of 
Lin’s death came out, and revised Anyuan’s exhibits to his own political advantage.8 
An exhibit’s narrative text was a barometer for political winds: a docent script could be 
revised, a display backboard could be rewritten, and a cassette tape could be recorded 
over. As a political technology, the museum was at once an authoritative master 
narrative and an eminently adaptable form. 
Since the end of the Mao era, the museum in China continues to be a site for political 
narratives. It was in 1990—one year after the 1989 Tiananmen student movement—
that President Jiang Zemin chose Beijing’s Museum of the Chinese Revolution as the 
setting to speak on the importance of patriotic and socialist education, calling on 
Chinese museums to take responsibility in cultivating youth. From 2004, the state has 
promoted ‘patriotic education’ by supporting red tourism (hongse lüyou), entailing 
visits to historic sites associated with the revolutionary tradition.9 In 2012, President 
Xi Jinping introduced his slogan ‘China Dream’ (zhongguo meng) at what is now called 
the National Museum of China. As Timothy Cheek writes in this volume, the project of 
‘telling China’s story well’ (jianghao zhongguo gushi) is a central priority for the current 
regime, and museums no doubt play a role. As part of local development, municipalities 
have been building museums, and there is an increasing trend for companies and work 
The Site of the First National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Shanghai (2010)
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units to each have their own museum. A tour of the museum is sometimes a stand-in 
for an inspection of the factory floor or an actual site visit—in other words, museums 
remain a way to control the script. And, in a time when China’s influence increasingly 
reaches abroad, museums will play an important role in ‘telling China’s story well’ for 
global audiences. For instance, the World War II Pacific War Memorial Hall (haiwai 
kangri zhanzheng jinianguan), a private museum in San Francisco, looks remarkably 
like a Chinese museum, featuring a sculpture ‘Great Wall of Blood and Flesh’ that 
evokes the Chinese national anthem. 
Museums as Grassroots
Exhibitions in Mao’s China departed from Republican and Soviet precedents in that 
they were a grassroots phenomenon. Neighbourhood cadres were instructed in the 
early 1950s to mount small-scale exhibits in alleyways that would complement the 
latest political campaign and the most recent propaganda. Officials were encouraged to 
enliven exhibits with objects and cartoons, to employ students to narrate them to those 
who could not read, and to even set up games; one anti-spy exhibition in Shanghai’s 
Huangpu district presented a ‘study city’ in which visitors could work their way 
through a maze by answering questions correctly. Similarly, handbooks for rural art 
workers gave detailed instructions on how to put on ‘class education exhibitions’ (jieji 
jiaoyu zhanlanhui), down to how to set up display halls for the best visitor circulation 
and how to construct backdrops to maximise visual space. In these ways, exhibitionary 
culture served a historiographical trend that began in 1958: to write and display history 
at the grassroots. Indeed, museums also had their own Great Leap Forward, in which 
the Ministry of Culture called for a museum in every county. 
In the era of permanent revolution, local exhibits served to mobilise the masses. 
They provided visitors with a narrative, but they also taught participation. At the 
grassroots, individuals were encouraged to provide artefacts to display: schoolchildren 
offered the uniforms and identity cards of their proletarian parents, workers presented 
the protective gloves and safety equipment of the factory in New China. During the 
Socialist Education Movement, which preceded the Cultural Revolution, teachers 
encouraged students to curate their own ‘class education exhibitions’ at school. The 
prototype for such a display was Sichuan’s Rent Collection Courtyard, which showcased 
the threat of class enemies past and present. It also provided a stage for individuals to 
tell stories of class suffering, for viewers to remember their own pasts, and for visitors 
to shout political slogans (see Javed’s essay in the present volume). Though the Rent 
Collection Courtyard was the most elaborate and well known, each locality had a ‘class 
education exhibition,’ some complete with a landlord manor and sculptural tableaux 
(see the image on page 145). 
In today’s China a different kind of grassroots exhibition is taking place. There 
has been a craze for personal collecting, ranging from retirees collecting Mao-era 
memorabilia to multimillionaires competing for artwork at international auctions. 
The  former may do so for personal pleasure, with the occasional participation in 
a collective exhibition encouraged by the ‘friends’ of a local museum. The latter may 
see collecting as connoisseurship and investment, and build private museums on par 
with the most modern and professional of state museums. Grassroots exhibitions can 
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Lei Feng Memorial Hall of Hunan, Changsha (2010)
even be digital, as in the case of virtual Cultural Revolution museums.10 Unable  to 
have a bricks-and-mortar Cultural Revolution museum in China, activists wishing 
to  memorialise the period do so online. In Hong Kong, there is somewhat more 
space to mount a grassroots exhibit; the territory has hosted pop-up displays on the 
1989 Tiananmen student movement, and between 2014 and 2016 a privately run June 
Fourth Museum existed across the street from the official Hong Kong Museum of 
History. Yet, the long arm of the Chinese state extends far and deep; with the rise of the 
Xi Jinping regime’s ‘sharp power,’ even displays outside of China—like Harvard’s 2017 
exhibit of Cultural Revolution ‘big-character posters’ (dazibao) from an anonymous 
private collector—can be seen as politically sensitive (see the image on page 146). 
Museums as Evidence
In the Mao era, museums and exhibitions differed from other propaganda forms 
in their focus on the material. Officials stressed that objects—more so than pictures 
or text—were most attractive for the ordinary viewer. ‘Every exhibition object,’ they 
exhorted, ‘has in and of itself a life and the ability to persuade.’11 Both accessible and 
arresting, material objects also fit within the ideological framework of a revolution 
based on Marxism: if a material object was a reflection of the historical circumstances—
and class relations—that produced it, then an object was the ideal lesson. Yet curators 
in Mao’s China departed from the Soviet model. In Soviet museums, exhibits explained 
class by showcasing the means of production and their ownership. In China during 
the Mao era—with the persistence of class struggle in the context of a ‘continuous 
revolution’ (see Galway’s essay in the present volume)—curators displayed class 
through personal possessions: workers and peasants through patched clothing and 
humble quilts, landlords and capitalists through silks and furs. Like temple depictions 
of otherworldly justice, greed and corruption were represented by material excess.12 
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Red and Black Revolution: Dazibao and Woodcuts from 1960s China, Cambridge, MA (2017)
Yet ‘class education exhibitions,’ ubiquitous during the Socialist Education Movement 
of the early 1960s, were more than mere morality tales. These were used to make the 
argument that class enemies existed in New China, threatening the socialist revolution, 
and that it was necessary to struggle against them; hence such exhibits used material 
possessions to display what were literally called ‘evidence’ and ‘proof.’ Land deeds and 
rent registers were called ‘change-of-sky documents’ (biantianzhang), supposedly saved 
by former owners so that after a capitalist restoration they could stage a comeback. 
Similarly, gold bars and foreign currency were used to identify landlords and capitalists 
who had ‘failed to reform,’ concealing their wealth for a future ‘change-of-sky.’ Finally, 
weapons and Nationalist flags were proof of counterrevolutionary intent, revealing 
enemies in New China’s midst. So powerful at suggestion was the ‘class education 
exhibition’ that it gave the Red Guards concrete examples, things to look for when 
they ransacked the homes of alleged class enemies during the Cultural Revolution’s 
notorious ‘house searches’ (chaojia). The discovery of such material evidence became 
grounds for class struggle, and the Red Guards proudly displayed the spoils of their 
revolutionary rebellion.13 
Four decades after the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution and the Mao era, where 
is the material evidence of this period? Outside of China, there have been exhibitions 
of its material culture, but most have been limited to displaying cultural artefacts and 
manufactured products: folk paintings and propaganda posters, ceramics and objects 
of everyday use, Mao badges and other consumer goods. Within China, a few collectors 
have established and built private institutions that exhibit what is sometimes called 
the ‘Red Age’ (hongse niandai)—for instance, Shanghai’s Propaganda Poster Art Centre 
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Jianchuan Museum Cluster, Anren, Sichuan (2016)
has become a niche tourist attraction, and the Jianchuan Museum Cluster, adjacent 
to Sichuan’s Rent Collection Courtyard, boasts the largest private museum in China 
today. But in the main these private museums do not offer an alternate narrative to 
that of the state. Events like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution 
are acknowledged, but their violence and tragedy are only obliquely referred to, if 
mentioned at all. A propaganda poster or an enamelware basin present a past that is as 
‘red, bright, and shining’ as it was once imagined. 
Ironically, the rare examples of individuals who collect negative evidence borrow 
a page from Mao-era exhibitionary culture. For example, the display of blood-stained 
shirts is a constant trope from the Nationalists’ martyrs memorials to the Communists’ 
land reform rallies to New China’s ‘class education exhibitions.’ In Hu Jie’s 2006 
documentary film, Though I Am Gone, the husband of Bian Zhongyun—the first 
teacher beaten to death in the Cultural Revolution—saved her bloody clothing to be 
displayed one day in a Cultural Revolution Museum. In a similar way, some of the 
Tiananmen Mothers saved mementoes of their children: a death notice or a photograph 
of a bloodied corpse.14 Another central element of Maoist exhibitionary culture was 
the use of written and verbal testimony: letters and confessions, in-person recounting 
of suffering, and post-viewing reflection and self-criticism. Unconsciously mirroring 
this repertoire, the grandson of the notorious Liu Wencai—the landlord of the Rent 
Collection Courtyard—has spent his retirement years collecting testimonials of his 
grandfather’s good deeds from former family servants and tenant farmers, a present-
day attempt to rectify names.15 
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The Power of Material Objects
Material objects—in the Mao period and since—are powerful forms of evidence. 
To control their collection and exhibition is a priority for the state. Thus, museums in 
China, past and present, are repositories of official history, contemporary politics, and 
guides to the future. In the Mao era, a visitor could go to an exhibit and learn the script 
for a mass campaign as it was happening; likewise, an official could read a display’s 
backdrop for clues on political reshuffling. Today, one can still read Chinese museums 
and note revisions to the displays. In 2016, subtle changes to the private Jianchuan 
Museum Cluster’s ‘Red Age’ Exhibition Halls were observed. What was once to be 
a separate building devoted to the Cultural Revolution now exhibits the Red Army in 
Sichuan. A previous ambition to have a hall simulating the terror of the ‘house search’ 
was replaced with a digital collection of documents relating a house search account, 
erasable with the flick of a switch. In a series of glass cases, archival materials about 
property confiscation disappeared in favour of collectible cards featuring Mao Zedong 
quotations and revolutionary songs. Finally, a provocative side gallery consisting of 
the ‘wanted circulars’ of political enemies has been remade into a room for Mao-era 
textbooks (see the images on page 147–48). From official exhibition to private museum, 
the state continues to control the political narrative, the grassroots collection, and the 
material evidence of the past.
Jianchuan Museum Cluster, Anren, Sichuan (2013) 





Modern China has inherited not only a large territory but also many ethnic groups from the Manchu Qing Empire it overthrew in 1912. How to ‘stretch the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire’ has 
been a question confronting the successive governments of the Republic of China 
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 In 1912, Chinese revolutionaries came to 
power with an anti-Manchu rage vowing to ‘drive out barbarians to restore China to the 
Chinese’ (quchu dalu, huifu zhonghua), but settled with the last emperor, who issued an 
abdication edict handing over the non-Chinese dominions of the Manchus, Mongols, 
Tibetans, and Muslims to the new Chinese state, thereby inaugurating it as a ‘union 
of five races’ (wuzu gonghe).2 This multinational settlement was only a temporary 
compromise by Chinese nationalists whose foremost goal was to build a ‘Chinese’ 
nation-state in which the nation and the state were congruent. The imagined nation was 
zhonghua minzu (Chinese nation) to match the state name zhonghua minguo (Republic 
of China). Thus, the Chinese Nationalists who established a National government 
(guomin zhengfu) in Nanjing in 1928 scrapped the Five-colour Flag of the Republican 
government (minguo zhengfu or beiyang zhengfu) based in Beijing, which symbolised 
the five races, and replaced it with a Blue Sky with a White Sun Flag (qingtian bairi qi) 
signalling a desire for a national unity. 
The PRC founded by the Communists in 1949 had a different vision for the new state. 
Since the Communists’ legitimacy lies in ‘the people’ (renmin), the PRC Constitution 
defines China not as a nation, but a ‘unitary multinational state created jointly by the 
people of all its nationalities’ (quanguo gezu renmin gongtong dizao de tongyi de duo 
minzu guojia). And yet, with the waning of communist ideology, in the recent decade 
the discourse of the nation—zhonghua minzu—has come to the fore, thereby raising 
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the question not only of how to refer to its diverse constituent nationalities, but also 
whether they should have any place in the newly imagined Chinese nation now openly 
embraced by the Communists.
Pre-communist Ethnopolitics
At the turn of the twentieth century, as the empire was transformed into a nation-
state, China’s ethnopolitics centred around how to name the diverse ethnic groups 
and the nation itself. The Chinese borrowed the concept of minzu from the Japanese 
minzoku (written with the same characters), which translated the English terms 
nation and nationality in the original Western sense of a civilian class opposed to 
aristocracy. In China, though, minzu came to denote a genealogical group with a racial 
connotation. In his oath of office as the provisional President of the Republic, and his 
reply to Sun Yat-sen’s congratulations on 10 March 1912, Yuan Shikai referred to the 
‘five great nationalities’ (wuda minzu), thanking them for elevating him to the supreme 
position and swearing to work for their happiness.3 The nationalist vision espoused by 
Sun Yat-sen and his successors was, however, to blend these five groups into a single 
minzu, which was called zhonghua minzu—the Chinese nation. The adoption of the 
term minzu to refer to two different categories faithfully reflected the built-in structural 
tension of the Republic. Not surprisingly, as the Nationalists overthrew the Beijing-
based Republican government in 1928 to build a national state centring on the Han, they 
attempted to resolve the tension by changing the designation of the five national groups 
from minzu to zongzu (lineages). In this schema, minzu was reserved for the Chinese 
nation, while zongzu was used to designate the five groups as lineages descending from 
the same ancestors as the Han—the Yan and Huang emperors—with a hope to bind them 
into a single large Chinese nation-cum-family.4 Such a genealogical gerrymandering 
to assimilate non-Han peoples into the Han was prompted by a national crisis in the 
1930s, when the Japanese invaded China and supported non-Han nationalist ‘dissent’ 
by restoring their own sense of ‘descent.’ 
The conflict between the Chinese Nationalists and the four non-Han groups was 
masterfully exploited by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was in need of 
any support it could muster to fight the Nationalists who were bent on annihilating 
them in the 1930s. The CCP adopted a different concept for the non-Han peoples, 
calling them ‘shaoshu minzu’—in its original Western sense of ‘national minorities’ 
whose anti-imperialist national self-determination was deemed legitimate. Initially, 
the CCP couched the ‘nationality question’ in class terms, seeing national minorities 
as exploited and oppressed by the Chinese Nationalist regime, and their struggle for 
liberation a just cause. Pursued by the Nationalist Army on their Long March (1934–35) 
to safe haven, the Red Army passed through the Yi, Tibetan, and Muslim territories, and 
found in the non-Han peoples natural allies. Presenting themselves as ‘good Han’ (hao 
hanren), the Communists forged alliances with political leaders of the non-Han groups, 
pledging to help fight against their ‘bad Han’ (huai hanren) common enemies, and 
support their demand for autonomy.5 This ‘united front’ strategy proved to be effective 
in winning them over to the CCP and the new state it later built—the PRC. The Chinese 
Nationalists, in their zealotry to assimilate non-Han peoples, inadvertently pushed 
minorities into the embrace of their enemies, resulting in their own demise in 1949.
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Conceptual Contradictions
However, the communist class-nation principle had a built-in contradiction. 
The communist support for national minorities and their nationalist aspirations was 
predicated on the existence of exploitation and oppression by ‘the enemy.’ It operated 
not in binary opposition, but in a triadic relation, with the Communists and the 
minorities forging an alliance against their common enemy—the Nationalists. But 
the victory in defeating the enemy and the termination of exploitation and oppression 
rendered any continued nationalist demand on the part of minorities illegitimate, for 
not only had they lost their basis for grievance, but any nationalist demand was perforce 
an indictment against their former ally, the CCP, casting it among the ranks of the ‘bad 
Han.’ Thus, the recognition of shaoshu minzu after the founding of the PRC was not so 
much a concession to minority nationalism as it was the adoption of a different logic 
pertaining to state-building. 
The Qing Empire, ruled by the Manchu from 1644 to 1912, and the two Chinese 
republics built by the Chinese after 1912, were all composite states divided into two 
large components: China proper and Inner Asia. They were also conquest states, the 
Manchu conquering Inner Asians and the Chinese, and in turn the Chinese conquering 
the Inner Asians who had their separate territories and whose loyalty to the Chinese 
regime had little historical precedent. Ruling Inner Asians and their territories required 
conquests, which were euphemistically referred to as ‘liberations’ (jiefang). The 
friendship and alliances forged earlier during the Long March certainly helped make 
the liberation a relatively easy process, but the new government faced the task of both 
knowing the peoples it had incorporated into the new state and ruling them through 
appropriate representations. 
The PRC thus launched a nationality identification (minzu shibie) project in the 1950s, 
which resulted in the recognition of 55 shaoshu minzu groups. The project followed both 
the Chinese genealogical principle and the Stalinist definition of nationality, which is 
based on four criteria: common territory, common economy, common language, and 
common culture. Each identified and approved group was granted territorial autonomy 
at various administrative levels depending on the size of their population and that of 
the territory they occupied. Shaoshu minzu now acquired a different connotation than 
the previous understanding as ‘national minorities;’ they were instead understood as 
‘minority nationalities,’ whose identity was to be set against the ‘majority nationality,’ 
the Han, and were to enjoy rights only to territorial autonomy but not to secession. 
As a communist state, the PRC represented itself as a radical rupture from the previous 
regimes, thus it did not define itself as a nation-state, but as a unitary multinationality 
state, comprising ‘the Chinese people of all nationalities’ (zhongguo gezu renmin). 
The autonomy granted to minority nationalities was, thus, not national autonomy 
as originally demanded by minorities. Nor were minorities recognised purely for 
their own sake. Rather, the classification was an act of statecraft to recast minorities 
in a way that was legible for the state to solve the ‘nationality question,’ i.e. to achieve 
the twin purposes of both winning their loyalty to the regime and integrating them 
into ‘the Chinese people.’ The territorial autonomy granted to each minority nationality 
was defined as ‘regional national autonomy’ (minzu quyu zizhi) rather than ‘national 
autonomy’ (minzu zizhi). The term quyu has two sets of connotations: first, as ‘local,’ 
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i.e. a lower administrative level, and second as a region, whose raison d’etre was to 
accommodate other nationalities, especially the Han, in the autonomous area which 
is named after a specific minority nationality. The combination of the regional and 
nationality principles then effectively rendered an autonomous quyu a local-level 
multinationality administrative area. Moreover, a minority nationality would not be 
granted autonomy until there was a significant Han Chinese presence in the designated 
autonomous area, and autonomous leadership was firmly in the hands of the CCP. 
Governance Innovations
One key area of innovation by the CCP in governing autonomy was the creation 
and training of minority cadres; they were to replace the traditional leaders who 
were removed after they had delivered their people to the PRC through the war-time 
Second United Front (see also De Giorgi’s essay in the present volume). They were 
deemed politically suspect because they were elites, hence belonging to the category of 
‘enemy,’ whose rule must be overthrown. Minority cadres, recruited from lower classes 
and owing their political life to the CCP, were to serve the twin roles of both Party-
state agents ruling their own respective nationality, and members of their nationality 
providing representation to the Party-state. To the extent that the degree of autonomy 
is measured by the number of minority cadres proportionate to the percentage of 
their nationality vis-à-vis other groups in their designated autonomous quyu, these 
cadres embody a conflict of interest. However, although the CCP is supposed to be 
transcendental and above ethnicity, the communist ideological authenticity is to be 
more faithfully maintained by Han cadres in an autonomous quyu, because the CCP 
subscribes to social evolutionism, which treats the Han as more ‘advanced’ than the 
minorities. Thus, with the exception of Ulanhu, a Mongol who served as the Party 
secretary of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region from 1947 to 1966, all Party 
secretaries in all the five provincial-level autonomous regions have been Han. In most 
cases, the Party secretaries also served as chairmen of the local People’s Congresses, 
which represent the ‘state,’ leaving only the chairmanship of the people’s government 
to a member of the nationality exercising autonomy. In the Chinese political hierarchy, 
the government chairmanship is the third position, and it has the duty to implement 
Party policy and state laws—both the prerogative of the Han. 
The Party and state control of minority autonomy is supplemented by the presence 
of the Han population in an autonomous area. In addition to the principle of what may 
be called ‘joint autonomy’ (gongzhi), i.e. the combination of regional and nationality 
principles, the Han are also assigned the task of ‘uplifting’ minorities to the level of the 
Han. Culturally, this means assimilation as minority languages are deemed an obstacle 
to progress. Economically, it means Han ‘replacing’ minorities in the development 
of the autonomous area’s economy. The Chinese development model of ‘partner 
assistance’ (duikou zhiyuan) since the launch of the Great Western Development (xibu 
dakaifa) policy starting in 2000, whereby numerous coastal provinces and municipal 
cities are to provide ‘aid’ to corresponding counties and departments in Tibet and 
Xinjiang only exacerbates the economic conflict in the frontiers. In the face of massive 
and rapid economic development initiated and carried out by forces from outside of the 
autonomous regions, minorities have begun to shy away from the public domain, and 
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have moved into their private domain—that is, seeking refuge in religions or traditions. 
There they hope to run their ‘internal affairs’ (neibu shiwu), rights actually prescribed by 
the Law on Regional National Autonomy passed in 1984, but never fully implemented. 
Fears of Disintegration
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the partial Chinese attribution of its 
cause to nationality conflict, have led to open calls from both within the CCP and 
Chinese academia not only to abolish the regional national autonomy system, but also 
to change the minzu category.6 In their diagnosis, the system of autonomy has not led 
to minority integration in China; instead, minorities are alleged to have treated the 
autonomy under their ethnonym as their patrimony, and regarded the Han as alien 
invaders. Minority separatism is said to have been undergirded by the very category 
of minzu. From this perspective, the sin of the concept of minzu for minorities is that 
it competes with zhonghua minzu, the Chinese nation. The proposed solution to this 
apparent contradiction is to change minority as a minzu to minority as a ‘zuqun,’ the 
latter being a direct translation of the English term ‘ethnic group.’ In their prognosis, 
minzu, with its allegedly misleading overtone of territorial autonomy, has led minorities 
to distance themselves from the Han and China, while the concept of zuqun is both 
relational and cultural, but not territorial, and the adoption of such a conceptual 
category would be conducive to interethnic intimacy, and eventually a consolidation 
of the Chinese nation. 
What this amounts to is an attempt not only to ‘depoliticise’ minzu by replacing it 
with zuqun, but also to ‘securitise’ it in order to mitigate the minority tendency for 
splittism, terrorism, and extremism—the three crimes allegedly prevalent in minority 
regions.7 Such calls, as proposed in the so-called Second Generation Nationality Policy 
to replace the current nationality policy, effectively rendered the current system as 
‘abnormal.’8 However, such a desire to make China a ‘normal’ country would mean 
scrapping the Regional National Autonomy System, which the CCP has defined as 
one of the three basic political systems of China, along with the system of multiparty 
cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CCP, and the system 
of community-level self-governance. 
Although the CCP seems to have rejected such calls and stayed the course, 
fundamental changes have already taken place at multiple levels. For one thing, 
Xinjiang and Tibet are already ‘states of exception.’ Not that minorities there have 
more rights to enjoy, but quite the opposite, as the two autonomous regions are now 
under tight security control (see also Yi Xiaocuo’s essay in the present volume). Some 
of the measures adopted, such as the outright banning of minority languages in schools 
in Xinjiang, not only as a medium of education, but as a language in its own right, 
clearly violate the Chinese Constitution, which stipulates that ‘all nationalities have the 
freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages and to preserve or 
reform their own folkways and customs’ (Article 5). For another, zuqun is now deemed 
a scientific concept in Chinese ethnology or anthropology, which has shunned the term 
minzu as too political. And the English phrase ‘ethnic group’ has long been used to 
translate minzu in official documents, even though the official English translations of 
the Constitution and the Law on Regional National Autonomy still keep ‘nationality.’ 
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The academic and popular ‘rectification of names’ (zhengming) by using zuqun 
and ‘ethnic group’ instead of minzu or ‘nationality’ is a déjà vu that reminds us of the 
Chinese Nationalist rendition of minzu to zongzu or lineages of the Chinese nation in 
the 1930s and 1940s. Although zuqun or ethnic group does not entail geneaologism 
as in zongzu, it is made subordinate to minzu, which is now reserved for the larger 
Chinese nation—zhonghua minzu. However, both zuqun and zhonghua minzu are 
unconstitutional concepts.
 
On the Steppes of the Mongol Empire
This does not mean that these challenges should be dismissed. For they have been 
framed as a warning to the CCP that unless it gives up on the current nationality policy 
and the term minzu for minorities, there is a risk of demise for both the Chinese state 
and the Party. The argument is seductive as it is conceptualised academically: minority 
nationalities are said to have been invented out of nothing, a result of blindly following 
the Soviet model. Invented or socially constructed ‘nationalities’ are deemed as being 
creatures akin to Frankenstein’s monster, who have developed desires for independence 
and, when denied, begin to attack their very inventor: the CCP and the Chinese state. 
Such a discourse mirrors the postcolonial criticism that often denounces Europe’s 
arbitrary demarcation of ethnic boundaries in its colonies for having caused interethnic 
violence and even genocide. The opponents of this view have argued, however, that it is 
not the implementation of the current nationality policy or the state’s Law on Regional 
National Autonomy that has led to minority splittism, but rather the lack of a good faith 
to put it into practice.9 They warn the CCP not to forget the solemn oaths it made to 
minority leaders when the Party was in dire need and urge the Party to keep its promise 
not to discriminate against minorities. Reversing the policy would be tantamount 
to returning to the position of the Nationalists, against which the Communists and 
minorities fought in alliance. 
The notion of zhonghua minzu has come to centre stage in China’s imagination of its 
identity in recent years. The current Party leadership has set the goal of achieving the 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as one element of the China Dream. This version 
of zhonghua minzu is different from the Chinese Nationalist rendition, the purpose 
of which was to assimilate non-Han into the Han, giving no place to their culture and 
history in the Chinese nation. Instead, in this iteration the impetus comes from the new 
ambition of Chinese leadership for global recognition of China’s big power status. This 
dream has compelled China to present itself not as an inward-looking Han nationalist 
state, but as a big power in the image of the Mongol empire, as evidenced by China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative. This has meant broadening the scope of China to embrace 
its former conquerors, such as Chinggis Khan and Kublai Khan, as Chinese, and even 
as national heroes. The new notion of zhonghua minzu actually challenges the Han 
historical and cultural sensibility and pride, for the Chinese tradition of resistance 
to Inner Asian conquests is now redefined as petty isolationism. The question now is 
whether the Chinese celebration of the Inner Asian ‘minority’ contribution to China’s 
greatness and glory as embodied in the new zhonghua minzu will do justice to and 
improve the fate of its Inner Asian minority citizens. The situation in the frontiers does 
not, however, give any room for optimism, at least for the foreseeable future. 





‘New Democracy’ (xin minzhuzhuyi) was a theory, an overarching revolutionary strategy, and a period of the Chinese Revolution that lasted from the 1930s until the first half of the 1950s. Mao Zedong explained it in 
his classic 1940 essay ‘On New Democracy.’ He argued most centrally that:
The Chinese revolution must go through two stages, first, the democratic 
revolution, and second, the socialist revolution, and by their very nature they 
are two different revolutionary processes. Here democracy does not belong 
to the old category—it is not the old democracy, but belongs to the new 
category—it is New Democracy. 
Shaped by the material forces of the class struggle at the time, New Democracy 
involved specific economic, political, and cultural forms to be elaborated by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It stood as a ‘necessary’ bridge between ‘the old 
European-American form of capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship, which 
is the old democratic form and already out of date’ and ‘the socialist republic of the 
Soviet type under the dictatorship of the proletariat which is already flourishing in 
the Soviet Union.’
Politically, ‘a system of really universal and equal suffrage, irrespective of sex, creed, 
property or education, must be introduced,’ though Mao was careful to add immediately 
that it would be part of the Party’s ‘system of democratic centralism.’ In economic 
terms, large industrial, financial, and commercial enterprises would come under state 
ownership, but under New Democracy ‘the republic will neither confiscate capitalist 
private property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production 
as does not “dominate the livelihood of the people,” for China’s economy is still very 
backward.’ Landlords’ holdings would be distributed to farmers as private property. 
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‘In  general, socialist agriculture will not be established at this stage, though various 
types of cooperative enterprises developed on the basis of “land to the tiller” will contain 
elements of socialism.’ Culturally, Mao identified it with the breakthroughs of the May 
Fourth Movement of 1919 and with ‘native legacies, especially popular culture’ and in 
contrast to the immediately preceding ‘imperialist’-inflected ideas of the bourgeoisie. 
Under New Democracy, the Party’s ideology and propaganda would place communist 
ideas decidedly on the back burner, ‘prepar[ing] the ground’ by emphasising instead 
attacks on feudalism and imperialism.1
Hidden Controversies 
Between 1949 and 1953, a controversy among the top leadership began to bubble 
below the surface about whether to shift to what Mao had always said was going to be 
the subsequent phase of socialist revolution. According to Arlen Meliksetov, a Moscow 
State University scholar who has analysed Soviet archives, Mao began to abandon New 
Democracy, while Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, Deng Xiaoping, and 
others continued to support it. At a June 1953 meeting of the Party’s Politburo,
Mao came down heavily on those [Party] members who sought ‘to establish 
firmly the new democratic social order … .’ ‘There are some,’ Mao Zedong 
said, referring to Liu Shaoqi and his supporters, ‘who, after the victory of the 
democratic revolution, are still marking time. They do not realise that the 
nature of the revolution has changed, and instead of socialist reforms they 
continue to dabble at their precious “new democracy.”’2
Between 1953 and 1956, as the socialist transition got underway, Mao continued to 
relegate New Democracy to the past. In 1957, the Communist Youth League, which in 
1949 had been renamed ‘New Democracy Youth League,’ reverted to its original name. 
With the onset of the Anti-rightist Campaign, also in 1957, and the following Great 
Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, New Democracy would not play a significant 
role in the Party’s policy for the next two decades.
Legacies 
Yet it left some legacies. Saloth Sar—who changed his name to Pol Pot—was first 
attracted to Mao’s thought by the theory of New Democracy, though by the time 
the Khmer Rouge finally came to power, any trace of it had vanished to say the least 
(see Mertha’s essay in the present volume).3 New Democracy did leave a more lasting 
impact on China’s own nationality policy (see Bulag’s essay in the present volume). 
On the one hand, it kept Han chauvinism in check; on the other, it presupposed that the 
Party would lead the country’s minority nationalities (as it did all classes and groups), 
thus precluding any movement toward national self-determination.4
New Democracy began to stir from its coma with China’s turn to structural reform 
starting in 1978. Arif Dirlik has observed that:
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there was much in common initially between reform policies after 1978 and 
policies of New Democracy that had brought the Communist Party to power 
[including] a mixed economy blending private national capital and state 
management and direction (bureaucratic capital) … and a culture policy 
that sought to integrate a new Communist culture with native legacies, 
especially popular culture.
The Mao Zedong Thought the Party restored in 1978 returned it to its ‘true’ 
spirit, that of New Democracy, premised upon class alliance (united front) 
and development of the forces of production as the primary goals.5
The landmark 1981 ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party 
since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,’ which comprised the Party’s 
decidedly mixed verdict on the Maoist period, did not finish its second sentence 
before it mentioned New Democracy, going on to argue that it was one of Mao’s major 
achievements. But leading Party ideologues Feng Wenpin and Hu Qiaomu were quick 
to contend that China was certainly not returning to New Democracy, partly because 
it had been so closely associated with the Chairman, and partly to assert that structural 
reform was forward- rather than backward-looking.6
But structural reform was, of course, politically contentious. In 1999, no less a figure 
than Hu Sheng—a long-standing revolutionary, Chair of the Seventh and Eighth 
National Committees of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 
member of the Twelfth Party Central Committee, and President of the Academy of 
Social Sciences—weighed in:
A reexamination of Mao Zedong’s theory of New Democracy and his 
integrated theory of correctly handling the relationship between capitalism 
and socialism under Chinese historical conditions and with Marxist 
principles will be of great help to us in correctly understanding Deng 
Xiaoping Theory, the theories of reform and opening up, and the primary 
stage of socialism and relevant policies.7
He backed up his argument with Mao’s own words: ‘There will be a need, for a fairly 
long period after the victory of the revolution, to make use of the positive qualities of 
urban and rural capitalism as far as possible, in the interest of developing the national 
economy.’8
New Democracy and the Chongqing Model
The most politically intriguing effort to resuscitate New Democracy came in 2011, 
as the Hu/Wen government was winding down and China was in the run-up to the 
accession of the new leadership. Zhang Musheng is a prominent Party intellectual whose 
father, Li Yingji, was a secretary to Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu during the Maoist era. 
The publication of his book Transforming Our Cultural Perspective on History attracted 
the attention of no less a figure than General Liu Yuan, the son of Liu Shaoqi, who 
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wrote a foreword to it and brought five senior military officers to the April 2011 book 
launch.9 Zhang was a supporter of Bo Xilai and his so-called ‘Chongqing Model,’ both 
eventually crushed by Xi Jinping.
What Liu Yuan and Zhang Musheng considered to be the Chongqing Model is 
similar to the Socialist New Democracy Movement of the early 1950s in three main 
ways: rural land reforms that aim to please peasants; an urban socialist welfare economy 
with a strong presence of state-owned enterprises that claim to protect the interests of 
workers; and a moral and authoritarian government that takes a strong stance against 
corruption.10
Zhang’s stunning position is worth quoting at length:
Only the CCP can save China; only New Democracy can save the CCP.
If China hopes to roll with the globalisation trend of ‘democracy,’ I’m afraid 
it will be like drawing a tiger and ending up with the likeness of a dog, not 
getting at all what we expected. Rather than bringing in a stone that might 
shatter the jade [i.e., result in chaos], why don’t we just have confidence and 
just use our native-born New Democracy, which CCP member Mao Zedong 
raised and Liu Shaoqi put into practice?
There will be constitutionalism, there will be different parties within the 
Party, and opening up and freedom of public opinion, including freedom 
and independence of thought, can all ultimately be resolved within a single 
party.
If we had trade unions and farmer’s associations, even under the leadership 
of  the CCP, and their anti-corruption and balancing mechanisms went 
further in using the law to check the ruling Party itself, unlike today 
where everything is bound up together—could [the Party] not develop in 
this direction [toward greater democracy]? I believe it is entirely possible. 
We could surely proceed slowly, step by step. What Hong Kong and Singapore 
have accomplished, the CCP can surely accomplish.
If the CCP does not recover its leadership and control as principally 
a representative of workers and farmers, then there is no way out for you 
[the Party] whatsoever, and no legitimacy. So you cannot regard them 
(the  workers and farmers) as [weak and] disadvantaged groups. Today, 
what kind of farmers are our farmers? On average they have 13.5 years of 
schooling, and for workers it goes without saying [that this is even higher]. 
Go back to the past, go back to the era of Mao, and they all belong to what 
you would call the intellectuals. So these masses aren’t such fools [as you 
might imagine]. We are talking about 800 million mobile phones sending 
out short messages, and 460 million notebook computers exchanging ideas. 
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There’s no way of comparing this to your so-called staging demonstrations, 
airing views and writing big-character posters, or to the great networking—
it is so much freer than it was at that time.11
Zhang offers an extraordinary vision in which the Party maintains its monopoly 
but opens itself up to vigorous, public debate and greater press freedom. It locates 
itself squarely within the educational and communicative advances of the twenty-first 
century, mindful, unusually and most significantly, that these belong not just to middle-
class urbanites but also to farmers and workers. It would, indeed, comprise a new kind 
of democracy never seen in history, but inspired by Mao’s theory and practice of New 
Democracy. With the fall of Bo Xilai a year later, and the rise of the increasingly hard-
line Xi Jinping, Zhang’s ideas went nowhere. Yet with such powerful supporters as Liu 
Yuan, his trial balloon, and New Democracy, may yet float again. Chinese politicians 
play the long game, and such a development would not be the first profound political 
innovation by the CCP.






Like many other statements of Mao Zedong, the description of imperialists—or even all reactionaries—as ‘paper tigers’ (zhi laohu) became famous beyond China through the Little Red Book, where it features as the title of its sixth 
chapter. In fact, if one closely reads the chapter, only the first quotations deal with this 
term.1 Elsewhere we find a different imaginary, such as ‘lifting a rock only to drop it on 
one’s own feet’ referring to the persecutions of revolutionary people by reactionaries; 
‘nooses round the neck of US imperialism’ to describe American invasions and 
aggressions all over the world; or ‘the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind,’ as 
a characterisation of the international conjuncture at that time. Amidst these passages, 
the paper tiger, far from being a trompe l’oeil in which the fragility of the enemy would 
be masked by a belief in its appearance of ferocity, reveals the double nature of any class 
enemy. 
Classical Roots
Paper tigers made their first appearance in Maoist discourse during the Civil War. 
When Chiang Kai-shek’s offensive began against the small communist bases scattered 
throughout China, Mao had to invent a way of framing their difficult situation so that 
communist soldiers could imagine their own possible victory. After its initial usage, the 
term came back into fashion in 1950 and 1951—years marked by the threat of a new 
world war linked to the atom bomb and precipitated by the US operation in Korea—
and appeared once again at the outset of the so-called ‘Sino-Soviet Controversy’ in 
1957. What these different situations had in common was the perceived danger that the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the international communist movement would 
lose courage in the face of disproportionate enemy military forces, and fall prey to the 
temptation to capitulate or accept futile compromises.
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The origins of the metaphors that appear in Mao’s writings are often ancient and 
literary. In this specific case, the image probably comes from a classic of Chinese fiction 
that is known for having greatly inspired Mao: Water Margin by Shi Nai’an. This is the 
story of 108 rebels guided by Song Jiang, who fight against powerful and corrupted 
people and defy imperial troops through inventive stratagems. In the 23rd chapter, one 
of these outlaws, Wu Song, proves able to kill a terrifying tiger with his bare hands. 
Tigers, animals that represent both courage and cruelty, are omnipresent in the novel. 
The names of at least ten rebels contain the character for ‘tiger’ (hu), and throughout 
the book, the rebels’ courage is continuously challenged in these terms: ‘When the 
time comes for action, what good are you? Seeing a paper tiger, you cry out in fright!’ 
In Mao’s writing, it seems that the exploits of the incredible tiger-killer Wu Song and 
the fear of the cowards in front of simulacra of tigers combined to give birth to a new 
image that represented both the refusal to overestimate powerful enemies and the 
ability of overcoming the most terrifying threats.
From Paper Tigers to Contradictions among the People
Some people mock or despise statements of this kind—metaphors like paper tigers 
concentrating a political vision—taking them as an expression of a purely idealistic 
or even cynical position. But in Mao’s thought, such formulas are never hazardous 
inventions. They are rather meant to condense experience, or enhance experimentation. 
In 1946, Mao’s rhetoric about paper tigers was clearly aimed at giving courage to the 
revolutionary army facing Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party (guomindang, hereafter 
GMD) forces. The GMD was allied to the greater power of the time, the United States, 
then inflated by its victorious involvement in World War II. In 1950 and 1951, the 
injunction to not fear the enemy was still confidently rooted in the Marxist concept of 
History—who needs to be afraid when History is on their side? At the end of the 1950s, 
another conception emerges, introducing a displacement from history to politics: the 
crucial distinction between ‘contradictions among people’ (renmin neibu maodun) 
and ‘contradictions with the enemy’ (diwo maodun) (see Rojas’s essay in the present 
volume).
This formula laid the foundation for a historical experiment that was confirmed by 
the final and complete victory against the GMD. A few years later, in a new threatening 
conjuncture, confronting the risk of a third world war, the victorious experiment was 
enlarged to a global philosophy of history. But the true power of the concept cannot 
be thought in separation from new political categories. It became clear to Mao that the 
solution of contradictions among people had been all along the key to the previous 
military victories and required being thought of in its own terms. What we can do 
today with paper tigers cannot be decided without a full examination of the conditions 
prevailing when it was invented. 
A New David against Goliath?
Returning to the Civil War period and the origin of the Maoist usage of the term, in 
1946 Chiang Kai-shek had a professional army with more than four million soldiers. 
As Mao described in ‘Farewell, Leighton Stuart!’ (18 August 1949), immediately after 
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the barbaric atom bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and the following Japanese 
surrender, the armed forces of the United States were deployed to help the GMD fight 
the Civil War in China. In Mao’s words, the US government ‘[supplied] the money 
and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter 
the Chinese people.’ By the end of June 1946, the United States had equipped 45 GMD 
divisions, trained 150,000 GMD military personnel, and landed 90,000 Marines. 
According to Mao: ‘There were US naval bases in Qingdao, Shanghai, and Taiwan. 
US troops were stationed in Beiping, Tianjin, Tangshan, Qinhuangdao, Qingdao, 
Shanghai, and Nanjing. The US air force controlled all of China’s air space and took 
aerial photographs of all China’s strategic areas for military maps.’ In different places, 
US troops and other military personnel clashed with the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) and the American air fleet took part in the war on Chiang Kai-shek’s side. 
Mao’s immediate conclusions were that the American policy against the revolutionary 
bases in China was a major component of ‘the US imperialist policy of worldwide 
aggression since World War II.’ From his perspective, in 1946 not only did the war 
continue, but a new world war seemed possible—maybe unavoidable—based on the 
military superiority of the US and their expansionist tendencies. It was the beginning 
of what would later be called the ‘Cold War,’ a period marked by the obsession over the 
possibility of conflicts between the US and the Soviet Union with global repercussions. 
To face the GMD and American forces, the PLA had 900,000 guerrillas isolated 
and scattered throughout China. By the end of June 1946, Chiang Kai-shek and his 
allies launched an all-out offensive against the liberated areas, opening six major 
theatres of war. The PLA was outnumbered by its enemy. It is no surprise, therefore, 
that a pessimistic appraisal of the situation gained traction within the CCP, with some 
people showing weakness in the face of enemy assaults and superior military strength.
Mao tried to counter pessimism, first through the diffusion of inner-Party documents 
that excluded the possibility of any new short-term compromise between the Soviet 
Union on one side, and the United States, Britain, and France on the other. The 
point was to reassure CCP members that there was no possibility of an American-
Soviet agreement, which would leave the Chinese revolutionaries isolated and alone. 
It was a hard task, considering that in August 1945 Stalin had already recognised 
Chiang Kai-shek’s government as the central government of China and negotiated 
a partial occupation of Manchuria, choosing the Nationalists over the Communists as 
interlocutors.
Courage or Recklessness?
In the face of Stalin’s desertion, Mao’s statement on paper tigers was deliberately 
addressed to Anna Louise Strong, who was a freelance American journalist, already 
linked to revolutionary Russia. This meant that Mao’s words were aimed at a global 
audience, including the American government and the American people. It was August 
1946, only one year after the terrifying destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and 
two months after the beginning of the GMD offensive in China. In this context, Strong 
asked a question that was far from rhetorical: ‘Suppose the United States uses the atom 
bomb? Suppose the United States bombs the Soviet Union from its bases in Iceland, 
Okinawa, and China?’ To which Mao responded: ‘The atom bomb is a paper tiger which 
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the US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn’t. Of course 
the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by 
the people, not by one or two new types of weapon.’ And he went on: ‘All reactionaries 
are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are 
not so powerful. From a long term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the 
people who are really powerful.’
In other words, Mao subordinated the power of weapons to the conduct of the war. 
But how long would it take for the CCP to defeat the GMD armies? Strong asked this 
exact question: ‘Suppose the United States gives Chiang Kai-shek no help, besides 
that already given, how long can Chiang Kai-shek keep on fighting? Mao: More than 
a year. A.S: Can Chiang Kai-shek keep on that long, economically? Mao: He can.’ Here 
Mao firmly opposed the long-term reality to the immediate perception of powers. 
On one side the GMD could keep going for a long time, more than one year, at least 
‘economically,’ and even without US help. On the other side, Mao was confident that 
recent historical facts were going to vindicate his apparently adventurous statement 
about Chiang’s fragility. He quoted the fall of the tsar in Russia, the smashing of Axis 
allies (Hitler, Mussolini, and Japanese imperialism) as elements supporting his faith 
in a communist victory, in spite of the initial disproportion between forces. And he 
did not hesitate to announce the impending defeat of Chiang Kai-shek before its time: 
‘We have only millet plus rifles to rely on, but history will finally prove that our millet 
plus rifles is more powerful than Chiang Kai-shek’s aeroplanes plus tanks.’ This last 
sentence sums up Mao’s belief in the power of the masses, and people’s war, to defeat 
those on the wrong side of the people and therefore on the wrong side of history 
(see Guan’s essay in the present volume). For him as for Marx, although articulated 
in different conceptions, progress remains a driving force of history: reaction has no 
future in the face of progress, and people are on the side of progress.
Victory over Paper Tigers
Six months after Mao’s talk with Anna Louise Strong, the GMD’s offensive was 
halted, and a counteroffensive began. This eventually would lead to the victory of the 
communist forces in 1949, less than three years after Chiang’s violation of the truce 
agreement and in spite of all his American support. Mao’s statement had been submitted 
to experiment and proved right, at least in the context of the Chinese Civil War. 
In fact, in that case, the conditions—‘progress’ and mass support—that made victory 
possible were anything but abstract or metaphysical. They consisted in the minute 
care with which the war of self-defence was organised and guided, including decisions 
and strategies such as accepting mobile warfare and the temporary abandonment of 
specific places and cities; developing close cooperation with the masses of the people; 
moderating policy towards middle peasants and landlords; and working to increase 
production in protected areas in order to become self-sufficient.
In an inner-Party directive entitled ‘On some Important Problems of the Party’s 
Present Policy’ (18 January 1948) produced a few months before the CCP’s final victory, 
it is possible to find some honest reflections stemming from the paper tigers notion: 
‘We have reason to despise them and we are confident and certain that we shall defeat 
all the domestic and foreign enemies of the Chinese people. But with regard to each 
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part, each specific struggle (military, political, economic or ideological), we must 
never take the enemy lightly; on the contrary we should take the enemy seriously and 
concentrate all our strength for battle in order to win victory.’ Here a new distinction 
appears, between strategy and tactic, between the whole and the part: there must be no 
strategic overestimation, but also no local imprudence or tactical eagerness. Everything 
depends on specific circumstances. In other words, non-adventurist policies always 
require a clear identification of the real process. 
From Circumstantial Statement to Political Concept
Ten years later, Mao brought up paper tigers again in three different contexts: a talk 
with two Latin-American public figures (‘US Imperialism is a Paper Tiger,’ 14 July 1956); 
a speech at the Moscow Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers’ 
Parties (‘All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers,’ 18 November 1957); and a publication in 
his Selected Works (‘On the Question of Whether Imperialism and All Reactionaries are 
Real Tigers,’ 1 December 1958). In each text, Mao went back to the period of the Civil 
War, emphasising its victorious outcome. In his mind, victory remained tightly linked 
to the correctness of a strategy that minimised the power of the enemy. He henceforth 
elevated what originally was only a circumstantial statement to a proper political 
concept. ‘We have developed a concept over a long period for the struggle against the 
enemy,’ he wrote in 1957, ‘namely, strategically we should despise all our enemies, but 
tactically we should take them all seriously.’
To broaden and find potential value for this concept in other situations and countries, 
Mao produced new arguments belonging to what we might call ‘historical dialectics,’ 
insofar as these arguments take the form of historical laws. In his 1956 Talk, first he 
presented an extension of the Marxist vision of History: ‘History as a whole, the history 
of class society for thousands of years, has proved this point: the strong must give way 
to the weak.’ In so writing, Mao introduced a dialectics of the strong and the weak, still 
related to the Marxist vision of the transformation of ruling classes—first vigorous, 
revolutionary, and progressive, like the bourgeoisie itself—into backward, decaying 
classes. He then added his own optimistic theory of universal change and becoming: 
‘Everything is subject to change. The big decadent forces will give way to the small new-
born forces.’ Or again: ‘Bigness is nothing to be afraid of. The big will be overthrown by 
the small. The small will become big.’
The philosophical ground for these affirmations is what Mao calls ‘the law of the unity 
of the opposites,’ which he expounded in his 1958 Essay: ‘Just as there is not a single 
thing in the world without a dual nature (this is the law of the unity of the opposites), 
so imperialism and all reactionaries have a dual nature—they are at the same time 
real tigers and paper tigers.’ This law is defined in these terms: ‘This basic concept of 
Marxism, the concept of the unity of opposites … is the concept of the dual nature of the 
development of the universe, the concept of the dual nature of the  development of 
things, the concept that a thing invariably manifests itself in a process and that every 
process without exception has a dual nature.’ 
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The Return of Real Tigers
Nevertheless, in 1956, Mao warned his interlocutors that, if it was true that ‘all 
oppressed nations want independence … the day will come when the paper tigers 
will be wiped out. But they won’t become extinct of their own accord, they need to be 
battered by the wind and the rain.’ And in 1958, again: 
They are at once real tigers and paper tigers, they are in the process of being 
changed from real into paper tigers. Change means transformation. Real 
tigers are transformed into paper tigers, into their opposite … . Hence, 
imperialism and all reactionaries, looked at in essence, from a long-term 
point of view, from a strategic point of view, must be seen for what they 
are—paper tigers. On this we should build our strategic thinking. But they 
are also living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers, they can devour people. On this 
we should build our tactical thinking.
Mao’s dialectics is the subject of another essay by Pang Laikwan included in this 
volume. What I would like to underline here is this: first, reactionaries have to become 
what they are in essence, but they do not reveal what they truly are without a political 
catalysation of the process. The historical process of change never works alone, this is 
what no one should miss, or forget. No great progressive transformation may happen 
without the invention of a new fair and real policy. Yes, Mao in 1956 claimed: ‘Small 
forces linked with the people become strong.’ And again in 1957: ‘All allegedly powerful 
reactionaries are merely paper tigers. The reason is that they are divorced from the 
people.’ But the true question, the crucial question, is: what kind of processes may 
create such progressive links with the people? Or rather, which processes nowadays, 
can give birth to ‘the people’?
Of course, popular movements advancing claims such as ‘We are the 99 percent’ or 
even to represent entire countries—such as the use of the slogan ‘We are Egypt’ in 
Tahrir Square—were far from being able to answer this question. The problem is: were 
they even aware of these underlying issues: what does it mean today to organise the 
existence of something durably solid, which we may name ‘the people,’ or rather a piece 
of ‘generic humanity’? 
A New Starting Point
Mao in 1958 reminded us that ‘the destruction of the rule of imperialism, feudalism, 
and bureaucrat-capitalism took the Chinese people more than one hundred years and 
cost them tens of millions of lives before victory in 1949.’ In other words, to be victorious 
takes time. Because this kind of war ‘can only be fought one by one’ (1957). But Mao 
himself did not entirely elucidate how the victory becomes possible, at least not until 
he wrote one of his most influential and significant essays: ‘On the Correct Handling of 
Contradictions among the People’ (27 February 1957). My own hypothesis is that this 
text represents the true political development of the paper tigers concept. It contains 
not only the theoretical aftermath of the vast former sequence—the Long March, the 
War of Resistance against Japan, and the War of Liberation—but also decisive elements 
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for a break with Stalin’s policies. It begins by departing from a traditional notion of 
class struggle and opening to a non-classist definition of the category of ‘people:’ one 
belongs to the ‘people’ not strictly by virtue of one’s objective class; more important is 
the subjective position towards revolution. To cite Mao’s own words: ‘The concept of 
“people” varies in content in different countries and in different periods of history in 
a given country.’ 
Even more important is the distinction between two kinds of contradictions—
you will notice the name itself, which is not equivalent to ‘struggle’ or ‘conflict’—
those ‘between ourselves and the enemy’ and those ‘among the people.’ No need to 
be Chinese to understand these categories: they take the opposite course of Stalin’s 
conceptions—anyone likely to be an enemy who could then be eliminated—and try to 
place the contradiction with the enemy under the rule of the contradictions among the 
people. The weight of emphasis is shifted entirely. For the first time, such distinction 
and the correlative assertion that ‘the two are totally different in nature’ allow the 
development of multiple policies, multiple treatments, depending on the antagonistic 
or non-antagonistic character of a contradiction. It was a turning point in the history 
of revolutionary politics, because it put an end to the exclusive bilateral face to face 
between the people and the enemy. It allowed a political work enlarging the existence 
of the people and diminishing the existence of the enemy. Henceforth, the departing 
point of any progressive politics had to be the ability to give existence to the people 
itself. When Mao claimed that real tigers—living tigers, iron tigers, tigers that devoured 
people—could be changed into paper tigers, he rested his claim on repeated political 
experiences of how the CCP had been able to constitute a Chinese people in the face of 
haunting odds and seemingly inevitable defeats and disasters. 
The dialectics between real tigers and paper tigers may still be true, but remains of 
no use for us, as long as we do not connect the question of the enemy to the question 
of how a piece of ‘generic humanity’ today can exist, under which political conditions, 
through which local processes. Do real tigers and paper tigers still roam the world 
and haunt social space? This may very well be the case, but we wander among them 
blindly as long as we do not connect the question of the enemy to the circumstances in 
which people today live. Especially when we believe we understand the world around 
us, we are at our most ignorant. The production of knowledge no longer fully takes 
place within the university but depends on people’s political capacity to speak about 
their lives as sites in which the present is contested and new futures are promised. One 
of the most enduring promises of communism is the egalitarian capacity of speech for 
all, regardless of national identity or traditional markers of belonging. In the words 
of a Malian worker in France and member in an organisation called Workers of the 
World/Architects of Peace, these conditions begin to be realised when ‘those who have 
read all the books and those who have passed a hundred countries meet and work 
together.’2  






‘Peasant’ (nongmin) is a modern historical and political category in China, and Mao Zedong had more to do with its construction than any other individual. At the turn of last century, nongmin emerged as a translation of 
the English term peasant. While the category usually had negative connotations—such 
as backwardness, superstition, and ignorance—some took nongmin to be a positive 
category. For instance, in the first decade of the twentieth century, a moment in which 
the capitalist transformation of China was leading to a more pronounced rural-urban 
divide and worsening conditions for peasants, early Chinese anarchist Liu Shipei saw 
rural rebellion as having revolutionary potential and the peasant as a revolutionary 
subject.1 Liu took a populist position on the peasantry, in the belief that rural revolution 
implied a resistance to capitalist transformation by a unified peasantry in a way that 
would significantly transform rural social relations.
While Liu mapped a potential historical transformation, in his narrative the peasant 
was largely an essentialised figure. Others followed a similar, though less anarchist-
inflected, populist view of the peasant. Li Dazhao, one of the founders of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), believed that the peasantry was a singular, if disorganised, 
class.2 A less revolutionary populist vision of the peasantry emerged with the Rural 
Reconstruction Movement of Liang Shuming, Y. C. James Yen (Yan Yangchu), and 
others, who believed that rural education and governance reforms could lead to 
a unified rural sphere immune to class differentiation, and to a stronger China safe 
from capitalist and imperialist intervention (see also Ou’s essay in the present volume).3 
Nonetheless, the dominant image of the peasant in early twentieth-century China was 
negative, portraying the peasantry as holding China back from progress and in need of 
modernisation. For example, Chen Duxiu, an intellectual of the New Culture Movement 
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and another founder of the CCP, viewed peasants as petty-bourgeois reactionaries who 
at best stood on the sidelines of revolution, if not in its way. In his opinion, they would 
never play a progressive role in history. 
These dichotomous images of the Chinese peasant, however, were brought together 
into a new dynamic unity within the Maoist theory and practice of rural revolution, 
a result that was achieved by paying particular attention to the question of class 
differentiation. During the revolution, Mao came to understand the political inclinations 
of peasants as two-fold, depending on the local material and political conditions: 
as potentially tending towards rebellious activity, on the one hand, or towards the 
protection of their individual petty-bourgeois land holdings, on the other. The task of 
revolutionaries then became to investigate why certain peasants—especially ‘middle 
peasants’ (zhongnong)—would become revolutionaries instead of conservative 
defenders of the status quo. This ‘revolutionary peasant dialectic’ formed one of the 
most important and influential political inventions of China’s short twentieth century 
(from 1900 to the 1970s), and has been referred to by historian Philip C. C. Huang 
as the ‘dialectic of rural revolution.’4 Yet this dialectic began to disintegrate soon after 
the CCP victory in 1949, devolving into the earlier incongruous and static images of the 
peasantry. With China now undergoing rapid capitalist agrarian change, the question 
of class is returning in a new form.
The Peasant Dialectic of the Chinese Revolution
The methodology of the revolutionary peasant dialectic that emerged in China 
in the first half of the twentieth century did not seek a true comprehension of the 
essential nature of the peasantry. Rather, it sought a historical grasp of rural class 
differentiation aimed at understanding which classes of peasants would most likely 
become revolutionaries, and under what material and political conditions this kind 
of change could occur. In 1926, Mao argued that rural China at that time had eight 
classes, ‘each having different economic positions and living conditions. This in turn 
influences their psychology, so that their attitudes towards the revolution also differ.’5 
The ‘attitude’ (taidu) of the petty-bourgeois landholder class, the middle peasant of 
later analysis, was decisive for revolutionary strategy, and the turning of the richer and 
middling landholders towards revolution was a crucial moment in the unfolding of 
revolution. The petty-bourgeoisie was, thus, a wavering class.6 
Mao came closest to a populist vision of the peasantry in his famous 1927 ‘Report 
on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,’ in which he went so far as to 
claim that the Hunan uprising was a fulfilment of the ‘historic mission’ (lishi shiming) 
of the peasantry to ‘overthrow the forces of rural feudalism.’7 Yet Mao quickly returned 
to focus on rural class analysis, and in the sober 1930 ‘Report from Xunwu’ gone was 
the spontaneity of the revolutionary peasants of the previous ‘Hunan Report,’ replaced 
by more in-depth investigations and interviews that contained a far greater amount of 
sociological detail.8 In this later writing there was no abstract peasantry. Rather, the 
peasantry was riven with class divisions, and it was acknowledged that only detailed 
social investigations would lead to proper revolutionary practice. For Mao and the 
CCP, who, following Stalin, viewed China as a semifeudal and semicolonial society 
(see Barlow’s essay in the present volume), the primary axis of class in rural areas was 
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landownership. Chinese Trotskyists such as Ren Shu, Yan Lingfeng, and the Chinese 
Economy group, on the other hand, believed that society was already capitalist, and that 
the main rural class contradiction was between capital and labour.9 Organisationally, 
the CCP dominated, even if the debate on the nature of rural Chinese society was 
inconclusive.
By the late 1930s, the revolutionary peasant dialectic had become the CCP’s orthodox 
position. There was a consensus around the idea that the peasant had a ‘dual nature’ 
(liangchongxing).10 As Mao stated in 1939, ‘the positive or negative attitude of the 
middle peasants is one of the factors determining victory or defeat in the revolution, 
and this is especially true after the agrarian revolution [land reform] when they become 
the majority of the rural population.’11 But as the Party began to contemplate victory in 
the Civil War, the increasing fear that the conservative side of ‘peasant consciousness’ 
(nongmin yishi)—which derived from a petty-bourgeois class of small property 
owners—might prevail led to worries that, after liberation, the defensive attitude of 
the peasants towards their property would eventually block socialist development. 
In such a context, in 1948 Mao argued that the Party had to be vigilant against ‘agrarian 
socialism’ (nongye shehuizhuyi), a ‘reactionary, backward, and retrogressive’ form of 
rural socialism based on the principle of an absolute egalitarianism of landholdings.12 
With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the CCP turned 
to socialist modernisation, within which agriculture was to play an important but 
subordinate role. Party leaders saw a high level of accumulation from agriculture as 
the only way to underwrite the industrialisation process, which focussed on heavy 
industry.13 To feed industrialisation, the agricultural economy had to be developed, 
but under the conditions of a high and growing level of surplus extraction. Within this 
situation, the more conservative view of the peasant as a potential block to socialism 
and industrialisation, and as an object in need of modernisation, took precedence.14 
The revolutionary peasant dialectic, which had brought the dual images of the peasant 
into dynamic unity, thus began to break down.
Dialectical Breakdowns and Theoretical Reversals
This process of dialectical breakdown accelerated in the early 1960s, following the 
demise of the Great Leap Forward, and is especially visible in historical debates on 
peasant revolution from that time.15 As political stances became increasingly rigid, 
the image of the peasant bifurcated into a revolutionary actor that carried the seeds 
of socialism, on the one hand, or a conservative and reactive class of small property 
owners that could never escape their own conditions without outside help, on the 
other. For example, the historian Bai Shouyi, interpreting peasants from a class 
viewpoint, argued that peasants could create their own ‘peasant dictatorship’ (nongmin 
zhuanzheng) to represent their interests just as a proletarian dictatorship represented 
the interests of the proletariat.16 Cai Meibiao, representing the orthodox Marxist stance 
of more senior Party historians such as Guo Moruo, Fan Wenlan, and Jian Bozan, 
argued to the contrary, that peasant rebels could not be revolutionary because they 
did not have the political consciousness necessary for the revolutionary overthrow of 
feudalism, and that their rebellions were simply spontaneous outbursts, largely without 
historical significance.17 In his view, peasant wars were neither real social revolutions 
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nor the prime motor of history under feudalism, and it was only with the appearance 
of the bourgeoisie or proletariat that the conscious overthrow of feudalism could be 
accomplished. 
During the Cultural Revolution, the more orthodox stance was attacked as 
conservative, and many of its proponents lost their academic positions. Nonetheless, 
from the early 1960s on, the peasant revolutionary dialectic that had guided the 
revolution was at a standstill. Diagnoses of the peasant inclined either to one side or to 
the other, depending largely on political engagements rather than concrete analysis of 
class, interests, and material conditions. 
These debates reemerged and were reframed in the post-1978 reform period. As rural 
policy shifted to support the Household Responsibility System (jiating lianchan chengbao 
zerenzhi), effecting a return to household farming, the conservative side of the peasant’s 
dual nature was initially emphasised, and peasants were portrayed as a conservative 
block to modernisation. As the 1980s proceeded, however, the valence of the dichotomy 
reversed. From then on, in the dominant discourse peasants could become a subject of 
modernisation only if they became more entrepreneurial. In a remarkable reversal, it 
was exactly their petty-bourgeois nature—which, within Maoist discourse had been 
the cause of their conservatism—that now made them progressive. Under this new 
formulation, class and class differentiation disappeared as problematic elements. It was 
rather the risk-taking individual farmer who became the motor for rural economic 
development. In an influential text, reformist intellectuals Wang Xiaoqiang and Bai 
Nansheng argued that the transformation of the rural economy—rather than simply 
its quantitative growth—depended on the ‘quality’ (suzhi) of individual peasants, with 
suzhi denoting ‘the quality of engaging in commodity production and management’ 
highlighted by an individual entrepreneurial attitude.18 
This discourse on the low quality of peasants was central to the controversial 
television documentary River Elegy, which aired in China in the months preceding 
the 1989 protest movement. The series blamed China’s lack of development on the 
peasantry, which with its low quality stood as a block to modernisation. 
In the vast, backward rural areas, there are common problems in peasant 
[quality] (suzhi) such as a weak spirit of enterprise, a very low ability to accept 
risk, a deep psychology of dependency (yilai sixiang) and a strong sense of 
passive acceptance of fate … . It’s not the lack of resources, nor the level of 
GNP, nor the speed [of development], but rather this deficiency in the human 
[quality] that is the essence of this so-called notion of ‘backwardness.’19
In other words, the rebellious side of the nature of the peasants was chaotic and 
disruptive to social progress, and only petty-bourgeois self-interest could lead to 
entrepreneurial progress.20 
From Peasant to Low-end Population
This reformulation of the peasant comprised the basis for both the liberalism of 
the reform-period and the state’s view of rural modernisation.21 But it was not long 
before this formulation was challenged by the reemergence of a populist politics of the 
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peasant around the turn of the millennium. Growing out of the New Left critique of 
market utopianism in the early 1990s, pro-peasant scholars such as Wen Tiejun and 
He Xuefeng took a Polanyian stance, arguing that free market policies and the invasion 
of the countryside by the forces of capital would destroy peasants and rural society, 
destabilising China as a whole.22 In their writings, only a unified peasantry built through 
cooperative villages and protective state policies could prevent this dire outcome. These 
ideas developed in relation to rural activist and cooperative practices that came together 
under the name of ‘New Rural Reconstruction’ (xin xiangcun jianshe), a label that drew 
from the populist movement of the 1930s mentioned above.23 While the Movement 
generated considerable innovative practices, it had less influence on state policy. From 
the pro-peasant perspective, the policies of the Hu-Wen administration were a mixed 
bag for rural society: on the one hand there was the abolition of the agricultural tax in 
2005, but on the other, those years saw an acceleration of the entrance of capital into the 
countryside, a facilitation of land transfers, and a limitation of cooperative relations.24 
With the rapid growth of agribusiness and the formalisation of land transfers allowing 
for the accumulation (and dispossession) of rural land, it is more and more difficult to 
talk of a unified peasantry. In response, newer scholars are paying more attention to 
class differentiation and capitalist agrarian transition in China, although it is less clear 
what political stances much of this new academic work presents.25 At the very least, 
however, peasants today are being treated less as an essentialised, general abstraction, 
and more as a historical formation or process that requires explanation (i.e.  de/
repeasantisation, class differentiation, new spatial formations, etc.). One might even 
question whether the category nongmin does the analytical and political work it used 
to do. The rural-urban divide, so central to the Mao years, now plays a much different 
role in structuring social relations, everyday life, and political economy, with so many 
rural residents no longer living in the countryside or, in many cases, not even knowing 
how to farm. Responses to the evictions of ‘low-end population’ (diduan renkou) at 
the edges of Beijing at the end of 2017 point to some possibilities, with the extent of 
public outcry against and debate concerning the evictions seeming to surprise the 
Chinese state. While many see the term ‘low-end population’ from a liberal viewpoint 
as a form of discursive discrimination, the analyses of others suggest its importance 
in reviving discussions of class in the Chinese context.26 With the acceleration of 
capitalist transformation in China, especially in the agricultural sector, class analysis 
and historical inquiry are as necessary as ever. 






(Translated by Christian SORACE)
The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.  
It is mainly because of the unorganised state of the Chinese masses that Japan dares 
to bully us. When this defect is remedied, then the Japanese aggressor, like a mad bull 
crashing into a ring of flames, will be surrounded by hundred of millions of our people 
standing upright, the mere sound of their voices will strike terror into him,  
and he will be burned to death. 
Mao Zedong, ‘On Protracted War,’ 1938
In 1938, as Japan’s war machine and total invasion of China clearly advanced, and the Chinese army suffered defeat in every battle, the entire country was pervaded by the anxiety and premonition of defeat. Given the conspicuous lack of national 
and military strength at the time, China seemed to have no other road than surrender. 
In May 1938, Mao published ‘On Protracted War,’ rich with a vision of the future 
that firmly predicted China’s ultimate victory in the War of Resistance against Japan 
(1937–45). According to him, the ‘magic weapon’ (fabao) that would deliver victory 
to China was guerrilla warfare. But the ability to engage in guerrilla warfare for an 
unknown duration of time depended on the support of the people in the countryside. 
In Mao’s words, ‘the [people] may be likened to water, the [guerrilla soldiers] to the fish 
who inhabit it’—later aphorised as ‘the people are the sea that the revolutionary swims 
in.’ The metaphor of a fish in water describes an intimate political relationship and 
ecology in which the Communist Party (CCP) lives among the people. Thus, ‘guerrilla 
war’ (youji zhan) and ‘protracted war’ (chijiu zhan) were more than mere military 
strategies, as they constituted a broad outlook that Mao referred to as ‘people’s war’ 
(renmin zhanzheng). For Mao, people’s war was not only a blueprint for victory against 
the Japanese but a source of political legitimacy. In August 1946, after the victory 
against Japan, Mao said to the American reporter Anna Louise Strong: ‘The outcome 
of a war is decided by the people.’1 One does not have to strain too hard to hear echoes 
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of Mencius’s political philosophy: ‘The time is not as important as the terrain, and the 
terrain is not as important as having unity with the people … [A]n unjust cause finds 
little support.’
Who Are the People?
To understand people’s war, it is imperative to raise the conceptually thorny question: 
who are ‘the people’ (renmin)?
In China’s history, there has never been a concept of the people—only the binary 
structure of government officials and ordinary people. In traditional Chinese thought, 
the minority of rulers—‘officials’ (guan)—and the majority who are ruled—‘people’ 
(min)—are both separated and connected by a material force, which confirms the truth 
that people are the material foundation of rule. This idea is articulated in the well-
known Chinese expression that the ‘water can carry the boat or overturn it.’ 
The concept of the people originated from the French Revolution (1789–99) and 
the  transformation of monarchical subjects into the subject of popular sovereignty 
of the nation-state.2 After the emergence of the modern nation-state—alongside 
other basic factors, such as territory, sovereignty, population, and government—the 
vague concept of the people was elevated to the ruler of the nation. Marxist theory 
was suspicious of such a slippery concept. From a Marxist perspective the state is an 
instrument of the ruling class; in this light, the people function as a vague concept that 
conceals class antagonism. The Marxist worldview of class antagonism between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie does not include the category of the people. So how did 
the people arrive on the stage in China? 
The people is a fundamentally abstract concept—what Ernesto Laclau referred to 
as an ‘empty signifier,’ the meaning of which is determined by how it is inserted into 
a particular context.3 Under the ideological control of the Leninist political party, the 
people can be transformed into a flexible and pliable object of political manipulation. 
On the one hand, the people is the faintly discernible trace of revolutionary practice, 
a slogan that can be found everywhere, but the meaning of which is constantly changing. 
On the other hand, the people takes on particular meanings in different contexts in 
order to satisfy the needs of political reality. For example, in the War of Resistance 
against Japan, the revolutionary objective was the country’s independence and national 
liberation: the Chinese people (zhonghua minzu) as a national category were equivalent 
to the people of China as a political category. After the CCP obtained political power, 
the category of the people was reformulated. Anyone who endorsed the socialist path 
belonged to the people, and anyone who opposed it became an ‘enemy of the people.’ 
The fulcrum of internal political struggle was the distinction between ‘contradictions 
among the people’ (remin neibu maodun) and ‘contradictions between ourselves and 
the enemy’ (diwo maodun) (see the essays by Rojas and Dutton in the present volume). 
The differentiation of political community is the foundation and prerogative of the 
CCP’s leadership. 
The abstract concept of the people always requires a supplement to make it concrete. 
For this reason, it is necessary to examine in fine-grained detail the different historical 
moments and discourses in which the name of the people was invoked. 
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People’s War or Peasant’s War? 
Under the conditions in which military strength was insufficient for victory, the 
CCP’s army did not solely rely on military strategy, but simultaneously applied a political 
strategy. A slogan of this strategy was ‘to win the war, rely on the people for support.’ 
Due to its dependence on the people for victory, the army of the CCP referred to itself 
as ‘the people’s army’ (renmin zidi bing)—a term that semantically implies that the army 
is the child of the people—and proclaimed its mission to fight on behalf of the interests 
of the ‘the broad masses of the people’ (guangda renmin qunzhong). 
But in China at the time, the peasantry was the country’s largest demographic. The CCP 
won the peasantry’s support by identifying, addressing, and resolving their needs and 
aspirations, at the same time as it set up military encampments in the countryside. 
If communism is said to be a utopia, the CCP’s revolutionary policy of land reform 
was far from an ideologically misty affair. Rather, it was a practical political endeavour, 
which severed the roots of the existing social system. The CCP’s Marxist message and 
promise of the communist future was enthusiastically received by the peasantry who 
understood it through a Confucian framework of social equality in which ‘the elite 
and the lowly, the rich and the poor are [treated] the same.’ Confucian morality was 
draped in the attire of modernity and Marxist social equality. The majority of Chinese 
people fully supported the CCP’s War of Resistance against Japan because they saw 
the land reform being carried out in communist-controlled areas as containing the 
seeds of their emancipation—a potential future when they could become the masters 
of their own lives. To defend the land parcels allocated to them by the CCP, the masses 
were willing to risk and sacrifice everything, and ‘give their last grain of rice for army 
provisions, last piece of cloth for military uniforms, last bed frame as a coffin lid, and 
send their last son to the troops.’4 Under the historical magnifying glass, the people 
were revealed to be none other than the peasantry. 
Mao realised that the Chinese revolutionary war depended on the correct handling 
of the peasantry and the ability to resolve their problems (see Day’s essay in the present 
volume), and could not rely on the classical definition of the proletariat. From  the 
earliest periods of his thinking, Mao’s call to ‘strike local tyrants and redistribute 
the land’ (da tuhao, fen tiandi) became the basis of revolutionary policy. Whereas this 
practice was successful in the early years in the base of operations in the Jinggang 
Mountains and Jiangxi Soviet (1931–34), it later had to be modified to fit the changing 
political situation. 
After arrival in Yan’an in 1935, the CCP adjusted its land policy to call upon the 
peasantry to ‘pay rent and interest’ (jiao zu jiao xi) and for landlords to ‘decrease rent 
and interest’ (jian zu jian xi) in order to ameliorate the impact of class contradiction. 
This was because Mao regarded the War of Resistance against Japan as a historical 
mission of national liberation, and wanted to mobilise the political capabilities of the 
entire nation. In other words, class warfare had to take a backseat to national liberation. 
The results of this decision were fruitful. To synthesise the precarious balance between 
class and national objectives, the CCP invented different political forms, such as: 
the democratic regime of the ‘three-thirds system;’ the absorption of ‘enlightened 
gentlemen’ (kaiming shenshi) into the struggle for national liberation; the invention 
of a ballot mechanism based on the ‘selection of representatives by the casting of bean 
178   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
shoots;’ and the establishment of a democratic system of government that was a bright 
lantern in the darkness.5 In all of China at that time, the mountain pagoda of Yan’an was 
the most politically attractive place.
Mao’s people’s war was conducted by the peasantry—but this fact is often obscured 
by the common definition of the peasantry as narrow-minded and incapable of class 
consciousness and class affection. But the CCP’s concept and practice of people’s war 
and the united front (see De Giorgi’s essay in the present volume) supplemented the 
limited scope and class exclusivity of the original principles of Marxist-Leninist theory, 
while maintaining the organisational structure and mobilisational character of the 
Leninist political party. The inclusion of the peasantry expanded the CCP’s social base 
of mobilisation, and formed unique political traditions, such as the centralisation of 
power to achieve major goals and the ability to launch political movements to solve 
political and social problems, which deeply influenced modern China. 
People’s War or National War? 
The war of national liberation was considered a stepping stone on the road to class 
emancipation. But could these logics be so neatly disentangled? 
The interests of the oppressed classes and oppressed nations are the motor of the 
development of human history. People’s war came into being as part of the resistance 
against oppression. Mao traced the concept of people’s war along a lineage of resistance, 
including examples from Chinese history, the slave revolt led by Spartacus against the 
Romans, and the early nineteenth-century wars of national resistance across Europe 
against Napoleon. In communist ideology, for the true nature of people’s war to be 
revealed, it needed to first separate itself from the category of national war and transcend 
the principle of national self-determination—only then could the people obtain a class 
basis, and gain the long-term support of the oppressed classes of the world—the dream 
of international communist solidarity. 
But for the CCP to achieve victory over the Japanese, it needed to mobilise the 
support of the entire nation, and not just the industrial working class (who barely 
existed as a class at that time). The category of the people was expanded to ventilate the 
contradictions of Chinese society. Mao invoked the name of the people to transform 
the CCP into the core leadership of the Chinese Revolution, construct the political 
party itself through the ‘mass line’ (see Lin Chun’s essay in the present volume), and 
establish itself as the founder and leader of the emancipation of the Chinese people—
and not only serve as a local branch of the Comintern. Although the CCP called itself 
a class party, people’s war transcended the narrow boundaries of class and popularised 
the revolution as a project of national liberation. 
People’s war was grounded in two fundamental premises. First, all of the material and 
spiritual wealth of human society is created by the large majority of the labouring people 
who are the natural masters of society (‘the people, and the people alone, are the motive 
force in the making of world history’); second, all social phenomena and processes, 
including war, must conform to the fundamental interests and aspirations of the masses 
in order to be just and reasonable. On these grounds, all wars can be divided into two 
categories: ‘righteous wars’ (zhengyi zhanzheng) that serve the people’s interests and 
‘unjust wars’ that harm them. Righteous wars will obtain the endorsement and support 
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of the people. Not only will people throw themselves into non-military struggle, but 
also energetically participate in military struggle. In this way, people’s war possesses 
a mass quality and totalising quality. Conversely, people often resist and oppose unjust 
wars. For example, in both Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 1973, the United States finally 
had to withdraw from these unfinished wars as a result of the popular belief at home 
that they were unjust. 
In its own revolutionary struggle, the CCP and the People’s Army attempted to 
preserve maximal distance and independence from the command of the Republican 
government. They did this by engaging in people’s war, i.e. investing in the people’s lives, 
infrastructure, and productive capabilities in its base areas. Under army leadership, the 
large production campaign at South Muddy Bend (nanniwan) significantly improved 
the living conditions, and reduced the burdens of people living there.6 The contrast 
with the Nationalist Party could not be clearer: the People’s Army was more than just 
a fighting unit, but also a propaganda team, a production team, and a tractor planting 
the seeds of the future rolled into one. By establishing a relationship of flesh and blood 
with the local people, the People’s Army was full of vital force. The Japanese invaders 
found themselves trapped in a people’s military struggle behind enemy lines. As Mao 
said in ‘On Protracted War:’ ‘The mobilisation of the common people throughout the 
country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that 
will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites 
for overcoming every difficulty in the war.’
This discourse of people’s war supplied the CCP with an explanation for its victory 
over both the Japanese and the Nationalist Party, and a source of legitimacy. It was able 
to defeat armies with superior military and technological support on the basis of its 
magic weapon—the support of the people (see Balso’s essay in the present volume). 
In political propaganda, the CCP accused the Nationalist Party of ‘representing the 
reactionary classes’ and ‘opposing the people,’ and labelled Chiang Kai-shek an ‘enemy 
of the people.’ Mao’s theory of people’s war contrasted the Nationalist Party’s corruption 
and alienation from the people with the political superiority and mass-based support 
of the CCP. 
Political Legacy
People’s war was not only a military strategy, but also a theory of political party 
organisation and ideology. Ultimately, the theory of people’s war determined the nature 
of the CCP. 
From the Communist Manifesto onwards, socialist revolutionaries have explored 
how  to establish a revolutionary party organisation. In What is to be Done?, Lenin 
expounded the idea that the Communist Party must control the machinery of public 
opinion to impart proletarian consciousness to the proletariat, and transform disparate 
workers into an organised force aware of their own power. Mao’s theory of people’s war 
was developed on the basis of his insight into the conditions faced by the CCP. As early as 
Mao’s 1927 ‘Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,’ he realised 
that the crucible of the Chinese Revolution was the education of the peasantry and 
that the revolutionary process depended on an alliance between peasants and workers. 
From Mao’s first mention of his famous phrase ‘political power grows out of the barrel of 
180   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
a gun’ at the emergency meeting of the CCP Central Committee to address the question 
of agrarian revolution and armed struggle on 7 August 1927 in Hankou, the theory of 
people’s war began to ferment until it achieved final form. 
During the revolutionary process, Mao gradually realised that the CCP could not 
separate itself from the practical conditions of Chinese reality. Although the CCP came 
into being as part of the international communist movement, it became a distinct party 
by absorbing into itself the cultural traditions of Chinese civilisation. In retrospect, 
it is clear that the CCP did not mechanically replicate the definitions of Marxism, 
Leninism, and Stalinism, but supplemented and refashioned them through Confucian 
moral norms and China’s dynastic historical experiences. Mencius’s phrase ‘whoever 
wins the people’s hearts, wins the world’ (de minxin zhe de tianxia) was proven in the 
victory of people’s war. For Mencius and Mao, the people’s heart is the most formidable 
weapon. 
To this day, people’s war is one of the historical foundations of the legitimacy of the 
CCP government. In the revolutionary years, the Communists who engaged in people’s 
war cultivated an exceptional work style, disciplined themselves through arduous 
struggle, and behaved with integrity and honesty. But without the motivational horizon 
of people’s war, this moral resource has been gradually lost. Armed with the concept of 
the people, Mao Zedong transformed the CCP, achieved Revolutionary victory, blazed 
a new path for China, and created history. But the world has changed since Mao’s death. 
In China today, who is still capable of mobilising the people in their exalted name? 





Our revolutions come one after another. Starting from the seizure of power in the 
whole country in 1949, there followed in quick succession the anti-feudal land reform, 
the agricultural cooperativisation, and the socialist reconstruction of private industries, 
commerce, and handicrafts … . Our revolutions are like battles. After a victory, we must 
at once put forward a new task. In this way, cadres and the masses will forever be filled 
with revolutionary fervour instead of conceit.
Mao Zedong, 19581
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) victory and proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 was a watershed moment in communist history. The Party had defied all odds and defeated a numerically and technologically 
superior foe in the Nationalist Party (guomindang, hereafter GMD). The victory, 
however, was not the end of the Chinese Revolution, but its beginning. As CCP 
Chairman Mao Zedong intimated in 1948:
The question now facing the Chinese people … is whether to carry the 
revolution through to the end or to abandon it half-way. If the revolution is to 
be carried through to the end, we must use the revolutionary method to wipe 
out all the forces of reaction resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely; 
we must unswervingly persist in overthrowing imperialism, feudalism, and 
bureaucrat-capitalism; and we must overthrow the reactionary rule of the 
[GMD] on a country-wide scale and set up a republic that is a people’s 
democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat and with the 
worker-peasant alliance as its main body.2
182   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
Mao’s call for China’s revolution to persist—what became his theory of ‘permanent 
revolution’ (buduan geming lun)—was a reminder that new contradictions would 
inevitably emerge along China’s path to socialist development, and even old 
contradictions could reemerge, thus necessitating a persistent revolutionary fervour. 
Permanent revolution also meant that revolution had to pass through stages and achieve 
specific goals at each stage before progressing to the next. As a concept, permanent 
revolution raises important questions: when does a revolution end, if ever? How does 
one know that enemies have been defeated? Are enemies of class struggle ever truly 
defeated? Is there a threshold of exhaustion when permanent mobilisation becomes 
unsustainable? Mao believed that social change still necessitated and demanded 
revolution even after the defeat of imperialism and the reactionary classes. Permanent 
revolution thus represented a response to the fact that revolution can never truly be 
complete because of the persistence of contradictions in socialist society (see Rojas’s 
essay in the present volume). The incessant emergence, development, and resolution of 
contradictions are ultimately integral to socialist and communist development.3
Permanent revolution may consist of charismatic leadership, mass mobilisation, and 
an oppositional force against which revolutionary classes can struggle.4 It also contains 
spatial and temporal dimensions: spatially, the revolution must extend globally, as 
we see in the case of global Maoism (see Lanza’s essay in the present volume); and 
temporally, it must become a duration of the present, as a way of making and sustaining 
revolution after seizing state power. To extend revolution in space and time, thereby 
making it permanent, became a central theoretical dispute of twentieth-century 
communism. The temporality of permanent revolution in China also led to a form 
of post–Cultural Revolution exhaustion and dissipation of revolutionary energies. But 
outside China, for instance in the case of Peru’s Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero 
Luminoso (Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path, hereafter CPP-SP), permanent 
revolution found new life. 
In what follows, I trace this conceptual lineage from Mao’s initial formulation to its 
invocation and experimentation in the highland territories of central and southern 
Peru, where the CPP-SP recruited students and peasants to fight incessantly across 
‘a river of blood’ to punish exploiters and establish communism.5
Genealogy of Permanent Revolution
First coined by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the mid-nineteenth century, 
and developed later by Leon Trotsky, the term permanent revolution has evolved 
significantly. Marx and Engels initially discussed a ‘revolution in permanence’ in 
The Holy Family in anticipation of social upheaval and a proletarian uprising after the 
national bourgeoisie’s failure. Permanent revolution came to mean the proletariat’s 
continued pursuit of its interests despite its political domination by another class; in 
the face of class hostility from above, this idea gave rise to an independent militant 
approach whereby the proletariat organises autonomously.6 Trotsky drew from this 
conception, emphasising the proletariat’s role in leading an ‘uninterrupted’ revolution, 
surpassing the bourgeois democratic revolution to implement socialism.7 The ‘socialist 
revolution,’ he elaborated, ‘begins on the national arena, it unfolds on the international 
arena, and is completed on the world arena,’ thus transforming domestic political 
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change into an international affair. In 1927, the CCP made permanent revolution 
its political line, which at this stage was ‘an uninterrupted series of armed uprisings 
[in the countryside] until final victory was achieved.’8 This earlier approach was hardly 
the final formulation; indeed, on the eve of the Great Leap Forward in January 1958, 
Mao announced his theory of permanent revolution, which offered a new strategy to 
guide the Chinese Revolution’s transition to socialism. The ubiquity of contradictions 
in any society, even a socialist one, required permanent proletarian struggle, passing 
through necessary stages, to prevent a lapse in revolutionary progress.
From Permanent to Continuous Revolution
Rhetorically indebted to Trotsky’s formulation, and to Sun Yat-sen’s view that the 
Chinese Revolution ‘has not yet been completed’ and ‘comrades must still bend every 
effort to achieve it,’ Mao’s theory of permanent revolution grew out of the CCP’s 
struggle against the GMD.9 Pre-revolutionary China, Mao diagnosed, was semifeudal 
and semicolonial (see Barlow’s essay in the present volume). The bourgeois democratic 
revolution’s failure meant that only proletarian revolutionary action in an unbreakable 
alliance with the peasantry ‘as its main body’ could bestow the revolution with 
a permanent character on the path towards socialist development. New contradictions, 
however, required ‘revolutionary zeal’ to realise China’s modernisation, economic 
development, and socialist unity.10 Mao’s theorisation thus regarded the entire 
revolutionary process predating and anticipating communism as ‘an endless series of 
social contradictions and struggles [that] can be resolved only by radical revolutionary 
breaks with existing reality.’11 Progress to higher stages, he urged, ‘must necessarily 
be in a relationship between quantitative and qualitative changes. All mutations, all 
leaps forward are revolutions [that] must pass through struggles. The theory of [the] 
cessation of struggles [in a socialist society] is sheer metaphysics.’12 The persistence of 
contradictions would remain given the permanent possibility of a reactionary class 
attempting to restore its power, and undermine the revolution. The Chinese Revolution 
would therefore pass through ‘many stages and many revolutions’ to safeguard the 
revolutionary gains and protect against the reemergence of bureaucratic, reactionary 
tendencies.13
Mao’s theory of permanent revolution departed from Trotsky’s conclusion that the 
bourgeois democratic revolution (the Republican government) had succeeded in China 
on the grounds that the latter had failed to eradicate feudalism, enact land reform, 
develop and augment productive forces, resolve national questions, and safeguard 
national sovereignty. The CCP, by contrast, sought to accomplish such tasks, stage-by-
stage, on the path towards socialist construction and proletarian dictatorship. As Mao 
noted, the Communists were ‘exponents of the theory of the transition of the revolution, 
and not of the Trotskyite theory of “permanent revolution” … for the attainment 
of socialism by going through all the necessary stages of the democratic republic.’14 
He elaborated on this break from the Trotskyite approach in 1958:
I stand for the theory of permanent revolution. Do not mistake this for 
Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution. In making revolution one must 
strike while the iron is hot—one revolution must follow another, the 
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revolution must continually advance … . After Liberation in 1949 came the 
Land Reform; as soon as this was completed there followed the mutual-aid 
teams, then the low-level cooperatives, then the high-level cooperatives. 
After seven years the cooperativisation was completed and productive 
relations were transformed; then came the Rectification. After Rectification 
was finished, before things had cooled down, then came the Technical 
Revolution.15
In Mao’s version, permanent revolution rationalised the CCP’s economic and political 
rectification campaigns (see Mertha’s essay in the present volume). ‘Our revolution,’ he 
urged, ‘is like fighting battles. After winning a battle, a new task is at once put forward. 
In this way, the cadres and the masses can be made to uphold their revolutionary 
enthusiasm to the full extent.’16 Contradictions would indeed be present even beyond 
the 1949 victory, and new contradictions would emerge as the CCP developed China 
into a socialist society with a modern socialist economy. Such ‘continually emerging 
contradictions’ required accomplishing objectives that corresponded to each stage 
and revolutionary enthusiasm to stamp out bourgeois tendencies seeking to reverse 
revolutionary gains.17 Hence the CCP moved from Land Reform and the First Five-
year Plan to the mutual-aid teams, cooperatives, the 1956 Hundred Flowers Movement, 
the 1957–59 Anti-rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward, and lastly, the Cultural 
Revolution.
During the Cultural Revolution, permanent revolution metamorphosised into 
the concept of ‘continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat’ 
(wuchanjieji zhuanzheng xia jixu geming). Continuous revolution was an innovation 
introduced by the Gang of Four to theoretically justify the most radical features of 
the Cultural Revolution.18 ‘Continuing the revolution’ first emerged in People’s Daily 
in 1967 and eventually constituted a theory of sorts.19 Consisting of quotes from Mao’s 
earlier writings, continuing the revolution was a necessary ingredient of proletarian 
political power and the establishment of socialism. The enduring nature of class 
conflict in socialist society required continued infusions of revolutionary energy and 
enthusiastic action to ensure its perpetuity (see Dutton’s essay in the present volume).
The debate over the difference between the earlier buduan geming and jixu geming was 
never definitively resolved. On one hand, the shift from the predicate adjective buduan 
to the transitive verb jixu stresses that positive action was essential to the revolution’s 
continuation; on the other, jixu also implies continuity with the CCP’s bureaucratic 
establishment, whereas buduan contains the possibility of rupture.20 The first reading 
is supported by Zhang Chunqiao’s warning of a resurgence of the ‘bourgeois right’ 
unless the revolution was fortified under the dictatorship of the proletariat.21 The fear 
was that the bourgeoisie would reverse the positive gains of the revolution and reroute 
the Chinese path towards capitalism. Enthusiastic action ultimately took the form of 
a revolutionary culture that upheld the path towards socialism in all fields and stood 
steadfast against ‘capitalist roaders.’ Intrinsic to the revolutionary promise at the core 
of the Cultural Revolution was the formation of a new culture for a socialist mode of 
production, which necessitated continuous reinvention, i.e. revolution, to prevent it 
from deviating along a capitalist or Soviet bureaucratic path. To achieve the type of 
socialist society that Mao envisioned, the Cultural Revolution aimed at transforming 
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high culture and everyday culture into a new type of revolutionary culture, and 
removing rightist tendencies that presented potential obstacles (see the essays by 
Thornton and Dai in the present volume).22
There were, ultimately, consequences to making revolution permanent in China. 
As Mao once said, ‘the straw sandal has no pattern, its shape evolves as it is woven.’23 
This phrase evokes the need for a constant reassessment and recalibration of the 
shape revolution takes as it unfolds. Yet the result of this approach had disastrous 
consequences, ranging from the Great Leap’s unrealistic production quotas and pace to 
the Cultural Revolution’s iconoclastic fanaticism, both of which disfigured the ‘pattern’ 
of revolutionary politics. Such misshapen sandals were not suitable for China’s post-
Mao leadership, in its attempt to ‘cross the river’ of economic modernisation and leave 
revolution on the shores of history. The lessons and inspiration from China’s permanent 
revolution, however, spread beyond its own borders and found new life elsewhere.24
Exporting the Revolution to Peru
The Cultural Revolution struck a chord with foreign visitors to China, notably 
a Peruvian Marxist named Abimael Guzmán. His visits to Beijing between 1965 and 
1967 led him to adopt Mao Zedong Thought as the CPP-SP’s guiding ideology and 
regard the Chinese Revolution as pregnant with lessons for Peru. He studied Mao’s 
works closely, trained in the CCP’s military techniques, and received small arms 
training at a Chinese cadre school. Upon his return to Peru, he founded the CPP-SP 
as a Maoist party, avowing Maoism in his claim that the Shining Path’s armed struggle 
required peasant mobilisation ‘under the infallible banners of Marxist-Leninist-Mao 
Zedong Thought.’25 Now convinced to launch a people’s war from Ayacucho, Guzmán 
adopted the nom de guerre ‘Presidente Gonzalo’ and followed Mao’s example in waging 
a permanent revolution in Peru.26 The CPP-SP’s ideological foundation contained four 
central pillars on which its revolution rested: a) the universality of people’s war (see 
Guan’s essay in the present volume); b) the Party’s militarisation of the worker-peasant 
alliance; 3) the personality cult; and d) a permanent cultural revolution. 
In addition to Mao, Guzmán drew inspiration from Peruvian Marxist José Carlos 
Mariátegui’s (1894–1930) anti-imperialism and diagnosis of Peru as a semicolonial, 
semifeudal society. The name ‘Sendero Luminoso’ derives from Mariátegui’s axiom 
that ‘Marxism-Leninism will open the shining path to the future.’ After Guzmán’s 
trips to China between 1965 and 1967, he discovered ideas in Mao that resonated 
with Mariátegui, and also went beyond them. Mao’s strategies of protracted war and 
revolutionary violence provided tactical elements that were absent in Mariátegui’s 
thought.27 Together, Mariátegui and Mao’s respective writings from the 1920s are 
reflected in CPP-SP assessments of the nature of Peruvian society in the 1970s. Mao’s 
call to apply Marxism-Leninism creatively, Guzmán admits, allowed him to appreciate 
the contributions of Mariátegui as a ‘first rate Marxist-Leninist who had thoroughly 
analysed our society.’ 
Mariátegui had applied Marxism as an interpretive paradigm to Latin American 
realities with Indigenismo, which called for socialism to end the racial marginalisation 
of indigenous peoples. Since his death, however, every leftist Peruvian political party 
failed to address the ‘ethnic question’ and the state’s pauperisation of its indigenous 
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population.28 Frustrated over issues of political line, strategy, and revisionism of leftist 
currents in Peru, Guzmán broke from the Mariátegui-founded Partido Comunista 
Peruano (Communist Party of Peru) and, later, the pro-Chinese Partido Comunista 
Peruano-Bandera Roja (Communist Party of Peru-Red Flag). These schisms were 
justified as an unfolding of the principle of permanent revolution, which was venerated 
as a fundamental pillar of the CPP-SPP. Under these auspices, the newly formed Party 
declared its intention to surround the cities from the countryside in an unrelenting, 
continuous peasant revolution.29 Guzmán’s CPP-SP sought to conquer ‘three mountains’ 
before it could succeed where others had failed: a) US imperialism; b) semifeudalism; 
and c) bureaucratic capitalism. The ‘three mountains’ metaphor shows the centrality of 
Mao’s permanent revolution in Guzmán’s thinking: Mao’s April 1945 invocation of the 
fourth-century story of the ‘Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountains,’ a tale about 
persistence and human will in removing a mountain, had become one of the seminal 
essays of the Cultural Revolution (see also Lora-Wainwright’s essay in the present 
volume).30 As Mao intimated:
Today, two big mountains weigh down on the Chinese people. One is 
imperialism, while the other is feudalism. The CCP has long made up its 
mind to dig them up. We must persevere and work unceasingly [buduan de 
gongzuo], and we, too, will touch God [hui gandong shangdi de]. Our God is 
none other than the broad masses of the Chinese nation. If they stand up and 
dig together with us, why can’t we dig these two mountains away?31
The only way to conquer these mountains, Guzmán urged, was through protracted 
struggle, an alliance between urban and rural proletarians (notably the Andean 
peoples), and a perpetual struggle against reactionary forces, both local and global.32
A philosophy professor at a university in Peru, Guzmán declared himself the ‘greatest 
living Marxist-Leninist’ and intellectual successor to Marx, Lenin, and Mao. His 
‘mastery of Maoist text’ granted him total authority over the CPP-SP as its supreme 
theorist, with ‘pensamiento Gonzalo’ (‘Gonzalo Thought’) constituting a ‘Fourth Sword 
of Marxism.’33 A Mao-like personality cult developed around him that employed 
Cultural Revolution agitprop methods of wall posters and fervid acolytes singing Mao 
songs ‘memorised in Mandarin.’34 
Peru’s need for a ‘permanent’ or ‘continuous’ revolution is most explicitly stated in 
a 1988 interview by El Diario with Guzmán:
This democratic revolution [of ours] must be followed uninterruptedly by 
a socialist revolution, on this we would like to specify, taking what President 
Mao taught us with a lot of foresight thinking about what could arise; he tells 
us that the democratic revolution ends on the same day that power is taken 
in the whole country and the People’s Republic is founded, and on that same 
day and hour the socialist revolution begins, and in it, we have to develop 
a dictatorship of the proletariat and, thus, initiate the basic transformations 
to develop socialism.35
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Guzmán’s perspective on permanent revolution was clearly informed by his close 
reading of Mao’s texts during his time in China, as he echoes the Chinese leader’s 
emphases on world revolution, the peasantry’s potential under Party leadership, and 
waging a people’s war. By studying Mao and the CCP, Guzmán came to regard the 
Cultural Revolution as ‘a continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and its indispensable character; without it the revolution cannot continue 
its march to communism.’ But in no way was the Cultural Revolution—its Chinese 
or Peruvian version—to be a single-step towards socialism; rather, as Guzmán makes 
clear, there were to be ‘successive culture revolutions’ responsive to ‘our own reality.’ 
The Peruvian revolution, he concludes, ‘is linked inextricably to the world revolution; 
that is our final goal, the others are stages, steps, moments and we believe that the road 
to reach communism is long.’36
CPP-SP’s brand of Maoism took the form of broad recruitment among rural 
workers, organising peasant patrols (rondas campesinas), military encroachment, and 
continuous mass violence. Recruits were either students from Ayacucho’s countryside, 
or from the margins of urban society. Despite its self-proclaimed vanguard status, 
however, the Party organisation reproduced rather than eradicated Peru’s top-down 
‘colonial stratification,’ as a Central Committee of white Peruvians oversaw a largely 
poor youth of indigenous or mixed ancestry. The CPP-SP nonetheless won over many 
students and peasants, as millenarian promises of radical upheaval in a continuous 
armed struggle struck a sympathetic chord with a disaffected base. By 1977, young 
militants were hosting Maoist-style ‘education sessions’ and ‘recruiting fighters in 
mountain villages.’37 The ouster of corrupt authorities and punishment of criminals 
and counterrevolutionaries by rondas were also positive changes. 
But when military forces moved in to eliminate Party influence in the 1980s, the 
CPP-SP response was mass violence, often at the expense of the impoverished villagers 
and respected local leaders that it purported to help. This was all part of Guzmán’s 
grand scheme and represented, ultimately, an extension of his adaptation of permanent 
or continuous revolution in fervour and scope. Mao’s tactic of a people’s war also 
guided the CPP-SP. Between 1980 and 1988, the Party nearly completed all stages of 
its revolution, expanding its peasant revolution by 1989 in preparation of seizing Lima. 
As the movement progressed, however, the Party initiated brutal internal purges to 
ensure longevity and loyalty. The personality cult around Presidente Gonzalo and the 
view that the Russians, Cubans, North Koreans, and even Chinese were ‘weak and not 
true communists’ led it to change its official ideology to ‘Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-
Gonzalo Thought.’38 Government forces captured Guzmán in 1992, and although 
the people’s war persisted, Guzmán’s imprisonment effectively ended the CPP-SP 
revolution.
Abimael Guzmán’s thinking on permanent revolution was responsible for some of the 
CPP-SP’s strategic blunders. A faithful adherent to the Gang of Four’s dogmatic Maoism 
of the Cultural Revolution, his emphasis on ideological purity ultimately pigeonholed 
his movement and squandered its emergent momentum. The Party’s fixation on its own 
revolutionary purity sacrificed another vital aspect of Maoism and reason for the CCP’s 
longevity—its pragmatism and adaptability. As a result of the Party’s betrayal of its base, 
it ended up decapitated from its body politic.39
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Permanent Revolution Today
Today, both in China and Peru, permanent revolution is all but dead. The planted 
seeds of global capitalism in both nations have grown into deeply rooted trees. The 
afterlife of permanent revolution, or versions thereof, outside China is a different 
tale. Maoist parties—some of which have ruled, others somewhat marginal—have 
emerged in several far-flung polities in Europe (Italy and Turkey), South Asia (India, 
Nepal, Afghanistan, and Bhutan), and Peru’s South American neighbours (Bolivia 
and Colombia). Although the Peruvian Maoists failed, both the theory and concept 
of permanent revolution remain relevant to those still seeking redress in a world 
increasingly dominated by global capitalist imperialism. Even in Peru, where most 
believe that the Maoist movement is over, the insurgents who continue the fight do 
not see it this way. CPP-SP acolytes revere Presidente Gonzalo, and hold firmly that 
permanent revolution against imperialism and contradictions will never die. ‘This will 
demonstrate to the world that what we have in Peru is a people’s war, not a central 
committee’s war,’ stated director of the pro-CPP-SP London-based Sol Peru Committee 
Adolfo Olaechea. ‘The war has more to do with a class struggle than with personalities.’40 
So long as class struggle remains, then, revolution will permanently be necessary.





To situate contemporary Chinese poetry among the afterlives of Maoist China is problematic, above all due to the very nature of the poetry, which is like a karst river surfacing erratically at unpredictable points and moments, making 
it difficult to locate its springs and tributaries. Added to this is the complication that the 
main novelty in the field of Chinese poetry is the wave of excellent poems written by 
migrant workers. Such a sociological phenomenon reopens a crucial political problem 
of modern China: what has been, and what could be, the role of the workers in a project 
of collective emancipation beyond capitalism? The permanence of a simulacrum of the 
‘working class,’ mummified in the insignia of power (see Russo’s essay in the present 
volume), clashes with the lyrical realism of these new worker poets, who are fully 
aware of the radical political inexistence of workers in China today. A close source 
of inspiration is certainly the Misty poetry that emerged at the end of the 1970s, 
which brought to light the deadly ambiguities of the role played by poetry and art in 
revolutionary culture (see Dai’s essay in the present volume). Another hidden source, 
and perhaps the most paradoxical, is that Mao himself was one of the great poets of the 
twentieth century, although he wrote in classical regulated verses.
Finally, one could say that the richest source of the contemporary appearance of this 
karst river is still the immense Chinese poetic tradition, whose most authentic voices 
were driven by a sense of profound introspection about the place of poetry in China’s 
cultural space. In fact, the best Chinese poets and writers have always illuminated 
key dilemmas of ‘China’s identity.’ In the last 40 years, poetry has shed a peculiar 
light—a  ‘glitter among the interstices,’1 as Xiao Kaiyu, one of the most important 
Chinese contemporary poets, put it—on the very meaning, past, present, and future 
of ‘China.’ For Chinese writers and poets, ‘China is a big question mark’ and a vast 
unexplored territory accessible to poetic exploration.2
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In the words of Meng Lang, a poet who recently passed away: ‘The poet stays in 
the blind places of history.’3 These places are perfectly inhabited by the new migrant 
poets. Despite the rhetoric of twentieth-century state communism, which praised the 
worker as the brightest historical figure, today the worker toils away in the dark shadow 
of history. The intersection of artistic creation and wage slavery in the new wave of 
migrant worker poets must resist its own obscurity and bring to light the conditions 
of life at the bottom of the global capitalist production chain.
This path of poetic investigation was opened by an artistic group labelled the 
‘Misty Poets’ (menglong shiren), which was first formed in 1978–80 by the editors 
of the underground journal Today (jintian).4 This generation of young poets had 
grown up during the Cultural Revolution, which had given them a chance to taste 
a sense of equality (see Thornton’s essay in the present volume). In the aftermath of 
the Cultural Revolution, however, the political language of Maoism had become 
anaemic and impoverished, emptied of its revolutionary intensity and emancipatory 
promise. Following Mao’s death, the poets began to sense the risk of their own creative 
experimental enthusiasm being annihilated. In response, they dedicated themselves 
to a bold exploration of hidden possibilities within the Chinese language, creating 
new openings for thought, which reverberated across the entire Chinese intellectual 
horizon, not only in poetry and novels, but also in cinema, visual arts, architecture, 
music, and much more. 
Misty Poets and the migrant worker poets are two distinct poetic configurations that, 
although born three decades apart, are engaging in a significant dialogue. The main 
ground of convergence is the concept of poetry as an independent intellectual space 
distant from the dominant culture and governmental discourse. Moreover, both 
groups share a peculiar sensitivity towards labour. Most of the early Misty Poets had 
experiences as ordinary labourers, as ‘educated youth’ (zhishi qingnian) sent to work 
in the countryside, or as workers in factories during the Cultural Revolution. Famous 
poets such as Bei Dao and Shu Ting were factory workers, Mang Ke worked in a fishing 
village, and Yang Lian was in the countryside—experiences through which they find 
resonance with migrant poets. 
Living the Changing Chinese Workplace
Through these biographical experiences of contemporary Chinese poets one 
can glimpse the epoch-making changes of factory life in China after 1949. Chinese 
industrial workplaces have witnessed at least three eras: the early period of socialist 
construction in the 1950s; the intermediate, experimental period of the 1960s and 
1970s; and the post-Maoist period with its neoliberal factories. 
The poems written by workers during the era of socialist construction expressed 
a positive attitude and optimistic participation in the socialist project, as in ‘Factory 
Morning,’ a poem written by Li Xue’ao in 1957:
The valiant chimney is like the mast of a ship, 
it rises high at the centre of the factory. 
The towering plant is the ship cabin, 
the Party secretary here is our red pilot, 
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when all around all still sleeps quietly, 
we sound the siren and set sail 
bringing millions of heroic hearts we enter one wider day.5
These were poems that glorified labour (see also Ban Wang’s essay in the present 
volume). However, the meaning, practice, and organisation of labour all radically 
changed during the Cultural Revolution. The Misty Poets who lived during this 
intermediate period witnessed and participated in a variety of experiments, such as 
attempts to mitigate the division of labour; remould the relationships between workers, 
technicians, and managers; and produce ‘theory’ through the existence of ‘worker 
theoretical groups’ active in the factories, as well as ‘worker universities.’ 
These experiments in emancipation from factory despotism and the unprecedented 
space for intellectual pursuits among the workers contributed to the overall atmosphere 
in Chinese factories during the Cultural Revolution. Yu Jian captures this multifaceted 
situation in a recent reflection on his decennial experience as a worker before becoming 
a professor of literature and one of the greatest contemporary poets:
In my factory there were figures of the past who had been labelled rightists, 
ex-movie actors, painters, dancers, a variety of owners of the old society, 
descendants of capitalists, and intellectuals. These were highly educated 
people, a sort of living textbook, and they became my teachers. I remember 
well the time in the plant, the funniest thing was the storytelling—many 
people told stories and putting them together seemed like novels in which 
they all spoke. In that factory there were frequent power outages, so we had 
plenty of time to tell stories. Now when I think about it, the factory was like 
a secret art school … . I remember that in the factory I had time to write 
poetry, sing, play the flute, there was painting, writing of ancient poetry, 
studying philosophy of science, we listened to the Voice of America … even 
Western literary works from the eighteenth and nineteenth century circulated 
in private. I even read Shi Zhi’s poems, the brochures by Robespierre, and 
also Herzen and Chekhov.6
From this point of view, certain factory spaces in the Cultural Revolution functioned 
as ‘communist heterotopias’ in which traditional factory logic and temporality were 
suspended, and new capacities, relations, and senses of the world could take place. 
For today’s migrant poets, the subjective condition of life in the factory is radically 
different from both the classic socialist era and the experimental interval of the Cultural 
Revolution. The collective ‘us’ has blotted into ‘a massively single number’ (pangda de 
danshu), to borrow a line from the poet Guo Jinniu.7 It is a poetic description of the 
radical absence of sociality, the boundless eradication of identity and belonging in 
which the only relationship with the ‘motherland’ is ‘my payment for the temporary 
residence permit.’ As Guo writes with bitter sarcasm:
A person crosses a province, another province, another province
A person takes a train, then a truck, and then a black bus again
Next stop
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The motherland has given me a temporary residence permit.
The motherland accepted my payment for the temporary residence permit.
…
Sister Li of the north, stands alone facing south in untidy pajamas
Sister Li of the north, embraces a broken chrysanthemum
Sister Li of the north, hangs from a banyan tree
Lightly. As if her flesh and bones did not weigh. 
Alas, I could not arrive to help her.8
Strangers to Themselves
 
‘Sister Li of the North, hangs from a banyan tree’ and the author is devastated for 
arriving too late to help her. Strange destiny for a poet to arrive in the place where 
someone has just killed oneself! In another poem, ‘Going Home on Paper’ (zhishang 
huanxiang), Guo portrays himself as a worker charged with putting up the nets on the 
top floor of the factory (this was a well-known measure taken by Foxconn managers 
to prevent the reoccurrence of suicides among young workers). For the poet it is an 
excruciating job that cannot but remind him of those who have jumped. The poem is 
like a funeral that brings the young boy back home, though only ‘on paper.’
1.
The boy, at dawn, counts from the first to the thirteenth floor 
ends up counting and arrived on the top floor 
he 
flies, oh, flies 
he cannot imitate the birds’ movements  
…
3.
Thirteenth floor, I’m putting the anti-jump nets, this is my job 
to earn a payday 
with force turn clockwise, tighten the screws bit by bit,  
fight and resist in the darkness 
the more I use force, the more dangerous it is … .9
The poet searches in verse for a way to survive and resist the self-destructiveness 
of wage slavery. 
Another migrant poet, Xing Huangtian, points out that ‘we do not know anything’ 
about workers today and their depressing labour in the deadly repetition of the factory 
life.10 How far from the Chinese Dream is the verse ‘Dreams decreasing, slowness 
increasing?’11 In a poem simply titled ‘He,’ the worker is unidentifiable, not only 
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outside the factory, where ‘he’ is virtually invisible, but even inside the factory. ‘He’ is 
the stranger—even to himself—who works at the next machine. Everyone is locked in 
their own obsessions: 
It is always like this, day after day, month after month 
year after year, time going by,
machinery wearing out, physical strength running out
dreams decreasing, slowness increasing.
It is always like this, always
feeling blue, except for labour, 
except for love. It is like innate that
we do not know anything about him
we do not know what 
this person is grounded on, neither
his obsession, but is this the obsession 
that we do not have.12
Fatalism
What it means to be a worker in the modern world constitutes an intellectual enigma, 
which requires renewed conceptual inquiry. Previous theoretical-political attempts—
Marxism above all—to explain the worker as a political subjectivity and not merely an 
economic reality have fallen into a period of confusion and disorientation. It is unclear 
what a worker’s existence can be grounded in beyond mere survival. 
In this era, when political visions of labour have become rarefied, the poetry of 
migrant workers can be read as a symptom of unmoored subjective existence. Surely, 
they are a ‘massively single number,’ but can this number become a collective entity? 
My tentative answer is to consider the ‘us’ of the ‘worker’ in these poems as animated, 
at least temporarily, by a ‘rational fatalism,’13 condensed in the following lines by Xu 
Lizhi: ‘I cannot accuse, I cannot complain/I can only suffer my exhaustion.’14 Though 
this statement is written in the first person, I suggest that it should be read as an ‘us’ 
representing any worker. 
As young Marx wrote: ‘To call on them to give up their illusions about their 
condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions.’15 This lucid 
understanding of the conditions of wage labour generates an intense realistic lyricism. 
This lyrical power of unflinching insight can be felt in the portrayal of the radical social 
inexistence of migrant workers in the following two poems by Ji Zhishui—a remarkable 
woman poet.16 While migrants generally come from rural areas to work in the cities, 
they neither reflect peasant characteristics nor fit into the urban ‘Chinese dream.’ They 
are merely ‘rocks piling up by the side of the road;’ leaves of grass that, on encountering 
a gust of wind, are ‘stripped of a rippling smile/stripped of the most basic respect;’ and 
finally, ‘leaves falling down into the dust.’
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Rocks by the Road
A gust of wind  
blows us up from the land 
and down onto machines in a strange place, down onto the assembly line 
plunged into noise, machine oil, red and black gum, white lead, rust 
beaten, screwed tight, nailed up 
our quick spinning  
flings off our accents and shouts and warm tears  
until we can’t squeeze out another droplet of sweat 
and we harden into rocks 
left by the side of the road 
even if we go home we don’t know how to farm 
these rocks piling up by the side of the road 
lean against one another, cold against cold
Migrant Workers
These grasses often 
encounter a kind of wind 
like a basin of cold water being sprinkled out 
stripped of a vibrating heartbeat, stripped of a rippling smile
stripped of the most basic respect
we head down
like leaves falling down into the dust
looking for food in the dirt, in garbage piles
these people still want to run, still want to escape
but that only brings them into the trap
others rush onto the knife’s point
these grasses are often
thin and weak
The last five verses expose the internal weakness of ‘rational fatalism.’ While insight 
is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of subjective existence, it is not enough to 
prevent self-destruction. The same movement ‘to run’ and ‘to escape’ ultimately leads 
to a trap, and even pushes some of the ‘grass leaves’ to ‘rush onto the knife’s point.’ 
To consistently maintain the ‘line’ of not hoping for anything and not complaining 
about anything is extremely difficult—a titanic endeavour requiring an ascetic-heroic 
attitude, which constantly risks transforming into its opposite. Under these constraints, 
as soon as one gives in to the poetic urge to lament one’s own sufferings, one risks 
succumbing to the ‘hope’ of recognition from the society which they ostensibly reject. 
Since every desire for recognition involves the frustration of misrecognition, this 
ambivalence ends up annihilating the starting point of not hoping and not complaining. 
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The Tragedy of Xu Lizhi
 
In 2014, Xu Lizhi, a 24-year-old migrant worker at one of the Foxconn factories 
in Shenzhen, committed suicide, leaving behind a vast poetic body posthumously 
published by his worker friends. Any suicide is always an enigma that cannot be 
reduced to a single cause, even less, I would argue, to an act of resistance. Even his 
biographic details cannot explain his tragic decision, as they are no sadder than those 
of the other migrants. Regardless of the reasons for his suicide, we should consider his 
verses independently from his tragic fate. An example is ‘I Swallowed an Iron Moon’, 
which has become the emblem of Chinese migrant workers poetry.
I swallowed an iron moon
they called it a screw
I swallowed industrial wastewater and unemployment forms
bent over the machines, our youth died young 
I swallowed the hurry and the displacement
I swallowed bridges for pedestrians and this rusty life
I cannot swallow any more
everything that I swallowed flows back to my mouth
 
I spread across my motherland
a poem of shame17
Other verses by Xu Lizhi offer chilling descriptions of the condition of workers in the 
despotic atmosphere of the factory:
I Fell Asleep Standing like That
The sheet of paper in front of the eyes yellows slightly 
I use the pen to mark over with various shades of black 
it is full of a worker’s vocabulary 
workshop, assembly line, platform machine, work sheet, overtime, wage … 
by these words I was trained to be submissive 
I cannot scream, I cannot resist 
I cannot accuse, I cannot complain 
I can only suffer my exhaustion in silence 
when I first arrived here
I was only hoping for the grey pay check of the tenth of the month  
that gives me a late consolation 
for this I have to grind off the edges and corners, grinding the language 
never skipped work, never a day of illness, never a day of personal break 
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never arrived late, never left early 
I’m standing like iron next to the assembly line, my hands as if they were 
flying 
how many days and how many nights 
I fell asleep standing like that.18
Such intense verses leave us with much to meditate on. The existence of poems written 
by migrant workers affirms the infinity of poetry against the oppression of any finitude. 
Clearly the way out of the hell in which these poems were written is still to be invented, 
but it will depend on the possible affirmation of creative subjectivities. How can this 
migrant proletariat of the contemporary world unite to abolish wage slavery? We can 
glimpse at least one sign of trespassing towards a new political capacity. Mi Jiuping, 
a worker from Shenzhen Jasic Technology, a factory in the southern metropolis, 
was arrested in July 2018 for spearheading a protest in which he and his colleagues 
demanded, among other things, the establishment of an independent workplace union. 
At the time of writing, he still remains under detention, but this poem, which he wrote 
while in jail, has been shared across several blogs and websites, becoming famous 
among the workers and generating its own collective force: 
I am with us
I stand atop a hill,
Seeing beyond the highest heavens,
The mountains crisp green,
The red sun rising.
I stand on the banks of a great river,
taking in the sight of the water,
the rolling waves
surging on endlessly.
I am a crane in a crowd of people,
I am silent beyond the outskirts,
I have lost family, love, and friendship,
I have lost all,
I have lost everything.
I will have family, love, friendship,
I will have all,
I will have everything.
Not today,
But in the not-distant future,
I am not me,
I am with us.19
Xiao Kaiyu observed, with a touch of skeptical irony, that for Mao poetry would be 
resurrected only when everyone in China became poets. Is not the new wave of migrant 
workers poets a ‘Maoist’ signal?20 





In Yan’an, the wartime base area of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), there were a number of dogmatists in the Party. They tried to impress people with their knowledge of Marxist texts and saw Marxism as an unquestionable and timeless 
truth, rather than a guide to action. Conversely, there were also a number of Party 
members who were empiricists. Those people based their thinking on their fragmentary, 
individual experiences. They failed to understand the bigger revolutionary picture and 
did not see the importance of theory at all. To correct these comrades’ divergent but 
equally erroneous, subjectivist ideas—especially those of the dogmatists, who had 
already caused the Chinese Communist Revolution to suffer several losses—Mao 
Zedong wrote ‘On Practice’ in 1937. Or so says the introduction to the essay in the 
official collection, Selected Works of Mao Zedong.
‘On Practice’—subtitled in the Selected Works as ‘On the Relation between Knowledge 
and Practice, between Knowing, and Doing’—was not the first time Mao had written on 
the importance of practice. In his 1930 essay ‘Oppose Book Worship,’ he excoriated the 
‘disgraceful’ comrades who ‘always keep their eyes shut and talk nonsense,’ insisting that 
‘unless you have investigated a problem, you will be deprived of the right to speak on it’ 
because ‘when you have not probed into a problem, into the present facts and its past 
history, and know nothing of its essentials, whatever you say about it will undoubtedly 
be nonsense’ and ‘talking nonsense solves no problems, as everyone knows.’ The 
claim that a core feature of Maoism is anti-intellectualism is often evidenced by Mao’s 
insistence that all knowledge comes from engaging in actual practices, especially those 
of labour. In fact, Mao was only anti-intellectual in the specific sense that he distrusted 
bourgeois intellectuals and their exploitation-abetting methods and pursuits. Mao was 
deeply devoted to some of the defining tasks of intellectual work: producing knowledge 
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and verifying it, which also required critiquing and evaluating methods of knowledge 
production (see Schmalzer’s essay in the present volume). He did not want to halt the 
pursuit of knowledge; he wanted to pursue revolutionary knowledge.1 
A Technology for Revolutionary Knowledge
Mao offered a technology for revolutionary knowledge production and truth 
verification: the ‘mass line’ (qunzhong luxian, see Lin Chun’s essay in the present 
volume). Encapsulated in the shorthand phrase ‘from the masses, to the masses’ (cong 
qunzhong zhong lai, dao qunzhong zhong qu), the mass line was premised on the Marxist 
claim that ordinary working people were best positioned in terms of class perspective 
to most clearly see objective realities, produce the best analyses of problems, and point 
the way to the best solutions. Why were the masses so ideally positioned to know? For 
Mao and other Marxists, it was because the masses engaged in labour:
Man’s knowledge depends mainly on his activity in material production, 
through which he comes gradually to understand the phenomena, the 
properties, and the laws of nature, and the relations between himself and 
nature; and through his activity in production he also gradually comes to 
understand, in varying degrees, certain relations that exist between people. 
None of this knowledge can be acquired apart from activity in production.2 
The most successful revolutionary praxis would produce knowledge by beginning 
with that practice of participating in the concrete daily experiences of production 
and paying attention, observing, and investigating the concrete conditions created by 
those practices, while listening very closely when other labourers describe their own 
practices and conditions. According to Mao, when you come to see through that mass 
perspective, through the viewpoint of the people who labour, you will know some of 
the truest truths about the concrete conditions of the world.
Crucially, however, Mao’s insistence on practice was not a dismissal of theory. For him, 
the dogmatists were worse than the empiricists, but both were guilty of subjectivism. All 
truth came from the concrete conditions of the masses, but not every interpretation of 
those conditions was true. Members of the masses, and the Communists who observed 
and worked with them, could hold incorrect views, or correct views that were ‘scattered 
and unsystematic.’ It is rarely possible for any individual to see fully the broader 
implications or imperatives contained in their own experiences. Mao famously likened 
the role of the Party to that of a processing plant for the ideas of the masses: the Party’s 
responsibility was to ‘listen attentively’ to the masses; to engage in the practices they 
engage in; to use Marxist-Leninist theory to help identify the correct ideas that emerge 
from concrete work; to show the masses how to apply Marxist/Leninist/Maoist theory 
to understand the full scope of their ideas in a ‘concentrated and systematic’ form; and 
then to propagate the systematised ideas until ‘the people’ came to understand and 
accept them as their own.3 The mass line knowledge production and truth verification 
technology operates through an open-ended and recursive process of new truths 
becoming lived realities and new sets of practices, the results of which are observed, 
discussed, and recalibrated. 
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Anti-intellectualism?
Mao was not anti-intellectual. He did not deny that we must produce knowledge 
about the world. But he also argued that we ought not simply seek to interpret the 
world when the point, of course, is to change it. He envisioned the dialectical method as 
ideally being able to produce new, verified knowledge, which could be used to change 
practice in revolutionary ways, to reshape the very conditions of the world (see Pang’s 
essay in the present volume). Nevertheless, from Mao’s perspective no revolutionary 
should become too invested or too certain about new practices, or the knowledge that 
informed them, or they would be vulnerable to those subjectivist ideas of empiricism 
or dogmatism. Revolutionaries must think in an ‘infinite way’—from practice, to 
theory, to practice, to theory, to practice—in an endless ‘ascending spiral’ of mass line 
knowledge production.4 
Some worry that the Party’s recent attempt to revive the mass line means a return 
to the disasters of the Mao era, but the mass line also offers the possibility for Maoism 
to transcend Mao.5 In the official Party view, Mao Zedong Thought is alive. It did not 
die with him, nor must it be killed to prevent repeating his mistakes, as its method 
can improve and disprove its founder’s preliminary conclusions. A recent article in 
a Party theory journal claimed that the CCP’s continuous use of the endless ‘ascending 
spiral’ of mass line knowledge production ‘is precisely why socialism is still flourishing, 
vibrant and alive in China, and why the Chinese nation is still walking along the road 
of socialism with Chinese characteristics toward its great rejuvenation.’6 
Many observers find ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ or ‘market socialism’ to 
be little more than cynical attempts to preserve the legitimacy of a Communist Party 
working with practices and theories that are seemingly far removed from the ideas Marx 
advocated and the practices he observed. Yet those phrases could be entirely logical 
within a mass line epistemology, if the progression from Marxist thought to Maoist 
praxis to Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms to Xi Jinping’s efforts to tie it all back 
together is the path lit by practice. Infinite practice-theory-practice processing could 
certainly take a party and a society in unexpected directions; if Marx could have set the 
course for revolution from his armchair, there would have been no need for a praxis 
of ongoing investigation and evolution. Of course, practice is not the sole criterion 
of truth, and the appearance of having been borne from experience does not, alone, 
make knowledge Marxist or emancipatory. It is only through the dialectical method of 
considering practice in light of theory and vice versa that one can approach truth and 
the possibility of revolutionary change.
Marxist Futures
What might Mao say on the debate over the nature of China’s economic and political 
system in the twenty-first century? He would probably be unsurprised that dogmatists 
still want to impress others with their knowledge of Marxist texts and thus attempt to 
falsify the ‘socialism’ in ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ by pointing to the way 
the practices of Chinese communism have failed to correspond with Marx’s nineteenth-
century theory. Yet Mao might also instruct empiricists to remember that their 
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fragmentary, individual experiences and practices must always be contextualised with 
theory. And that theory cannot be one that takes us farther away from the promises of 
equality, liberation, and communism. The present progress toward those revolutionary 
goals can only be judged by engaging in the practices of material production, observing 
the relations between people, and investigating the concrete realities of the people’s 
daily lives.





The creation of wealth is often ascribed to hard work and dedication by those who have it. Yet, ‘[i]n actual history,’ wrote Karl Marx, ‘it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest 
part.’1 Primitive accumulation (yuanshi jilei) is the transfer, often by violent means, 
of formerly common resources into the hands of a privileged few so that they can be 
utilised for the creation of private profit, thus depriving everyone else of an autonomous 
means of existence. Chronologically, primitive accumulation is precapitalist—it is the 
process by which the exploitative class relations inherent to capitalism come into being. 
Marx called it the ‘original sin’ of the capitalist mode of production. 
Historically, the basis of primitive accumulation is the centuries-long process of 
the peasantry being driven off the land. This process takes different forms in different 
countries during different historical epochs.2 The classic account of this is the enclosure 
movement in feudal England. As common lands were taken over for sheep pastures 
by the aristocracy in response to the rising demand for commercial wool, the English 
peasants, deprived of their means of subsistence, had no choice but to sell their labour 
in order to survive. Over time, the peasantry was transformed into a propertyless class 
of industrial workers—a proletariat—providing the cheap labour which eventually 
came to fuel the British industrial revolution. Such processes, as they unfolded in 
various ways across the countries of Western Europe, were accompanied by parallel 
forms of primitive accumulation overseas, as the rising colonial powers seized foreign 
lands and enslaved native peoples, providing ever more resources and cheap (or free) 
labour to perpetuate the cycle of capitalist expansion. 
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) relationship with the concept of primitive 
accumulation has been conflicted. In that it signifies the founding moment of 
exploitation of one class by another, it is considered the root of all capitalist evil. Thus, the 
presence or lack of primitive accumulation was a defining marker of difference between 
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unjust capitalism and morally superior, egalitarian socialism. The Chinese socialist 
state under Mao was therefore organised in such a way that nation-building should 
take place without the occurrence of primitive accumulation, through the creation 
of—at least in aspiration—non-exploitative forms of social and economic organisation. 
This meant no accumulation externally via colonisation—an impossibility in any case, 
given the hostile international environment of the Cold War—and no private property 
domestically. 
Production was to be organised on the basis of communal ownership, based on 
a system of work units (danwei), and via the collectivisation of agricultural production 
in the countryside (see the essays by Gao and Kevin Lin in the present volume). The 
relationship between urban and rural, industry and agriculture, was thus organised on 
the basis of an alliance between workers and peasants, under which grain produced 
by agricultural communes was cheaply supplied to industrial workers in the cities. 
With both workers and peasants as the owners of their respective means of production, 
primitive accumulation was rendered impossible—in theory, at least.
The Search for Primitive Accumulation
Yet, while primitive accumulation was to be avoided at all costs in the building 
of the new socialist state, paradoxically, it continued to be regarded as a necessary 
component for the realisation of socialism. Since primitive accumulation was the 
process by which two antagonistic classes emerged—those with property and those 
without—it was the very thing that produced class struggle (see Russo’s essay in the 
present volume). In the somewhat simplistic version of Marxist theory to which many 
Chinese communists subscribed—based on a universalist, stagist version of history—
class struggle was the basis of social dynamism and of revolutionary possibility.3 
For centuries, European thinkers from Hegel to Weber had conceived of China as 
a static and unchanging society which, under absolute despotic rule, was incapable of 
historical progress. For Chinese communist intellectuals, China’s apparent stagnation 
in comparison to European capitalist development likewise caused concern. In the late 
1950s and early 1960s, debates flourished on questions such as: why had capitalism not 
developed in China as it had done in Western Europe? Was there something lacking in 
Chinese society? And, most importantly, where lay the potential for socialist revolution 
predicted by Marx, on which the CCP had pinned its hopes as well as its legitimacy? 
With these questions in mind, Chinese economists and historians scoured China’s 
past to uncover moments of primitive accumulation. These efforts often corresponded 
with a search for the ‘sprouts of capitalism’ (zibenzhuyi mengya) in Chinese history. This 
term refers to moments of early commodification that scholars attempted to locate in 
order to disprove the common depictions of developmental stagnation, which, besides 
being factually inaccurate, contradicted the stagist version of history underpinning 
CCP doctrine.4 For many intellectuals, however, these ‘sprouts’ on their own were not 
synonymous with actual primitive accumulation and were therefore insufficient to 
demonstrate the sundering of Chinese society into two antagonistic classes. 
The discussions on whether or not primitive accumulation had taken place at some 
point in Chinese history are usefully summarised in an article published in 1962 in the 
People’s Daily by the economist Peng Zeyi.5 For some, according to Peng, these moments 
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were evident in commercial activities dating as far back as the mid-sixteenth century, 
under the Ming Dynasty. Others argued that it was not until after the Opium Wars, with 
the violent impact of invasion from foreign capitalist powers in the mid-nineteenth 
century, that China’s entrenched feudal social structure was shattered enough to kick-
start processes of primitive accumulation. There were others for whom even colonial 
invasion could not bring about real primitive accumulation. For these scholars, China’s 
lack of a strong monarchical regime meant it was incapable of enacting political 
violence of sufficient potency to reconfigure China’s social structure. They compared 
Chinese history to that of England, where the monarchy had acted in alliance with 
the British bourgeoisie, forcibly reshaping society to forge a class structure—including 
a large labour force—conducive to profit-making and capitalist expansion. 
Under Mao, these discussions remained sensitive, however. The implication of the 
historical failure of Chinese society to produce class struggle was taboo, as was any 
reference to primitive accumulation actually occurring during the Mao era.6 Indeed, 
a number of scholars were purged during the Anti-rightist Campaign of the late 1950s 
for daring to suggest that China’s unequal economic system, founded on the cheap 
extraction of grain from the rural communes in order to feed industrial workers in 
the cities at low cost, was, in fact, a form of state primitive accumulation based on the 
exploitation of China’s peasantry.7 Further discussions concerning such matters were 
supressed during the Cultural Revolution. 
The Return of Primitive Accumulation
After the death of Mao, primitive accumulation reappeared in policy discussions of 
the reform period as the regrettable, but necessary, starting point by which China was to 
reclaim its rightful place in a universalist world history through successful participation 
in the global capitalist economy.8 After a tentative reemergence in scholarly literature 
in the early 1980s, its passage to widespread acceptability was assisted by an article 
in 1989 by Wen Tiejun, a well-known left-wing scholar of China’s peasantry and 
agricultural economics.9 Wen published what he claims was the first article to openly 
recognise the role of primitive accumulation as an essential aspect of Chinese socialist 
modernisation under Mao. The article concerned Wenzhou—a city famed for its early 
and hugely successful adoption of market policies in the reform period. In the article, 
Wen’s reference to ‘state primitive accumulation’ during the Mao period implicitly 
referred to—without stating explicitly—the extraction of capital for industry from the 
countryside via the rural communes. Wenzhou’s economy, Wen argued, had stagnated 
under Mao due to a lack of investment because of its location across the strait from 
Taiwan. Yet, with the new sense of economic freedom that came with the reform era, 
the Wenzhou inhabitants began to take full advantage of their only abundant resource, 
low-cost manpower—in other words, cheap industrial labour. According to Wen, it 
was this ‘human capital primitive accumulation’ that led to the extraordinary levels of 
economic growth for which Wenzhou is famed.
This article was significant for two reasons. The first was Wen’s use of the term 
‘primitive accumulation’ with reference to industrialisation under Mao. This helped 
pave the way for other scholars and policymakers to use this concept when referring to 
various elements of China’s modernisation in the contemporary era which were deemed 
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unfortunate, but necessary. The second was Wen’s description of fully marketised labour 
as a source of primitive accumulation. Wen appeared to be hinting that—now that the 
period of state-managed industrial growth via rural communes was over—primitive 
accumulation in a different form, based on the extraction of cheap labour for industry, 
was the new foundation of China’s economy. The peasantry would continue to be the 
primary resource fuelling national economic growth, he was suggesting, but now in 
the form of industrial migrant labour in the cities (see Day’s chapter in the present 
volume).
Shortly afterwards, Wen published another influential article which explicitly 
discussed primitive accumulation both as central to Chinese modernisation, and as 
founded on an unequal urban-rural relationship.10 Wen portrayed the Chinese state 
under Mao as unexceptional in its use of primitive accumulation, viewing it as different 
from Western capitalism only in terms of its ‘Eastern-style:’
The main differences between societies of the East and West originate in their 
different resource environments and their different historical processes of 
state capital primitive accumulation … . China is a typical state which carried 
out Eastern-style primitive accumulation. It did not, as did Western states, 
carry out plunder and expansion externally, but mainly deployed internal 
‘self-exploitation’ … extracting accumulation from the countryside[.]11
By accounting for China’s difference from Europe by virtue of it being Eastern as 
opposed to Western, rather than framing the difference as one of socialism versus 
capitalism, Wen normalised primitive accumulation as a universal process deployed 
by modernising states globally, thus avoiding the prior association of primitive 
accumulation with capitalist states in particular. Stripped of its political baggage, 
the term could then be applied freely to Chinese development processes without the 
ideological rupture which would have occurred from deploying an ‘evil’ capitalist 
concept within a nominally socialist state.
The 1990s Onwards: Back with Abandon
Wen claims that his repeated advocacy since the mid-late 1980s that primitive 
accumulation is a normal and necessary process for modernising states and, as such, was 
central to Maoist industrialisation, led to this position being ‘accepted by the majority 
of scholars’ by the late 1990s.12 It is hard to avoid the irony that this conceptual shift in 
the language of Chinese socialism in favour of a mode of development situated right 
at the heart of classical capitalist transition theory was ushered in through a positive 
appraisal of Mao, for whom this very notion would have been anathema. Yet, it was no 
doubt Wen’s associating of primitive accumulation with Maoist, rather than capitalist, 
development which facilitated its passage into mainstream socialist discourse.13 
In fact, in a discursive double movement, just prior to primitive accumulation’s 
return to the mainstream, the term ‘class’ (jieji) had been dropped from the official 
lexicon of Chinese socialism, replaced by the far more anodyne phrase ‘social strata’ 
(shehui jieceng).14 This allowed the term primitive accumulation to roam free in public 
discussions while rendering silent, and invisible, its negative association with class 
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exploitation, which was, in fact, inherent to it. According to Qin Hui, another well-
known scholar of China’s peasantry, by the late 1990s the term primitive accumulation 
was being bandied around quite casually by local officials and in the media, sometimes 
used in a positive sense to denote rapid economic development.15 Qin also observed 
that the common occurrence of the term ‘capitalist primitive accumulation,’ a phrase 
never used by Marx, likewise stemmed from a misunderstanding of the concept. For 
Marx, primitive accumulation was a precapitalist phenomenon, but in postreform 
China it had become naturalised as a feature of early capitalism—the first stage of the 
market economy, and therefore something to be embraced. 
This important shift in the available language of policy, therefore, was not limited 
to rhetoric but reflected what had come to be considered acceptable in terms of how 
society and the economy were organised. The widespread embezzlement of public 
assets, often by dubious legal means and/or force while taking the appearance of the 
legitimate privatisation of state-owned enterprises, for example, was viewed as simply 
part of a universal historical trend of ‘transition’ to modernity—and whether that 
meant a socialist or a capitalist modernity was increasingly irrelevant.16 The promotion 
of urban industrialisation by redirecting central state budget allocations to the cities, 
leaving lower-level rural governments to fend for themselves, similarly normalised 
the countryside as a legitimate target of capital extraction, now by means of excessive 
taxation and often illegal fees imposed on rural households.17 With the concept of 
class excised from discussion and primitive accumulation consequently defanged, 
the formation of a proletariat—both via layoffs from state-owned enterprises and in 
the form of rural migrant workers flooding into the cities (in large part to escape the 
decimation of rural living conditions) now seemed entirely coherent with socialism, 
albeit ‘with Chinese characteristics.’
Meanwhile, the spate of rapacious land grabbing in the countryside, enacted by 
real estate developers in cahoots with local officials, and facilitated by the somewhat 
nebulous system of collective ownership over rural land, appeared all too similar to 
the enclosure movement of medieval England from which capitalism had originated.18 
Although widely condemned by scholars on the left, many people tolerated, and some 
even welcomed, these occurrences, which were perceived as unfortunate but necessary 
steps on the elusive universal path along which China would finally join the rest of the 
developed world.19 
The Road Ahead
Today, while it is difficult to consider China as being ‘precapitalist’ (let alone 
socialist), the restructuring of Chinese society in the interests of capital expansion 
continues apace. While the countryside remains a primary resource for national capital 
accumulation, the focal point appears to have shifted from people to land. Although 
rural land ownership remains collective, policies of land transfer have produced a quasi-
land market which is efficiently performing the work of class differentiation, gradually 
transforming a relatively egalitarian society of smallholder farming households to one 
of larger farms and employed labourers.20 In the name of ‘civilising’ the countryside, 
meanwhile, a variety of state policies are geared towards the removal of villagers from 
their homesteads and their relocation into dense tower blocks, either on the outskirts 
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of their villages or in far off townships, freeing up their land for use by incoming 
agribusinesses or other more profitable enterprises.21 Meanwhile, as expanding urban 
metropolises are branded ‘world cities’ to attract international investment, urban land 
encroaches further into the countryside. 
These days, however, low-cost migrant labour is being evicted from China’s 
cosmopolitan urban areas, no longer welcome in these increasingly exclusive 
playgrounds for wealthy global elites.22 Marx would have recognised these social 
upheavals as the long process of reconfiguring China’s class structure as the Chinese 
state is transformed into a component within the global capitalist economy. These 
epoch-defining historical transformations are neatly packaged, explained, and justified 
in official language as ‘the primary stage of socialism’ (shehuizhuyi chuji jieduan).





But our aim in exposing errors and criticising shortcomings, like that of a doctor 
curing a sickness, is solely to save the patient and not to doctor him to death. A person 
with appendicitis is saved when the surgeon removes his appendix. So long as a person 
who has made mistakes does not hide his sickness for fear of treatment or persist in 
his mistakes until he is beyond cure, so long as he honestly and sincerely wishes to be 
cured and to mend his ways, we should welcome him and cure his sickness so that he 
can become a good comrade. We can never succeed if we just let ourselves go and lash 
out at him. In treating an ideological or a political malady, one must never be rough 
and rash but must adopt the approach of ‘curing the sickness to save the patient,’ which 
is the only correct and effective method. 
Mao Zedong, ‘Rectify the Party’s Style of Work,’ 1942 
There is a sickness within our Party … . As our socialist revolution advances, 
however, seeping more strongly into every corner of the Party, the army and among 
the people, we can locate the ugly microbes. They will be pushed out by the true nature 
of socialist revolution. We are encouraged to expel treacherous elements that pose 
problems to the Party and to our revolution. If we wait any longer, the microbes  
can do real damage. 
Pol Pot, 19761 
All revolutionary regimes confront a decision of life and death: to kill or reeducate the enemy. This has not only determined the fates of countless people, but also shaped the rise to power and approach to governance of revolutionary 
movements. There is a tendency to blur the distinctions between Stalin’s eliminationist 
approach and the Maoist norm of ‘curing the sickness to heal the patient’ (zhibing 
jiuren). Distinct contexts and organised applications of violence are painted with the 
208   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
same brush of communist terror. This indiscriminate conceptualisation of violence, in 
turn, leads to faulty comparisons between Maoism and the methods of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea (CPK, the so-called ‘Khmer Rouge’) in Cambodia. Despite 
superficial similarities, the main difference—one that shaped two fundamentally 
distinct movements—is that China found a way to break out of the vicious cycle of 
purge and counterpurge while the Khmer Rouge swiftly and inexorably went down the 
dark path of liquidating any and all perceived opponents.
Despite key commonalities in the rise to power of the Chinese and Cambodian 
communists, their subsequent trajectories deviated from one another so much so 
that non-superficial comparisons are untenable. Specifically, these two movements 
embraced fundamentally different doctrines and methods about how to handle 
vanquished political opponents. China eventually settled on coopting them through 
the mechanism of rectification (zhengfeng), which remains built into the machinery of 
governance that functions up to the present day, while the Cambodian communists were 
unwilling or unable to move away from a single-minded obsession with eliminating the 
opposition, eventually cannibalising themselves into oblivion. 
This essay is divided into three sections. The first describes the ‘Anti-bolshevik’ purges 
that are commonly referred to as the Futian Affair (futian shibian) of 1930–31 within 
the larger context of political bloodletting in the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi Soviet era, 
in which thousands died and scores of military and political organisations vanished 
because of political infighting. The second describes the rectification doctrine that 
emerged in Yan’an in the mid-1930s as the antidote to the kind of open-ended purges 
at Futian, which transformed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into a durable, self-
moderating organisation. The third shows how the absence of a rectification doctrine 
left the Khmer Rouge bereft of a mechanism to prevent a Futian-esque model of 
governance on a national scale that eventually killed millions, accomplished nothing, 
and ultimately brought down the regime.
 
The Futian Affair (1930–31) 
Prior to 1930, violent measures adopted by the CCP and the Red Army targeted 
individuals and groups outside the Party. However, this key norm was broken by Mao 
in the ‘Conclusion of the Joint Conference and Announcement of the Establishment of 
the Front Committee’ of 16 February 1930:
There is a severe crisis in the Party in western and southern Jiangxi … the 
local leading organs of the Party at all levels [are] filled with landlords and 
rich peasants … . The Joint Conference calls on all revolutionary comrades 
within the Party to arise, overthrow the opportunist political leadership 
[within the Party], eliminate the landlords and rich peasants from the Party, 
and see to it that the Party is rapidly bolshevised.2
The reasons for this are debated by scholars—land reform, conflict between the 
Jiangxi and Hunanese wings of the Party, disagreements over the Li Lisan Line, and 
seepage of Stalinism into the Party ranks being just a few explanations that have been 
put forward—but the result was an intense factional struggle that began in October 
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1930 and led to the widespread torture and execution of CCP members identified as 
part of an ‘AB’ (Anti-bolshevik) ‘League’ (tuan).3 A lack of institutional ‘checks on both 
the leadership and the security organisations contributed greatly to the … [subsequent] 
expansion of the purges’ which completely bypassed judicial process (‘except as theatre’) 
with execution as the only possible outcome.4 Dutton concurs, arguing that within the 
binary logic of the time, ‘there could be no “soft option” when dealing with the enemy.’5 
Over the course of a week, some 4,400 First Front Army officers and men confessed to 
having ties to the AB tuan; 2,000 or more were shot.6
These confessions provided information targeting leaders in the Jiangxi Provincial 
Action Committee and officials in the Twentieth Army allegedly opposed to Mao. Five 
weeks later, in the Futian Affair, these officials were tortured with the goal of forcing 
them to provide the names of their coconspirators. This continued well into 1931:
The overall death-toll from the purge in the summer and early autumn of 
1931 can only be guessed at. Four hundred officers and men from the 20th 
Army perished, and probably several hundred from the 35th Army... . From 
other Red Army units, there were many more. In the local Jiangxi Party, 
3,400 were killed in just three of the more than twenty counties. By the 
beginning of September, a CCP Central Inspector reported that ‘95 percent 
of the intellectuals in the south-west Jiangxi Party and Youth League’ had 
confessed to AB tuan connections. Today the best-informed Chinese 
historians say merely that ‘tens of thousands died.’7
Given the small number of active Chinese communists, those figures mask the 
proportional scope of the massacre: ‘By the end of 1931, virtually all of the county- 
and regional-level Party cadres who had collectively been involved in accusing Yuan 
Wencai and Wang Zuo of becoming counterrevolutionaries—and in killing them—had 
themselves suffered the same fate.’8 Guo finds that in mid-1931, ‘90 percent of CCP 
cadres in southwestern Jiangxi were killed, imprisoned, or dismissed.’9
Futian occurred in the context of the ongoing ‘counterrevolutionary suppression’ 
(sufan) campaigns, borne out of an inherently dark view of revolutionary parties under 
duress, an atmosphere in which ‘the purges went to such extremes because there were 
no mechanisms to check potential abuses of power … [moreover] the sufan campaigns 
did not always benefit those leaders who initiated the campaigns [because of the] 
overwhelming terror they induced and widespread purges.’10 And they were to continue 
through the years leading up to the Long March in the Minxi (1931), the E-Yu-Wen 
(1931–32), and the Xiang-E’xi (1932–34) base areas.11
To the scholar of Cambodia, these campaigns are virtually indistinguishable from 
actions undertaken deliberately and enthusiastically by Pol Pot. Yet the Futian incident 
continued to weigh heavily on the post-1949 Chinese leadership: Mao considered the 
incident a mistake, and subsequently moved away from this type of bloody political 
manoeuvring by adopting rectification doctrine—a decision that would ultimately, and 
fundamentally, separate the two revolutionary movements in China and Cambodia.12
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Yan’an and Rectification
Mao introduced a number of innovations to the Chinese approach to Marxist 
revolution and governance by emphasising peasants over proletarians, privileging 
spatial alongside vertical governance, and establishing Party rectification. Teiwes 
defines rectification as:
The distinctive approach to elite discipline developed by the CCP leadership 
under Mao Zedong in the early 1940s, [that] occupies a key position in the 
Party’s organisational norms. It embodies several principles which quickly 
became basic Party doctrine: the vast majority of officials are ‘basically good’ 
and their mistakes can be corrected, discipline must aim at achieving reform 
and utilising the talents of such officials for the CCP’s cause, and disciplinary 
methods on the whole should be lenient and limit purges to exceptional 
cases.13
Rectification doctrine arose in Yan’an in tandem with Mao’s rise to supremacy in the 
Party as an attack on the twin evils of ‘subjectivism’ (zhuguanzhuyi) and ‘sectarianism’ 
(zongpaizhuyi), and alongside the goal of eliminating the differences between 
individuals, particularly intellectuals, on the one hand, and workers and peasants, 
on the other.14 Rectification proved to be an exceptionally useful political tool which 
created a set of genuine incentives for politically vulnerable targets to demonstrate 
fealty to the regime and for leaders who, instead of liquidating the opposition, were 
able to coopt a grateful, relieved, and softened new, mobilisable political resource. The 
crushing of individualism was not universally celebrated (see below), but it was also not 
a completely foreign concept, tapping into deeper, Confucian principles: that thought 
can be purged of incorrect elements and reset to align with (in this case) Maoist 
doctrine (see Cheek’s essay in the present volume). Finally, in addition to the substantive 
normative conditioning, the purely strategic effect of rectification as a demonstration 
of the Party’s supremacy provides a signalling device to keep potentially errant cadres 
in line.15
Rectification facilitated the establishment of core tenets of organised governance, 
such as minority rights in collective decisionmaking, and in particular the norm of 
democratic centralism (minzhu jizhong zhi), as a way of preempting factionalism 
and extra-Party manoeuvring.16 One need not establish a causal link between the 
Futian Affair of 1930–31 and rectification doctrine 12 years later; one need only to 
demonstrate the vastly different political outcomes that accompany choosing one over 
the other. That said, Mao reportedly did make an ‘indirect’ self-criticism during the 
Yan’an rectification specifically about the brutality of the sufan campaigns.17
There are several possible reasons why rectification doctrine emerged under Mao at 
this time in Yan’an. Organisationally, it was a necessary response to the unmanageable 
growth of CCP membership from 40,000 in 1937 to 800,000 in 1940. Fully 95 percent of 
CCP members were new and thus required ideological conditioning to absorb them as 
trustworthy partners within the revolutionary ranks. The differences among and across 
these groups were vast. As Bonnie McDougall argues, ‘it is difficult for Westerners 
to appreciate the depth of the distaste for manual labour that the new intelligentsia 
 AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM   211
inherited from the old gentry class’ and most of the new CCP recruits making their way 
to Yan’an held this view. Even the May Fourth Movement intellectuals were referred to 
by Mao as ‘heroes without a battlefield, remote and uncomprehending,’ a phrase that 
richly invokes the spirit and goals of rectification.18 And all of this was taking place 
as Mao was being enshrined in a position of absolute leadership, where developing 
a governing programme distinct from the Soviet Union, in terms of both substance 
and practice, was becoming a political imperative. Rectification was thus not something 
that happened in the absence of agency; it was a conscious decision to shift governance 
from one identifiable form to another.
At the same time, lest rectification seem overly benign, it should be noted that, quite 
apart from the intellectually horrific notion of externally ‘controlling one’s thought,’ 
the process could be physically and mentally excruciating. This was particularly true 
in its more severe iterations, as in the case of ‘brainwashing’ (xinao) in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s.19 Moreover, it was not completely separate from purges and violent 
struggle, as the 1942 Rescue Campaign (qiangjiu yundong) and subsequent excesses 
by Kang Sheng (who was enabled by Mao) made clear. At the time Yang Shangkun 
observed: 
We can see that the Rectification movement contains two kinds of struggles. 
One is the inner-Party struggle … to remould the ideological methods 
of both cadres and Party members … . The other struggle is the one that 
exposes and opposes those Trotskyites and dissidents who snuck into our 
Party to destroy and undermine it.20
Clearly, the ghosts of Futian were difficult to exorcise. Nonetheless, even as 
rectification doctrine itself was not immune to the more violent side of revolutionary 
governance, it fostered leadership norms that allowed the CCP to evolve from 
a  revolutionary organisation into the wards of a mature state borne from the fires 
of revolution. Rectification emerged and evolved as an important tool that to this 
day provides the necessary institutional ‘give’ for the CCP to continually recast and 
recalibrate itself as new challenges arise, avoiding the excesses of non-institutionalised 
political struggle while simultaneously eschewing the ‘transfer of power’ of contested 
elections.21 The longevity of the CCP in exceptionally changing circumstances arguably 
owes a great deal to rectification doctrine.
The Khmer Rouge Rise to Power
Rectification’s ‘curing the patient’ metaphor was fundamentally at odds with the 
Stalinist idea of the rusty screw that needed to be eliminated for the machinery of the 
state to operate more efficiently, which was the tacit political logic underlying the events 
encompassed by the Futian Affair.22 Pol Pot used the metaphor of the microbe (merok), 
but his view was fully consistent with Stalin’s.23 If after Futian, the CCP rejected Stalinist 
purges, the CPK embraced them. 
The ubiquity of the Khmer phrase ‘no gain in keeping, no loss in weeding out’ in 
describing their subjects provides a window into the stark Khmer Rouge worldview.24 
The doctrine—and certainly the practice—of the Khmer Rouge had an extremely dark 
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view of human nature. Describing in aspirational terms the purity of the hill people in 
the northeastern highlands, they deemed that anyone who had deviated from upland 
purity—‘lazy’ lowland rice farmers, ethnic Chinese and especially Vietnamese, Muslim 
Cham, urbanites, artists, intellectuals, politicians, and beneficiaries of the ancient 
regime—had no claim to innate goodness or even utility. As Ta Mok said of Pol Pot after 
his death: ‘He is nothing more than cow shit. Actually, cow shit is more useful because 
it can be used as fertiliser.’ This provides an apt description of the Khmer Rouge’s view 
toward potential enemies, real or imagined.25
Second, the fact that people could be rehabilitated was dismissed almost completely 
out of hand. Rectification, insofar as it existed under the Khmer Rouge, was in the 
form of ‘tempering’—hard labour mixed with torture. More often, people who were 
accused by the authorities, or named in three or more confessions of others being 
tortured, would be brought into the national processing centre of Tuol Sleng (or a local 
counterpart) with the sole purpose of confessing under brutal torture before facing 
inevitable execution.26 
Indeed, as in Futian, attacking elements within the Party was a key feature of Khmer 
Rouge governance. During the CPK rise to power in 1973, its united front strategy—
adopted in 1970 as a way to offset their initial weakness vis-à-vis the government in 
Phnom Penh—came to an abrupt end, when it turned on its erstwhile allies, killing 
many of them or expelling them from the country. And this continued after they gained 
national power in 1975. After the initial killing of elements from the Khmer Republic 
regime that had just been overthrown, the CPK shifted to targeting its own cadres: 
zone commanders of the North, Northeast, East, and Northwest Zones were all killed, 
as were several generations of ministry heads.27 Torture was widely used to uncover 
networks (khsae) of often imaginary conspirators. During Futian, Jiangxi Provincial 
Action Committee Member Li Bofang gave up the names of a thousand cadres perhaps 
to confuse his accusers; former CPK zone secretary and minister of commerce Koy 
Thuon similarly named thousands who were subsequently brought in for torture.28 
All this was used as evidence to build the narrative that the respective leaders’ political 
line was correct, and to utterly vanquish their opponents (see Ishikawa and Smith’s 
essay in the present volume). Leniency—a central tenet of rectification—was simply 
not part of the Khmer Rouge vocabulary.
This rectification-free political environment fostered a necropolitical culture of 
distrust and secrecy, of preempting one’s enemy by attacking him first. As a result, loyalty 
to other individuals, let alone the regime, was a luxury that was not only unaffordable, 
but one that made no sense. Such an environment formed an extremely brittle regime 
bereft of legitimacy, which collapsed spectacularly in only a matter of days following 
the Vietnamese invasion of 1978 after being in power for less than four years. Indeed, 
some two decades after this, ragtag Khmer Rouge remnants along the Thai-Cambodian 
border had not learned this lesson. Suspecting his number three lieutenant, Son Sen, 
of conspiring against him, in 1997 Pol Pot had him and his extended family (including 
grandchildren) killed and ordered a truck to repeatedly run over the corpses and 
leave them there for public viewing to deter others from doing the same.29 This led his 
hitherto loyal commander Ta Mok to preemptively rout Pol Pot’s forces and arrest Pol 
Pot himself, bringing the Khmer Rouge to an ignominious end. 
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Seeds of Authoritarian Resilience
To sum up and reiterate, the Cambodian communists self-destructed after proving 
unable to advance beyond the same political dynamic exemplified by the Chinese 
communists in and around the Futian Affair. Had they been able to adopt a model of 
rectification like the CCP, the CPK may well have strengthened their ability to govern 
and enjoyed the longevity of their erstwhile Vietnamese allies. Had the CCP not adopted 
the doctrine of rectification, it may have easily have been snuffed out before Chiang Kai-
shek’s troops ever got near them. Instead, China witnessed multiple instances in which 
rectification doctrine was developed (early post-1949 campaigns), debased (the Anti-
rightist Campaign, the 1959 Lushan Conference, the Cultural Revolution), resuscitated 
(the 1983 Rectification Movement, the 1998–2002 Three Stresses Campaign), and 
brought into the twenty-first century (Xi Jinping’s current anti-corruption measures). 
Taken together, this essay provides a first cut, a soft, comparative-historical engagement 
with the hypothesis that such internal rectification is an important explanatory variable 
which helps account for regime stability in the absence of external accountability, 
contributing to what is commonly referred to as ‘authoritarian resilience,’ a key 
preoccupation within the field of Chinese politics scholarship today.






In 1957, leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began calling on students and intellectuals to become ‘both red and expert’ (you hong you zhuan or hong yu zhuan)—that is, to combine revolutionary politics with technical expertise. 
By 1958, the slogan had ramified, taking on new kinds of significance for other social 
groups. Its influence was due to the definition of two crucial relationships: the political 
relationship between intellectuals and the socialist state, and the epistemological 
relationship between knowledge and the revolutionary society. The first of these has 
been of particular concern to liberal critics of authoritarianism, who recognise the call to 
be ‘red and expert’ as an effort, first and foremost, to discipline and control intellectuals. 
The second has excited radical critics of technocracy, who share the Maoist perspective 
that science and politics are inseparable, and who often also appreciate Maoist efforts to 
engage in inclusive and class-conscious forms of knowledge production (see Aminda 
Smith’s essay in the present volume). Both politically and epistemologically, the ‘red 
and expert’ concept continues to speak to enduring questions in the history of science, 
society, and the state—in China and around the globe. 
 
Intellectuals and the State
The ‘red and expert’ slogan emerged in 1957 during the early months of the Anti-
rightist Campaign, an especially wrenching episode in the tortured history of the CCP’s 
relationship with China’s intellectuals. As with the Rectification Campaign (1942–44) 
of the Yan’an era (see Mertha’s essay in the present volume), and following on the heels 
of the massive national criticism campaign against the literary figure Hu Feng in 1955, 
the Anti-rightist Campaign facilitated Party authority over the political expression of 
intellectuals. Those labelled ‘rightists’ were publicly criticised and often imprisoned 
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or ‘sent down’ to the countryside for reeducation, removing them from academic and 
political influence for years or even decades. This was the political context within which 
the ‘red and expert’ slogan gained meaning.1 
Already in 1957, and repeatedly for the next two decades, Party leaders took pains 
to emphasise that for intellectuals the ‘red’ half of the ‘red and expert’ equation boiled 
down to loyalty to the CCP and the proletariat it represented. In a December 1957 
article, the People’s Daily specified that the call to be both red and expert by no means 
entailed an expectation that ‘every expert would at the same time be a political activist 
or political theorist,’ because this would be ‘very difficult’ and a requirement ‘only 
a small number of people could achieve.’2 Rather, the question of whether one was red 
would be ‘resolved with respect to whom one serves.’ The article quoted Liu Shaoqi 
as explaining: ‘China’s staff members and various types of experts must all commit 
to transforming themselves to wholeheartedly serve the workers and peasants, and 
to serve socialism, placing the benefit of the individual within, and not above, the 
collective benefit of the masses. This is what being a red expert means.’ A few months 
later, Mao himself underscored the significance of loyalty: ‘Red is politics; expert is 
one’s job. To be only expert and not red is to be a white expert … . If we are to overtake 
Britain in 15 years, then we must mould millions upon millions of intellectuals whose 
loyalty is to the proletariat.’3 
In fact, during the Anti-rightist Campaign and subsequent Great Leap Forward, 
demonstrating such loyalty frequently involved intensive political reeducation and 
work alongside the masses in manual labour. In 1961, science policy leader Nie 
Rongzhen spearheaded the ‘Fourteen Articles on Scientific Work,’ a policy document 
which dialled back the standard: loyalty to the Party and placing one’s expertise in the 
service of socialism were again deemed sufficient to earn the label ‘red and expert.’ 
In 1978, following the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed this position.4 
Both of these cases involved ‘moderate’ political leaders resetting expectations after 
intense periods of attacks on ‘bourgeois’ intellectualism. Defining redness as political 
loyalty thus represented a kind of minimum expectation that CCP leaders across the 
spectrum shared; we may also say that defining it as merely political loyalty represented 
a perspective on the relationship between intellectuals and the state held especially by 
‘moderate’ (or technocratic) Party leaders like Liu Shaoqi, Nie Rongzhen, and Deng 
Xiaoping. 
The highly charged and dangerous politics surrounding intellectuals during the Mao 
era was grounded in a tension between intellectuals who held cultural capital and cadres 
who held political capital. These two groups gradually came to overlap as children of 
intellectual families gained access to channels of Party membership, and children of 
Party cadres gained access to elite schools. By the time Deng Xiaoping rose to power in 
1978, a new, more powerful, and stable class had emerged that wielded both forms of 
power.5 In one sense, the underlying contradiction between red and expert would seem 
to have been largely resolved; the decisive blow to dissident intellectual voices of June 
Fourth 1989 contributed still further to this resolution. 
Nonetheless, the ‘red and expert’ slogan has continued to trickle through official 
discourse during the post-Mao era, and recently resurfaced in a way that provoked 
significant public discussion. In May 2017, Education Minister Chen Baosheng gave 
a speech on undergraduate education in which he proclaimed the need to cultivate 
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‘reliable successors’ to further the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics. 
These graduates would be ‘both red and expert,’ possessing ‘both integrity and talent,’ 
and boasting a ‘well-rounded development.’6 The phrase ‘red and expert’ attracted 
special attention, with some netizens using discussion boards to declare their ‘disgust’ 
and point ominously to what one called the ‘imprint of the Cultural Revolution.’7 
A report in the US-based online newspaper The Diplomat picked up on the buzz and 
elaborated on the concerns that Chen’s rhetoric signalled a return to Mao-era policies 
on education and intellectuals.8 Taking the other side of the issue, an article by Lin Aiyue 
on the left-patriotic Chinese website Chawang considered it ‘unsurprising’ that ‘rightist 
public intellectuals’ should be up in arms over Chen’s statement, and further emphasised 
that the Minister’s evocation of ‘red and expert’ surely reflected policy decisions from 
far above and was a welcome direction. Lin traced the origins of the ‘red and expert’ 
slogan to Mao in 1957 and noted the widespread support for the concept among 
other leaders, including Deng Xiaoping. However, reflecting the highly nationalistic 
perspective of Chawang and many—though by no means all—other leftists in China 
today, Lin narrowly interpreted ‘red’ to mean ‘deeply loving the nation-state and its 
people’ (guojia minzu).9 This takes the emphasis on loyalty advanced by moderates like 
Nie Rongzhen and Deng Xiaoping in a new direction: loyalty to the Party is now tied 
more to the interests of an ethnically defined nation-state than to a class-based national 
or even global proletariat (see Bulag’s essay in the present volume). The use of a Mao-
era slogan to buttress such nationalism and state power certainly deserves attention 
and criticism. However, this is not the only legacy ‘red and expert’ carries. 
Knowledge and Society
The repeated calls to understand ‘red and expert’ as fundamentally about political 
loyalty is in some sense evidence that the slogan also stands for something else. 
During the Mao era at least, ‘red and expert’ was one of a set of concepts related to the 
nature of knowledge itself, intended to change what people were supposed to know, 
how knowledge was supposed to be produced, and who might be deemed an expert. 
This was the side of ‘red and expert’ that leftists around the world found inspiring. 
Fundamentally anti-technocratic, it declared all knowledge—including that of the 
natural world—to be political; in a class society, this meant that knowledge has class 
character. Such a proposition attacked intellectual elitism and thus could still result in 
attacks on intellectuals themselves. However, when the emphasis is on epistemology, 
the threat posed by intellectual elitism is not that of a class poised to translate cultural 
capital into political capital, but rather that of a concept of knowledge divorced from 
the experiences and perspectives of labouring people. What is required is thus not—
or at least not merely—loyalty to the Party-state, but rather a sincere commitment to 
recognising and engaging the value of knowledge possessed by labourers. 
The epistemological aspect of ‘red and expert’ is found in the influential ‘Sixty Points 
on Working Methods,’ drafted by Mao on 31 January 1958: ‘There is no question that 
politics and the economy must be unified, and that politics and technology must be 
unified. It has always, and will always, be so. This, precisely, is the meaning of red and 
expert.’10 An article appearing in the People’s Daily two weeks later—‘Plant Experimental 
Fields: The Road of Red and Expert’—offered one of many concrete examples.11 
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The article opened by describing a scene in which two local officials ‘wearing shoes and 
socks’ stood at the side of a rice paddy ostensibly ‘inspecting production.’ A commune 
member loudly scolded them: ‘Quit strutting around like lords! You’re going to wreck 
the embankment!’ The People’s Daily declared the scolding justified and applauded the 
eventual outcome in which one of the local officials ceased standing on the side waving 
his hands and giving orders, and began working with the peasants and technicians to 
plant ‘experimental fields.’ The article called on all cadres similarly to shed their ‘aloof 
and remote’ attitudes and plunge deep into the grassroots—to ‘integrate intimately 
with the labouring masses and technological experts, and diligently study necessary 
industry and technological knowledge, in order to become proletarian experts in their 
fields.’ In this way China would be able to establish a mighty contingent of ‘red and 
expert’ cadres. 
To be ‘red’ was thus not merely to be ‘loyal,’ but to be proletarian in consciousness. 
More broadly, to be ‘red and expert’ was not only to be both loyal and skilled, but 
rather to develop knowledge through a process of engagement with both peasants and 
technological experts. It was an ideal to be achieved not just by intellectuals, but by 
political cadres—and by the labouring masses themselves. Indeed, beginning in 1958 
some communes began establishing ‘red and expert universities,’ where peasants could 
learn to become ‘technicians possessing socialist consciousness; scientific knowledge 
in the areas of agriculture, forestry, and irrigation; and the ability to participate in 
labour.’12 Two years later, Chinese Academy of Sciences Vice-president Zhang Jingfu 
gave a speech proclaiming the need for ‘all people to do science,’ turning science into 
a ‘mass movement’ and ‘cultivating a red and expert, mighty, proletarian scientific and 
technological contingent.’13 
It is easier to appreciate the epistemological challenge presented by ‘red and expert’ if 
we place it in the broader context of related slogans and programmes of Maoist science, 
including the unity of practice and theory; the joining of peasant/native (tu) and elite/
foreign (yang); the principle of ‘walking on two legs,’ i.e. employing existing, indigenous 
methods, while also developing new, modernised methods; the effort to transcend 
the barrier between mental and manual labour; and the formation of ‘three-in-one’ 
scientific experiment groups combining cadres, labourers, and technicians.14 Several 
of these concepts emerged prior to 1949, but they came to new prominence along with 
‘red and expert’ during the Great Leap Forward and continued to develop over the 
next two decades. The common theme undergirding all of them was the harnessing 
of different forms of knowledge to produce a revolutionary programme of science and 
technology. 
In some cases, the goal of such programmes appeared to be dissolving contradictions 
by weakening the difference between elite and popular forms of knowledge—for 
example by requiring intellectuals to engage in manual labour and learn from peasants 
and workers, while simultaneously encouraging peasants and workers to engage in the 
arts and sciences. The ‘red and expert’ paradigm similarly envisioned individuals who 
would combine previously separate characteristics to become living embodiments of 
the ‘all-round communist’ ideal. 
Other programmes, however, organised people who represented different perspectives 
and types of experience to work together in the production of revolutionary scientific 
knowledge. In agriculture, ‘scientific experiment groups’ were formed on a ‘three-in-
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one’ (san jiehe) basis, integrating the practical, experiential knowledge of old peasants 
with the political knowledge of revolutionary cadres and the technical knowledge of 
educated youth (and/or agricultural technicians, where available). The three-in-one 
model did not promise to produce individuals who transcended divisions between 
mental and manual labour, or between technical and political knowledge. Rather, it 
preserved specific epistemological identities for different social groups and attempted 
to create a mechanism where each could contribute to a collaborative project of 
knowledge production. 
The broad epistemological implications of ‘red and expert,’ understood as 
a  representative slogan within Maoist science, encountered widespread enthusiasm 
among leftists and left-leaning intellectuals around the world, who saw in China a living 
example of a politically conscious and socially revolutionary scientific practice. For 
example, the ‘Knowledge and Power’ course, offered by Deakin University in Australia, 
included a book by historian of science David Wade Chambers entitled Red and Expert: 
A Case Study of Chinese Science in the Cultural Revolution.15 Bringing together a range 
of primary and secondary sources, Chambers presented the ‘red and expert’ paradigm, 
and Mao-era science more generally, as an example from which Westerners could 
and should learn. Among the questions Chambers saw Mao-era science addressing 
were: ‘What is the nature of expertise?’ ‘What role can the interested amateur (or non-
professional) play in the actual practice of science?’ ‘What constitutes an appropriate 
education for scientists and engineers?’ and ‘Will politics always continue to influence 
scientific judgements?’16 
Though the slogan ‘red and expert’ in current discourse is undoubtedly dominated 
by the Party-loyalty definition discussed in the previous section, the more radical, 
epistemological implications are also sometimes evoked. Examples are collected and 
circulated on leftist websites—both those critical of the state, like Red China, and those 
supportive of the state, like Chawang.17 In one recently circulated article, literature 
scholar Yan Zuolei portrays the significance of ‘red and expert’ precisely as the joint 
efforts to ‘make labourers into intellectuals and intellectuals into labourers’ in order 
to create ‘new people, both red and expert.’18 Similarly, Peng Guangcan, a professor 
of philosophy at Guangxi University’s School of Public Management, praises Mao-
era factory movements for allowing ‘cadres to participate in labour, and workers to 
participate in management,’ and bringing cadres, technicians, and workers together 
in ‘three-in-one’ combinations: he sees this as a model for Chinese industry today and 
consistent with the teachings of influential Harvard University management scholar 
and systems scientist Peter Senge.19 The anti-elitist, anti-technocratic challenge of Mao-
era radical epistemology lives also in some ongoing rural development projects: the 
‘participatory action research’ approach adopted from the West was itself shaped by 
Maoist theories of knowledge.20 For example, in terms strikingly reminiscent of Maoist 
epistemology, the Participatory Plant Breeding Project run by an interdisciplinary 
group of scholars and scientists explicitly rejects ‘top-down’ methods divorced from 
rural realities and peasant knowledge, and instead brings peasants and researchers 
together in mutually respectful collaboration.21 Although the political and economic 
contexts have changed dramatically, we may still imagine these researchers—like 
that cadre featured in the 1958 People’s Daily article—stepping down from the field 
embankments to ‘integrate intimately with the labouring masses.’ 
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Long-lasting Political and Epistemological Questions
The principle of ‘red and expert’ emerged from the anti-elitist politics of the Mao 
era and served two closely related but nonetheless distinct political projects. Emerging 
within the specific historical conditions of the Anti-rightist Campaign, it without 
question worked to rein in intellectuals and prevent them from using their cultural 
capital to wield political power. However, it quickly became integrated into the broader 
Maoist epistemological universe, which sought to transform scientific knowledge and 
practice along revolutionary lines. Today, ‘red and expert’ is sometimes invoked to 
promote loyalty to the Party-state among an increasingly wealthy professional class 
and in ever more nationalistic terms. But it also survives in ongoing efforts to highlight 
the inseparability of science and politics, and on the basis of that understanding, to 
forge scientific knowledge and practice that respects the contributions and priorities 
of labouring people. 
In closing, I would suggest that our assessment of the ‘red and expert’ concept hinges 
on such highly charged questions as the legitimacy of the state in representing the 
people, the value of intellectual freedom, and the neutrality or objectivity of scientific 
knowledge. Just as David Wade Chambers predicted more than three decades ago, 
the political and epistemological questions raised by the ‘red and expert’ concept have 
far outlasted its glory days in the Mao era. 
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移山倒海
Removing Mountains and 
Draining Seas
Anna LORA-WAINWRIGHT*
The expression ‘removing mountains and draining seas’ (yi shan dao hai) first appeared in the sixteenth-century classic novel Journey to the West to refer to the attitude one should adopt in the face of difficulties. Taken a little more 
literally, it encapsulates rather well the promethean attitude to nature—conceiving of 
the environment as a resource to fulfil human needs and interests—during the Mao 
years. It embodies a celebration of the capacity of humanity to overcome natural 
obstacles and mould the environment to its benefit. It goes hand in hand with a broadly 
adversarial disposition towards nature exemplified in the militaristic language often 
adopted during that period, involving humans conquering nature (ren dingsheng tian) 
or waging a ‘war’ against it.1 
At first glance, this vision of nature may seem completely at odds with the ethos of Xi 
Jinping’s ‘New Era’ (xin shidai). Upon visiting China today, one is struck by the frequent 
exhortations to ‘build an ecological civilisation’ (shengtai wenming jianshe) and equally 
frequent references in official speeches and policy documents to Xi’s statement that 
‘clear waters and green mountains are as good as mountains of gold and silver.’2 But are 
the Party-state’s approaches to nature in these two periods so radically at odds? In this 
essay, I will argue that the promethean attitude still continues into the present, even if it 
supports different representations of and engagements with nature.
Tracing the Changing Lives of ‘Removing Mountains and Draining Seas’
The ideology of ‘removing mountains and draining seas’ is rooted in a Confucian vision 
of nature at the service of humans. The various forms of environmental deterioration 
which result from this stance—including deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and soil 
erosion—have a similarly long history.3 Nonetheless, representations of nature promoted 
in Mao’s thought enhanced this promethean attitude towards the environment. 
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Reference to exemplary tales and local success stories became the ideological support 
structure for megaprojects aimed towards building a socialist paradise which, however, 
accelerated concomitant environmental degradation.4 
An illustrative example is the tale of the ‘Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountains’ 
(yugong yi shan). Originally attributed to an ancient Daoist text, Mao reinterpreted this 
story in a famous 1945 speech in Yan’an, where he used it to refer to the metaphorical 
mountains of imperialism and feudalism which needed to be removed by the masses 
organised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But this tale was also used to suggest 
that human will and perseverance can alter anything, even nature. It was promoted as 
part of a related propaganda campaign known as ‘In Agriculture, Learn from Dazhai.’ 
Dazhai was the name of a production team in Shanxi province which was elevated to 
a national model in 1964 because of its success in turning infertile soil into productive 
land allegedly through sole reliance on the physical efforts of the farmers who cleared 
mountain land and created terraced fields. 
A number of other campaigns were promoted in this spirit during the Mao period, 
including massive hydropower projects such as the Three Gorges Dam, plans for which 
began before the Mao era and continued well after its end; the backyard smelter campaign 
during the Great Leap Forward, designed to accelerate steel production; and sweeping 
deforestation and dredging to ‘open the wilderness to plant grain.’ Encouraging people 
to follow in the footsteps of the foolish old man who moved mountains, campaigns paid 
little attention to local topography and climate, following the conviction that with hard 
work and socialist spirit, anything could be achieved, despite any natural obstacles. The 
effects of these campaigns were mixed to say the least. In the case of efforts to intensify 
agriculture at all costs, for instance, the result was in some cases extreme soil depletion 
and deforestation without the intended growth in agricultural production.5
Following the death of Mao in 1976, the early reform period was characterised by 
a rather different ethos, with development and profit being prioritised at the expense 
of communitarian ideology. Indeed, Deng Xiaoping—who is often described as the 
architect of China’s social and economic reforms—is best known for the dictums ‘let 
some get rich first’ and ‘it doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white as long as it can catch 
the mice.’ Nevertheless, the utilitarian approach to the environment exemplified by 
‘removing the mountains and draining the seas’ carried on with renewed vigour despite 
the ideological shift. Rural industrialisation—and particularly the creation of Township 
and Village Enterprises (TVEs)—was a key feature and encapsulates how the natural 
environment was treated in the early reform period.6 Although individually these TVEs 
were relatively small, taken collectively their development amounted to a megaproject 
rivalling those of the Mao era. Given that profit considerations determined investment 
in industrial infrastructure and methods of mining and processing, longer-term 
environmental impacts were substantial.7 However, due to the fragmented nature of 
rural industrialisation and the short-term horizon implicit in the immediate profit 
orientation of the TVEs, these impacts are difficult to measure. 
The grave environmental consequences of this development model soon became 
apparent and the early reform mindset—‘pollute now, clean up later’ (xian wuran hou 
zhili)—came under growing scrutiny. Since the late 1970s, concerns about preserving 
the natural environment—rather than exploiting it—began to take shape, and China’s 
government developed a growing body of environmental protection policies and 
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legislation.8 However, megaprojects led by a promethean spirit have continued into 
the late reform period, including the South-to-North Water Transfer, a massive project 
first conceived during the Mao era and still ongoing which is intended to divert over 
40  billion cubic meters of fresh water through three separate routes from southern 
rivers into the notoriously arid northern China. 
Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji (1998–2003) a campaign 
to ‘Develop the West’ was promoted in order to tackle regional differences between 
the eastern seaboard and the less-developed western interior.9 This includes massive 
projects which are, in some cases, the literal manifestation of ‘removing the mountains 
and draining the seas’ in terms of their intended reach and effects. Some of these projects 
are directed towards preserving, restoring, or even creating ecological environments—
such as reforestation and the establishment of ecocities—alongside others which are 
much less about natural protection than about industrialisation and infrastructure 
development. 
Many of these projects have tended to prioritise economic gain over a slower and 
more sustainable version of development. This is particularly the case in historically 
poor regions where local governments depend on polluting firms to raise tax revenue 
necessary to support public services and villagers rely heavily on them for employment.10
While under the leadership of Jiang and Zhu the focus remained on relatively 
unbridled economic development, the tide began to change with the ascendance in 
2003 of the subsequent administration, led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen 
Jiabao. They made Scientific Development (kexue fazhan) and Harmonious Society 
(hexie shehui) the cornerstones of their leadership, and emphasised the need to build 
an ‘ecological civilisation.’ 
The concern to protect the natural environment was further expanded by Xi Jinping 
who has made ecological civilisation a leading principle for his vision of a ‘New 
Era.’ In  a  similar spirit, and in recognition of the gravity of China’s environmental 
situation, at the opening of the annual session of the National People’s Congress in 
March 2014 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang stated that China would declare ‘a war on 
pollution.’ The difference between Mao’s war against nature and the current war against 
pollution is striking, of course, but it is significant that in both cases a militaristic 
language convergent with the ethos of ‘removing the mountains and draining the seas’ 
is employed in approaching the environment. 
Just as during previous leadership periods, less developed areas (particularly in 
China’s interior) have continued to feel the pressure to catch up with the rest. For 
instance, in Langzhong county, Sichuan province, where I lived in 2004–05 and which 
I visited frequently since, a new ‘development zone’ was established in the early 2010s 
to further expand infrastructure and boost the local economy. This included building 
new roads and a new railway line and station, as well as providing space for investors to 
open businesses. Much of this area was hilly, and in order to create the new development 
zone many hills were literally removed, making parts of the landscape unrecognisable. 
In the words of an elderly villager which uncannily resemble the Maoist promethean 
spirit, ‘opening and developing mountains’ (kaifa shan) was an important resource for 
the local economy, particularly because hill land is less valuable than prime agricultural 
land and therefore cheaper to compensate. This anecdote illustrates a situation that is 
unfolding across much of rural China as it urbanises at breakneck speed. For all the 
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emphasis on environmental protection, the allure of economic development remains 
alive and well in poorer areas. Conversely, removing mountains to enable development 
is no foolish endeavour, just as Mao maintained.
A New Era for the Environment?
If we take the expression ‘removing mountains and draining seas’ literally—to mean 
exploitation of nature with no regard for the consequences—then there are clear signs 
in rhetoric and policy under Xi that this approach is no longer applicable. Humans are 
not seen as entirely separate from nature, there is an emphasis on harmony between 
them, and the language of warfare is reserved for pollution rather than nature per se. 
However, if we take it to stand for megaprojects and prometheanism, various examples 
come to mind that betray an attitude to the natural environment led by a vision in 
which humans are at the centre and nature serves as nothing more than a resource. 
For instance, the Belt and Road Initiative, embraced with vigour in recent years, is 
a development strategy to build infrastructure connecting China and its neighbours 
and involves, among other things, resource extraction and the development of new coal 
power plants outside of China’s borders. China’s renewed push to urbanise is one of 
the fastest in human history, and the functional zoning at the heart of integrated rural-
urban planning protects certain areas while targeting others as objects of exploitation. 
The ongoing campaign to develop the western areas of the country involves plans to 
extract resources from China’s interior. Hydropower projects may be construed as 
efforts to protect the environment by reducing reliance on coal, but they may also 
negatively impact biodiversity. Most representative of the enduring promethean ethos 
of the current leadership are weather modification and geoengineering projects, 
whereby the weather itself becomes an object of intervention and human innovation. 
Crucially, the extent to which the increasing attention to the natural environment 
under Xi trickles down to localities, especially poor and remote localities which regard 
development at all costs as desirable, will not be equal everywhere. The notorious 
implementation gap, whereby central government policies and national laws are often 
not well enforced in the localities is likely to be addressed in different ways and to 
different extents in different parts of the country.11 This may result in reinforcing 
existing environmental and social inequalities between regions and between rural and 
urban areas.12 
While the balance overall may be shifting in favour of more emphasis on nature 
protection, this is likely to affect some regions more than others—as the principle 
behind functional zoning suggests—and could well result in the safeguarding of 
areas designated as national parks while mineral-rich areas are subject to ongoing 
exploitation. Rural areas are under contradictory pressure to perform as an ecological 
resource and as a resource for extraction and industrialisation.13 In conclusion, the 
question is not so much whether the promethean ethos of ‘removing the mountains 
and draining the seas’ is still applicable but rather where it is applicable and in what 
guises. 





(Translated by Rebecca E. KARL)
In contemporary Chinese discourse, what is called the ‘Chinese Revolution’ (zhongguo geming) usually indicates the socialist revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The core content of this revolution is Marxism, primarily 
Leninism, dominated by the injunction to eliminate private property. For this reason, 
the Chinese Revolution is seen as forming a constituent part of twentieth-century world 
history while, in its realisation, it can also be seen as having temporarily disrupted the 
developmental logic of nineteenth-century capitalism. And yet, the Chinese Revolution 
also possessed its own local characteristics, namely in its anti-imperialist and anti-
feudal aspects (see Barlow’s essay in the present volume). Anti-imperialism indicates 
anti-colonialism, which means that the Chinese Revolution also had a nationalist 
component. Its anti-feudal aspect means that theories of enlightenment were also 
a special constitutive part of the revolution. In this sense, Marxism, nationalism, and 
theories of enlightenment comprised the complex structure of thought informing 
the Chinese Revolution—although, of course, after the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), we must add the dimension of developmentalism (as Lin 
Chun has argued).1 
The modernity of the Chinese Revolution is produced in this structure, even as 
the structure also produces the particularities of the theory of its historical stages, 
from New Democracy to socialism (see also Blecher’s essay in the present volume). 
At the same time, the abundant experiences and complex content of the revolutionary 
process contributed to, while also helping produce, numerous particular revolutionary 
theories—for example, theories of the countryside surrounding the city, the united 
front, the mass line, etc.2 Yet, by the same token, communism was always the ultimate 
horizon and the end goal of the struggle. The self-negations and theories of ‘continuous 
revolution’ characteristic of the Chinese Revolution can be attributed to the essential 
particularities of this ultimate goal. 
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Rupture and Continuity
The modernity of the Chinese Revolution meant that inherent to it was a strong anti-
traditional tendency; for this reason, it constituted a genuine rupture in Chinese history. 
This rupture is responsible for much of the creativity of the twentieth century. And yet, 
from a different perspective, at the same time as the Chinese Revolution decisively 
parted from tradition, it also consciously or unconsciously utilised tradition to enhance 
its own creative content. For example, the CCP required its own members to ‘first eat 
bitterness [endure hardship], and then to enjoy themselves.’ This could be seen as akin to 
the spirit of the adage attributed to the ancient sage Fan Zhongyan (989–1052), a Song 
Dynasty statesman credited with being the founder of neo-Confucianism, who said: 
‘Be the first to bear the world’s hardship, and the last to enjoy its comforts.’ Historian 
John King Fairbank once encapsulated modern Chinese history into an ‘impact [of the 
West]-response [of China]’ paradigm, yet, with regard to the Chinese Revolution, 
this paradigm could perhaps be more precisely expressed as ‘impact–appropriation–
response.’3 Even so, in the normal course of affairs, the appropriation of resources from 
Chinese tradition usually congealed around the requirement to effect an absolute break 
from tradition. 
From the late 1920s, when the CCP was mostly based in the Jinggangshan area 
of Jiangxi province, along with the gradual growth of the consciousness of the need 
for revolutionary bases, rudiments of the new nation emerged, which later came to 
maturity during the Yan’an period. For this reason, inherent in the Chinese Revolution 
was a strong commitment to institution building, which simultaneously produced 
a serious critique of anarchism. However, this certainly did not spell the end of 
discussions over where power resided; to the contrary, whether power belonged to the 
state or to society was consistently one of the arenas of potential trouble throughout 
the revolutionary years. This trouble reached its climactic theoretical and experiential 
limits during the Cultural Revolution and was expressed in the Paris Commune-like 
principles that informed the January Revolution of 1967 in Shanghai, one of the high 
points of the proletarian commitment to the Cultural Revolution in the city (see also 
the essays by Russo and Thornton in the present volume).4 The most pragmatic choice 
for restoring social order was that power belonged to the state, and yet the idealistic 
or even romantic yearning that power could belong to society remained a strong 
sentiment. Understanding this point is essential to grasping the internal theoretical 
contradictions and paradoxes of the Chinese Revolution. 
Beyond the Political Revolution
The Chinese Revolution was never only a political revolution, but rather it was 
always also a social revolution, with the ultimate goal of fashioning a more egalitarian 
social order. After 1949, the PRC underwent a sea change to become a collective 
society. In the rural villages, there was a gradual transformation from a small peasant 
private property regime to the collective property regime of the people’s communes 
(see also Gao’s essay in the present volume). In the urban areas, there was a gradual 
nationalisation of industry and manufacture through unitary purchasing policies. 
In the end, these comprised the planned economy. Forbidding individuals or any kind 
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of interest group from putting themselves above society was one of the core ideals 
hidden in the  background of these socialist transformations. That is, in addition to 
valorising the broad proletariat-peasant masses, radicalising political campaigns were 
used to smash the formation of any possible power blocs. Restraining bureaucratisation 
was about preventing the emergence of special power factions; the vigilance against 
markets and its corresponding commodity economy was about rejecting privatisation 
and the possibility of the reemergence of capitalist classes; the remaking of intellectuals 
to one degree or the next was about the transformation of intellectuals as a class into 
a form of cultural capital, whose ‘red and expert’ mastery could help control social 
anxiety about the future of communism in China (see Schmalzer’s essay in the present 
volume). This radical socialist transformation reached a climax during the Cultural 
Revolution; its ultimate failure can be attributed to many different factors.
Socialism retained the nation-state form and at the same time it also retained the 
bureaucracy, in particular the system of cadres which not only included bureaucrats 
but also absorbed intellectuals. Essentially, there was no way to break through the laws 
of the salary-wage system, so that the problem of distribution continuously tilled the 
fecund soil of special privileges. In the context of the modern world system, it was 
almost impossible for China, in reality, to return to any autarkic form of economics—
self-reliance, rich harvests, and self-sufficiency (see Yang’s essay in the present 
volume)—even while, of course, this impossibility simultaneously is attributable to the 
Cold War geopolitical patterns.5 Even more important, perhaps, is that after 1949 there 
was never a pure socialist system in China. Because of nativist elements, the Chinese 
Revolution was at once both radical and incrementalist, and was always oscillating 
between compromise and struggle. This embodied the strategic spirit of the Chinese 
Revolution at the same time as it also formed the internal complexity comprising its 
socialism. 
In the rural villages, what actually existed was what can be called a semiplanned, 
seminatural economic formation, where the small peasant economy (including its 
corresponding ideology) could never have been completely eradicated. The system of 
‘three-level ownership with production teams as the base’ of the people’s communes 
was a formation that integrated the production team, the production brigade, and the 
commune. The production team in many essential aspects was merely the continuation 
of a traditional natural village formation, with, in particular, the system of individual 
plots substantively retaining the idea of a private economy along with its cultural 
connotations. By the same token, in the cities, once socialist nationalisation had been 
completed in 1956, there nevertheless remained a host of consolidated ownership 
forms (state-owned enterprises, collectively owned enterprises, individual economy). 
In the midst of such a complex socioeconomic structure, exchange obviously became 
extremely important; at the same time, the reality of the pattern of a ‘private economy 
in the midst of the collective’ became particularly evident. In this light, we can say that 
the socialist revolution from 1949 to 1976 did not really cope with these problems 
completely.
As for the transformation of intellectuals, in addition to the clear challenges presented 
to professionals, the popularisation of education also produced new problems. In 1950, 
the horizons of this issue began to become evident, and by 1960 the problem of ‘successors’ 
drew huge political attention.6 On the one hand, the popularisation of education gave 
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rise to tense relations between intellectual youth and villagers, with a conflict between 
peasant children ‘entering the cities’ and urban intellectual youth ‘returning to the 
villages.’7 On the other hand, modern education, particularly the expansion of university 
education, included the movement of university graduates into work environments 
with relatively well-paid salaried positions and social welfare provisions. This led to the 
gradual formation of a socialist middle class, with corresponding newly arising middle 
class lifestyles and cultural desires. The reforms of the 1980s in China derived from the 
impetus provided by the alliance of the three social strata that was forged in this period 
between bureaucrats, urban entrepreneurs, and the petty bourgeoisie. In the middle of 
this kind of socialist transformation was a continuation of conflict in Chinese tradition 
over the relationship between xiaokang and datong (for an exegesis of the interpretation 
and translation of these terms, see Craig A. Smith’s essay in the present volume). That 
is, should one pass through xiaokang so as to achieve datong (socialism), or should one 
achieve datong in order to reach xiaokang? This debate continues to this day.
A Social Enlightenment
The difficulties encountered in the political or economic arenas often found their way 
into the cultural sphere, so that training the so-called ‘new socialist person’ became an 
urgent task (see Dai’s essay in the present volume). Political scientist Tang Tsou has 
called Chinese society an ‘all-round society,’ but from a different perspective we could 
say that the ambition of new China was to build an ‘education society.’8 This intention 
was fully expressed and contained within Mao Zedong’s 1966 ‘7 May Directive.’9 
Literature and arts were to throw themselves wholeheartedly into the social fray, where 
their goal was to transform society and to help mould the new socialist person. For this 
reason, these practices were far from the older (individualised) practice of literature, 
and rather were intended to produce a literature of society or the collective with the 
aim of creating the conditions of possibility for a richer public life. The design of this 
‘education society’ clearly mobilised to a great extent ancient Chinese resources on 
social ‘enlightenment’ (jiaohua); in its aspirations to cover all of society, it was close to 
the neo-Confucianism of the Song-Ming period, and particularly the idealism of Wang 
Yangming (1472–1529).10 The idea that every person could achieve the perfection of 
the ancient sages Yao and Shun was directly cited in Mao Zedong’s poetry: ‘Our six 
hundred million Chinese can all be Yao and Shun.’11 
This education society naturally has a social disciplinary aspect, but, by the same 
token, it also retained classical educational aspirations for the cultivation of social 
morality: for example, excellence, brilliance, loyalty, devotion, selflessness, courage, 
etc. For this reason, the sublime was always the most prominent aspect of socialist 
aesthetics (see  Sorace’s essay in the present volume). Through this type of learning, 
which emphasised intrinsic quality (moral fibre), the hope was that the new socialist 
person would reject material rewards and ambitions for power so as to carry out 
revolution to the very end. What the Chinese Revolution sought to accomplish was the 
popularisation of the ancient aristocratic ideal of the ‘gentleman’ (junzi),12 although, 
truthfully, this was not the innovation of the Chinese Revolution alone. For, aside from 
the aesthetic influences of the former Soviet Union, this also came from an internal 
aspect of the Song–Ming idealist school, even though the Chinese Revolution relied 
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upon the strength of the Party-state to realise it. However, the difficulties this education 
society encountered also derived from the structure of state coercion: for many people, 
this form of the sublime steadily created a kind of pressure which, by the 1980s, 
produced the beginning of the trend towards ‘avoiding glory,’ in the words of Wang 
Meng.13
Advocating Datong
In the twentieth century, the Chinese Revolution experienced a cycle of radicalism-
retrenchment-radicalism, of temporary compromise followed by a new move on the 
chessboard. This makes conspicuous the fact that difficulties were not just the province 
of prerevolutionary activity, but that in the postrevolutionary era, the difficulties of 
realising socialism in one country were multisided and emerged from everywhere. 
Yet,  the core issue, I still believe, is that the revolution was never able to resolve the 
problem of private property in the midst of the regime of public property. This also 
encompasses the problem of how to preserve individual autonomy in the context of 
collective life. Despite this, the Chinese Revolution has left behind a mighty legacy, 
inclusive of its errors and failures. Today, China has reaffirmed the system of market 
economy and is trying to resolve the inverse problem of ‘public property in the midst 
of the system of private property.’ This encompasses the problem of how to ‘embed’ the 
market into social structures rather than allowing the market to dominate or control 
society. 14 For this reason, I believe renewed calls for datong as an ideal able to surmount 
the society of xiaokang will only become more important in the future. 15 






The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) first referred to ‘self-reliance’ (zili gengsheng) in the late 1930s. The meaning of the term shifted over time, reflecting the Party’s economic capacity and changes within official ideology. In 
English, self-reliance is defined as a ‘reliance on one’s own powers and resources rather 
than those of others.’1 In Mandarin, self-reliance has an additional connotation of 
regeneration through one’s own power and effort. It is a dynamic phrase that entwines 
power, economic, and spiritual growth, and has lent itself to continuous redefinition.2 
This essay traces how self-reliance came to have a precise meaning in official Party 
discourse in response to economic constraints during the War of Resistance against 
Japan (1937–45) and describes how it was redefined to justify Mao’s radical isolationist 
policies between the late 1950s and early 1970s. Despite China’s integration into the 
global capitalist economy, the phrase has retained conceptual flexibility in its adaptation 
to the changing economic policies and political landscapes of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Tracing the fluid meanings of self-reliance provides a lens through which we can more 
clearly understand how China politically conceptualises the economy and its own 
position in the world.
Historical Origins
Although the concept of self-reliance predated the conflict with Japan, it was the 
War of Resistance against Japan which made the need to practically implement policies 
aimed at self-reliance a concrete reality. The Party’s efforts to turn the term into 
a  precise formulation—a so-called tifa, i.e. a term that was, and still is, used by the 
CCP to encapsulate its political ideas and important policies3—began in the late 1930s. 
After the surviving the treacherous Long March and prolonged economic blockade, 
the Party was on the verge of fiscal collapse. The outbreak of the war with Japan and the 
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economic isolation of the communist base in northwest China further exacerbated the 
woes of the CCP. In order to increase self-sufficiency in food and living necessities, in 
February 1939 Mao launched a series of production campaigns in the area controlled 
by the CCP by encouraging all students and soldiers to engage in agricultural and 
industrial production.4 The concept of self-reliance was first formulated in precise 
terms in a speech that Mao gave to senior Party officials in June 1939 to mobilise all 
CCP members to make mental preparation for the most adverse conditions. In his 
words: ‘The Party and its military force need to prepare for the harshest [survival] 
environments.’5
In the following years, the Party’s fiscal situation worsened due to two factors. 
First, the CCP’s continuous success in territorial expansion and military recruitment 
threatened and provoked the Nationalist Party into an attempt to isolate the CCP 
nationwide. Second, the Rectification Campaign, launched by Mao in 1941, not only 
created many internal enemies but also distracted Party members from agricultural 
production (see Mertha’s essay in the present volume). The dramatic increase of 
the burden on peasants in 1941 left the Party with no choice but to accentuate the 
importance of self-reliance through production campaigns.6 These underlying tensions 
came to a head on 3 June 1941, when the acting governor of Yanchuan county, northern 
Shaanxi, was struck dead by lightning while he was attending an administrative 
meeting in an open-air square. At the same event, a peasant whose donkey had also 
been killed by lightning publicly put a curse on Mao, asking why the heavens did 
not strike him dead instead. In the next few days, the peasant told anyone who was 
willing to listen about the curse he had put on Mao. The local public security agency 
investigated the peasant’s outburst, and acknowledged that his discontent arose from 
the Party’s policies that had led to the high agricultural tax burden. Mao himself also 
acknowledged that the excessive burden imposed on the peasants had pushed them to 
the verge of subsistence. This incident served to strengthen the CCP leadership’s resolve 
to implement the policy of self-reliance through further production campaigns aimed 
at increasing agricultural output.7 
The CCP’s ability to overcome scarcity during the War of Resistance depended on 
its ability to mobilise the masses in production campaigns and ‘regenerate’ its own 
conditions of existence. After the victory over the Japanese, self-reliance became 
cemented as an official formulation within official Party discourse. On 13 August 1945, 
Mao delivered a speech in Yan’an, in which he summarised the lessons from the war 
that was then ending, underscoring the importance of self-reliance in the following 
way:
On what basis should our policy rest? It should rest on our own strength, and 
that means ‘regeneration through one’s own efforts’ (zili gengsheng). We are 
not alone; all the countries and people in the world opposed to imperialism 
are our friends. Nevertheless, we stress regeneration through our own efforts. 
Relying on the forces we ourselves organise, we can defeat all Chinese and 
foreign reactionaries.8
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In this sense, the war with Japan provided the historical basis and justification 
for the ideological framing of self-reliance as a political and economic concept. The 
continued survival of the CCP, against overwhelming odds, meant that the Party 
had self-confidence that it could rely on itself to overcome dangerous times ahead. 
Mao’s statement strove to attach revolutionary spirit and significance to ‘regeneration 
through one’s own efforts,’ thus embedding the concept deep within Party symbolism. 
Self-reliance in China’s Era of High Socialism
In the 1950s and 1960s self-reliance gradually evolved from a symbolic commitment 
and mark of loyalty to China’s socialist project into a Maoist principle of development 
and foreign relations. In the early 1950s, the CCP discarded the wartime policy of 
self-reliance and instead adopted the socioeconomic development model of the Soviet 
Union. The CCP’s dependence on Soviet aid—including technical specialists—was 
vital for the promotion of the industrial sector. However, commencing from around 
1955 fissures started forming in the Sino-Soviet alliance. In 1957, the Soviet Union 
began withdrawing experts from China in response to the escalation of the diplomatic 
feud between the two countries. The conflict between the remaining Soviet experts and 
Chinese officials in 1958 and 1959—when the Great Leap Forward was in full swing—
gave the Soviet Union an excuse to pull back even further.9 As a result of the Sino-Soviet 
split and the loss of technical expertise, Mao revitalised the concept of self-reliance as 
the fulcrum of domestic development strategies and relations with the international 
community. Unfortunately, this approach did not accelerate industrialisation as 
envisioned, but rather facilitated and fed into the utopian economic experiment turned 
disaster of the Great Leap Forward (1958–62).10
During the early years of the Cultural Revolution, the commitment to self-reliance 
was bound up with radical revolutionary values, which in practice resulted in self-
imposed isolation. In the domestic sphere, the emphasis on self-reliance at all levels 
through continuous propaganda campaigns resulted in a dramatic decline in both the 
supply of light industrial products in cities and state support to rural areas.11 A case in 
point was the national campaign to ‘Learn from Dazhai in Agriculture’ (nongye xue 
dazhai) which emerged in 1963 and became the model for revolutionary agriculture 
based on the practices of Dazhai, a village in Shanxi province. Dazhai villagers placed 
a great deal of effort in the policy of self-reliance, and refused support in the form of 
state grain, state funds, and other outside relief materials. Their attempts to sustain 
themselves were showcased by the central government to compensate for its own 
limited ability to provide Chinese people with the life necessities they badly needed.12 
In the international sphere, the Party’s excessive commitment to self-reliance resulted 
in the breaking off of diplomatic ties with other countries and the reduction of foreign 
imports, particularly of industrial equipment.13 
By the late 1960s, the international isolation and rigid insistence on self-reliance 
had caused the Chinese economy to lag behind a large number of European and 
Asian countries, which had experienced rapid economic growth during this 
period.14 Its economic anxieties compelled the CCP to modify its policies by seeking 
rapprochement with both the United States and Japan in the early 1970s.15 
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Contemporary Transformation
At the onset of the reform period, the Party leadership under Deng Xiaoping 
paid enormous attention to repairing and renovating the institutions and norms of 
political life. At the same time, the Party shifted its focus from continuous revolution 
to economic reform and the country’s integration into the global economy. Against this 
backdrop, the concept of self-reliance was hollowed out leaving behind only a name, 
akin to a museum piece in the shrine of the Chinese Revolution. That being said, it 
was a source of pride and glory within and legitimation of Party history. In the CCP’s 
decisive 1981 ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the 
Founding of the People’s Republic of China,’ the relationship between self-reliance and 
the victory of the Chinese Revolution was highlighted in these terms:
It must be said that, fundamentally, victory in the Chinese Revolution was 
won because the Chinese Communist Party adhered to the principle of 
independence and self-reliance and depended on the efforts of the whole 
Chinese people, whatever their nationality, after they underwent untold 
hardships and surmounted innumerable difficulties and obstacles together.
The postreform articulation of self-reliance reformulated the term from a pillar of 
Maoist revolutionary thought and action, to a Dengist conceptualisation that saw self-
reliance as a means to an end in the struggle to ultimately reclaim China’s rightful place 
on the world stage.
The transformation of the concept of self-reliance into a historical artefact was further 
confirmed by Deng Xiaoping’s opening address at the Twelfth National Congress of the 
CCP in September 1982. In his speech, Deng specified that ‘China’s affairs should be 
run according to China’s specific conditions and by the Chinese people themselves. 
Independence and self-reliance have always and will always be our basic stand’. The 
objective of his speech was, however, to emphasise the importance of economic 
development through ‘unswervingly following a policy of opening to the outside world 
and increasing our exchange with foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual 
benefit.’16 In the following seven years, Deng, mentioned the term self-reliance on at 
least four separate occasions, but all in the context of policies aimed at accelerating 
economic reform and integrating China into the global economy.17 
In the late 1980s and 1990s, when Chinese economic reform gained momentum, the 
term self-reliance was gradually discontinued in official Party documents and speeches 
by Party leaders. It was only in the late 1990s that a debate over the revision of the 
state-sponsored Chinese Dictionary of Etymology (cihai) brought the term back into 
the public discourse. This dictionary, updated on a ten-year basis, is roughly equivalent 
to the Britannica Concise Encyclopaedia. At that time, the editors of the Dictionary 
succeeded in removing ‘self-reliance,’ alongside hundreds of existing entries related 
to revolutionary discourse, such as ‘independence and self-reliance,’ ‘criticism and 
self-criticism,’ and ‘the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party.’ These 
changes immediately provoked heated controversy among Chinese scholars, with left-
wing intellectuals lashing out against the editors of the Dictionary and accusing them 
of denying the legitimacy of the Chinese Revolution, as well as Mao’s historical merits. 
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As a belated response to the above criticism, at a conference in 2005 the Dictionary’s 
editor-in-chief explained that the controversial updates had aimed to ‘get rid of the 
stale and take in the fresh.’ More specifically, old-fashioned words were no longer 
included in the new version of the dictionary because they were not deemed useful for 
the Chinese people, as they did not describe the current socioeconomic and political 
circumstances.18
Fast forward two decades to today, and self-reliance suddenly seems to be having 
a resurgence. Between September and November 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
frequently used the term in his speeches during visits to several high-tech companies. 
A number of observers of China have interpreted this as Xi’s attempt to revitalise 
Maoist political rhetoric.19 However, we should be careful not to hear Mao’s voice in Xi’s 
words. A closer look at the context and usage reveals that Xi’s main concern is not about 
the revival of Maoist revolutionary rhetoric, but about the development of a number 
of key technologies in response to accusations that China engages in technology 
and intellectual property theft coming from the United States. The current Chinese 
leadership is of course keenly aware of the importance of technological development 
for the economy, as well as the vulnerability of Chinese companies that rely on global 
supply chains for high-tech components, many of which originate in the United States. 
While Xi’s use of the term self-reliance may evoke memories of Mao’s isolationism, in 
actuality it is a reflection of the Dengist interpretation of self-reliance as a means to an 
end—in this case China’s continued rise within the global economic order.







In his treatise Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Vladimir Lenin inserts the term ‘semicolonialism’ to describe China under global capitalism’s industrial and financial imperialism.1 Theories sharpen and clarify conditions that are neither 
clear nor consistent; the addition of the prefix ‘semi’ refined the strategic understanding 
of colonialism as a matter of degrees and historical conditions that are permanently in 
flux. This reformulation also expanded what global imperialism/colonialism (or capitalist 
imperialism in the Soviet tradition) meant strategically. After 1917, in Internationalist 
Comintern politics, semicolonialism indicated relative subordination to imperialist 
powers. Translated as banzhimindi in Chinese, this latent, formulaic category in 
European internationalism was given new life in the writing of Chinese Marxists in the 
1930s, such as Chen Hongjin and Mao Zedong.2 Mao particularly interpreted Marxism to 
address conditions facing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1920s and 1930s. 
In the 1930s and 1940s, key ideas inherited from European traditions of revolutionary 
thought and party organisation were retooled to fit Chinese conditions under the 
banner of Mao Zedong Thought. One resulting category was ‘semifeudal, semicolonial’ 
(banfengjianshehui, banzhimindi), which was both a  conceptual innovation of Maoist 
dialectics and a strategic approach to people’s war (see Guan’s essay in the present 
volume). The power of the concept of semicolonialism and semifeudalism was due to its 
proximity to local conditions and availability to strategic praxis; because it was close at 
hand, the concept had predictive value.3
The White-haired Girl
The coded simplicity of the term semifeudal, semicolonial was widely communicable 
and routinely transmitted to the masses. Transforming a backward society into 
a progressive one during the War of Resistance against Japan involved both disciplining 
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intellectuals and also raising the consciousness of the ordinary people so they, too, 
understood the difference between emancipation and oppression. Among the massive 
number of syncretic cultural texts that appeared in the mid-century, the ‘White-haired 
Girl’ story shows most obviously how the reality of history in China could be coded 
into a story about China’s semicolonialism and semifeudalism. 
Beginning in 1945 and in direct response to Mao’s ‘Talks at the Yan’an Forum on 
Literature and Art,’ the CCP authorised a story about Xi’er, a peasant girl, her beloved 
fiancée Dachun, her father, her godmother, and her fellow villagers. Based on the 
vicissitudes of village girls abused by landlord families, ‘White-haired Girl’ was staged 
in various versions but the core story remained the same. The narrative takes place in a 
small village in Shaanxi province, and revolves around the life of Xi’er who is engaged to 
a poor peasant named Wang Dachun. Because of his debt from a phony interest charge, 
Xi’er’s father commits suicide (in the ballet version, he is killed by the debt collector). 
As a result, the father’s ‘creditor,’ the local landlord Huang Shiren seizes Xi’er to pay her 
father’s debts. This exchange transforms Xi’er into a commodity subject to the abuse 
of her owners; she is forced to work day and night, and becomes pregnant after being 
raped by the landlord’s son. Alerted to the fact that she will be sold to a brothel, she 
escapes to a mountain shelter where she gives birth to a stillborn baby. Xi’er lives in 
a cave in the mountain where she learns to be free and self-sufficient, and survives 
by stealing food from a local temple. In another version of the story, an angry mob 
believes that Xi’er is a spectral apparition threatening their community with harm and 
attempts to desecrate her body until they are stopped by Wang Dachun, who recognises 
his lover (this version was intended to help eradicate superstition; see Williams’s essay 
in this volume). In the mainstream version, Dachun uses his revolver to flush out the 
supposedly supernatural ‘white-haired spirit’ only to find that it is his beloved. Despite 
the different variations and art forms, the tunes are still familiar. Peng Liyuan, spouse 
of China’s leader Xi Jinping, starred as Xi’er in the People’s Liberation Army song and 
dance troupe during the 1980s, and more recently, served as artistic director of a revival 
tour, which opened in the hallowed revolutionary site of Yan’an in November 2015.4
Decoding this cultural phenomenon is by-the-book. Each figure embodies elements 
of semicolonial, semifeudal, backward village society. Old Zhao, who advises Wang 
Dachun not to seek revenge on the landlord but to join the Eight Route Army, typifies 
the honest but culturally illiterate poor peasant. Dachun, the poor landless peasant and 
his mother, Wang Dashen, live in permanent indebtedness to the Huang family whose 
scion, Huang Shiren, and Dowager, Madame Huang, inflict pains small and large on 
their indebted workers. Each character performs a range of predictable activities that 
identify them as archetypes. Huang Shiren, for instance, is a tool of the Nationalist 
Party and a leader of the rural bourgeoisie. He is a rapist and unredeemable criminal 
who relies on imperialist and international capital to extract surplus value and labour 
from villagers until they die. Similarly, scenes showing Xi’er, abandoned and pregnant, 
milling wheat like a water buffalo, convey how semicolonial, semifeudal sociology 
truthfully represents reality. The feudal setting where peasants incur debt just to stay 
alive and where landowners are usurers, armed with bourgeois pistols is contrasted with 
the white-faced, red-lipped Eighth Route Army soldiers, whose solemn and operatic 
visages signal that the time has come for poor peasants who are seeking revolutionary 
vengeance to take action. Before he is reunited with Xi’er, Wang Dachun returns to 
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the village and teaches his old cohort how to stage an uprising. He has learned to read 
and has become a politically aware, revolutionary cadre. The strategic logic that Party 
members bring to the village merges into revolutionary indignation and vengeful rage 
as the villagers overthrow the semifeudal, semicolonial old order.
Fierce Debates
Despite its seductive appeal and simplicity, Maoist terminology—semifeudal, 
semicolonialism, colonialism, feudalism—has provoked savage historiographic debate. 
First, these terms cannot be subsumed into theories about colonialism in India and 
British capital accumulation known under the rubric of ‘postcolonial theory.’ Postcolonial 
theory is a portmanteau of related techniques for theorising England-to-India relations 
including: a) magical inversions (‘provincialising’ imperial power); b) disputing class 
and class consciousness (incommensurability, subalternity); c) conflicts over the status 
of capital as such in colonisation (othering or otherness); and d) post-Althusserian 
disregard for the historical limits of culture. There is some doubt that postcolonial 
theory even supports its alleged intention, to comprehend colonialism in India.5 
Second, in the last several decades, China historians have struggled to distinguish 
universal elements of Marxism from localisms. In US debates, some scholars argue that 
Maoism, a field of praxis, has no bearing on Marxism, which consists of Marx’s critique 
of capitalist logic and history of capitalism’s rise out of conditions in Europe.6 Others say 
that Maoism is a utopian offshoot of Marxism, its potential lying in voluntaristic effort 
and a praxis for changing social relations of production outside Marxism’s Europe-
oriented universalism.7 The Adelaide School suggested Maoism was a future Marxism 
that could bridge national differences and unevenness in the relations of production 
internationally.8 A few have refused to admit Maoism into the Marxist Pantheon at 
all, declaring instead that Maoism is a ‘discourse,’ a localist category without universal 
significance.9
How Maoists sculpted the phrase ‘semicolonialism, semifeudalism’ is a legitimate 
historical question. Marxism, Maoists observed, was universally true. Marx, they 
argued, discovered the ‘universality of the contradiction between the productive forces 
and the relations of production in class society in general.’10 Singularity (Chineseness) 
and utility lie in Marx’s emphasis on praxis or what Maoists particularly valued, 
i.e. method. Their explanation was as follows. Universally without exception, Marxism 
makes material and social process visible. Intervening in reality requires flexibility, 
however. Practitioners of Marxism find truth in circumstances in order to choose the 
best course of action. A good strategist must understand immediate process, embrace 
dynamic contradiction, and anticipate where human action can influence outcomes. 
In semicolonial China, Marxists realised that while the principal contradiction is class 
society as such, there are singular or ‘Chinese’ non-principal contradictions. 
Universalism and Localism
The ‘semi’ in semicolonialism opens the way to recognising what is a singular 
and non-principal contradiction while holding onto the universal or principal 
contradiction stated above. It turns out that semicolonial and semifeudal offers a way 
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into given conditions through specific instances. The determinate difference between 
colonial and semicolonial spaces, for instance, gives analysts the key to grasp how the 
concrete universal appears in the world under specific temporal and geographical 
conditions, such as the pursuit of irregular guerilla warfare in a border region in 1938. 
On the basis that China was semicolonial and semifeudal, Maoist battle strategy was 
both regular and irregular, relying on ground troops as the main force, and guerrilla 
warfare to drain Japanese imperialist military power.11 As Nick Knight has long pointed 
out, the difference between the Maoist and orthodox Leninist-Stalinist approach to 
contradiction lies in the Maoist mandate that analytic terminology proliferate around 
singularities and specifics.12
If China was understood to be a semicolonial, semifeudal social order, and not 
a colonial, feudal state—i.e. distinct from India—planners could see warfare in a new 
way. This understanding of concrete universality allowed for battle plans to be designed 
on the basis of real conditions. These were not cerebral exercises but high-stake analyses, 
such as Mao’s 1938 essay ‘On Protracted War,’ in which he wrote that: ‘The Sino-Japanese 
War is none other than a war of life and death between a semicolonial and semifeudal 
China and an imperialist Japan in the 1930s. Herein lies the basis of the whole problem.’ 
‘On Protracted War’ explained what semicolonial meant in that context, on the way 
to addressing why protracted war was the strategy needed to defeat Japan.13 The essay 
reasoned that China was no longer a feudal society in great part as a consequence of 
European and Japanese imperialism. Therefore, in a global context, with the Soviet 
Union on the one hand and the example of a failed Ethiopian war of independence 
against Italy on the other, Marxists could locate China’s singular ‘identity.’14
The bigger point was to demonstrate how semicolonial, semifeudal conditions 
were ripe for politically defining identity and mobilising the masses in a protracted 
war that drained the enemy’s relatively stronger position. Under real conditions and 
correct theoretical work (theory and praxis in relation to identity) attacking an enemy 
requires using a feedback mechanism, such as the mass line, that puts into constant 
circulation political, military, cultural, and mobilisational resources. Protraction means 
only that no one yet knows what amount of time will be needed to unbalance the 
enemy. It is a temporality that exists within an uneven spatiality composed of different 
topographies, resources, populations, and shifting real conditions. Not only that—
engaging in protracted struggle expedites the transformation of the very conditions 
that make possible the protracted warfare. Consciously understanding the reality 
around us makes it possible to decide strategy and tactics. 
The Truth of the Singular Moment
The historical task of the Chinese nation-in-process during protracted war 
against Japanese imperialism was to overthrow semicolonial, semifeudal relations of 
production and to set in motion a dialectic—theory and praxis—that would transform 
national identity and readjust class struggle. The CCP’s long experience of battle had 
demonstrated that the sine qua non for the Party was to grasp the ‘unity between the 
theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese Revolution.’15 As this 
essay has shown, that was not an abstraction. To initiate praxis on the basis of theory, 
one can extract from Mao Zedong Thought the contemporary historical moment 
 AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM   241
(the Second Great Imperialist War, emergence of the Soviet Union, etc.) and the truth of 
that singular moment. This method provides clarity about momentary configurations 
of identity, topography, sociology, economics, and suggests a range of good policy 
options. When Maoists use the term semicolonial and semifeudal this way, it is not 
a description but a representation of the realities that theoretical Marxism can, when 
used properly, actually illuminate.
The power of representation is certainly a reason why in December 1939 the 
collective group of writers associated with Mao published an official textbook about 
society, revolution, and Party building (the latter chapter was never completed) for 
incoming intellectuals and CCP members.16 The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese 
Communist Party starts with the history of a space that originated, like all places, as 
a classless society, and had emerged into slave and then feudal social relations, but 
was currently a weak semicolonial, semifeudal country. In simple language the text 
explained that because imperialism introduced foreign capital, the feudal economy 
began to crumble, and the landlords, bureaucrats, and bourgeoisie turned toward 
capital investment in modern industries. There is nothing particularly Chinese about 
the concluding argument: 
It is clear that by penetrating into China the imperialist powers have on the 
one hand accelerated the disintegration of China’s feudal society, caused 
factors of capitalism to emerge in China and transformed the feudal society 
into a semifeudal one, and on the other hand imposed their ruthless rule on 
China and reduced an independent China into a semicolonial and colonial 
China.17
My essay consequently demonstrates how central to Maoism the phrase semicolonial, 
semifeudal turns out to be. And yet, it also turns out that unsnarling claims about 
Chinese singularity does not make Maoism into a ‘Sinicised’ or discursive Marxism. 
As  Mao Zedong Thought emerged, it claimed only that all situations and societies 
where Marxism prevails are singular. No two sites of class struggle will ever be the 
same: however, no amount of difference alters Marxism-Leninism’s universal truth. 
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电影下乡
Sending Films to the 
Countryside
Tong LAM*
The idea of delivering education, health care, and technical knowledge to the countryside has always been an important part of China’s nation-building effort. In the early twentieth century, many intellectuals argued that such initiatives 
would be crucial to the production of modern citizens in China’s vast rural areas. They 
also maintained that the suffering and hardship that they had to endure in the process 
would be the key to converting themselves into new political subjects.1 By the time of 
the Cultural Revolution, the idea of ‘going down to the countryside’ took on yet another 
significance, as it became associated with the relocation of millions of urban youths to 
the rural regions for reeducation by a supposedly ideologically pure peasantry. In spite 
of the strong resentment harboured by these so-called ‘sent-down youths’ (xiafang 
qingnian) or the ‘Lost Generation,’ the programme—which was officially called ‘up to 
the mountains, down to the villages’ (shangshan xiaxiang)—did help to address many 
of the deficiencies suffered by the rural communities.
Nevertheless, xiaxiang as a cultural and political trope encompassed a wide range 
of practices that served to reduce the unevenness between rural and urban areas and 
populations. Among them was the project known as dianying xiaxiang, or ‘sending 
films to the countryside.’ Like other projects that sought to overcome the rural and 
urban economic and social disparity, a primary purpose of bringing films to China’s 
rural communities was to deliver entertainment to remote and underdeveloped areas. 
At the same time, not unlike similar mobile cinema projects around the world, open-
air film screenings also allowed the Chinese rural population to experience the shock-
and-awe of the cinematic spectacle for the first time. Moreover, the magic quality of 
outdoor films did not just disrupt the harsh reality of the everyday, but also projected 
the utopian fantasy of the socialist future. In doing so, the state effectively presented 
itself as the cultural broker of modernity, strengthening its legitimacy and authority.
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Mobile film screening was indeed tremendously popular in the socialist era. Since such 
screening events reached a village only once every few years, many villagers walked for 
hours and even days from nearby villages in order to catch a film. Projectionists, many 
of whom were young men and occasionally women—including a large number of sent-
down youths during the Cultural Revolution—were well respected by rural residents as 
they were seen as intellectuals and agents of the state. Their jobs entailed the endurance 
of hardship as they needed to cross formidable mountains and rivers with heavy 
equipment in tow. Projectionists were also often required to do live performances, 
such as puppet shows and singing, as part of the practice of delivering revolutionary 
messages to the rural masses. Not surprisingly, by the late 1980s, mobile films sponsored 
by the government ceased to operate as the magic of outdoor propaganda films was 
increasingly challenged by other forms of popular entertainment, such as television, 
karaoke, and foreign films.
Yet, significantly, in 1998—an era of rising rural and urban disparity as well as social 
discontent—the Chinese government reactivated the programme of rural outdoor film 
screenings with much greater coverage and intensity, promising that it would deliver 
at least one film in each village every month. Known as Project 2131, the programme 
has shown how digital technology can be mobilised to augment the already powerful 
propaganda machine in the postsocialist era. At the same time, contemporary mobile 
film screenings also operate in a different visual economy and political register. Instead 
In television footage from 1965, a female projectionist is seen singing a revolutionary song while 
her male colleague is showing a slideshow prior to a feature presentation. The same machine 
is also projecting the lyrics that she is holding in her left hand. (Inner Mongolia, c. 1965; Central 
Studio of News Reels Productio archival footage) 
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of just screening the popular old revolutionary films, the mobile screening programme 
uses newly developed propaganda films that are specially made for the rural audience. 
With the assumption that the rural viewers are simple-minded and unsophisticated, 
these are mostly war and revolutionary films set in the World War II and Civil War 
times. While these new films, like their predecessors, tell the familiar stories of the 
liberation of the peasantry under the leadership of the Communist Party, their 
emphasis is more often about the triumph of the Party and the nation rather than class 
struggle. Moreover, the sheer quantity of these films is enormous, as an entire segment 
of the Chinese film industry is now devoted to their production and digital delivery for 
the government-sponsored rural mobile cinema.
Of course, the Chinese countryside today is different from that of the socialist era in 
some fundamental ways. Decades of rapid urbanisation have not merely transformed 
China into an urban nation, but have also uprooted many of its rural citizens. In most 
villages, those who are being left behind are the elderly and their grandchildren, since 
young and middle-aged men and women have often become migrant workers in the 
city. If these peasant migrant workers, who mostly work in factories, construction sites, 
and other service industries, have become precarious labourers in the postsocialist 
economy, so are the new generation of projectionists. The improvement of technology 
and infrastructure means that film projection has become straightforward, effortless, 
and a highly disciplined affair. Projectionists can now drive directly to the screening site 
with their government-issued vehicle and digital equipment. From the downloading of 
films to the uploading of audience tallies, screening events are constantly being tracked 
A projectionist setting up the screen for the evening in a so-called Socialist New Village, which 
is often a combination of several old villages with villagers being housed in mid-rise and 
occasionally high-rise buildings. (Mumian new village, Sichuan province, 2013; Tong Lam)
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and tabulated. Gone, therefore, are the days when delivering films to the countryside 
was seen as admirable and heroic. In fact, these days, projectionists are generally poorly 
paid, part-time and subcontract workers with few benefits. 
More importantly, the new generation of propaganda films are no longer about 
celebrating and sustaining the socialist revolution. Quite the contrary, they are now 
used to promote patriotism in order to ease any potential social discontent amid the 
country’s enduring, if not widening, urban and rural divide. In this respect, it seems 
that the latest ‘sending films to the countryside’ programme is nothing but an ironic 
reminder of its phantom past. Meanwhile, in the new visual economy, as flashy 
skyscrapers and mobile devices have become ubiquitous, these open-air propaganda 
films, even with their updated audiovisual effects, can hardly offer the same level of 
enchantment and satisfaction that they once did. Behind the sound and fury generated 
by special effects are the unresolved tensions between the socialist ideal and the 
postsocialist reality. Hence, if some viewers nonetheless find these films captivating, it 
is not because of the projected future imagined by these films, but the nostalgic feelings 
evoked by them.
An anti-Japanese war film is being screened next to a village road. Aside from a few classic films, 
most of the films used in the new mobile cinema programme are tailormade for such purposes. 
(Yuhe village, Sichuan province, 2014; Tong Lam)





On 8 September 1944, in China’s far northwest communist base headquarters of Yan’an, Party Chairman Mao Zedong eulogised a just-deceased soldier, Zhang Side, as a paragon of ‘serving the people’ (wei renmin fuwu).1 While a common 
soldier’s death in wartime is always tragic, it is usually not the cause for a major tribute, 
much less for the coining of a vital phrase that, after a half-century of earnest usage, 
has now devolved into a commodified cliché. Yet, in this small piece of oratory—the 
speech is no more than a few paragraphs long—we find a text that called into being, and 
now can recall, an entire kind of history: a prospective and prescriptive socialist history 
of China. In the deceptively simple locution ‘serve the people’ is embedded a political 
injunction, a social ideal, a cultural expectation, and an economic norm, which, in the 
several decades after its initial articulation, summoned a form of common sense—an 
ideology—that once was lived as a concrete social practice. 
In China’s official historiographical understanding, ‘serve the people’ is primarily an 
ethical demand. It names a requirement for pure selflessness and individual sacrifice, 
ideally through death, for the already constituted revolutionary collective. As it turns 
out, Mao’s tribute became one of the three ‘constantly read articles’ (lao san pian) of 
subsequent socialist education campaigns—the other two texts being Mao’s tribute to 
a Canadian surgeon, Norman Bethune, who devoted his life and skills to global leftist 
causes from the Spanish Civil War to the Chinese Communist Revolution; and the 
mythical figure of the foolish old man who moved the mountains, whose legendary 
perseverance despite impossible odds was given a new positive spin. Indeed, by the 
time of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, ‘serve the people’ had become a mostly empty 
incantation, and its prescriptive and inscriptive scope narrowed to the sole demand 
to ‘wholly and entirely… live or die for the people.’ While the modifying ‘wholly and 
entirely’ (quanxin quanyi) was a later addition (1945) to the basic phrase (1944), 
the narrowed Cultural Revolution era attitudinal directive—as well as the narrowed 
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definition of ‘service’ to a willingness to sublimate the self in death—stuck, as if original 
to the pronouncement. It is this rigid dogmatic version of the phrase that is thoroughly 
lampooned in Yan Lianke’s scandalous 2005 novel, Serve the People.2 
Yet, in its time and in its more immediate afterlives, the simple text contains several 
interpretive levels that should not be so readily ridiculed. On the surface, the tribute 
was penned for a beloved comrade: a man who had worked his way from poor peasant 
obscurity in Sichuan province into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a soldier 
in an elite armed division; who had completed the arduous Long March in 1935, 
becoming quite close to Mao and other Party leaders; and who had died at the age 
of 32 in 1944, when a charcoal kiln collapsed on him during the process of mining, 
just as the armies of the Nationalist Party were besieging the communist base that 
housed their ostensible allies in the ongoing War of Resistance against Japan. At a 
more abstract level, Zhang Side was rendered through Mao’s tribute into a repository 
of all the elements of an emulative model of socialist becoming, a so-called bangyang. 
In this process of abstraction, his particularities came to be dissolved into a universal 
type—a dianxing—through which the timelessness of service/labour and the timeliness 
of socialism could be coproduced. In this play of temporalities, the phrase inspired 
by Zhang’s death proposed a new form of social relation, a socialist organisation of 
time and society that was at once abstract and concrete, lived and ‘yet to be made,’ 
remembered and ‘not yet existing.’
Heavier than Mount Tai, Lighter than a Feather
When Mao Zedong first spoke the phrase on 8 September 1944 at the mass meeting 
to commemorate Zhang’s death, ‘serve the people’ indicated a method through which 
the enduring and repetitive fact of human death in war could be wedded to the ethical 
imperative and materially spontaneous creation of the revolutionary unity called ‘the 
people.’ Hence, the injunction to ‘serve’ can be understood as a method in the widest 
Marxist sense: it is a ‘practice of theory.’ The locution wei … fuwu (serve for…) had 
been used by Mao in his 1942 ‘Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art,’ when 
he proposed that the purpose of socialist culture was ‘to serve the masses’ (wei dazhong 
fuwu) (see Sorace’s essay in the present volume). It was thus initially used for promoting 
the welding of all cultural production, as a form of abstract intellectual labour, to the 
very concrete and lived historical materialist creation of revolutionary culture in China 
that ‘service’ came to be elevated to the pinnacle of expectation for the definition and 
realisation of socialist social relations. 
With the eulogy of Zhang Side, this creative principle was expanded and deepened 
to speak to the production not only of the masses as a cultural concept, but of the 
‘people as unity’ who were the very objects and subjects of socialist revolution itself. 
Thus, in ‘serve the people,’ the objects and subjects of service are merged into the same 
revolutionary productive process: one is to become properly part of the people by 
serving and being worthy of being served. ‘To serve’ becomes a concrete abstraction: 
a form of labour indifferent to space/time but also productive of a determinative space/
time; even while ‘the people’ is the everlasting but concrete revolutionary ‘unity in 
formation’ appropriate to a particular historical moment—socialism.
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In this sense, the locution ‘to serve’ pertains and appeals to a kind of enduring history 
different from, and yet made to engage with a socialist one. So, while ‘the people’ is 
a peculiarly revolutionary formulation that is politically specific to the socialist era, the 
durational ‘service’ ethic must be embedded in socialism in very particular ways. Let us 
note briefly that an important prior history of the injunction ‘to serve’—as an ethic but 
also as a form of labour—resides in filiality, where service is labour performed with the 
proper expression, or attitude. That is, in the Confucian classics, labour is not merely 
the performance of an atomised task, but rather also an attitude commensurate to the 
project of producing and maintaining a form of social relations. ‘Labour as service’ is 
an embedded form of social relation. For Confucius and the tradition that follows from 
his teachings, the social relations sought after through the appropriate performance 
of service were those defined by and through the family. That is, for example, the 
son serves the father by labouring as a son for the father as a father, where each of 
those social positions is predetermined by relation to the other in a social hierarchy. 
By contrast, the desired social relations in Mao’s China were intended to produce a very 
different social formation altogether: one defined by and through egalitarianism and 
social equality in pointed opposition both to the hierarchies of the Confucian past 
and to the global capitalist inequities of China’s midcentury present (see Lee’s essay in 
the present volume). Thus, for Mao, ‘service’ would create the conditions not for the 
mutually binding reproduction of hierarchical social relations, but rather the possibility 
for their undoing. 
In this regard, in Mao’s speech, the meaning of labour/service (or sacrifice) is historically 
contextualised and productive. This historicity is dependent on the individual attitude 
of the performer and the moment of her performance. Specifically, Mao says: ‘People 
die, yet the meaning of their deaths is variable.’ How is one to understand the meaning 
of death? Paraphrasing ancient historian Sima Qian, Mao indicates that the meaning 
of death can be heavy or light depending on the dialectical relation between personal 
intention/expression (attitude) and historical situation. From that older principle, Mao 
derives the concrete meaning of the moment in which the sacrifice (service) occurs: 
specifically in the eulogy, to die for the benefit of ‘the people’ (revolution) is as weighty 
as Mount Tai, whereas to die on behalf of fascism, exploitation, or oppression is feather-
light. The contrast between ‘the people’ as a revolutionary concept, whose existence and 
equality is created at the same time as it is being secured, and ‘fascism/exploitation/
oppression’ is thus established as the historical specificity required to materially 
produce the particular meaning of Zhang Side’s death and the nature of his service. 
While the people will have been—as a predicated future—created as revolutionary, 
they also will have led that revolution through the weighty service rendered to one 
another as masters (zhurenweng), shaping and realising their own histories.
It is evident, then, that at the same time as it extols the merits of a soldier who died 
in the course of the anti-Japanese war, this speech is already looking forward to the 
end of the war against Japan and to the coming civil conflict with the Nationalists. 
Much of the organising in the base areas from this point onwards was thus aimed 
at transforming rural society into ideological and military bastions of socialism 
in preparation for the imminent domestic showdown. Part of this transformation 
included the expansion of popular education movements focussed on literacy and 
economic skills. Thus, for example, the 1944 directive to ‘develop production, expand 
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the schools’ was never merely a technocratic problem, but rather—as with ‘serve the 
people’—it was an ideological imperative to reformulate social relations along the lines 
of socialist equality.3 In other words, the creation of revolutionary unity through the 
dual emphases on production and education was not just a sociological problem of 
a class alliance between workers and intellectuals, where each readymade constituent 
part of society occupies its proper place; rather, it was a materialist-ideological problem 
of producing a new social formation altogether (see Dai’s essay in the present volume).
End of Politics
In Mao’s ‘serve the people’ the practice of theory is precisely the realm of politics. 
That is, it is the realm of the futurity whose glance back towards the present calls 
into being the necessity for an ethical form of social relations in the here and now. 
Unlike any Confucian notion of filial service, aimed at transhistorically reproducing 
social hierarchy, Mao’s ‘serve the people’ names a revolutionary political unity as 
the historically mandated form of ethical social formation, whose creation will be 
accomplished through the labour of service and the service of labour. The imperative 
to serve is thus an injunction to properly pursue class struggle (see Russo’s essay in 
the present volume); yet perhaps more important, it is an imperative to create out of 
the contingent historical moment marked by the spontaneous potential of the people 
as a revolutionary subject the possibility for socialism. This revolutionary unity could 
never be free of conflict—for, as Mao theorised earlier, contradictions would persist 
into whichever social formation eventually took shape—but it would always be the site 
of concrete politics aimed at its own realisation through labour as service.
The retreat of Maoism from the social field of substantive ideology and social 
practice has meant the erasure of the original embedded capacity of ‘serve the people’ 
to produce socialist meaning. Thus, today, if and when it is evoked—as in the 2012 
ill-fated and much-mocked ‘Learn from Lei Feng Day’—the topos of service is entirely 
instrumentalised and mechanically reproduced as a hierarchical desire for popular 
obedience.4 This is not service in the Maoist sense of producing a new collective 
lifeworld of socialist equality; this is Party injunction nakedly appropriating resources 
for their opposite use. ‘Serve the people’ today can only be communist kitsch or empty 
Party blandishment. Its life as a socialist text has gone the way of socialism itself: dead, 
gone, buried.





Socialist law, both in the Soviet Union and in Mao’s China, emerged as a system of legal principles based on the historical realities of socialist revolution. The role of the Communist Party in both nations was to lead over all aspects of 
the law in order to bring about the realisation of communism. In his Law of the Soviet 
State, Soviet legal theorist Andrei Vyshinsky theorised Soviet law as a system of norms 
of conduct based on relations of domination. Soviet law, he stated:
… is the aggregate of the rules of conduct established in the form of 
legislation by the authority of the toilers and expressive of their will. The 
effective operation of these rules is guaranteed by the entire coercive 
force of the socialist state in order to defend, to secure, and to develop 
relationships and arrangements advantageous and agreeable to the toilers, 
and completely and finally to annihilate capitalism and its remnants in the 
economic system, the way of life, and human consciousness—in order to 
build a communist society.1 
The theory of socialist law that developed in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) borrowed heavily from Vyshinsky’s theory of the law and the state. In a Mao-
era dictionary of jurisprudence, socialist law is defined as ‘the aggregate of rules of 
conduct enacted and approved by the state, expressing the will of the dominant class, 
the application of which is guaranteed by the coercive force of the state.’2 Of utmost 
importance to the theory of socialist law in both China and the Soviet Union, was the 
prominence given to the normative nature of the law, an emphasis which had its roots 
in political principles taken directly from the philosophy of Marxism. Legal scholar 
Phillip Chen notes the following in relation to Vyshinsky’s theory of law:
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The ‘theory of law’ Vyshinsky has in mind is evidently not a theory of 
positive law. It is a theory which has to produce ‘legal principles.’ But these 
legal principles are not the positive law that is to be established on the basis 
of these principles. If they are to be ‘legal’ principles, they are legal not in the 
sense of positive law, but in the sense of norms of an ideal law, the law that 
ought to be established in a socialist society. It stands to reason that these 
principles are the ideal norms of a socialist law.3 
China’s socialist legal system developed out of this defining principle: that the 
Party utilises state law to regulate social relations in order to advance the cause of 
the  dominant class and ultimately for the realisation of communism. As such, law 
had to be flexible and open to the vicissitudes of socialist development and class 
struggle, not bound by the strictures of detailed positivist legal statutes. Throughout 
periods of state bureaucracy and legal system-building (the mid-1950s) and in the age 
of mass campaigns (from the late 1950s to the late 1970s), socialist law continued to 
be conceived of as a system of norms of human behaviour based on the relations of 
domination; that is, the Party dominating on behalf of the people, with the application 
of the law open to constant change based on the requirements of Party policy.4 
Socialist Rule of Law from Jiang to Xi
The concept of a socialist rule of law (shehuizhuyi fazhi) emerged as a defining 
reform-era ideology after the Mao period. It developed along the same principles as 
those observed by Chen and Keller above in relation to socialist law: it was conceived 
as a strategy to realise the broad governance agendas of the Party. The Deng Xiaoping 
leadership of the 1980s promoted it as a way of differentiating their reformist regime 
from the chaos of the Party’s Mao-era ‘rule by man’ (renzhi) governance style (see Hurst’s 
essay in the present volume). In the 1990s, Jiang Zemin sought to improve Deng’s notion 
of rule of law by coining a new phrase, ‘governing the nation in accordance with the 
law’ (yifa zhiguo). First put forward by Jiang in the mid-1990s, yifa zhiguo refers to the 
institutionalisation of law-based governance across all areas of the state. It was inserted 
into the Constitution in 1999 and declared China’s governing strategy for reform.
The vagaries of core Party policy priorities, which shift each decade or so as the 
Party leadership group changes, means that yifa zhiguo contains a level of ambiguity 
and flexibility that can accommodate different nuances of meaning, apt for political 
leverage.5 The formula was used to promulgate and validate legal reforms through the 
Hu Jintao era of the 2000s but it was not the central discursive tool employed to define 
the Hu leadership’s overall agenda of ‘Harmonious Society’ (hexie shehui). In contrast, 
yifa zhiguo has come to the ideological foreground in the present Xi era. 
Xi Jinping’s leadership group has endowed yifa zhiguo with a more compelling Party-
centric stance, by giving its Jiang-era focus an ideological upgrade in late 2014. Yifa 
zhiguo is now an integral part of Xi’s ambitious ideological plan for a rejuvenation of 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) governance and supervision over the state through 
law. The new administration’s theoretical contribution to socialist legality has been to 
assert the idea that ‘socialist rule of law’ and ‘Party leadership’ (dang de lingdao) are two 
entirely complementary concepts, and that given this truism the Party must exercise 
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its rule through all processes of yifa zhiguo. As is explicated in more detail below, this 
assertion is important for strategic reasons, as it further embeds the Party into the state 
through law, in order to maintain the supremacy of Party rule so that the people remain 
masters of the nation. 
Party Leadership as the Core Mechanism of Accountability
Political discourse frames the parameters of governance in China. In the Xi era, the 
Party’s governance discourse of yifa zhiguo operates conceptually and in practice as a key 
ideological lever to identify and affirm power relationships for governing the nation. 
In Xi’s new era of socialism, given the corruption epidemic and the Party’s response to 
it, the Chinese leadership claims that the need for virtuous governance—or ‘governing 
the nation through moral virtue’—is even more crucial now than ever before.6 Building 
on Jiang Zemin’s original interpretation of yifa zhiguo, the Xi-era claim is that the 
Party’s role should be to focus on monitoring and supervising government employees 
in a much more comprehensive way than in previous years. Hence, in this thinking, 
Party leadership itself is the core mechanism of accountability. Given the idea that the 
government must be accountable to the people through the conduit of Party leadership, 
the Xi administration declared in 2017 that an all-encompassing new mechanism for 
greater accountability is required, and moved to expand the parameters of the authority 
of Party leadership to incorporate routine supervision and monitoring of the activities 
of all employees of the state. Among other innovations, the upshot of this political 
upgrade of yifa zhiguo is the establishment of the National Supervision Commission 
(NSC), a behemoth supervisory and prosecutorial structure that was piloted in some 
provinces in 2017. This is supposedly a state- (rather than Party-) based mega anti-
corruption and national surveillance body that effectively merges state and Party 
surveillance structures by integrating same-level Party commissions for disciplinary 
inspection, government corruption prevention agencies, and state prosecution offices.7 
Broadly speaking, the NSC monitors and inspects all state civil servants across China 
to ensure that they comply with laws such as the National Civil Service Law and the 
Criminal Law. In this respect, the Commission has the power to monitor, investigate, 
and, where necessary, detain any personnel working for any enterprise—including 
a school or university, cultural, medical or sports institution, or mass organisation—
that is effectively operated or owned by the state.8 A new State Supervision Law passed 
in March 2018, gives the NSC a total of 12 main powers. Notably, these include the 
power to investigate (diaocha) and detain (liuzhi) any China-based government 
employee (both Party members and those without Party membership) for any work-
related infringement, illegal behaviour, or suspected crime as defined by administrative, 
civil, or criminal law. Xinhua News Agency boasts that merging state and Party anti-
corruption apparatuses ‘will overcome longstanding rule of law problems in China,’ 
since it will ‘improve rule of law thinking and yifa zhiguo methods in the state’s 
capacity to punish corruption.’9 The NSC will exercise much greater surveillance and 
supervisory power over the nation’s legislature, judiciary, police, and procuratorate 
than any previous organisation.
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Since the Fourth Plenum in 2014, Xi Jinping has repeatedly declared that for yifa 
zhiguo to be effective, the Party must be able to exercise its legitimate leadership over 
all government activities, including those of the legal and security systems.10 Party 
supervisory power over all functionaries including both Party and non-Party members, 
concentrated with Xi at the helm in Beijing, now sits above any claim to supervisory 
authority or accountability that might be made by military, legal, or security institutions 
or personal.11 We saw the first signs of this bold move in 2015 with the promulgation 
of the State Security Law, which ‘grants a Party authority state powers and allows such 
powers to be exercised directly by a Party authority—a practice that only existed during 
the Cultural Revolution in the PRC.’12 Further moves were made again in late 2017 
with the announcement that amendments to the People’s Armed Police (PAP) Law 
now place the PAP under direct control of the Central Military Commission run by 
Xi himself. 
The Party Leads Over Everything
The opening paragraph of this essay gives us the necessary clues to understand 
from whence this ideological rationale for Xi’s bold new era of the Party ‘leading over 
everything’ is derived: it comes from the Soviet and Mao-era idea that the Party must 
dominate through a system of norms of conduct based on relations of domination. 
In refocussing Jiang-era yifa zhiguo to pay much greater ideological attention to Party 
leadership, Party theorists now claim that Xi’s yifa zhiguo is an advancement on both 
Deng and Jiang’s thinking on law.13 The historic decision of the Fourth Plenum of the 
Eighteenth Party Congress in late 2014 contains two key assertions about the Party 
and the law that are new to the theorising of law in China. The first assertion relevant 
to this claim is that the authority of the leadership of the Party is entirely compatible 
with the rule of law. The second is the imperative that ‘the authority of the leadership 
of the Party must be implemented across the entire process of governing the country in 
accordance with the law.’14 
Xi’s revised interpretation of yifa zhiguo rests on the assertion that there is 
a  fundamental harmony between three key conceptual elements of power in China: 
the ‘rule of law,’ ‘Party leadership,’ and the idea that ‘the people are the masters of the 
nation.’15 The rationale thus becomes as follows: it is only through Party representation 
of their interests that the people of China can claim their place as the rightful masters 
of the nation.16 A so-claimed harmony of interests between the people and the Party 
legitimates the Party’s right to represent the people. Bringing the Party and the people 
together under the yifa zhiguo umbrella allows Xi to promote the idea that the Party, 
as the vanguard of the people, must always and forever remain present and supreme 
throughout the entire process of the law. This includes not only the making of law but 
also the process of enforcement of the law.17 To leave no one in doubt of its ambitions, 
in late 2017, the phrase ‘the Party leads over everything’ (dang shi lingdao yiqie) was 
inserted into the Party’s Constitution.18 
By reworking Jiang Zemin’s original interpretation of yifa zhiguo, the Party has 
codified its leadership of everything. The ‘New-style Party Political System’ (xinxing 
dangzheng zhidu) announced in March 2018 rests on two main political truisms: first 
that ‘the Party leads over everything’ and second that the Party’s main government 
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accountability mechanism is in fact the Party leadership itself. The underlying ethos 
behind this new style of governance is that concentrated power under the core leadership 
of the Party in Beijing is a more effective accountability mechanism than Western-
liberal dispersed power-type arrangements. This is justified by dint of the ideological 
assertion that the Party that holds this concentrated power is the purist representation 
of the people.19 It is its representational status that makes the Party virtuous and thus 
most capable of leading: it leads over governance in China because its leaders possess 
an advanced nature, capable of representing the will of the people. 
Among other strategies, the Party aims to achieve its ambition to ‘lead over 
everything’ in Xi Jinping’s China by ‘organically unifying’ (youji tongyi) intra-party 
law with state law—that is, by directly governing the nation through all processes of 
the law. The Xi administration’s ideological focus on ‘comprehensively integrating’ 
(yiyuanhua) the Party into the state through law reconstitutes the Chinese governance 
landscape through a reassertion of, and renewed focus on, the idea of Party-dominated 
governance over everything, an ideal which was first espoused by communists in Yan’an 
during the 1930s.20 This integration of Party and state law is, to date, most evident in 
the supervisory ethos and laws that govern the NSC, particularly those relating to the 
investigatory powers of officials.21 It is also evident in the intention, announced in May 
2018, to fully incorporate the Party’s ‘socialist core values’ into all legislation over the 
next five to ten years, and in so doing, making accountability based on socialist values 
‘the core’ of the legislative system.22 
New Thinking, Old Roots
The focus of this essay on Party dominance enables us to discern how Mao-era 
socialist law and Xi-era yifa zhiguo are from the same ideological family tree: the latter 
derives its basic precept—that is, the idea of law being a system of norms of conduct 
based on the relations of domination—from the former. Hence, a consistent legitimising 
rationale in Xi-era Party propaganda has been the claim that for the Party to exercise 
leadership effectively, it must both supervise and remain supreme over the institutions 
that administer the law—that is, it must be above the law—so that it can effectively 
represent the people. Party supremacy over and via the law is based on the assumption 
that since it is the people who are the masters of the nation, the Party does not need 
to build overall structures of law that protect ‘the people’ from the people’s very own 
manifestation of power: the Party.23 On the contrary, the Party’s effective supervision 
of state officials confirms the claim that China is governed by the Party in ‘accordance 
with the law.’ This does not mean that the Xi leadership has in any way—so the narrative 
goes—ignored the importance of government accountability. On the contrary, it is 
seeking to redefine how accountability operates. To this end, to a much greater extent 
than in previous decades, accountability is now provided through supervision by Xi 
Jinping, the Politburo Standing Committee, and the Party-run NSC in a manner that 
protects the people against individual illicit behaviour within the Party-state at the 
lower levels. Therefore, Xi Jinping has Mao-era socialist legal ideology to thank for his 
‘Party leads over everything’ ambitions since his yifa zhiguo is indeed a system of norms 
of conduct based on the relations of domination—Party domination.






To relate abstract ideologies to the lived experiences of ordinary people is the great task of all revolutionaries. How do we then explain the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) remarkable success in mobilising workers and peasants, many 
of whom had little interest in Marxism-Leninism, to join its fervent, violent cause? 
One of the key foundations of the CCP’s successful mobilisation was its ability to tap 
into human emotions, which it did most notably and effectively through a practice 
known as ‘speaking bitterness’ (suku)—the public expression of an individual’s woes 
with the intent to cultivate sympathy toward the speaker and outrage against those who 
caused his or her suffering.1 As one of the foremost strategies the CCP used to build the 
revolutionary subjectivity of the masses, its principal purpose was to leverage morality 
and emotion to inculcate in the populace new mass identities that accorded with the 
Party-state’s ideology of class struggle. Operating through outrage and sympathy, it 
sought to build hostility towards an outgroup of class enemies and solidarity among 
an ingroup of ordinary villagers (see also Dutton’s essay in the present volume). By the 
time of the Chinese Civil War, speaking bitterness had become a mainstay of the Party’s 
repertoire of mobilisation techniques to incite villagers to pursue land reform, a tool for 
‘soliciting tales of suffering for mobilising the masses.’2 
Mobilising Outrage and Sympathy through Suffering
Although speaking bitterness was always a public act, it occurred at many different 
scales: cadres guided villagers to speak bitterness in both small, face-to-face settings 
and large mass rallies—e.g. struggle sessions and public sentencings. Early on in the 
course of land reform mobilisation, work team cadres met with local villagers, often in 
the homes of the poorest in the village, to discuss their concerns and grievances in ‘small 
groups’ (xiaozu) and ‘informal chats’ (mantanhui) (see also Perry’s essay in the present 
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volume). These meetings provided safe spaces for poor peasants and farmworkers—and 
middle peasants—to speak bitterness in focus group-like settings before their fellow 
villagers. Officials designated those who spoke suffering as ‘the aggrieved’ (kuzhu)—
literally, ‘masters of bitterness.’ Not everyone at these meetings spoke bitterness, but 
for both the speaker and the listener such affectively charged words ‘construct[ed] the 
old order as oppressive, inherently violent, and immoral by recalling instances of social 
antagonism between individuals who occupy very different positions within hierarchies 
of power in Chinese society.’3 In this way, speaking bitterness unified various strata of 
peasants—the landless, the land-poor, and even the average landholder—as ‘oppressed 
class subjects.’4 
Speaking bitterness, particularly when performed in front of large audiences at 
struggle sessions, was a highly organised process. Officials cautioned against speaking 
bitterness ‘recklessly,’ and instructed cadres to use it ‘at a proper time and against a proper 
target.’5 At struggle sessions, cadres organised the aggrieved to take turns speaking 
against their alleged oppressors. To heighten the efficacy of their storytelling, cadres 
coached speakers on their dramatic delivery, and even arranged the lineup of speakers 
to frontend those who were the best storytellers, had the most pitiful stories, and had 
the most damning and colourful evidence against their targets. As  one eyewitness 
remarked, speaking bitterness at struggle sessions was ‘ordered and methodical’ and 
‘rich in theatricality.’6
Speaking bitterness in small groups and informal chats sought to generate ingroup 
solidarity among ‘the masses’ (qunzhong) by eliciting villagers’ sympathy toward those 
who were suffering (see also Lee’s essay in the present volume). Sympathy is a powerful 
method for building ingroup solidarity: empathising with another’s pain triggers the 
same affective responses in an individual as if he or she were the recipient of pain.7 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith defines ‘sympathy’ as a ‘fellow-feeling’ 
that ‘does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation 
which excites it … . [W]hen we put ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our 
breast from the imagination.’8 Indeed, it was seeing one’s own suffering reflected in 
the stories told by others that forged this collective bond among villagers. Cadres 
viewed collective sympathy as a sign of successful speaking bitterness. Township cadres 
in Fengyang county, Anhui province, reported that speaking bitterness succeeded to 
the extent that when ‘a single person spoke bitterness, everyone sympathised’ (yi ren 
suku, dajia tongqing).9 Elsewhere in Fengyang, a township’s small group meeting had 
13 people speak about their plight and how they lived on the brink of starvation without 
land or draft animals. Touting the success of this session, the report notes that ‘there 
were three people at the meeting who “spoke bitterness” until they were in tears. Class 
consciousness, therefore, greatly increased.’10 
To facilitate the cultivation of sympathy, work teams specifically tried to recruit 
women and the elderly to speak bitterness at struggle sessions because they believed 
they could better attract sympathy from the masses. In Liyang county, southern Jiangsu 
province, cadres, in their collection of speaking bitterness material, discovered that 
nearly 200 local women had been raped by Japanese soldiers. They used these women’s 
stories to ‘educate the broad masses’ about the evils of the old feudal order, but, more 
importantly, to help locals ‘understand the roots of their own suffering.’ From this, the 
Southern Jiangsu Regional Party Committee concluded that ‘in the struggle against 
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feudal “evil tyrants” (e’ba) and landlords, women are the most powerful force in sparking 
the class consciousness of the masses.’11 These sympathetic figures helped create feelings 
of commiseration that cadres could shape into violent outrage. In a striking example 
of this, an elderly woman in Baoxi township, Chongming county, cried herself hoarse, 
prompting others to break down sobbing, after which they subjected the evil tyrant 
landlord to ferocious struggle.12
Inextricably tied to the cultivation of sympathy for the aggrieved was the elicitation 
of outrage against those who were claimed to have caused their suffering, with the 
ultimate intent to justify and mobilise violence against them. The link between outrage 
and violence is well established: outrage is an emotion that ‘motivates people to shame 
and punishes wrongdoers’ in response to perceived violations of moral norms.13 
Importantly, speaking bitterness used individual instances of landlord malfeasance 
to elicit outrage and establish hostility towards landlords as a group. These individual 
examples of moral transgression were often deployed in speaking bitterness conducted 
at struggle sessions, where the theatrical retelling of stories of suffering could most 
effectively generate outrage and instigate violence. During the public sentencing of 
evil tyrant and landlord Chen in Huaining county, southwestern Anhui province, 
an old couple entered the stage, sobbing, to tell the crowd their story of how Chen 
had beaten their son to death while attempting to settle a debt owed to him, hounded 
their daughter-in-law to death, and rendered them destitute, causing their newly born 
grandson to die of starvation. The crowd of over 2,000 people were so enraged by the 
couple’s story that they began to yell: ‘Down with the evil tyrant landlord, a blood debt 
must be repaid in blood.’14
That the Party used speaking bitterness within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
illustrates its utility as a tool of ingroup consolidation for mobilising outrage and 
violence. Wu Guo’s thoughtful and fascinating exploration of the PLA’s use of speaking 
bitterness shows how the Party used it to recruit soldiers, build camaraderie, and forge 
a violent hatred of internal ‘class enemies’ as well as the Nationalist foe.15 The Speaking 
Bitterness and Seeking Vengeance (suku fuchou) handbook, published in 1947 by the 
PLA, contains a collection of ‘classic’ speaking bitterness materials that the Party used as 
templates for PLA soldiers. With colourful titles like ‘How Vicious Are the Hearts of the 
Landlords!’ (dizhu laocai de xin duo hen ya!), ‘When Will Two Generations of Hatred 
Be Avenged, Setting One’s Mind to Eliminating Chiang Kai-shek’ (liang dai yuan chou 
he shibao, lizhi xiaomie Jiang Jieshi), and ‘Tell My Bitterness to the Party’ (ba wo de ku 
gaosu gei dang), these stories were designed to conform to generic narratives of suffering 
that could trigger the righteous indignation of soldiers before battle. Some of these 
stories of exploitation were even written in verse.16 Because speaking bitterness was 
used to provoke outrage against both the Nationalists and landed elite and strongmen 
who allied with them, cadres drew on examples of injustice from members of the local 
community to mobilise soldiers. To an audience of soldiers at the battlefield of the 
Qingcang Campaign in 1947, an elderly man surnamed Liu spoke of his abuse at the 
hands of the region’s notorious strongman—a ‘traitor-evil tyrant’ landlord named Gao 
Hongji—who beat Liu senseless after failing to extort money from him: ‘As the soldiers 
heard this, they became moved, one by one, [until] everyone shouted, “Resolutely 
avenge Old Man Liu!”’ After hearing more stories of how Gao Hongji raped women, 
ordered the demolition of people’s houses, and otherwise oppressed locals, one of the 
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army commissars led his troops to yell the slogans ‘Avenge the people!’ and ‘Resolutely 
exterminate Gao Hongji!,’ after which the soldiers ‘through gritted teeth, avowed to 
avenge the people.’17 
The Historical and Cultural Foundations of Speaking Bitterness
What were the origins of speaking bitterness? Considering the Western roots of the 
CCP’s mobilisation tactics, Frederick Yu remarked that ‘[the Chinese Communists] 
appear as such veterans of what seem to be psychiatric and psychoanalytical practices 
that one could even suspect that they had read Freud and Jung along with Marx and 
Lenin in their early revolutionary days. But there is no evidence that they did so.’18 
It is more plausible that the Party developed speaking bitterness into a structured 
technique by drawing upon cultural norms regarding the public expression of suffering 
and storytelling traditions.19 The goal of making its audience sympathise with suffering 
resembles the neo-Confucian idea that one can cultivate virtue through witnessing and 
being upset by suffering. As De Bary explains: ‘For the neo-Confucians it was the mark 
of the humane man that he could not endure the sufferings of others, but felt compelled 
to take action to remedy them.’20 The use of suffering to elicit sympathy appears to have 
been widely practiced in various contexts in pre-communist China. In an intriguing 
anecdote from his memoir of life during the Taiping Rebellion, Zhang Daye writes 
of how ferryboats often hired ‘one-headed women’—childless widows—to wail and 
tell their stories of suffering to defuse brawls among passengers by making everyone 
cry or feel deep pity.21 Shi Jianqiao, who infamously shot and killed the warlord Sun 
Chuanfang in public, disseminated pamphlets to onlookers detailing how Sun had 
murdered her father; the Nationalist media used Shi’s tale of filial vengeance to solicit 
the public’s sympathy and successfully pressured the government to acquit her.22 These 
various cultural precedents could possibly explain how the Communists came to see 
this technique as a legitimate and effective form of political education and why ordinary 
villagers may have accepted it as a practice. 
The structure of speaking bitterness and its attentive focus on public performance 
appears to be inspired by China’s folk operatic tradition. The Party did not simply find 
those who were aggrieved to serve as accusers, they actively guided them to understand 
their suffering and trained them to deliver their stories in the most effective way 
possible. Speaking bitterness, as Anagnost notes, was ‘not the spontaneous flow of pent-
up sorrow but the careful reworking of perception and experience into the narrative 
frame of Marxist class struggle.’23 The ways in which cadres coached ‘accusers’ to speak 
bitterness resembled acting lessons. In his research on the use of speaking bitterness 
during land reform in Shandong and Hebei during the Civil War, Li Lifeng observes 
that speaking bitterness participants received a great deal of instruction on how to 
deliver their tragic stories: speakers needed to learn how ‘to summarise several [of the 
landlords’] most heinous crimes  that  could  make the  masses  feel  a  high  degree  of 
hatred  and  thus a desire to join the struggle.’ 24 Cadres treated accusers like actors 
playing before an audience. A cadre would push an accuser, when delivering his or 
her stories, to ‘wear a sad facial expression’ and to ‘become an actor who can move 
the people.’ In fact, when the Party introduced speaking bitterness to the PLA during 
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the 1947 Speaking Bitterness Campaign, it used an opera—‘Wang Keqin’s Squad’—
to demonstrate the technique: at one point in the opera the titular character literally 
performs speaking bitterness on stage.25
The Legacy of Speaking Bitterness after Mao
Speaking bitterness, as a mobilisation practice, disappeared with the ascendancy 
of Deng Xiaoping, but the use of suffering to legitimise and justify state repression 
quickly resurfaced in the campaigns of the early reform era. Though the Party claimed 
to continue to draw on the experiences of the masses, it now spoke bitterness on their 
behalf. The Anti-spiritual Pollution Campaign of 1983, aimed at attacking intellectuals 
who were ‘polluting’ China with bourgeois liberal ideas, linked degenerate intellectual 
thought with societal decay—i.e. rising rates of rape, murder, and corruption. 
The ensuing Strike Hard Campaign of 1983 to 1986 used sensational, morally abhorrent 
acts, such as sexual crimes and murder, to rally public enthusiasm for a broad crackdown 
on criminals who were harming society. As Thaxton writes:
In city after city, top CCP and Public Security personnel stoked public 
indignation toward accused criminals, often issuing calls for quick, violent 
revenge against the accused … . [P]eople were sentenced and shamed in mass 
public meetings and alleged wrongdoers were paraded through the streets 
with derogatory signs around their necks while scores of police cars, sirens 
screaming, were dispatched to seize ‘criminals’ reported by ‘the masses.’26
Although speaking bitterness was never a spontaneous grassroots practice, it still 
succeeded in creating a form of mass politics that vocalised suffering that had long 
been mute or met with resignation. Today, such places have again fallen silent, as the 
masses have been moved off the stage of history, relegated to passive spectators of their 
own suffering.
Under Xi, the anti-corruption drive and the Eliminate Crime and Purge Evil Campaign 
(saohei chu’e) again resorted to sensationalised accounts of criminal activity to teach 
the masses the nature of their suffering and to provoke outrage against corrupt officials, 
drug dealers, and those who threaten social order, and to rally sympathy for the Party-
state’s harsh repression of them. Instead of the masses, it is the alleged agents of suffering 
themselves who speak. Even when it is the Party that is responsible for the suffering of 
the masses, it ventriloquises and individualises guilt through the confessions of fallen 
cadres. In the resurgence of televised confessions under Xi—a more contemporary 
manifestation of the age-old communist practice of self-criticism—allegedly corrupt 
cadres enumerate their sins to a national audience who can only applaud or remain 
silent.27 And so the Party continues to speak bitterness—to quote the title of the hit 
anti-corruption television series—‘in the name of the People.’






The political debates of the period 1945–49, although spanning a variety of subjects, were underpinned by the question of how to comprehend the imminent realisation of power by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) within 
the larger historical frame of the Chinese Revolution. By 1949, the victory of the 
Communists was no longer in doubt, and yet Mao and other leaders showed themselves 
curiously resistant to any premature triumphalism. They were, rather, concerned about 
how the Party might maintain the élan and heroic commitment of the war period after 
the beginning of socialist construction. 
It was against this historical and theoretical backdrop that Mao developed the concept 
of ‘sugarcoated bullets’ (tangyi guozhe de paodan) a formulation that first appeared in 
his ‘Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the 
CCP,’ issued in March 1949. In the conclusion of this speech, in which he argued against 
an immediate transition to socialism and warned against policies that would endanger 
the careful coalition and reform strategy that the Party had developed under the name 
of New Democracy (xin minzhuzhuyi) (see Blecher’s essay in the present volume), 
Mao alluded to the impending change through a series of theatrical metaphors. 
The revolutionary process up to the present, Mao said, had only been ‘a brief prologue 
to a long drama,’ of which the climax—the realisation of socialism—lies yet in the 
future, and would require many years of arduous work. In this frame, Mao warned 
revolutionaries of the challenges and temptations following the initial seizure of power, 
that is, the possibility that the Party might succumb to ‘love of pleasure and distaste for 
continued hard living.’ The bourgeoisie, having failed to defeat the revolution, might 
resort to flattery and temptation as the means by which to undermine revolutionary 
morale. They might, in other words, make use of ‘sugarcoated bullets’ in order to 
destroy the system of revolutionary morality that had been developed through the 
struggle of the preceding decades. 
264   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
Mao’s insistence on the continuation of arduous struggle after the formal seizure 
of power amounted to a new conception of revolutionary temporality. For Mao, 
the end of the war against the Nationalists marked the culmination of a process of 
revolutionary war and state construction in which the Communists had been engaged 
since the 1920s. Therefore, for him, the task of unifying mainland China under the 
leadership of a revolutionary government could not be understood solely within 
the Leninist or Bolshevik temporal framework. For Lenin, cleaving to a pre-Maoist 
revolutionary temporality, revolution was a concentrated moment, the hour at which 
history strikes, or that singular moment which must be grasped lest the opportunity 
for transformation slip.1 For Mao, revolution is a moment of rupture within continuity 
and continuity amidst rupture—a transformation of the strategic terrain in which the 
nature of both the possibilities and the dangers undergo a marked change from one 
state to another, but where the conquest of power by no means marks the end of the 
revolutionary process. 
Shifting Terrains of Revolution
Closely tied to this epochal change was a shift in the geographical terrain of revolution. 
Over the course of the Chinese Revolution, Mao juxtaposed the urban and the rural as 
two contending zones of political struggle, noting that the period of ‘the city leading the 
village’ (you chengshi lingdao xiangcun) had begun. It was in the cities that the problem 
of sugarcoated bullets first presented itself, as cities were the locations in which the 
rhythms of commodity production and consumption had most radically established 
themselves during the preliberation period. The problem of the city did not refer 
uniformly to all urban centres across China, but more specifically Shanghai, with which 
the concept of sugarcoated bullets was always most closely associated. Immediately after 
Mao’s address, the People’s Daily borrowed directly from his formulation of the Party 
entering the cities in order to lay out a vision of ‘transforming cities of consumption 
into cities of production.’2 The cities of the past, the authors argued, were cities of 
consumption because of the unequal and exploitative relationships they enjoyed 
with the rural periphery, whereby the countryside provided both goods and a supply 
of cheap labour in order to meet urban needs. As such, socialism would involve the 
development of heavy industry in Shanghai and elsewhere, so that these cities would 
cease to play the role of exploitative centres of parasitic consumption or sites where the 
bourgeoisie would target sugarcoated bullets against the revolution.
Hence, the political history of sugarcoated bullets from the moment of liberation 
onwards reveals a process of expansion, with Shanghai at the centre of this political 
imaginary. It began with a set of specific concerns directed against cadres who were 
entering the city for the first time, coming into contact with forms of consumerist 
pleasure that had so far been unknown to them in their rural locales. The formulation 
was also employed in the context of the Three Antis Campaign of 1951, which sought 
to eliminate problems of corruption amongst cadres. With the progression of the first 
decade of socialist construction, the formulation of sugarcoated bullets entered into the 
language of an influential propaganda drive launched in 1959 during the Great Leap 
Forward, namely the Campaign to Emulate the Good Eighth Company of Nanjing 
Road, in reference to a People’s Liberation Army detachment that had been stationed on 
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the main shopping boulevard of Shanghai at the moment of liberation. This company, 
in the language of the campaign, had succeeded in overcoming the sugarcoated bullets 
of metropolitan Shanghai by refusing to bow to the temptations offered by the city. 
The dissemination of the campaign crucially took the form of a series of plays, later 
adapted into one of the socialist period’s most enjoyable films, Sentinels Under Neon 
Lights (1964). 
In his own reporting on the campaign in his capacity as a cultural journalist in 
Shanghai, Zhang Chunqiao, who would later emerge as a member of the Gang of 
Four in the Cultural Revolution, extended Mao’s language to emphasise the problem 
of sugarcoated bullets as one of visibility and exposure. Whereas ‘enemies with guns’ 
can ‘be seen at a moment’s glance,’ he argued, the ‘fragrant breezes’ of sugarcoated 
bullets require a wariness that goes beyond that of the violent battlefield.3 Significantly, 
for Zhang, the heroism of the Eighth Company under peacetime conditions was 
demonstrated through everyday forms of asceticism and attention to the self rather 
than singular acts of heroic bravery. He says that ‘we must not neglect such “small 
affairs” as handing over a lost penny, using a wash basin for eight years, and wearing 
clothes that have been patched up thirty-eight times.’ Through these everyday acts, 
the Campaign sought to impart revolutionary élan among the younger generation as 
a defence against sugarcoated bullets. The everyday itself emerged as the site at which 
the revolution was fought through the demand to produce new modes of behaviour, 
above all amongst the young. 
Here too, there was a temporal consciousness, but of a different kind from that 
posed in Mao’s speech. While Mao had directed his warning against seasoned cadres 
about to enter the city, the problem of sugarcoated bullets in the late 1950s was bound 
up with the problem of revolutionary succession, which was articulated in terms of the 
problem of ‘revolutionary successors’ who would maintain the spirit of the pre-1949 
period as the first generation born under the People’s Republic (PRC). The problem 
of how to mould those who had not personally experienced the Civil War into 
revolutionaries became one of the enduring problems of the Chinese Revolution in ways 
that resonated with the larger problem of the cultivation of the ‘new person’ (xin ren) as 
the appropriate mould of the human for a socialist society. The Maoist envisioning of 
the new person was in many ways modelled on those virtues that Mao had associated 
with seasoned revolutionaries prior to the seizure of power—a resistance to material 
corruption, heroism, and a sense of responsibility to the Party and the collective. 
The Maoist envisioning of the new person in these terms informed the emergent 
critique of the Soviet model of socialism from the late 1950s onwards, whereby radical 
intellectuals, Zhang Chunqiao among them, called into question the Soviet reliance 
on the technical division of labour, the continued role of commodity production 
under socialism, and above all the use of material rather than spiritual incentives to 
regulate labour and productivity. In the 1960s and 1970s, this aspiration to maintain 
revolutionary succession and resist sugarcoated bullets provided the rationale for the 
Cultural Revolution, which carried injunctions to avoid material corruption to a yet 
higher level, as the whole of Chinese society was enjoined to conduct a revolution to 
the depths of their soul (see Thornton’s essay in the present volume). Significantly, 
the Cultural Revolution would also borrow from Zhang’s language of visibility and 
exposure by emphasising the enemy as he who is not visible to the naked eye or at 
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a moment’s glance, but must be exposed through a violent moment of revelation in 
order to overcome the threat of sugarcoated bullets. In much the same terms, the 
remaking of the self also invokes a language of depth, whereby revolution demands 
a transformation of the innermost depths of subjectivity. The revolutionary, therefore, 
is called upon not only to remake their own subjectivity but also to pierce beyond 
visible surfaces in order to identify failures of revolutionary discipline wherever they 
may present themselves. 
Pleasure and Play under Socialism
The problem of sugarcoated bullets recurs across this entire period as a way of 
marking the deleterious effects of material consumption on revolutionary morale. 
It highlighted the danger of a counterrevolutionary reversal not by armed defeat but 
by the gradual corruption of revolutionary vigour. As Mao’s formulation marked the 
continuing threats to revolutionary morale after the seizure of power, it seems to leave 
little room for the utopian optimism normally associated with a revolutionary process. 
It might be read together with Mao’s more philosophical notion of ‘contradiction’ 
(maodun) as the ontological status of all being, and the failure of the dialectic to ever 
truly resolve itself into a stable synthesis, in order to argue that no revolutionary victory 
is ever truly definitive, and that history always encompasses the possibility of reversals 
(see the essays by Pang and Rojas in the present volume). 
Already in his 1937 essay ‘On Contradiction,’ Mao had declared that ‘without 
contradiction, there is no world.’ Perhaps this sense of tragedy is necessary, particularly 
in a postsocialist era such as our own. At the same time, however, Mao’s critique of the 
corrupting influence of the bourgeoisie contains a hidden utopian imperative that may 
yet prove useful in future revolutionary projects, which is the demand that socialism 
also produce new modes of pleasure and happiness, ones which can assist in the 
process of forming new human beings who are no longer bound to the seductions of 
the commodity form (see Dai’s essay in the present volume). If there is a dimension 
of Mao’s injunction that might be made meaningful in our present context, therefore, it 
is that a socialist alternative be grasped not only as an amelioration of the pressing crises 
of gross inequality and environmental catastrophe, but also as a society that will invent 
modes of enjoyment and pleasure that exceed the banalities of the capitalist present. 
Taking socialist pleasure seriously also compels us to attend to the liberatory aspects 
of the history of the PRC that have otherwise been obscured by prevailing discourses 
of vulgar anti-communism, in which all socialist experiments are characterised as 
a monotone of grey. 
The history of pleasure and play across the socialist period marked an attempt to 
wrest pleasure away from the atomised limitations of commodity consumption 
through the formation of new cultural practices that would produce new modes of 
human collectivity and aesthetic experience. This took place above all in the cultural 
sphere. Less often appreciated is the fact that these cultural practices were radically 
popular because they opened the possibility of aesthetic enjoyment to those who had 
previously been denied a recognised cultural universe, and because they also sought 
to orientate the aesthetic tastes and spiritual sensitivities of their participants towards 
a radical vision of a new human being. The cultural activities of the revolution were 
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developed over the long process of revolutionary mobilisation from the People’s War of 
the 1930s through the postliberation period.4 Over the course of the People’s War, when 
the Party’s primary locus was in the countryside, this meant the Party working through 
existing cultural forms and seeking to meld them with new radical content, most clearly 
actualised in the traditional peasant dances known as ‘rice sprout songs’ (yangge). From 
1949 onwards, as its cultural activities turned towards the cities, and as the problem of 
sugarcoated bullets became a key part of the Party’s political project, socialist pleasure 
was prioritised through an emergent infrastructure of factory recreation and a new 
film system (see also Lam’s essay in the present volume). Whereas once workers would 
have been marginalised within the commodity system of an urban metropolis such 
as Shanghai, socialism sought to open up a new world of pleasure that would offer 
a definitive break from the atomised consumerism of the colonial past. 
A recovery of the Maoist conception of pleasure and play may draw not only on the 
institutional history of workplace recreation or the details of these socialist cultural 
texts themselves, but also in the ways that the question of pleasure became a site of 
explicit theoretical articulation at some of the most pressing moments of the revolution. 
The use of ‘theory’ here should be understood with its full range of connotations and as 
a recognition of how the Chinese Revolution threw existing categories into contestation 
and produced its own modes of self-reflexion, rather than being a mechanical repetition 
of prior socialist experiments. The development of socialist pleasure received explicit 
theoretical articulation in 1964 through a discussion series held in the Southern Daily 
titled ‘How Should One Live in Order to Be Happy,’ subsequently published as an edited 
collection.5 This discussion serves as an appropriate bookend to the early socialist period 
and the present discussion because it recapitulates the positions and experiments of the 
preceding phase of experimentation, but did so in terms that anticipated the Cultural 
Revolution.
The editors of the collection argued in their conclusion that the divergent classes 
of bourgeoisie and proletariat possessed their own distinct ‘conceptions of pleasure’ 
(xingfuguan), with the proletariat being endowed with a conception of pleasure that is 
‘collective’ (jiti) and ‘spiritual’ (jingshen) rather than individualist and material.6 This 
experience of pleasure is explicitly counterpoised to the atomised form embodied in 
sugarcoated bullets. For these editors, the foremost experience of happiness in a socialist 
society consisted of nothing less than the practice of ‘arduous struggle’ (jianku fendou) 
itself, understood as the transformation of the world through labour and the ongoing 
overturning of oppressive social relationships. In this conception, revolutionary praxis 
itself becomes pleasurable, engaged in an ongoing battle against the bourgeois notion 
of pleasure as material consumption, and envisioning a society in which labour itself 
would become life’s first form of pleasure. It is, perhaps, in the very struggle against 
sugarcoated bullets as the bourgeois mode of pleasure that socialism also discovers and 
engenders its own experience of collective pleasure.
Life beyond the Commodity Form
The formulation of pleasure in these terms provides suggestive connections with 
other dimensions of the Chinese Revolution, including the glorification of labour 
(see the essays by Wang Ban and Meyskens in the present volume). There is also much 
268   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
that is absent in this theorisation of pleasure, above all the question of sex and sexuality, 
which fared poorly throughout much of the revolution due to the state reification of 
heterosexual reproduction. Yet most suggestive and powerful of all is the celebration of 
insurrection as a site at which a new conception of pleasure might also present itself, 
and the understanding of insurrection as continuing after the seizure of power. The 
revolution may not, strictly speaking, be a dinner party, but for the Maoists it can and 
should be pleasurable in order to befit the name of revolution at all. The pleasurable 
contents of insurrection, and the insurrectionary contents of pleasure, are most closely 
in accord with the larger grammar of Mao’s thought, which, from its earlier beginnings 
and through the decades of high Maoism, offers an affirmation of the legitimacy of 
insurrection, even against the Party-state itself. 
The collective euphoria experienced by the Red Guards during the early years of the 
Cultural Revolution, when they witnessed Mao on the rostrum of Tiananmen Square, 
can, in these terms, hardly be dismissed as simple evidence of a personality cult, or 
even as violent revolutionary fanaticism, but must be taken seriously as that collective 
pleasure of insurrection based on the promise of a better world born through struggle. 
The intensification of the struggle against sugarcoated bullets during the Cultural 
Revolution coexisted with a new collective experience of pleasure as insurrection. 
More relevant to the present, perhaps, is how the celebration of arduous struggle 
and insurrection as pleasurable connects with the reappearance of an insurrectionary 
politics in our own time. From Tahrir Square to the varied articulations of the Occupy 
Movement, these moments of collective struggle and euphoria may as of yet offer 
glimpses of a society based on a different and more expansive notion of pleasure than 
the banality of the present. Just as the heady days of insurrection in revolutionary 
China sought to strike a blow against the dangers of sugarcoated bullets, so too, in our 
present moment, as we grasp for a life beyond the commodity form and its atomised 
forms of pleasure, may we glimpse in our own insurrections the possibility of a different 
way of living and playing together. 





‘Superstition’ (mixin) and ‘heterodoxy’ (xiejiao)  are related concepts in contemporary Chinese political discourse, although the terms’ scope has continued to fluctuate from the time of the founding of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) in the early 1920s through the present. As in the West, the 
notion of superstition in China emerged from earlier antecedents to assume a central 
role in the discourse of modernity. Like many other terms associated with modernity—
including xianfa (constitution), kexue (science), and even the term xiandai (modern) 
itself—mixin (literally ‘confused belief ’) was probably a Japanese loanword, as was 
‘religion’ (zongjiao), another neologism with which superstition has a complicated 
relationship.1 Although the earliest cited usages of mixin appear during the last 
decades of the Qing, the word was in common use by 1920. By 1930 the eradication of 
superstition was an essential component of the revolutionary programmes of both the 
Nationalist Party (guomindang, hereafter GMD) and the CCP.
Imperial Antecedents
The term from late imperial political usage that provides the clearest discursive 
antecedent for mixin is xiejiao, literally ‘heterodox teaching.’ Xie can also be rendered 
as perverse, evil, or heretical, and thus the state’s preferred translation for the heterodox 
organisations (xiejiao zuzhi) banned today is ‘heretical cult.’ Legal codes from the Ming 
Dynasty (1368–1644) established statutes criminalising ‘sorcerers and black magic’ 
(xieshu, literally ‘heterodox arts’) and became the precedent for legislation under 
the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), which adopted them verbatim. The codes banned 
‘fraudulent summoning of evil spirits’ (jia jiang xie shen), creation and use of charms, 
spirit writing, membership in illegal groups like the millenarian Buddhist sect of 
the White Lotus, and secret meetings of worshippers organised by those who ‘feign 
270   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
virtuous deeds to incite the people’ (yang xiu shanshi, shanhuo renmin). Conducting or 
organising any of these activities was a capital offense, and adherents were punishable 
with 100 blows of the heavy bamboo.2 Though the word superstition was not yet in use, 
its core concept is reflected in the discourse of fraudulence that the codes’ architects 
used to frame these crimes. The gods were always false, leaders always charlatans, and 
believers always deluded. These assumptions remain central to superstition discourse 
in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), though today they are articulated in a way 
consonant with Marxist theory.
Even before the fall of the Qing, however, superstition in the form of popular religion 
was targeted by reformers who saw it as antithetical to the construction of a modern 
state. The first campaign against popular religion was mounted in north China under 
the auspices of Yuan Shikai, Governor-general of Zhili. Forcible transformation of 
local temples into schools and other measures curtailed ostensibly malignant forms 
of religious practice, and reformers also discovered the fiscal advantages to be gained 
from confiscating real estate and other material resources. Though many of the 
targeted practices resembled the illicit behaviour labelled as ‘xie’  in the Qing code, 
the early campaigns eschewed the terminology of heterodoxy in favour of superstition. 
This reflected more than semantics, for the discourse of heterodoxy left space for 
many popular religious practices that, however unseemly from the point of view of 
Confucian orthodoxy, remained acceptable, or least legal. Superstition, by contrast, 
encompassed virtually all forms of religion, popular or otherwise, and pointed to 
a  fundamental distinction between the scientific and modern on the one hand, and 
the primitive and irrational on the other. As a pejorative, superstition was less sinister 
than heterodoxy and, for the time being, had fewer criminal implications; but its use 
signified a fundamental epistemological shift in the thinking of early twentieth-century 
political elites. Discursively, superstition was a far more categorical and absolutist term 
than heterodoxy, and its deployment signalled the unprecedented and eventually 
permanent intrusion of the state into local society.3 
Superstition in the Republican Era
As the discourse of superstition came into wide use in the first decade of the Republic, 
intellectuals, revolutionaries, and state-builders used it to attack elements of traditional 
belief systems seen to impede the modernisation of the state, in particular those linked 
to popular religion and the mantic arts. New Culture Movement (xin wenhua yundong) 
intellectuals made superstition a main target. For example, Chen Duxiu wrote in 1918 
that standing at the crossroads of modernity, China had to choose between the ‘path of 
light that leads toward republicanism, science, and atheism,’ or the less attractive ‘path 
of darkness leading toward autocracy, superstition, and theism.’4 Though socialism 
would soon replace republicanism in Chen’s hierarchy of values, science and atheism 
remained indispensable components—and superstition was the enemy of both. 
By the end of the 1920s, positive scientism had become the dominant epistemological 
paradigm of revolutionaries and intellectuals, and the legitimacy of any new political 
order depended on its ability to mobilise the cognitive and moral truth claims of 
scientific modernity in service of nation-building. In this context, superstition’s modern 
associations with backwardness, irrationality, and political ignorance combined with 
 AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM   271
traditional connotations of crime and disorder to make it a fundamental oppositional 
category against which the modern Chinese state—and in particular the then newly-
founded CCP—defined itself.5 
Superstition was also a distinctly political problem for GMD and CCP cadres in the 
1920s. In the north China countryside, loosely organised, religiously inspired rural 
militias had arisen in response to the depredations of militarist forces, demonstrating 
an ability to coalesce into ever larger confederations—as happened in 1926 when an 
uprising in northern Henan threatened the control of militarist Wu Peifu. The CCP’s 
mobilisation efforts in rural north China depended on the cooperation or tolerance of 
these groups, called ‘spear societies’ (qianghui) after the long pikes with red tassels that 
were their trademark weapon. Though in communist iconography the tasselled spear 
came to symbolise rural uprisings in general, their actual use reflected the poverty of 
the poorly armed militias, who made up for lack of firepower with rituals believed to 
grant invulnerability from the bullets of more heavily armed warlord troops. These 
ranged from spirit possessions to the ingestion of written charms, taught by itinerant 
and often charismatic martial arts masters.6 Heterodoxy, in other words, had outlived 
the imperial state and now posed a distinct challenge for those vying to succeed it. 
Indeed, Republican news media continued to describe such movements in just these 
terms. For instance, one article in Beijing’s Morning Post (chenbao)—one of the most 
widely read Chinese language newspapers of that time—called the invulnerability 
rituals ‘heterodox arts’ (xieshu), while another decried the ‘heterodox language’ militia 
leaders used to dupe ignorant commoners.7 
Though all agreed the militias represented a ‘stubborn and chronic superstition’ 
(wanjiu mixin) that was, in the words of Chen Duxiu, part of the ‘intrinsic nature of 
primeval rebellion among a backward peasantry,’ opinions varied on whether and how 
to mobilise them.8 Ultimately, the CCP issued a resolution at its July 1926 Plenum 
recognising that the infiltration of rural society might require cadres to ‘go along with 
the superstitions of the masses in order to further develop our work.’9 
Mao’s Early Views on Superstition
It was in this context that Mao equated superstition and popular religion in his 
1927 ‘Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan.’ In it, he posited 
four meshed systems of authority that oppressed Chinese society and thus needed to 
be overthrown: the state, the clan, religion, and patriarchy. Elites exercised religious 
authority (shenquan) via the system of ghosts and spirits (guishen xitong), the panoply 
of popular deities spanning the overlapping pantheons of Buddhism, Daoism, and local 
popular religion. Mao reported that nascent peasant associations had appropriated local 
temples for offices and income, terming the seizures ‘public revenue from superstition’ 
(mixin gongkuan); Liling county was particularly notable for the popularity of icon-
smashing and proscriptions on superstition (jin mixin). Mao’s analysis operated in 
a materialist-functionalist frame: it was not so much that peasants were liberating their 
minds from irrational religious beliefs—although their political awakening certainly 
implied that too—but rather seizing the means of religious cultural production 
(and thus the income it produced) from local elites who used it to maintain the class 
system. 
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It was in keeping with Mao’s theme of rural awakening that the peasant associations 
became the architects of these campaigns, but the modus operandi he described and 
the discursive frame he employed actually resembled the Nationalist government’s 
campaigns against superstition in the lower Yangzi delta in 1928 and 1929. The latter 
also sought to seize revenue streams—in this case to aid the fiscal consolidation of 
the Nanjing regime—but the agency lay  with the Nationalist government, whose 
modernising reformers held that peasants must be shown the way to demolish the 
religious authority that obstructed progress, since a ‘religious society’ was incompatible 
with a ‘new society based on the Three People’s Principles.’10 
Contemporaneous with the anti-superstition campaigns, the GMD suppressed 
the Red Spears and similar groups with varying degrees of success. Spear societies 
became active again during the War of Resistance against Japan, along with other 
popular salvific movements like the Way of Pervading Unity (yiguandao). All were 
outlawed with the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Though superstition in all its 
guises remained anathema to the Party-state, the mode and target of discussion (and 
suppression) shifted over the course of the Maoist and reform eras. 
The Fight against Superstition in Maoist China
Anti-superstition efforts in the early PRC employed activist cadres and mass 
campaigns to limit or eradicate local religious practices. Combat Superstition Teams 
dispatched to the village in the 1950s represented the first wave.11 Their targets 
most often were local religious customs associated with annual festivals and rites of 
passage. Theoretically, this brand of superstition represented the persistence of a false 
consciousness that stymied political awareness in the countryside. As a vestige of the 
sociocultural structures underlying class exploitation in the old society, such customs 
remained a threat to the new one. More concretely, they represented an economic drain 
on local society—a misallocation of resources badly needed for industrial development 
and poverty alleviation, which was a view that had much in common with the classic 
Confucian and Mohist critique of extravagant funerals.
In the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward and accompanying famine, media reports 
of ‘superstitious rumours’ proliferated. In 1962, for example, talking toads in Jilin were 
said to prophesy widespread death among the elderly; in 1963, tales of chinless ghosts 
roaming the streets of Shanghai allegedly kept nervous textile workers from leaving the 
mill at night. These disturbing phenomena, along with the apparently limited success 
of earlier anti-superstition efforts, contributed to the inclusion of ‘feudal superstition’ 
(fengjian mixin) in the list of corrupt practices targeted by the Socialist Education 
Movement.12 
The height of the Cultural Revolution brought widespread attacks on all forms of 
religious practice. Superstition was, of course, a central characteristic of the Four Olds 
(si jiu)—customs, culture, habits, and ideas—first enunciated in Chen Boda’s 1966 
People’s Daily editorial ‘Sweep Away All Monsters and Demons’ (hengsao yiqie niugui 
sheshen).13 The ‘monsters and demons’ of Chen’s title, in fact, derived from traditional 
Buddhist demonology, and the rhetorical potency of the metaphor itself demonstrated 
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the ways in which superstition remained the Party’s cultural bogeyman. This is perhaps 
nowhere more apparent than the designation of Mao’s personality cult as a ‘modern 
superstition’ in the early reform era.14 
Superstitious Revivals in the Reform Era
The reform era transformed superstition discourse in a number of ways. The loosening 
of control over religious and economic life permitted the revival of folk religious customs 
while increasing opportunities for charlatanism. In the early 1980s, the state recognised 
three broad categories of superstition. ‘Religious superstition’ (zongjiao mixin) referred 
to all forms of religious belief, in particular those of the universal organised religions 
practiced in China: Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. ‘Common superstitions’ (yiban 
mixin) were those conducted at the individual or household level, such as ancestor 
worship or the eudaemonic practices associated with holidays and festivals. ‘Feudal 
superstitions’ (fengjian mixin), on the other hand, were those related to traditional 
mantic practices such as divination, geomancy, exorcism, and healing, or unauthorised 
forms of communal popular religion that were often distinguished by charismatic 
leadership and seen as threatening to social order.15 This formula retained an overall 
theoretical consistency with earlier understandings, while essentially narrowing the 
range of activities to be actively suppressed as feudal superstition to those covered 
under the late imperial rubric of heterodoxy. 
Current PRC criminal law reflects this shift. The three times superstition appears 
in the criminal code, it is accompanied by the term ‘heterodoxy.’ These all occur in 
Article 300, one of 27 provisions in the section on ‘Crimes of Disrupting Public Order’ 
(raoluan gonggong zhixu zui). Article 300 prohibits the organisation and utilisation of 
‘superstitious sects, secret societies, and heterodox organisations,’ but distinguishes 
between acts that ‘sabotage the implementation of the state’s laws, that result in 
death; or that defraud money, property or result in sex crimes.’ The first two instances 
are punishable by up to life in prison, while sexual exploitation through the use of 
superstition is punished according to the article on rape (Article 236, qiangjian zui), 
and the illegal procurement of property or funds is prosecuted according to the article 
on fraud (Article 266, zhapian zui). 
Expanding upon these laws, on 30 October 1999 the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress adopted a ‘Resolution on the Suppression of Heterodox 
Organisations, and the Prevention and Punishment of Heterodox Activities’ in order to 
facilitate the suppression of the increasingly popular spiritual movement Falun Gong, 
whose rapid growth the state found threatening.16 This resolution resembled the late 
imperial legal codes in terminology and approach. The measure also emphasised the 
distinction between organisers and adherents, ordering that the former be prosecuted 
harshly. Followers, on the other hand, were assumed to be unwitting dupes and thus 
should be ‘differentiated from the criminal elements’ leading heterodox organisations 
or activities. Article 300’s distinction between activities that threaten the state and 
those that materially defraud its citizens, moreover, is analogous to that made in the 
two substatutes appended to the law on heterodoxy in the Ming and Qing codes.
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Nevertheless, the resolution was thoroughly couched in the discourse of socialist 
modernity, and reflected social and cultural dynamics unique to late twentieth-century 
China. It ordered ‘all corners of society’ to mobilise against the illegal sects in a manner 
reminiscent of the mass campaigns of the Maoist era (see Li’s essay in the present 
volume). It also emphasised ideological work, stipulating a long-term educational 
and propaganda effort to raise awareness about illegal cults while at the same time 
promoting scientific and technological literacy. One result was the Campaign to Revere 
Science, Leave Heterodoxy Behind (chongshang kexue, yuanli xiejiao yundong). As a 
2005 reader issued by the Shanxi provincial anti-heterodoxy association explained, 
even though Falun Gong had been soundly defeated, ‘various heterodox cults acting in 
the name of false religion have reappeared in certain parts of the country, particularly 
the countryside.’17 
The reader laid out ten major differences between proper religion and heterodox 
cults, ranging from millenarian theory to supernatural belief to social function. Not 
surprisingly, these differences establish xiejiao as a negative category of religion: 
everything that religion does, xiejiao perverts. More remarkable is the construction 
of religion as a positive category in which the word superstition does not appear 
once. Though the tract concedes that there are negative aspects that require correct 
government policy to control, orthodox religion in general serves a positive social 
function by promoting social order and harmony in interpersonal relationships, and 
by ‘upholding the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system.’ It serves as a ‘spiritual 
support and expression of the people’s respect and reverence of supernatural forces’—
in wholesome contrast to the fraudulence of heterodox teachings.18 
The absence of superstition in this discussion reflects the ironic truth that there is 
currently more tolerance for popular religious belief and practice than at any other time 
in the history of the PRC. Returning to the formula of the early reform era cited above, 
‘common superstition’ is often criticised in the media but is no longer recognised —at 
least publicly—as false consciousness signifying the reemergence of the class system or 
a threat to New China. ‘Religious superstition’ is not only tolerated but, if the Shanxi 
tract is any indication, openly endorsed as beneficial to social and political order. 
‘Feudal superstition,’ a category whose definition had already narrowed substantially 
in the early 1980s, is now largely limited to the illegal religious organisations that the 
late imperial and modern Chinese states have endeavoured, with varied success, to 
eradicate.





Where is China going? How will it influence world politics in the twenty-first century? Such questions currently vex commentators not only in the West, but within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as well.1 In his first 
month as China’s leader in 2012, Xi Jinping addressed this concern when he proposed 
the ‘China Dream’ (zhongguo meng) as his vision of the PRC’s future direction. Such 
discussion of directions and dreams is actually part of a broad and ongoing debate 
about the ‘moral crisis’ that China faces after four decades of economic reform and 
opening up. Public intellectuals from across the political spectrum, thus, are engaged 
in ‘patriotic worrying’ (youhuan yishi), where they feel that it is their job to ponder the 
fate of the nation, and to find the ‘correct formula’ to solve China’s problems.2
Curiously, in this broad discussion, the concept of ‘surpass’ (chaoyue or chaoguo, 
also translated as ‘overtake’) keeps appearing to inform the ‘correct formula’ for saving 
China. Such surpass-speak characteristically invokes a quotation from Mao Zedong’s 
1956 speech on ‘Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions:’
Given 50 or 60 years, we certainly ought to surpass the United States. This 
is an obligation … . [I]f after working at it for 50 or 60 years you are still 
unable to overtake [ganguo] the United States, what a sorry figure you will 
cut! You should be read off the face of the earth. Therefore, to surpass the 
United States is not only possible, but absolutely necessary and obligatory. 
If we don’t, the Chinese nation will be letting the nations of the world down 
and we will not be making much of a contribution to humanity.
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This essay will do two things. It will conduct a textual analysis of this quotation, first 
to locate it in its original context, and then to examine how it has been rejuvenated 
as a guide for the future. It will argue that surpass-speak is part of what can be called 
a  ‘nostalgic futurology’ that looks back to key events, like the Great Leap Forward, 
in order to look ahead to Chinese success in the twenty-first century. 
Mao’s Strategy to Surpass America
To imagine China’s future, Mao employs a quantitative strategy measured by material 
metrics, as opposed to a qualitative strategy that invokes normative ideas. Earlier in the 
Speech, Mao stated that ‘a country like ours may and ought to be described as “great.” 
Our Party is a great Party, our people a great people, our revolution a great revolution, 
and our construction is great, too.’ ‘Greatness’ (weida) here is not measured in terms of 
the normative measures of cultural achievement, economic equality or social justice, 
but in terms of the material metric of steel tonnage. ‘Great,’ thus, is the quantitative 
measure of ‘big’ (see also Tomba’s essay in the present volume). Big-ness is not absolute, 
but relative, and for Mao, relative to the United States:
The United States has a population of only 170 million, and as we have a 
population several times larger, are similarly rich in resources and are 
favoured with more or less the same kind of climate, it is possible for us to 
catch up with the United States. What are your 600 million people doing? 
Dozing? Which is right, dozing or working? If working is the answer, why 
can’t you with your 600 million people produce 200 or 300 million tons 
of steel when they with their population of 170 million can produce 100 
million tons?
Surpassing the United States is not simply a national goal for China, but is seen as 
the PRC’s responsibility to the world. Otherwise, as we saw above, Mao feels that China 
would be letting the world down, and therefore would not deserve any respect. 
This was the first time that Mao spoke of his goal of surpassing the United States. 
The speech ‘Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions’ was delivered 
at a preparatory meeting for the Communist Party (CCP)’s Eighth Party Congress that 
was held in September 1956. At that time, Mao was fighting against Zhou Enlai and 
others who wanted to consolidate the economic and social gains of land reform and 
move forward with the nationalisation of industry. They criticised Mao’s more radical 
economic ideas as a ‘rash advance’ (maojin) that was ‘proceeding too rapidly without 
due consideration of actual circumstances and likely consequences.’3 Mao’s 1956 Speech 
was, thus, an early expression of his push for what would later be called the Great Leap 
Forward (1958–62). 
Drawing on Khrushchev’s 1957 prediction that the Soviet Union would surpass the 
United States in 15 years, ‘surpass Britain and catch up to America’ (chao ying gan 
mei) became Mao’s key slogan for the Great Leap Forward. According to Bo Yibo, ‘the 
stated goal of the Great Leap Forward movement was to overtake Britain in iron and 
steel production within just two years, overtake the Soviet Union within four years, 
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and overtake the United States within ten years.’4 As we can see, Mao became more 
ambitious as the movement developed.5 But as is well-known, this ambition eventually 
led to humanity’s greatest famine, killing more than 30 million people.6
Public Intellectuals Revive ‘Surpass America’
Why then would this passage about surpassing America, which exemplifies the key 
ideas of the disastrous Great Leap Forward, continue to be popular? Actually, according 
to CNKI—China’s largest academic database—Mao’s 1956 ‘Strengthen Party Unity’ 
speech was not regularly cited in the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s. It regained currency in the 
2000s as a way of explaining China’s dramatic economic expansion, in the context of 
predictions that the gross domestic product (GDP) of the PRC would soon surpass that 
of the United States. In the past decade, Chinese confidence has grown, with Chinese 
futurologists no longer just speaking of the ‘rise of China,’ but also of the impending 
‘fall of the West.’ For many, Mao’s dream of a strong China that could beat America was 
coming true, and even according to his 1956 timetable of ‘50 or 60 years’—i.e. between 
2006–16.7
For instance, military intellectual Colonel Liu Mingfu, development economist 
Hu  Angang, and political scientist Zhang Weiwei each come from very different 
institutional backgrounds and pursue quite divergent approaches to China’s future. 
But they all appeal to Mao’s surpass-speak to make similar arguments about China’s 
unstoppable rise. For Colonel Liu, China is in an era of strategic opportunity, where 
it is incumbent to seize the day to become the ‘world’s No. 1’ superpower (shijie diyi). 
To describe why Mao is the top ideologist of ‘world No. 1-ism,’ Liu conducts a close 
textual analysis of the surpass quote from Mao’s 1956 Speech. Mao is heroic for Liu 
because he dared to craft a grand plan to surpass America, stating again that beating 
the United States would be China’s great contribution to humanity. Liu is fascinated by 
the Great Leap Forward, seeing the outrageous ambition of this Maoist mass movement 
as the key to China’s success in the twenty-first century. He admits that the Great Leap 
Forward ‘suffered defeat,’ and that ‘a large population met an irregular death,’ but 
concludes that ‘the “Great Leap Forward” is the roadmap for surpassing Britain and 
catching up to the United States’ in the twenty-first century because it shows that in 
order to create a new path one has to destroy old rules.8 Liu thus understands Deng 
Xiaoping’s post-Maoist reform and opening policy as a continuation of Mao’s Great 
Leap Forward plan. China’s current and future success, here, is the upshot of Mao’s 
ambitious aspirations from the Great Leap Forward era. Colonel Liu’s ideas and 
arguments are important because his China dream of the PRC as a strong military 
power has been largely adopted by Xi Jinping.
Hu Angang also quotes the ‘Strengthen Party Unity’ speech at length to argue that Mao 
and the Speech are important because they created ‘the strategic concept of catching 
up to, and then surpassing the United States.’9 He elaborates on Mao’s materialist 
quantitative way of measuring power and status, quoting him to explain that because 
of its large territory, large population, and superior socialist system, China is the only 
country in the world that is capable of catching up to and surpassing the United States.10 
Like with Liu Mingfu, Mao is important for Hu because he dared to dream of China as 
the ‘world’s No. 1’ power.11 Hu’s understanding of China’s future direction is important 
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because he is a very influential public intellectual. He leads Tsinghua University’s China 
National Conditions Research Centre, which writes important reports for the Chinese 
government and consults for the PRC’s Five-year Plans.
In asides and footnotes, Hu actually acknowledges the problems with Mao’s ‘leap-
forward’ economic policy, and is quite critical of the negative economic impact of 
the Great Leap Forward: ‘By 1965, GDP was 41 percent less than it would have been 
had the Great Leap Forward not taken place.’12 Former World Bank Chief Economist 
Justin Yifu Lin explains that Mao’s ‘leap-forward strategy’ did not lead to sustainable 
economic growth because its capital-intensive development model defied the country’s 
comparative advantage of abundant cheap labour.13 Since Mao’s political campaigns 
to develop heavy industry—i.e. steel production—actually retarded China’s economic 
growth, Mao’s grand political goal of surpassing the United States could only be 
achieved by discarding Mao’s economic policies. Like most economists, Lin contrasts 
the problematic first three decades of the Maoist planned economy with the successful 
three decades of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening policy. Hu, on the other hand, 
follows China’s New Left to rehabilitate the Maoist period, arguing that ‘China’s pre-
1978 social and economic development cannot be underestimated.’14 
Back to the Future
It certainly is odd to imagine China’s future in terms of the audacious aspirations and 
disastrous results of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. But this is not 
simply a historical lesson—Mao’s ‘great leap strategy’ is back in vogue. China’s recent 
‘great leap forward mentality’ can be seen in the leadership’s demands for rapid and 
glorious achievements, such as the PRC’s high-speed train network, a domestically-
built aircraft carrier, and a Chinese space station. This rush to greatness, critics argue, 
has led to a rash of accidents, including a major train accident in 2011, as well as to 
broader social and environmental problems (see Lora-Wainwright’s essay in the present 
volume).15 Hu, however, is unconvinced, reasoning that Mao’s 1956 ‘Strengthen Party 
Unity’ quotation is actually the origin of the economic reform plans unveiled by Deng 
Xiaoping in 1979. Hu thus concludes: ‘It now seems that Mao Zedong’s grand strategy 
for China is on the verge of being realised. China overtaking the United States in terms 
of GDP, regardless of how it is calculated, is inevitable.’16
While Colonel Liu focuses on military power, and Hu focuses on economic power, 
Zhang Weiwei emphasises political power. His main goal is to show that China’s political 
system is better than the (Western) democratic system. To do this, he cites many 
Western sources to ‘prove’ that China will soon surpass the United States economically, 
politically, and culturally—and even argues that his native Shanghai is already better 
than New York. In a section called ‘To the Top’ of The China Wave, Zhang reviews 
British economist Angus Maddison’s predictions of the PRC’s surpassing the United 
States by 2015, before noting: ‘This reminds many Chinese of a famous observation 
made by Chairman Mao in 1956.’ Zhang then reproduces the surpass quotation in full, 
to conclude that ‘Maddison’s prediction seems to tally well with Mao’s forecast back 
in 1956.’17 After citing predictions from PricewaterhouseCoopers and Goldman Sachs 
that China soon will overtake the United States, Zhang concludes the chapter by stating 
that ‘like it or not, China has risen, or to say the least China is now being held by many 
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as the “No. 2” in the world economy. Taking a longer-term view, China will eventually 
be “No. 1” in the future.’18 Once again, Mao’s 1956 surpass-speak is applied alongside 
current economic analysis to explain how the PRC is destined to become the world’s 
top power. Once again, the huge differences between Mao’s method of analysis and 
those of Maddison, PricewaterhouseCoopers, or Goldman Sachs are effaced simply 
because they come to similar conclusions. In a later book, China Surpasses: The Glory 
and Dream of a ‘Civilization-State,’ Zhang combines Mao’s ‘surpass America’ trope with 
Xi Jinping’s China Dream to argue that China has already overtaken ‘the West and the 
Western model,’ and will soon be at the top of the world.19 Zhang is important because 
his books sell millions of copies in China, are assigned readings for CCP study sessions 
in Shanghai, and were reportedly read by Xi Jinping in the summer of 2012, just before 
he became China’s leader.20
Misreadings
Certainly, it is not strange for China’s public intellectuals to think about how the PRC 
could be a great power, while looking to previous predictions of when China would be 
the world’s No. 1 power. What is remarkable, however, is the ‘correct formula’ China’s 
patriotic worriers invoke to guide their national and global aspirations: they all choose 
a reference to the Great Leap Forward, which employed such a different path from the 
reforms that facilitated China’s rejoining the world in 1978. In fact, employing Mao’s 
surpass-speak does not make sense in the twenty-first century because it embodies 
two serious misreadings: a) rather than being an example of causation (i.e. Mao’s Great 
Leap Forward idea led to China’s current economic success), it is actually an example 
of correlation (Mao’s prediction of success in 50–60 years came true in spite of his 
tragic policies that retarded China’s economic growth); and b) Mao’s notion of national 
power measured in terms of steel production does not make sense in the context of the 
current global political-economy, which is characterised by transnational production 
chains in a knowledge-based innovation economy. Indeed, China’s massive production 
of steel is now not seen as a strength, but is taken as a sign of the weakness of domestic 
overcapacity that has to be exported through state-subsidised projects like the Belt and 
Road Initiative.21 
The attraction of Mao’s surpass-speak, thus, is not economic, but political. Liu, Hu, 
and Zhang all stress the ideological and conceptual value of the ‘Strengthen Party Unity’ 
speech. For the New Left, this is part of a campaign to rehabilitate Mao, the Great Leap 
Forward, and the Cultural Revolution in order to confirm the continued relevance of 
socialism and the CCP in China. In many ways, it is an example of nostalgia for the 
imagined equality and order of the Maoist period, which is figured as the antidote for 
China’s current money-worship society. Mao’s 1956 Speech continues to strike a chord 
because it was memorised by a whole generation of Chinese who grew up during the 
Cultural Revolution. Its currency also benefitted from the rise of Maoist websites like 
Utopia in the 2000s, which further publicised such radical thought. Thus, surpass-
speak is a key example of what could be called China’s ‘nostalgic futurology.’






(Translated by Craig A. SMITH)
The revolutionary origins of the term ‘third world’ (di san shijie) in China are now buried under a litany of developmental discourse. After all, as Deng Xiaoping famously said: ‘Development is the only hard truth’ (fazhan shi ying 
daoli)—everything else is fanciful utopianism. In China in the twenty-first century, 
belonging to the third world is not a source of pride and revolutionary potential as it was 
in the Mao era, but a stigmatised and shameful mark of backwardness. The changing 
connotation of the concept—from the starting point for revolution to the beginning 
of a technocratic development path—registers a profound sense of the abandonment of 
China’s revolutionary potential. 
Mao’s Theory of Three Worlds
The fluidity of the concept of the third world has posed conceptual conundrums. 
These questions were further refracted through the perspective of those asking them. 
Did China belong to the third world, the Soviet bloc, or was it something else entirely? 
Early on, Mao wavered on this question, and even into the early 1960s had not yet 
formalised a theoretical answer to the problem. 
In this period, Mao experimented with different ideas such as an ‘extremely 
expansive … intermediate zone’ (zhongjian didai) between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. This shifting zone included a ‘great many capitalist, colonised, 
and  semicolonised countries in the three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa.’1 
He also detected contradictions among imperialist powers, and between imperialist 
nations and oppressed nations. As Mao’s thinking developed over time, these different 
formulations and experimental lines of thought developed into the Theory of Three 
Worlds (san ge shijie de lilun).
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In the early 1970s, the concept of the third world became a regular part of CCP 
discourse and self-identity. In November 1971, Zhou Enlai described China by saying: 
‘We are also very poor and very backwards. As a developing nation, we are a part of 
the third world.’2 Also, in the same month, at the 26th Session of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, China regained its seat in the assembly. In his first speech as 
the leader of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations, Qiao Guanhua stated: ‘Just 
as the vast majority of Asian, African, and Latin American nations, China is a third 
world country.’ In January 1974, the People’s Daily published the Xinhua News Agency’s 
authoritative interpretation of the third world:
The third world is the new power progressively forming after World War II. 
The countries of the third world suffered under the oppression of imperialism 
and colonialism for extended periods of time, and still face the aggression, 
bullying, and intimidation of the superpowers today. Economically, these 
countries are all developing countries. The vast majority of Asian, African, 
and Latin American countries are in the third world.3
This was followed by the unequivocal statement: 
Socialist China is part of the third world. China is also a developing country 
and shares a common [fate] with the countries and peoples of the third 
world, facing a common enemy and a common struggle. With mutual 
sympathy and mutual support, they unite to advance in the struggle to 
oppose imperialism, oppose colonialism, and oppose hegemony. 
However, the CCP had yet to formulate an integrated understanding of the divisions 
that defined the three worlds.
The Theory of Three Worlds was formally announced on 22 February 1974. In a 
meeting with Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda, Mao Zedong explained: 
I see the United States and the Soviet Union as the first world … . The United 
States and the Soviet Union have many nuclear bombs and are both quite 
wealthy. The second world, including Europe, Japan, Australia, and Canada, 
have fewer nuclear bombs and are not as wealthy, but remain wealthier than 
the third world. We are the third world, and the population of the third 
world is very large. Apart from Japan, all of Asia is in the third world. The 
entirety of Africa is in the third world, and so too is Latin America.4
Three days later, Mao also said to the leader of Algeria: ‘China is part of the third 
world. Due to politics, economics, and various other aspects, China cannot be 
compared to the rich and powerful nations, but must be grouped among the relatively 
poor countries.’5
However, Mao Zedong did not expand upon this issue with a detailed analysis. 
Rather, on 10 April 1974, with Mao’s approval, Deng Xiaoping related the Theory of 
Three Worlds in an address to the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly. 
He spoke in a formal language to clearly and succinctly express Mao’s theory:
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Regarding the transformation of international relations, there are three sides 
or three mutually integrated and mutually contradicting worlds existing 
under the real conditions in today’s world. The United States and the Soviet 
Union are the first world. Asian, African, and Latin American developing 
countries, as well as the developing countries of other regions, make up the 
third world. The developed countries that lie between these two comprise 
the second world.6
As a representative of the Chinese government, Deng continued: ‘China is a socialist 
country and a developing country, and therefore is a part of the third world. China is 
not nor ever will be a superpower.’ This principled refusal to become a superpower did 
not mean that China did not desire nor reflect on power; quite the contrary, its aim 
was to fight alongside oppressed nations and bring about a new way of conducting 
international relations and thinking about one’s place in the world.
Cold War Politics
In the Cold War system that took shape following World War II, the competition for 
supremacy between the United States and the Soviet Union delivered the world into 
a precarious situation. In order to gain a peaceful and safer environment, the newly-
established People’s Republic of China (PRC) endeavoured to unite those outside of 
the spheres led by the United States and the Soviet Union. Postwar leaders such as de 
Gaulle and Tito were also searching for roads to development that could transcend 
Cold War thinking and maintain independence. Historical events such as the 1955 
Bandung Conference, the 1961 Conference of Non-aligned Countries, and the 1964 
establishment of the Group of 77, all pointed to the efforts of a growing number of 
nations to engage in new forms of united and peaceful development. 
Furthermore, beginning in the 1960s, the divisions and discord between the PRC 
and the Soviet Union grew deeper by the day. A series of activities by the Soviet Union, 
including the deployment of troops to Czechoslovakia, the Sino-Soviet border conflict 
at Zhenbao island, and the amassing of millions of troops along China’s border, all 
prompted Mao to increasingly consider the Soviet Union as a social-imperialist state. 
In order to check and balance the Soviet threat, China began to contact, engage in 
negotiation, and finally establish official relations with its ideological enemies—the 
governments of the ‘counterrevolutionary’ United States, West Germany, and Japan, as 
well as the non-socialist or even anti-communist countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. 
Naturally, Mao’s introduction of the Three Worlds Theory in this complicated and 
fluctuating historical context was informed by the diplomatic survivalist strategy of 
‘making friends with distant states and attacking those close by’ (yuanjiao jingong). 
However, as a plan born of necessity, this strategy in no way implied that Mao was 
willing to renounce his revolutionary perspective. On the contrary, to act according to 
the real situation, to act from practical experience, and to be flexible in distinguishing 
the enemy, ourselves, and friends according to the time and place, were all in 
complete accordance with the theories he expressed in his essays ‘On Practice’ and 
‘On Contradiction’ (see the essays by Aminda Smith and Rojas in the present volume).
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Although Mao never published an article specifically dealing with the Three Worlds 
Theory, his judgement of the world situation and China’s position in it clearly emerged 
from his discourse and practice. First, he based his division of the three worlds upon 
military and economic strength. Second, this division transcended ideology and Cold 
War mentality, placing both the United States and the Soviet Union in the same world. 
Third, by situating socialist China in the third world, he indicated his willingness to 
occupy the same camp as Asian, African, and Latin American countries, bridging 
differences and establishing an extensive united front to oppose the hegemonic rule of 
imperialism and colonialism.
Although Mao’s Three Worlds Theory divided the world into three, it was by no 
means a hierarchical structure. The first world was not superior to the third world, 
just more powerful militarily and more developed economically. From this position 
of strength, it dominated the weak, attempted to rule the world imperialistically, and 
threatened to undermine world peace with its war bases. It was, therefore, an unjust 
and immoral world. In his words: 
We are the third world! I support the countries of the third world engaging 
in mutual support. The people of the third world must unite. Just as humans 
fear mosquitoes, so too shall the powerful nations fear the small nations.7
It is clear that Mao did not consider the three worlds to be a standard diplomatic 
strategy of the ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’ schools.8 The theory still maintained his belief in 
world revolution and internationalism, amassing strength to push through the low tide 
of revolution that plagued the 1970s by striving to unite anti-imperial and anti-colonial 
power. Despite the Sino-American Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, he also asked for 
Zhou Enlai to resolutely convey the position that ‘wherever there is oppression there 
will be resistance. Countries must be independent, nations must be liberated, and the 
people must revolt. This has become the irresistible tide of history.’
Post-Maoist Interpretations
After Mao passed away, the Cultural Revolution soon ended and the Party restored 
Deng Xiaoping. Deng then had Hu Qiaomu organise a writers group to draft an article 
discussing the topic of ‘Mao Zedong’s Theory on the Division of the Three Worlds.’9 Deng 
himself repeatedly revised this article during the writing process and recommended 
multiple discussions in the Politburo, in each province, and in the military divisions. 
Finally, the article was published in the People’s Daily, People’s Liberation Army Daily, 
and Red Flag. This was the first important theoretical document in which the CCP 
addressed the international situation since the nine criticisms of the Soviet Union in 
1963–64. It established the basis for the fundamental diplomatic policies of the Deng 
Xiaoping era. However, unlike Mao, Deng did not emphasise world revolution, instead 
favouring peace and development. 
Current Party theorists generally praise Deng for this revision, seeing this as 
a useful development of the Three Worlds Theory to overcome the limitations of Mao 
Zedong’s version.10 Deng attributed the East-West divide to a difference in politics 
and the South-North divide to an economic difference, which transforms the latter 
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into a  developmental issue. Particularly in the final stages of the Cold War, when 
the outcome was inevitable, and amidst the discourse of judging the defeated and 
bidding farewell to the revolution, the Chinese people gradually became accustomed 
to examining the history and present conditions of the third world through the lens of 
economic development. All that remained of the third world was poverty, backwardness, 
underdevelopment, and a lack of civilisation—a position to be escaped from with 
increasing haste. In today’s China, the division of the three worlds is possessed of 
a concrete hierarchical meaning, with the third world occupying the lowest substratum 
as the ‘other’ of the entire world structure.
In the past, the third world was the locality of the Chinese self in the Cold War. It was 
the place of China’s subjectification. However, in the post–Cold War world China’s 
subjectivity is consciously being shifted to a position above that of the developed 
countries of the West. At the same time, the third world has been other-ised while 
its stereotype has been internalised within the Chinese episteme. This transformation 
is even clearer when seen alongside the neoliberal global order indicated by China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organisation, and China’s rise to become the second largest 
economy in the world.
In Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri categorically assert that the spatial 
division into three worlds is already an outmoded paradigm, as ‘we continually find 
the First World in the Third, the Third in the First, and the Second almost nowhere 
at all. Capital seems to be faced with a smooth world—or really, a world defined by 
new and complex regimes of differentiation and homogenisation, deterritorialisation 
and reterritorialisation.’11 Although it may be tempting to give in to the thought that 
‘empire has no outside,’ this position excessively stresses the homogenous nature of 
today’s world structures. In contrast to Hardt and Negri’s conception of the empire/
multitude, the Maoist discourse of the ‘third world’ retains powerful insight into the 
constant reterritorialisations carried out through globalisation.12 It is only in those 
places which span or fracture borders that there is the possibility of the emergence of 
new political thought and practice. 
The third world is not necessarily located only in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but 
may be close at hand—as every place of poverty and every destitute person is the third 
world. We must strive to recover the third-worldism that Mao formulated through 
the dialectical relationships of ‘world peace, national liberation, people’s democracy, 
and socialism.’13 Despite global capitalism’s unceasing self-renewal through reliance on 
technological advancement, and despite the relentless tightening of hegemonic rule, 
we must strive to reunite, through mutual assistance, deliberation, and the fight against 
capitalism, the entirety of the third world across all of its oppressed and exploited 
countries, classes, societies, and individuals. In the third world we find a uniqueness, 
subjectivity, and unity that, although weak, cannot be ignored. 







‘Thought reform,’ or ideological remoulding, has been and remains a key tenant of leadership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The standard phrase in Chinese is sixiang gaizao, the reformation or refashioning of 
sixiang—a term that is difficult to render into English in a way that captures its range 
of meanings, which span from ‘thought’ to ‘ideology’ to ‘way of thinking.’ Thought 
reform in the CCP has a cultural affinity with deeper pathways in Chinese thought, 
most notably the Confucian commitment to self-cultivation (xiuyang) and the mandate 
of dynastic rulers to transform the people through state-sponsored education (yili 
jiaomin or jiaohua). Nonetheless, communist thought reform is substantially different 
from these traditional norms and expectations in Chinese statecraft for two reasons. 
First, technological and geopolitical changes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
brought the model of, and the communication technologies for, mass politics. Second, 
China’s father of the nation, Sun Yat-sen, adopted the sinews of Bolshevik organisation, 
including the commitment to an ideological Party—in his case, the Nationalist Party 
(guomindang)—under a supreme leader whose thought should guide all political 
activity. Then, beginning with the purge of its early leader Chen Duxiu in 1927, the 
CCP embraced the Stalinist version of a text-based, ideological Party in which ‘thought 
errors’ (sixiang cuowu) or ‘erroneous line’ (cuowu luxian) could spell political defeat 
and personal demise (see the essay by Ishikawa and Smith in the present volume). 
This model was perfected, if we can use that word, by the Yan’an leadership under Mao 
Zedong in the 1940s, and it remains a political technology much valued by China’s 
current leadership under Xi Jinping. Thought reform remains a key component of the 
‘pedagogical state’ that Chinese governments since Sun Yat-sen have required of their 
cadres and have tried to enforce on an unruly and generally disinterested public.
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In his now famous 1942 ‘Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art,’ Mao 
Zedong gave what has become the canonical example of revolutionary thought 
reform—his own:
I started off as a student at school, and at school I acquired student habits, so 
I felt ashamed about performing any manual labour, such as carrying my own 
bags, in front of all those students who were incapable of carrying anything 
for themselves. I felt that intellectuals were the only clean people in the 
world and that workers, peasants, and soldiers were in general rather dirty. 
I could wear clothes borrowed from an intellectual, because I considered 
them clean, but I would not wear workers’, peasants’, or soldiers’ clothes, 
because I thought they were dirty. When I joined the revolution and lived 
among workers, peasants, and soldiers, I gradually became familiar with 
them, and they got to know me in return. Then and only then the bourgeois 
and petty-bourgeois feelings taught to me in bourgeois schools underwent 
a fundamental change. Comparing intellectuals who have not yet reformed 
with workers, peasants, and soldiers, I came to feel that intellectuals are not 
only spiritually unclean in many respects but even physically unclean, while 
the cleanest people are workers and peasants; their hands may be black 
and their feet soiled with cow dung, but they are still cleaner than the big and 
petty bourgeoisie. This is what I call a transformation in feelings, changing 
over from one class to another.1
Thought, in Mao’s testimonial, is more than an idea, it is a fundamental attitude, 
what in modern Chinese is often called one’s taidu, which in English corresponds to 
concepts such as ‘orientation,’ ‘value assumptions,’ ‘commitments,’ and ‘judgment.’ Most 
recently, on 29 July 2018 the Organisation and Propaganda Departments of the Central 
Committee of the CCP announced a new campaign for local Party branches to lead 
in ‘Promoting the Spirit of Patriotic Struggle and Making Great Contributions in the 
New Era.’2 Their instructions to local Party units reflect the core assumptions of thought 
reform—implementing government policy (in this case promoting a spirit of patriotism 
among intellectuals) through propaganda and explanations carried out in small group 
study under the watchful eye of the local Party officials.
This essay offers an introduction to this key concept from the Mao era with some 
reflections on its relevance in Xi Jinping’s China. What is thought reform in practice? 
Why does it matter for Party leaders in the commercialised, globalised, politically-
secularised China of the twenty-first century? Is there a life beyond the Party for 
thought reform? For instance, could thought reform have a role in progressive politics? 
To address these questions, I offer an introductory history of thought reform in 
four scenes: prehistory, intentions, experiences, and legacies. This deeper historical 
perspective exposes the cultural and historical weight of thought reform in China’s 
modern political culture and suggests alternatives to Xi Jinping’s version that live on 
from that historical experience.
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Reforming the People through the Rites: A Prehistory of Thought Reform
The political application of thought reform, or the modification of assumptions, 
habits, and values to suit the norms of a cultural or political elite is not new to China. 
‘Transform the people through the Rites’ (yili jiaomin) is a political maxim recorded 
in the ancient Classic of Rites.3 It endorses the transformative power of correct models. 
Its constant repetition by Chinese governments and leading thinkers for the past two 
thousand years reflects a shared belief in the educability of humans to achieve good 
governance. By the eve of the twentieth century, Chinese scholar-officials continued to 
‘reform the people through the Rites’ by propagandising the sacred edicts of the Kangxi 
Emperor and later Qing monarchs in xuanjiang lectures elaborating on the emperor’s 
moral maxims.4 These maxims included general moral injunctions, such as ‘filial piety 
and brotherly submission’ and ‘instruct sons and younger brothers’ to avoid wayward 
behaviour, and practical advice to ‘cultivate peace and concord in your neighbourhood’ 
and ‘show that you prize moderation and economy.’ The maxims included political 
reminders, as well, to ‘pay your taxes promptly’ and ‘combine in collective security 
groups (baojia) in order to put an end to theft and robbery.’
These lectures were not simply in books. Local magistrates were instructed to recite 
the maxims and expound upon their meaning in monthly public meetings. Handbooks, 
such as Li Laizhang’s 1705 Explanations of the Sacred Edict Lecture System, literally 
mapped out how to hold these meetings, down to diagrams showing the placement 
of the tablets with the maxims and altars, and the locations where both scholars and 
townsfolk should stand, as well as instruction on how to hold the meeting and fill out 
the registers of good and bad behaviour.5 This was basic political thought reform in 
Qing China: public education or jiaohua. That it was not particularly effective by the 
end of the nineteenth century did not diminish the appeal or the collective impulse to 
find and inculcate correct thought to produce good governance.
The Intentions: Awakening the Leaders, Then the Cadres, Then the People
The intentions of thought reform in the CCP leadership have deep cultural resonances 
about the educability of people, as well as clear and coherent goals and practices suitable 
to an ideological party. Thought reform in its modern political form emerged in Sun Yat-
sen’s constitutional idea of ‘political tutelage’ (xunzheng).6 This was Sun’s explanation 
for putting democracy off for another day, because by the 1920s he had come to feel 
that the Chinese people were not ready for democracy and required instead a period 
of political education during which his one-party state would inculcate modern civility 
in the masses. This responsibility (or presumption, depending on one’s point of view) 
was enthusiastically embraced by his successors—Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist 
Party, as well as the CCP, most famously under Mao Zedong. Chiang’s efforts were 
unsuccessful—spectacularly so in the desultory New Life Movement (xin shenghuo 
yundong) of the 1930s.7 Mao’s efforts at public thought reform, on the other hand, were 
effective. ‘Rectification’ (zhengfeng) was the political education and reform movement 
to train Party leaders and rank and file members that Mao perfected in Yan’an in the 
1940s.8 When undertaken seriously, this form of political training resembles nothing so 
much as Bible study in small groups run by your local police department (with officers 
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from the intelligence service and military on hand when needed). Individual study, 
public confession of your sins, review of your personnel record, and public propaganda 
about role models (and a few negative role models to show what is to be avoided) define 
a CCP rectification campaign (see Mertha’s essay in the present volume). Rectification 
was taken to absurd and tragic extremes in the Cultural Revolution, but it has been 
a staple of political life in the CCP since the 1940s. Xi Jinping’s current anti-corruption 
drive belongs to this lineage of rectification.9
Rectification is a political process that Frederick Teiwes has documented as being 
a ‘persuasive-coercive continuum.’10 That is, the CCP version of political tutelage always 
ranges from warm and fuzzy advertising and efforts to persuade individuals to change 
how they think about themselves and the world along with incentives and penalties 
designed to encourage correct behaviour, to straight up use of force in censorship, 
arrest, public humiliation, and imprisonment. Thought reform is considered to be part 
of Party ‘thought work’ (sixiang gongzuo) and operates as much through the Party’s 
public propaganda system as through small group study sessions for Party cadres and 
government leaders. To see Xi Jinping sitting down at a ‘study session’ (xuexi xiaozu) 
with senior leaders may look ludicrous to outside observers, but it makes sense to Party 
leaders as part of a successful model of political training, discipline, and motivation. 
It worked to bring the CCP to power 60 years ago, so why not now?
Experience: Promise, Penitence, and Punishment
The reality of thought reform naturally varied over time and in diverse contexts, 
but we can trace a general arc, both for elites and common folk. Early experience 
suggested something of the promise of thought reform to build consensus, explain 
revolutionary change, and create a sense of hope and purpose. By the mid-1950s the 
experience of penitence, of being humiliated and corrected outweighed the promise 
of thought reform as it became clear that to survive one had to submit. In short, the 
corruption of power began its work on what had been, at least potentially, a redemptive 
and community-building technique. When it was voluntary (even with a fair amount 
of peer pressure), the techniques and goals of thought reform could have a salutary 
role in a political community. However, when applied with the direct threat of force, 
and especially by a leadership in a hurry-up mode unwilling to invest the time it takes 
to make such fundamental changes in one’s psychology, thought reform transformed 
into a particularly nasty form of punishment. By the late 1950s it had already become a 
tool of political oppression—effective in shutting down unwanted speech (and, to some 
degree, unwanted thought itself), but useless in building community or coordinating 
productive effort.
Recent literature on Mao’s China, especially the experience of intellectuals, is replete 
with examples of the political misrule and personal abuse that came in the form of 
thought reform. Even those who embraced thought reform in the early 1950s as a way to 
expiate the sin of enjoying a bourgeois life at university while the Chinese working class 
had suffered and who loyally served changing Party lines, such as the historian Zhou 
Yiliang, had to submit to the humiliating public criticism and painful denunciations 
of their own teachers and friends.11 For many others, thought reform under Mao 
was much worse. Fang Lizhi, the notable astrophysicist who became famous after the 
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1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and their violent suppression, discovered his faith 
in democracy and hatred of Party dictatorship precisely through the thought reform 
‘labour’ to which he was subjected during the Cultural Revolution. Unlike Zhou, Fang 
was a product of CCP-controlled universities and had no bourgeois guilt to expiate. 
When he saw the miserable lives of the coal miners among whom he was thrown at 
his ‘7 May Cadre School,’ Fang concluded that the Party had flat-out failed to serve the 
interests of the workers and peasants (see Karl’s essay in the present volume). He gave 
up on the Party and turned instead to the open scepticism of international science as 
a better tool with which to judge policy.12 Ironically, Mao’s vision of thought reform 
through living and working with China’s labouring masses had also worked in Fang 
Lizhi’s case, though the revolutionary ‘change in feelings’ produced by the thought 
reform was not what Mao would have prescribed.
Thought reform has not been limited to intellectuals and Party elites. Stories of local 
teachers and village officials, and even of urban layabouts and prostitutes brought in 
to be reeducated by the Party likewise reflect the range of experiences and responses to 
thought reform.13 As was the case with intellectuals, when applied carefully and with 
some sensitivity to local conditions, this form of political mobilisation could produce 
positive results, but when applied inflexibly, quickly, and without concern for local 
conditions, it was little more than personalised tyranny.
Legacies: Public Transcripts and Progressive Potential
Thought reform is still with us in China today. At the National Propaganda and 
Ideology Work Conference in August 2013, Xi Jinping issued a directive to ‘tell China’s 
story well’ (jianghao zhongguo gushi).14 That means teaching the ‘correct’ version of 
China’s history and values according to current Party policy. This story not only appears 
in the public media and propaganda in China, but also forms the content of thought 
reform study sessions for Party members and government leaders today, as we saw in the 
July 2018 announcement at the beginning of this essay. Nevertheless, thought reform in 
contemporary China is inextricably tied up in the persuasive-coercive continuum that 
has marked it since Yan’an, and even the most reasonable and mild suggestions carry 
the shadow of the ‘big stick’ that can be brought to bear as needed. The sharp end of 
the thought reform stick has been tragically demonstrated in the reeducation camps 
across Xinjiang in which hundreds of thousands of PRC Uyghur and Kazakh Muslims 
have been forcibly detained over the past year (see also the essays by Yi Xiaocuo and 
Bulag in the present volume). On 9 October 2018, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region government produced regulations legalising ‘anti-extremist ideological 
education’ (qu  jiduanhua jiaoyu) at various ‘education and training centres’ (jizhong 
jiaoyu zhuanhua zhongxin).15 Party thought reform now extends to ethnic relations in 
a troubled region.
Given that many Chinese people do not embrace the Party’s version of the ‘China 
story,’ why does Xi Jinping keep talking about this? The answer, we have seen, is that 
thought reform is an irreplaceable constituent part of the ideological Party. Such political 
organisations can no more do without ideological remoulding than the theology of the 
Church or Uma can do without prayer. The compelling question about thought reform 
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in China today is: does anyone care? Never mind China’s politically secularised society, 
one can reasonably ask: do the majority of China’s some 90 million CCP members take 
thought reform seriously? 
The pervasive corruption in the Party and the brutality of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption 
drive suggest that thought reform in the CCP has failed to produce the desired ‘noble 
attitude’ among China’s Party cadres. Nonetheless, thought reform, study sessions, 
and punctilious attention to ideological phrasing (tifa) are all part of what James Scott 
identified as the ‘public transcript’ elites tell each other to bolster their self-confidence 
and to justify their privileges.16 More importantly, the fundamental assumptions 
undergirding thought reform remain vibrant across Chinese society today: that 
behaviour can be fundamentally shaped by moral education, that the common people 
broadly lack such a moral compass, and that some elites have the cultural learning 
and awareness (often couched as suzhi, or ‘personal cultural refinement’) that entitle 
them to offer guidance in practical ethics to their social inferiors. On the other hand, 
it is not impossible for an inspired and capable figure outside the elite to harness 
the mobilisation potential of thought reform to help create a social movement. This 
possibility alone explains the current CCP leadership’s commitment to censorship and 
intellectual repression.





Despite Lenin’s preliminary misgivings about trade unions as bulwarks of economic conservativism only concerned with improving labour conditions under capitalism, he also saw them as sites of revolutionary potentiality, akin 
to tinder across which the Bolshevik message could be ignited and spread. After the 
October Revolution, Lenin considered trade unions to be ‘an indispensable “school 
of communism” and a preparatory school that trains proletarians to exercise their 
dictatorship, an indispensable organisation of the workers for the gradual transfer of 
the management of the whole economic life of the country to the working class (and not 
to separate trades), and later to all the working people.’1 Still, Lenin’s enduring distrust 
of trade union’s spontaneous and ‘conservative tendencies toward economic demands’ 
carried over from the revolutionary era to postrevolutionary governance. Unions 
could not be trusted to act on their own. They were powerful bodies without a head to 
guide them. For this reason, in his early writings from the prerevolutionary period, he 
demanded that all Party members be active in the unions, seeking to influence their 
membership.2 After the establishment of the Soviet Union, he further argued that 
the proletarian dictatorship ‘cannot work without a number of “transmission belts” 
running from the vanguard to the mass of the advanced class, and from the latter to the 
mass of the working people.’3 
As a transmission belt, the Leninist union was supposed to convey the directives of 
the Party leadership to the workers, and feed the opinions and reactions of the latter 
to the Party, implying a circular movement that stands in marked contrast with the 
linearity of production lines. One century later, this canonical interpretation of Lenin’s 
words remains crucial to understanding the role of the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU, zhonghua quanguo zonggonghui), the only union legally allowed to 
exist in China. To this day, the ACFTU—which currently has more than 300 million 
members—remains structured according to the Leninist principle of ‘democratic 
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centralism’ and continues to function as a transmission belt between the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and the workers. The current leadership of the CCP has 
made abundantly clear that it does not intend to reconsider its relationship with the 
union. At the Sixteenth National Congress of the ACFTU, held in October 2013, Prime 
Minister Li Keqiang expressed the hope that ‘the trade unions at all levels continue 
to develop their role of bridge and link [qiaoliang he niudai] between the Party and 
government and the masses of the workers and employees, rallying these broad masses 
to the cause of the modernisation of the country.’4 Such expectations were confirmed 
almost verbatim five years later, in October 2018, when both Prime Minister Li Keqiang 
and Politburo member and Party chief-ideologist Wang Huning took the stage at the 
Seventeenth National Congress of the ACFTU to reiterate the CCP’s view of the union.5
Nevertheless, these formulaic statements, common among both Party and 
union leaders, do not tell the whole story. In line with the ambivalence in Lenin’s 
conceptualisation, they hide a history of contention about what the role of a union 
should be that spans the entire existence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Through the voices of union and Party leaders of times past, in this essay I will show 
how, beyond the apparently smooth surface of orthodoxy, the relationship between 
the CCP and ACFTU has often been marred by seething tensions, ready to explode at 
critical economic and political junctures.
1951
Founded in May 1925 as a coordinating body for the activities of leftist unions 
nationwide, by the early 1930s the ACFTU had fallen into irrelevance due to the 
deteriorating political situation in the wake of the falling out between the CCP and 
the Nationalist Party. The CCP decided to revive it in the summer of 1948, when 
victory in the Civil War was in sight.6 In those early years of consolidating political 
power, the Party saw the organisation of the Chinese labour movement into a rigid and 
exclusive hierarchical structure as being instrumental to mobilising and controlling 
the human resources needed to rebuild the national economy.7 At the same time, the 
Chinese leaders were wary of the political risks involved in allowing the existence of 
a strong, organised national union. The compromise—encapsulated in the 1950 Trade 
Union Law—entailed a national union built on the basis of the Leninist principle of 
‘democratic centralism’ (minzhu jizhongzhi), a structure that required the minority to 
submit to the will of the majority and the lower levels to obey the higher levels. The 
ideological assumption was that the ACFTU, a ‘mass organisation voluntarily formed 
by the working class’ (gongren jieji ziyuan jiehe de qunzhong zuzhi), shared exactly the 
same interests as the Party, which was the vanguard (xianfengdui) of that same working 
class.8
According to Mark Frazier, in the first months after the foundation of the PRC: 
thousands of private-sector employees left unemployed by the collapse of 
industrial activity during the Civil War returned to their factories to demand 
their jobs back. They wanted higher wages, improvements in benefits and 
working conditions, and guarantees of full-time employment. In the state-
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owned factories, Communist military cadres who had been placed in certain 
critical factories to ‘supervise’ factory directors often seized power from 
them, with predictable upheavals in basic operations.9 
This led to a situation in which ‘workers struck at will and frightened capitalists 
closed their factories.’10 The necessity to restore production and regain control over 
the economy led the Party to strengthen the political role of the ACFTU, a move 
that caused widespread mistrust and even hostility among the workers, who came to 
perceive the union as a tool in the hands of management. In response, in August 1950 
the authorities launched a campaign against ‘bureaucratism’ (guanliaozhuyi) within the 
ACFTU, encouraging it to be more open and responsive—and less formal and rigid—
to the needs of workers.11
It was against this uncertain background that, in August 1950, the People’s Daily and 
Workers’ Daily published a speech by a Party cadre named Deng Zihui on the work of 
the ACFTU in southern and central China.12 According to Deng, the union had become 
detached from the masses. Going even further, he argued that, although in the public 
sector the union and the Party were both working for the wellbeing of the workers and 
the country, some differences between the functions of the union and those of the Party 
could not be avoided. For this reason, he reckoned that it was necessary to admit that, 
in certain circumstances, it was possible for the union to adopt a ‘standpoint’ (lichang) 
different from the Party. 
This apparently mild assertion triggered a heated debate. Li Lisan, a prominent Party 
leader and labour organiser during the Republican era who was then concurrently 
serving as ACFTU Chairman and Minister of Labour, intervened in support of Deng’s 
thesis. In a speech given in March 1951, he affirmed that, although under the new 
government, the administration and the working class converged, it was inevitable for 
‘some small contradictions’ (xie xiao de maodun) between workers and management to 
survive. For instance, even in the state sector there could be differing views regarding 
wages.13 Still, Li was careful to express his disagreement with Deng Zihui regarding 
the existence of different standpoints between the union and the administration. 
Such a distinction was substantially wrong because ‘under the “New Democracy,” 
public and private interests overlap and therefore the standpoint of the union and the 
administration also overlap. Wherever there is a difference, it can just be said that it is 
a matter between “fundamental standpoint” [jiben lichang] and “concrete standpoint” 
[juti lichang].’ In other words, while the Party still determines the fundamental 
standpoint, this may require modification to suit concrete situations.
In a draft official document written on behalf of the ACFTU in September 1951, 
Li further distinguished between two sets of potential contradictions that could affect 
the work of the union: the contradiction between ‘general interests’ (zhengti liyi) and 
‘individual interests’ (geren liyi), and that between ‘long-term interests’ (changyuan liyi) 
and ‘ordinary interests’ (richang liyi).14 In his view, while ‘in the state enterprises the 
workers are the owners and there are no class conflicts nor exploitation, therefore the 
effects of the development of production are always beneficial for both the individual 
and general interests of the working class, as well as for its long-term and ordinary 
interests,’ it was impossible to deny that ‘there remain some contradictions in the 
practical problems of workers’ lives, on issues regarding labour conditions.’ On this 
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basis, he argued that it was of the utmost importance that even state enterprises be 
equipped with a union strong enough to represent the workers and protect their 
interests. 
In October 1951, Li Lisan repeated his views in a report directly addressed to Mao 
Zedong, urging him to take a position in the debate.15 No official reply was given. 
However, months later, on 20 December 1951, during an enlarged meeting of the Party 
group of the ACFTU, Li was subjected to ferocious criticism.16 In strict Party jargon, he 
was accused of having committed three fundamental mistakes: first, he had ‘completely 
misunderstood the nature of state enterprises,’ confusing the relations between workers 
and enterprise under the new socialist government with the previous situation under 
the rule of the Nationalist Party; second, he had ‘denied the role of the Party as a guide 
of the union, considering the latter as the highest representative of the working class;’ 
and third, he was guilty of ‘subjectivism’ (zhuguanzhuyi), ‘formalism’ (xingshizhuyi), 
‘routinism’ (shiwuzhuyi), and ‘paternalism’ (jiazhangzhi de zuofeng). This attack not 
only put an end to Li’s political career but also crystallised the discursive boundaries 
for the role of the ACFTU in communist China for years to come.
1957
As the Party-state prepared to launch the First Five-year Plan in 1953, the priority of 
the ACFTU shifted even further towards boosting production. In the winter of 1955, 
the Chinese authorities decided to nationalise industry, a development that required a 
major restructuring of industrial relations. Although the nationalisation was presented 
by the official propaganda as a historical step forward towards the end of capitalist 
exploitation, many workers formerly employed in the private sector experienced 
a deterioration in labour conditions. In particular, while in the past workers had at 
least felt that they were morally entitled to fight their employers, with the entrance 
of the Party-state in the ownership of their enterprises, they lost even that discursive 
right. Paradoxically, the symbolic claim that the workers had become the ‘master of 
the state’ ended up weakening their practical power. The union cast off the pretence 
of representation and shifted ‘from a unionism of class struggle aimed in fact against 
the employers to a state unionism, dedicated to nothing else than production growth 
and the management of social services.’17 
As if this was not enough, a reform of the wage system launched in 1956 took a heavy 
toll on the workers, causing a wave of strikes.18 Mounting labour unrest in those months 
led the Chinese authorities to reconsider the right to strike, which had been omitted 
from both the Common Program of 1949 and the Chinese Constitution of 1954. Mao 
Zedong was the first to bring up the issue during a meeting of the Central Committee 
in March 1956:
It is necessary to allow the workers to go on strike, allow the masses to protest. 
The demonstrations have their basis in the Constitution. If in the future the 
Constitution is to be amended, I suggest adding a freedom of strike, it is 
necessary to let the workers go on strike. This can benefit the  resolution 
of the contradictions between the workers, the directors of the factories, and 
the masses.19 
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Mao reiterated his stance in February 1957, in his famous speech ‘On the Correct 
Handling of Contradictions among the People.’ In his opinion, the contradictions 
among workers and those between workers and the national bourgeoisie had to be 
considered ‘contradictions among the people’ (renmin neibu maodun) and therefore 
had to be solved through the method of ‘unity-criticism-unity’ (tuanjie-piping-tuanjie) 
(see also Rojas’s essay in the present volume). According to Mao, the episodes of labour 
unrest that had taken place the previous year had three different roots: the failure of the 
Party to satisfy the economic requests of the workers; a bureaucratic and formalistic 
approach by the leadership; and the inadequate political and ideological education of 
the workers.
After less than one month, the Central Committee of the CCP adopted a ‘Directive on 
How to Handle Strikes by Workers and Students.’20 This document—which to this day 
constitutes the only public official statement by the CCP leadership on how to manage 
strikes—espoused Mao’s point of view, claiming that in the event that the masses 
had been deprived of their democratic rights and had no other choice than adopting 
extreme measures such as strikes or protests, these actions ‘were not only unavoidable, 
but also necessary,’ and therefore had to be allowed. Moreover, the Directive stated that 
these actions did not go against the Constitution—and there was therefore no reason to 
forbid them—but at the same time suggested that Party committees infiltrate the strikes 
in order to take the lead and prevent the masses from being ‘stranded on the wrong way 
by some bad elements.’
Where did this leave the ACFTU? The Directive mentioned the union only three 
times, twice in passing, and once just to emphasise that Party committees had to ‘lead 
the union and the youth league to actively reflect the opinions and the requests of the 
masses.’ Facing irrelevance, when the CCP launched the Hundred Flowers Campaign, 
the union leadership saw an opportunity to reaffirm the role of the ACFTU on the 
national stage. On 8 May 1957, the Workers’ Daily ran a long interview with Lai Ruoyu, 
the official who had replaced Li Lisan at the helm of the organisation.21 In this exchange, 
Lai tackled the thorny issue of the position of the union vis-à-vis the Party-state, arguing 
for a more complex view that contemplated the possibility of contradictions arising not 
only between union and company managers, but also between the union, workers, and 
authorities. His words are worth quoting in full:
From the point of view of the union, one of the main problems at the moment 
concerns democracy. Only when there will be democracy, it will be possible 
to prove that the union is an organisation of the masses … .
For what concerns the relations with the administration, in the past the issue 
of the identity [of interests] has been emphasised and not much attention has 
been paid to the differences, so in dealing with problems we always stood 
by the leaders, it was not possible to represent the interests of the masses. 
This simplistic view of the contradictions among the people has often led 
the union to adopt bad work methods, preventing it from carrying out its 
function of mediator between the leaders and the masses. This will have 
to change.
298   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
For what concerns the relations with the Party, in the past it has been settled 
that the union has to accept the leadership of the Party. This is correct, but 
not enough attention has been paid to the fact that, being an organisation of 
the masses, the union also has to carry out independent activities, though 
being subject to the guidance of the Party for what regards policies and 
thought. Only by carrying out its own independent activities will the union 
be able to fulfil its functions.22
In the interview, Lai went so far as to assert that in the event of strikes or other worker 
protests, the ACFTU had a duty to stand by the masses, because otherwise it would 
have lost credibility and the workers would have had no other choice than to establish 
autonomous organisations. 
The following day, the Workers’ Daily published another critical piece, a report on 
a long investigation undertaken in the previous months by Li Xiuren, Deputy Director 
of the ACFTU General Office.23 The trip had taken Li into a dozen cities along the 
railway lines Beijing–Hankou and Hankou–Guangzhou. In every city, Li had found 
clear hints of a ‘crisis of the union,’ with enraged workers blaming the ACFTU for being 
nothing more than a ‘tail of the administration’ (xingzheng de weiba), a ‘department 
for the management of the workers’ (gongren guanlike), or a ‘tongue of bureaucratism’ 
(guanliaozhuyi de shetou), and striving to establish their own autonomous organisations. 
Many union cadres complained about the difficulty of their position: even if they 
wanted to support the rightful requests of the masses, they could not do so because of 
the imperative of respecting Party discipline. They were particularly concerned about 
being accused by Party leaders of ‘syndicalism’ (gongtuanzhuyi), ‘tailism’ (weibazhuyi), 
and ‘independence from the Party’ (dui dang nao duli), risking their Party membership. 
The publication of these two articles triggered a heated debate about the role 
and the functions of the union in China. In May and June 1957, the Chinese press 
published a great number of articles that dealt with the perceived impotence of the 
union. Confronted with such criticism, the Party once again stepped in. In September 
1957, at an enlarged meeting of the ACFTU Party Group, Lai Ruoyu delivered a long 
speech in which he substantively gave up any demand of independence for the union.24 
From that moment on, the ACFTU stopped playing any meaningful role in industrial 
relations. At least 22 high-level cadres of the ACFTU were purged in the following 
months, while Lai Ruoyu himself died of illness in May 1958. Relegated to irrelevance, 
the organisation was completely dismantled at the outset of the Cultural Revolution.25
1989
The ACFTU was reestablished in 1978 in concomitance with the launch of the 
reforms. Even then, the CCP lost no time in making it clear that they maintained 
a purely instrumental view of the union. In his opening speech at the Ninth National 
Congress of the ACFTU in October 1978, Deng Xiaoping declared that the role of the 
union was ‘to protect the wellbeing of the workers, [which] can only increase gradually 
following the increase in production, especially in labour productivity.’26 To achieve this 
task, the union was supposed to take a leading role in the ‘democratic management of 
the enterprise’ (qiye minzhu guanli), which in Deng’s words was the only way for the 
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ACFTU not to become ‘that kind of organisation whose existence does not make any 
difference’ (na zhong keyou kewu de zuzhi). In practice, this led to the establishment of 
workers’ congresses in hundreds of thousands of state companies. This development 
was due not only to the need to reinforce the legitimacy of the Party among the workers, 
but also to the necessity of gaining credibility on the international front in the wake of 
the PRC’s entrance into the International Labour Organisation in 1983.27
It took ten more years for the CCP to begin to contemplate the possibility of 
a  substantial reform of the union. In his opening speech at the Eleventh National 
Congress of the ACFTU, held in Beijing in October 1988, then CCP General Secretary 
Zhao Ziyang conceded that a real divergence existed among the general interests of the 
Party-state and the specific interests of the workers:
Under socialism, the working masses have not only interests in common with 
other sectors of the society—the general interests of the state—but also their 
own specific interests. In the past, the fact that the union had to protect the 
specific interests of the workers has been neglected and this has had a negative 
influence on the edification of the union organisation. We have to … ensure that 
putting the construction of the economy at the centre, protecting the general 
interests of the people but also, at the same time, guaranteeing the specific 
interests of the working masses become fundamental guiding principles of the 
Chinese labour movement and of the union’s activities, making sure that the 
union carry out its social role in a better way.28
The reformist bent of the Chinese leadership was confirmed by the release at the 
Congress of a Basic Plan for the Union Reform, a document that candidly admitted 
the weaknesses of the ACFTU—a lack of internal democracy, despotism of the cadres, 
scarce coordination between local and industrial unions, and alienation from the 
workers—and sought to trace a path for future reforms.29 If implemented, these reforms 
would have laid the foundations for a truly democratic union, instituting a system in 
which lower unions would form associations of higher unions, along with a delegate 
system in which lower levels would send their delegates to higher levels.30
These hopes for a top-down reform were dashed in 1989. Although the quality of life 
of Chinese workers by then had significantly increased, the morale of the workforce had 
sunk due to galloping inflation, a sense of uneasiness caused by the ongoing dismantling 
of the welfare system, and complaints about widespread managerial corruption.31 The 
death of beloved Party leader Hu Yaobang in April 1989 acted as a catalyst for the 
widespread discontent that was already brewing in Chinese society, triggering massive 
student demonstrations and an occupation of Tiananmen Square. Workers were also 
eager to join the protest, and between April and May 1989, independent unions sprang 
up in several cities in China, the most famous of them being the Beijing Workers 
Autonomous Federation (gongzilian). 
The ACFTU also decided to take action.32 On 14 May, a union delegation marched 
on Tiananmen Square to express its support for the students.33 Two days later, 400 
pupils of the Labour Movement Institute, a union think tank, marched to the union 
headquarters and presented the union leadership with a petition that asked the ACFTU 
to intervene as a ‘representative of workers and employees’ to call on the Party-state to 
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recognise the patriotic nature of the student movement, guarantee freedom of press 
and association, fight against corruption, adopt a new legislation on trade unions, and 
acknowledge the fact that the union had to speak and act on the behalf of the workers.34 
As more staff and students from the Labour Movement Institute participated in various 
demonstrations, on 18 May the ACFTU headquarter donated 100,000 yuan to the Red 
Cross to cover medical expenses for the students on hunger strike.35 That very day, 
the ACFTU put forward three new requests to the authorities: that they start a real 
negotiation with the students; that they open an early session of the National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee; and that they initiate a dialogue with the workers under 
the aegis of the union.36 
Some sources report that the ACFTU had decided to proclaim a general strike for 
20  May, an unprecedented step that could be one of the reasons why the Chinese 
authorities opted to declare martial law.37 After martial law was declared, the 
conservative side of the ACFTU took over and in the following months an internal 
purge stripped the union of most of its reformist cadres. That marked the end of any 
attempt at a structural reform of the ACFTU to this day.
Suspicious Emphasis
The moves of the ACFTU during these dramatic stages in contemporary Chinese 
history can be considered attempts at an ‘institutional conversion’ aimed at ensuring 
the survival of the organisation.38 At the same time, they were not entirely inconsistent 
with the role of the union as a transmission belt. If anything, they were attempts by part 
of the union leadership to make the ACFTU live up to the Leninist ideal of a union able 
to act as a real intermediary between the Party-state and the workers.
Although much has changed in the landscape of industrial relations in China since 
1989, the ACFTU has never relinquished its role as a transmission belt. Three main 
developments are worth noting. First, in 1992 the Chinese authorities passed a new 
Trade Union Law. Although this Law, amended in 2001, reaffirmed the control of the 
Party over the union and reiterated the ACFTU’s monopoly over labour representation 
in China, it was nevertheless a timid attempt to pick up the broken threads of the 
reforms. For instance, for the first time since 1956 it reintroduced the possibility for 
the union to stipulate collective contracts on behalf of workers. Second, in the wake 
of the drastic restructuring of the state sector in the late 1990s, the membership of the 
ACFTU plunged from 104 million members in 1995 to the less than 87 million in 1999, 
a drop which pushed the Chinese leadership to pursue a new unionisation drive among 
previously neglected targets: private companies and migrant workers. Third, since the 
mid-1990s the core focus of union reform has shifted from the ideological realm to the 
more technical aspects of legal reforms. The promotion of the ‘rule of law’ in the field 
of labour relations has become an important feature of union activity, with the ACFTU 
involving itself in the drafting of new laws and regulations on labour and in providing 
legal aid to its constituency.
Nevertheless, none of these changes have been successful in boosting the reputation 
of the ACFTU among the Chinese workforce. Constrained by a Party that to this day 
sees it as transmission belt, the Chinese union is still struggling to gain recognition 
among the workers. In surveys that I carried out in China over the years, I consistently 
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found significant percentages of workers who had no idea whether they were union 
members or not, nor whether there was a union in their factory. In one survey that 
I conducted in 2016 in garment factories in Dongguan, as many as 28 percent of 250 
interviewees had never heard the word ‘trade union’ (gonghui) before.39 In light of this 
widespread irrelevance, the calls of the CCP leadership for the union to keep playing its 
role of ‘bridge and link’ could be deceptive. If history teaches us anything, it is that just 
under the smooth surface of orthodoxy, trouble might be lurking. The ambiguousness 
of the union’s role—and the fact that Mao’s speeches were supportive of strikes—means 
that the union, either officially or simply the idea of it, remains a place that is ripe for 
contestation and a potential Achilles’ heel for the Party.






The notion of ‘united front’ (tongyi zhanxian), originally formulated by Lenin, was first adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the early 1920s—a period of strong Comintern and Soviet influence. At that time, it referred to 
the Party’s need to consider the historical stages of social revolution, and consequently 
to be able to set class contradictions aside and seek for more inclusive alliances in 
order to support what was then supposed to be nationalist revolution. As the military 
nature of the term reveals, the idea of united front was originally connected to the 
tactic of cross-class mobilisation against a target on a temporary basis, and it assumed 
the differentiation between friends and enemies according to this goal as its rationale 
(see also Dutton’s essay in the present volume). 
In time, the original concept took on a broader meaning, coming to refer to the CCP’s 
ability to work with, unite under its guidance, and manipulate other political parties 
and social forces, eliminating possible sources of opposition by means of cooptation 
and control. From this perspective, throughout the history of global communism, the 
CCP is the communist party that has most comprehensively developed the united front 
in both theory and practice.1
Origins and Development
The history of the CCP before 1949 has seen two important configurations of united 
front activity, both of which mainly concerned the relationship with other political 
parties, and the Nationalist Party in particular (guomindang, hereafter GMD). The First 
United Front was the alliance between the CCP and the GMD which was initiated in 
1923 with the aim of fighting foreign imperialism and the warlords in order to carry 
on a national revolution, and tragically ended in 1927 with a bloody purge of the 
Communists commonly referred to as the ‘White Terror.’ Since at that time the CCP was 
304   AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 
just a small political organisation, the First United Front permitted the Party to expand 
and gain political and cultural recognition outside the circles of radical intellectual 
and labour elites. It was, however, a short-lived experiment. The Second United Front 
(1937–41) was destined to have a stronger and more lasting impact on the CCP’s 
political strategy and theory. Historically it consisted of an alliance with the GMD and 
other minor patriotic and intellectual parties to fight the Japanese occupation of China. 
While in 1923 the members of the CCP had entered the GMD, on this occasion they 
maintained their separate political identity and worked in Nationalist-controlled areas 
and institutions to engage in patriotic resistance against the enemy. At the end of the 
war, this united front formation had become a distinctive feature of the CCP’s political 
strategy, as was demonstrated by the alliances that the Party revived with the so-called 
‘minor parties’ during the Civil War with the GMD in 1946–49, and then again after 
1949. 
The wartime period was also pivotal to a first theoretical elaboration of the notion 
of the united front, and to its institutionalisation within the structures of the CCP 
and, subsequently, the new Chinese state. First, war experiences shaped Mao’s attitude 
towards the united front, making him appreciate its importance for the final victory 
of the CCP. In 1939, he defined it one of the three ‘magic weapons’ (fabao) wielded by 
the CCP, along with people’s war and Party-building (see Guan’s essay in the present 
volume).2 In his view, the united front implied the choice of the proletarian class to 
temporarily suspend class struggle in order to lead and unite the Chinese people. 
Patriotism and nationalism were fundamental to this end. The final goal was to establish 
the political and ideological hegemony of the CCP, laying the foundations for the 
Communist Revolution. At that time, the united front was considered to be a specific 
transitional stage rather than a permanent feature of the political and ideological 
identity of the CCP. Mao also emphasised how one core issue in a successful united 
front had to be the ability of the CCP to interact with several political, cultural, and 
social constituencies within an apparent win-win strategy, but without jeopardising its 
ability to take autonomous political action. 
The institutionalisation of the united front work within the CCP also dates from 
the wartime years. It was in this period that the United Front Work Department was 
established under the direct supervision of the Central Committee, with branches at 
the local administrative level. During the Civil War, the CCP made extensive use of the 
united front—as an alliance with the other minor parties—to distinguish itself from 
the GMD and to win the political and symbolic battle as the best representative of the 
interests of the Chinese nation. 
After 1949, the notion and strategy of united front found an embodiment in the 
socialist state with the establishment of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), which mirrored similar institutions created by the GMD during 
the War of Resistance against Japan. The CPPCC was instrumental in the adoption of 
the so-called ‘New Democracy’ that, as an interclass alliance, constituted the basis for 
the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and characterised the early years 
of the new socialist state (see Blecher’s essay in the present volume). Though initially 
conceptualised as a representative and consultative institution useful for the transition 
towards the new Constitution, the CPPCC remained active as a symbolic element of 
the united front even after 1954, when the National People’s Congress was established.
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The importance attributed to the united front has changed over time. As its premise is 
the CCP’s acknowledgment of the complexity of social and cultural differentiation and 
interests, it has reflected not only the political priorities but also the ideological shifts 
within the Party. Until 1957, the United Front Work Department of the CCP was quite 
active, especially in seeking the cooperation of non-Party intellectuals, experts, and ex-
businessmen. In exchange, it granted them access to material and symbolic resources—
for instance, privileged information about policies, participation in political events, 
positions in the state bureaucracy, and direct relationships with the CCP leaders.3 
Cooperation was, at any rate, carefully managed by ideological education and criticism 
of individual personalities and groups. From 1957, it began to lose importance as the 
shift towards radical policies centred on the primacy of class struggle implied the 
demise of the ‘magic weapon’ of the united front. During the Cultural Revolution, 
until 1978, the United Front Work Department remained practically inoperative. It is 
worth noting that although it was downplayed in the domestic arena, in that period 
the doctrine of the united front continued to play a role in the theory and practice of 
international relations of the PRC with third world and European countries (see Teng’s 
essay in the present volume).4 
Institutionalising the United Front
United front theory and practice were resumed by the CCP in the early 1980s. In 
1979, Deng Xiaoping redefined the united front as a ‘patriotic’ entity, implicitly different 
from the ‘proletarian’ one of the Maoist era.5 Since the 1980s, the notion of the united 
front has gained increasing importance for the CCP, as it concerns not only its political 
strategy but also its ideology and political theory. 
More than ever before, in the reform era united front work has required a theoretical 
elaboration to provide ideological support for the activities of cadres. This elaboration 
has certainly been connected to the demise of class struggle as core notion of CCP’s 
identity (see Russo’s essay in the present volume), and to the adoption of nationalism 
as a fundamental tool of political and cultural legitimisation. However, it has also 
reflected the ambition and the need to enhance the ability of the Party to prevent and 
settle the conflicts generated by the increasing divergence in the economic interests 
and the cultural identities of different social constituencies in contemporary China. 
Consequently, the united front has been increasingly connected to the so-called 
‘cultural work’ of the Party, as it is in the realm of culture (broadly articulated) that it 
fully displays its effects, by creating relationships and seeking the cooperation of social 
and cultural elites outside the CCP. For instance, based on the vision of ‘one country, 
two systems,’ developed during the 1980s, united front work has aimed at fostering 
support among local elites to facilitate the return of Hong Kong and Macao to PRC 
control. This has been accomplished by developing contacts and strengthening the 
personal links with the CCP through cooptation, while isolating potentially adversarial 
individuals and groups.6 
The current discourse on a ‘theory of the united front with Chinese characteristics’ 
(you zhongguo tese de tongyi zhanxian lilun) is evidence that united front work is now 
being recognised as a structural element in the ideology and political identity of the CCP. 
In official Party literature, research and reflections on the united front have multiplied 
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in the first decade of the twenty-first century, suggesting the need to systematise and 
offer guidance to the cadres engaged in this work, which is historically perceived as 
risky and not rewarding for one’s political career. Party sources describe the ideological 
and intellectual genealogy of the ‘united front with Chinese characteristics’ after Mao, 
as included in Deng Xiaoping’s theory of the primary stage of socialism, Jiang Zemin’s 
notion of the Three Represents (san ge daibiao), and Hu Jintao’s Scientific Development 
(kexue fazhan). But, from an institutional point of view, the most systematic attempt 
to organise and assign a new fundamental role to united front work is currently being 
done under Xi Jinping.7 On several occasions, Xi has emphasised the importance of 
united front work in order to accomplish the ‘China dream and national rejuvenation’ 
in the ‘new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ In his view, the united front 
is connected to the need to modernise the governance of the CCP according to the 
perspective of the so-called Four Comprehensives (si ge quanmian)—the four political 
goals set out by the Party leadership in 2012, i.e. comprehensively build a moderately 
prosperous society, comprehensively deepen the reforms, comprehensively implement 
the rule of law, and comprehensively enhance Party discipline.8 Moreover, in Xi’s view, 
united front is a strategic asset to implement Chinese-style consultative democracy, 
and to consolidate the interethnic and cultural unity of the country. 
The importance that Xi attributes to this work is revealed by the organisation 
of several conferences on united front under his rule. Even more significantly, the 
complexity of goals now attributed to the united front has required that, for the first 
time in its history, the CCP established a regulatory framework for united front work. 
In 2015, the Party issued a set of ‘United Front Work Trial Regulations’ to clarify 
the realms of this activity. These Regulations define the united front as the ‘alliance, 
under the leadership of the CCP, on the basis of the alliance of workers and peasants, 
of the patriots (aiguozhe)—comprehensive of all the socialist workers, the builders 
of socialism, the patriots who support socialism, the patriots who defend the unity 
of the motherland and spare no effort in the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’9 
Emphasising national cohesion under the CCP to achieve the double centenary goals 
(2021 for the CCP and 2049 for the PRC), the document lists the targets of the united 
front work. They include members of the so-called democratic parties, public figures 
with no party affiliation, non-Party intellectuals, influential members of the national 
minorities, religious leaders, business people, private entrepreneurs, and important 
members of the new social strata, students abroad and returned students, citizens of 
Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and their relatives in mainland China, Chinese overseas 
and returned from overseas, and in the end all the people with whom it is necessary to 
make connections (lianxi) and unite (tuanjie).
The identification of these categories as the main targets is mirrored by the 
organisational chart of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee 
of the CCP.10 Besides the General Affairs Office, the Theoretical Research Office, the 
Retired Cadres Office, and the Liaison Office for Mass Organisations, it comprises 
another nine highly specialised offices. Among these, two are specifically dedicated 
to Tibet and Xinjiang, and one to the relationship with public figures in new media, 
a sign of the gradual expansion of the political activities of the United Front Work 
Department. Currently, it is assumed that there are tens of thousands of cadres officially 
working in the various branches of the Department, though the number of people 
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involved in the actual work is surely greater. United front work is expected to be carried 
out by cadres not only at every level of the Party’s administration, but also in other key 
institutions, such as universities, research centres, and private corporations. Academic 
and specialised publications dedicated to the subject are numerous.
From Local to Global
Considering the revival of some aspects of Maoist governance and the importance 
attributed by Xi to enhancing the CCP’s capacity to guide and control (using 
both ideology and legal tools) the different constituencies of Chinese society, this 
development is not surprising. At the same time, it has become urgent for the centre to 
increase its ability to control the work of local cadres involved in united front activities, 
in order to preserve the CCP’s hegemony in the social and cultural realm. That this 
is a paramount concern is demonstrated by the fact that a so-called ‘Central Leading 
Group for the United Front Work’ (zhongyang tongyi zhanxian gongzuo lingdao xiaozu) 
has been established in the Politburo under the leadership of Xi himself. 
The increasing social and cultural diversity of contemporary China and the impact 
of globalisation pose new challenges. As the wide spectrum of activities of the united 
front shows, it is evident that the CCP perceives potential threats as coming from very 
different constituencies—from religious organisations to ethnic communities, from 
private entrepreneurs to Chinese students and intellectuals abroad. Each context implies 
specific strategies and goals. For example, one goal of the united front work among 
private entrepreneurs is to ensure that they abide by the law and subordinate their 
personal ambitions to CCP’s policies. The work among Chinese students and scientists 
abroad is addressed at persuading them not to abandon the motherland and cooperate 
for the development of the national academy and scientific improvement. On the 
whole, the overarching objective is to guarantee the loyalty towards the Party-state 
and a sense of belonging and identification with the Chinese nation as it is envisioned 
and understood by the CCP. In practice, the work of the united front aims at coopting 
selected figures within these constituencies, while isolating the individuals who do 
not conform. Unavoidably, this ends up causing a polarisation within these groups 
regarding their attitude towards the CCP. 
Importantly, the Party leadership’s use of the united front as an instrument of control 
often contradicts its stated goal of obtaining the support and collaboration of targeted 
individuals and communities. In the same vein, the activities of the united front within 
Chinese communities abroad have been perceived in several countries as a longa manus 
of the CCP in foreign affairs, raising worries about the attempt of the PRC to influence 
foreign public opinion and to conduct intelligence work through the cooperation of 
Chinese citizens abroad.11
In the domestic arena, in recent years united front work has also been increasingly 
connected to the idea that it is necessary to modernise CCP ‘governance’ (zhili), 
which in turn presumes the full accomplishment of a Chinese socialist ‘consultative 
democracy’ (xieshang minzhu), different from the Western-style electoral democracy.12 
Centred on the pivotal role of the CPPCC as a distinctive Chinese political institution, 
the promotion of consultative democracy at any level is described as an important 
goal of united front activities, as the regular consultation with minor parties, targeted 
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individuals, and specialised groups about local and national policies is envisioned as 
a necessary praxis to build wide support and consent for the Party. This ‘consultative 
democracy’ must be carried out ‘seeking common grounds while putting aside 
differences,’ a method that has a long history in CCP diplomacy and foreign relations.13 
Regardless of how it presents itself abroad, it is worth remembering that within Chinese 
borders, the united front cannot be detached from the purpose of maintaining the 
CCP’s political and cultural hegemony through social control. 
Adopting a Gramscian perspective, Groot has argued that during periods of crisis, 
the Party-state relies on the united front as a strategy of ‘passive revolution’ to absorb 
potential oppositional elements and their elites into the state’s hegemonic structure.14 
From this perspective, the increasing importance attributed to united front work 
should be seen as a sign that the CCP is going through a critical stage of governance 
and political legitimisation. Nevertheless, the evolution of the united front has been 
also studied in light of the evolution of the corporatism of the Chinese state.15 In this 
sense, united front work must be seen as a structural aspect of the CCP’s strategy to 
shape the relations between the Chinese state and various interest groups and to settle 
divergences within society. As economic development, social peace, and stability must 
be achieved by avoiding the possible conflicts generated by the different social and 
cultural claims, resorting to the theory and practice of the united front serves to revive 
a historical ‘revolutionary’ pedigree to cover up for that socialist state corporatism that 
seems to be an enduring facet of China’s modernisation path. 





(Translated by Christian SORACE)
China today is defined by the rise of the so-called middle class, penetration of the market economy into all domains of life, and orientation toward practical benefit. Especially in the rash and ruthless populist undertones of online 
public opinion, the word ‘utopia’ is not only used to criticise the political catastrophe 
of the Mao  era, but also to satirise and mock today’s socially unrealistic deliriums 
and daydreams, monstrosities and abnormalities that run counter to the mainstream. 
In these days, people are ashamed to earnestly discuss utopia, let alone act on utopian 
ideas. 
Times indeed have changed. Only when danger is imminent and everything is on the 
verge of collapse do people begin to urgently ponder and search for an alternative plan. 
Utopia calls to mind a cheerful earth that is elsewhere, a negation of reality. If people 
find this prospect dull, it is perhaps because their lives are calm and orderly, and it 
quite simply does not speak to their interests. Or, because it negates reality, perhaps 
it touches the red line of discourse before which people suppress their voices to protect 
themselves. In China, discussing utopia requires bravery; putting it into practice 
requires power. 
The Seeds of Utopia 
After learning of the Japanese author Saneatsu Mushanokōji’s ‘new village-ism’ 
(atarashiki-mura, xincunzhuyi) through Zhou Zuoren in the early 1920s, the young 
Mao Zedong thought about organising a ‘work-study mutual aid group’ (gong du 
huzhu tuan) with his compatriots in order to build a new village utopia at the base of 
Mount Yuelu in Changsha.1 Due to the constraints of that particular time in history, 
this process never gained traction. Instead, Mao would have to wait until the 1950s—
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after he obtained the power to govern China by means of violent revolution—to act 
on his utopian impulse, which took the form of people’s communes (renmin gongshe) 
(see Gao’s essay in the present volume). 
If Mao’s ambition only resembled the small-scale utopian experiment pursued by 
intellectuals of the Shirakaba-ha (literally, ‘White Birch Society’) deep in the mountains 
of Miyazaki prefecture in Japan, the impact on society would be limited to the scale of 
a community.2 But propelled by Mao’s power, people’s communes sprung up in a vast 
political campaign and the entire country was transformed into a utopian experimental 
laboratory. By concentrating the means of production, militarising management, 
and enforcing collective labour, people’s communes thoroughly eradicated the social 
structure of China’s clan-based villages and the tradition of small peasant production 
methods. The laziness of human nature was indulged by imitating the system of 
‘communal feeding’ (daguofan) of Zhang Lu, a Han Dynasty warlord, with its principle 
of ‘setting up shelters for those in need of meat and drink’ (qi yishe, zhi mirou). Although 
the construction of water conservation works left a legacy for collective agriculture, by 
the end of the 1970s fields were no longer cultivated and lay in waste. It was peasants 
from Fengyang county in Anhui province, who had suffered untold miseries during the 
Great Leap Forward, that finally sparked the bottom-up reform of ‘fixing farm output 
quotas for each household’ (baochandaohu) that eventually put an end to the era of the 
people’s communes.3 
Almost all utopian experiments on earth end in failure. Although the origins of Mao’s 
utopian thinking can be traced back to small anarchist groups from the end of the 
nineteenth century, Mao magnified utopia at the national scale. When Mao in practice 
merged the communist principle ‘from each according to ability, to each according to 
need’ (ge jin suo neng, an xu fenpei) with Kang Youwei’s explication of the Confucian idea 
of ‘great unity’ (datong)—that is, a utopian vision in which everything is in its proper 
place and peace prevails (see Craig A. Smith’s essay in the present volume)—a disaster 
was born.4 In humanity’s infancy, when population was scarce and natural resources 
were abundant, it was possible to form small-scale societies that practiced communist 
mutual aid and emphasised morality. But with the rapid increase of population, the 
proliferation of ethnic communities, and the growing diversification of interests, 
the ideal society of ancient times vanished into smoke. As early as the Warring States 
period (475–221 BCE), legalist thinker Han Fei wrote in the treatise Five Venoms: ‘Men 
of high antiquity strove for moral virtue; men of middle times sought out wise schemes; 
men of today vie to be known for strength and spirit.’5 To enlarge the ideals of a small 
society to the scale of a whole nation is like using one’s childhood experience in the 
adult world. When such a brittle utopia collides with reality, it inevitably shatters into 
fragments. 
Utopian Traces in the World 
 
The Chinese word for utopia (wutuobang) has two synonyms: ‘ideal state’ (lixiang guo) 
and ‘nowhere place’ (wuyou xiang), meaning something nearly impossible to discern 
in the real world. For this reason utopia is in itself a discourse outside of time and 
space, an action that is unlikely to be realised. If utopia is put into action, it is destined 
to be connected with failure. Beginning with Sir Thomas Moore’s sixteenth-century 
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treatise Utopia, a school of utopian thought arose in England, culminating in Robert 
Owen’s New Lanark experiment in Scotland and his commune in New Harmony, 
Indiana, in the early 1800s.6 Owen devoted his life to improving the environment for 
workers, nurturing their character, and creating a new society in which, to use once 
again the words of Han Fei, ‘no rich rewards were doled out, no harsh punishments 
were administered.’7 Throughout the rest of the nineteenth century, which was the 
age in which all kinds of experimentation were possible, numerous other efforts to 
build utopias arose, most of which were short-lived, but which nevertheless often had 
significant implications for society going forward. 
In the United States, the Shaker Village (1805–1910) and the Oneida Community 
(1848–80) were distinguished by their rejection of the nuclear family and private 
ownership of property. This rejection manifested itself differently in each community, 
as asceticism in one, and complex marital arrangements in the other.8 However, these 
communities were unable to stave off the pressures from orthodox Christianity and the 
vigour of industrial capitalism. Entering the twentieth century, these formerly shocking 
practices were generally covered in dust and forgotten by mainstream society (despite 
the persistence of some like the Amish). After World War II, this kind of small-scale 
utopian project reappeared in two distinct responses to the crisis of Western society of 
that era: first in B. F. Skinner’s novel Walden Two published in 1948, and later in the social 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s symbolised by the hippie commune.9 After Trump’s 
rise to power in 2016, numerous books on utopian practices have been published. 
Even before this present crisis, globally there has been an intermittent accumulation 
of experimental small-scale ecological villages and intentional communities, which 
represent the evolution of utopia in the contemporary era. It would seem that the 
moment to discuss utopia is, once again, upon us. 
Utopian Violence 
At the time when Mao turned to violent revolution, there were still several intellectuals 
who attempted to improve society by other means. Although intellectuals involved 
in the Rural Reconstruction Movement (xiangcun jianshe yundong) of the 1920s and 
1930s seldom invoked the discourse of utopia, the desire to challenge the cruelty of 
that period’s realities had a certain shade of utopian thinking. Activists such as Y. C. 
James Yen and Liang Shuming attempted to transform China through mass education 
and moderate social experimentation.10 Although they shared the same starting point 
of dissatisfaction with the state of the world as Mao Zedong, they selected different 
paths. In response to historical conditions, Mao’s belief in Marxism became an 
ideological pretext for revolutionary mobilisation; utopia was shelved as a remote ideal 
and the urgent needs of political reality became a ‘you die, I live’ factional struggle for 
power. Subsequently, the Rural Reconstruction Movement was abruptly cut short by 
the Japanese invasion of China. It ended in failure, whereas Mao’s violent revolution 
succeeded. 
After seizing state power, Mao had a free hand to start building his utopia. Liang 
Shuming remained in China only to be persecuted in ideological campaigns; 
Y. C. James Yen went to the Philippines where he strove to internationalise the Rural 
Reconstruction Movement. As described earlier, people’s communes transformed China 
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into a place in which the people had no way to survive. After Mao’s death, the adoption 
of the Household Responsibility System (jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi) broke up 
collective agriculture and land-use rights were returned to the hands of farmers. For 
an ephemeral moment, there was vitality in the countryside, which was soon to be 
extinguished by the urbanisation movement that would swallow agricultural land and 
atomise the peasantry. In the new millennium, the problems of the countryside have 
returned, giving rise to a New Rural Reconstruction Movement (xin xiangcun jianshe 
yundong) (see Day’s essay in the present volume).11 This new version originated among 
intellectuals outside of the state system, as a continuation of the historical experiments 
of Yen and Liang, in an attempt to find new methods to address contemporary problems. 
In the Deng Xiaoping era, the tanks that rolled into Tiananmen Square cleared a path 
for neoliberal economics to enter China. After Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992, 
China was transformed from a political society into a consumer society. The trauma 
of 1989 was forgotten as people threw themselves into the business of making money. 
The reform of state-owned enterprises plunged millions of workers into unemployment; 
due to the opening and expansion of real estate markets, farmers lost their land; economic 
construction consumed natural resources and intensified ecological destruction; and 
social wealth was redistributed resulting in a staggering gap between rich and poor. 
The concentration of China’s population in megacities has hollowed out its villages. 
But China’s growing urban middle class is filled with discontent over the struggle to 
find work, traffic congestion, air pollution, and competition over limited educational 
resources. In response, a trend of counterurbanisation (ni chengshihua) has begun. 
The Danger of Utopia
The New Rural Reconstruction Movement was initiated by Wen Tiejun, a well-
known professor at Renmin University, as an attempt to reverse the dire realities of 
China’s urban-rural situation. It proposes to reconstruct a positive and mutually 
interactive relationship between the rural and urban, motivate young people to return 
to the countryside, establish ‘mutual aid societies’ (huzhushe) in different village 
areas, develop ecological agriculture, and form community colleges that follow in the 
tradition of Yen’s practice of mass education.12 In addition to taking care of people left 
behind in the villages, it also attaches importance to communities of migrant workers 
struggling to survive in the city. Aspects of this project have been extremely successful, 
while others have failed and been shut down. Although he does not define his efforts 
as utopian, and views himself as pragmatically working at the frontlines of rural 
communities, Wen Tiejun is associated with contemporary China’s leftist intellectual 
pedigree because of his opposition to neoliberalism and pursuit of social fairness. For 
this reason, some of his ‘failed’ projects have dismissively been labelled as ‘utopian.’ 
Whether in China or abroad, utopian experiments often take place in the countryside. 
The reason for this perhaps comes from the distance of rural life from the imagination 
of the urban mainstream: it is either wilderness or a place that has preserved the traces 
of humanity’s infancy. In reality, an untouched ‘place beyond civilisation’ (huawai zhi 
di) already ceased to exist in ancient times, let alone in post-Mao China. Rural areas do 
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not have fewer problems than cities, and are fully intertwined in the contradictions of 
Chinese society. For this reason, most efforts to improve rural areas in isolation from 
the city have been derided as ‘utopian.’ 
Among the numerous approaches to practicing the New Rural Reconstruction 
Movement, the Bishan Project is perhaps the only one not to be ashamed to admit its 
utopian orientation.13 In 2010, this project took root in Bishan village, Yi county, Anhui 
province, beginning with the renovation of tattered old houses and their conversion into 
living and work spaces, as well as a newly established bookstore, library, and art centre. 
The project also conducted research on village history and traditional handicrafts, 
organised large-scale cultural and art activities, provided work opportunities for 
volunteers returning to the countryside, and helped villagers increase their incomes by 
using Taobao and Airbnb—until Beijing shut it down in 2016. 
The Bishan Project was not the same as the Mao era’s state-led mobilisation of 
youth and intellectuals to go ‘down to the countryside’ (xiaxiang) to work and reform 
themselves through labour. And its utopian direction was also distinct from the large-
scale people’s communes of the Mao era. Rather, it was founded voluntarily after much 
consideration and reflection on the urbanisation crisis and agricultural situation. 
Moreover, it was based on a survey of the explorations of individuals and small groups 
in different historical periods from all over the world. That being said, Bishan was unable 
to incorporate some of the historical experiences and experiments in horizontal living 
arrangements from other places, which would be non-starters in China’s atmosphere 
of political control. 
In contemporary China there can be no genuine utopian practices, only utopian 
discourses. But sometimes even words themselves can disappear.






Different from the concept of women’s liberation articulated and practiced within the capitalist system—which focuses on middle-class individualism, female independent consciousness, and equal political and legal rights between men 
and women—socialist women’s liberation aims to dismantle the capitalist political-
economic structure that (re)produces not only gender hierarchy, but also class, racial, 
and regional inequalities. The socialist theory of women’s liberation does not separate 
women’s issues from other structural inequalities, arguing that women’s oppression 
cannot be resolved if political-economic oppression continues. As an extraordinary 
feminist movement that eventually helped establish a socialist country where gender 
and class equality became the norm, Chinese socialist women’s liberation particularly 
promoted an integrated, proletarian-oriented, and mass-participatory approach to the 
women’s movement. In addition to class revolution and anti-feudal cultural revolution, 
Chinese socialist women’s liberation is tied to the modern third world national 
independence movement and international socialist anti-imperialist endeavours. 
It endorses historical materialism, questioning any ahistorical naturalisation or 
culturalisation of women’s oppression. Women’s liberation, according to socialist theory 
and practice, is a long and complicated process because it is interlocked with liberation 
of all social subjects, which would amount to a total dismantlement and transformation 
of capitalist and other forms of patriarchal socioeconomic structures at both local and 
global levels.
Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, socialist feminist practice in general—
and Chinese socialist women’s liberation in particular—have been challenged by 
feminist scholars in both the West and China. Western Cold War ideology combined 
with the Western post–Second Wave feminist, especially radical feminist, repudiation 
of Marxist theory and the left-wing movement in the 1970s have played a powerful role 
in (re)orienting Western scholarship on women’s liberation in the Chinese Revolution. 
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In the Chinese context, the new ideology of economic reform implemented by 
the Party-state toward the end of the 1970s also, in its apparent de-legitimisation of the 
Cultural Revolution, swept aside some central socialist principles, including gender 
and class equality. The rise of the neoliberal trend of governance among both developed 
and developing countries—as well as the global intellectuals’ general (re)turn to 
depoliticised cultural and ‘bourgeois’ values such as individual liberty, privacy, 
and justice in the 1980s—further undermined and discredited the socioeconomic and 
political achievements of socialist women’s liberation in history.1 
In this neoconservative and market-dominated transnational context, Western 
feminist scholarship started asking the question: ‘Did socialism liberate women?’ 
Or, more directly: ‘Why has socialism not liberated women in China?’2 This quickly 
developed into a new scholarly trend, reversing the general direction of Western Second 
Wave feminist socioeconomic engagement in the 1960s and 1970s, especially retreating 
from its structural critique of capitalism. Whereas some scholars have argued that this 
reversal from idealisation to denigration of socialist China reflected more the changes 
in Western politics than anything directly to do with China,3 the rhetorical question 
of whether socialism can liberate women became transnational and pervasive in the 
1980s and 1990s, and much feminist research in the United States and in China ‘has 
directed itself to this question.’4 This new trend by no means suggested a historical 
and geopolitical inquiry into the meaning and process of women’s liberation in the 
Chinese Revolution. On the contrary, it worked to interrogate the socialist theory and 
practice of women’s liberation from liberal, individualistic, separatist feminist and 
Cold War standpoints generated and practiced in the capitalist system. That is to say, 
the integrated, proletarianised, and institutionalised approach of Chinese socialist 
feminism to women’s issues was dismissed as non-feminist both outside and inside 
China in the 1980s because it does not promote individualistic, autonomous, and 
essential female cultural values. 
Starting from the early 1990s, when the end of the Cold War showcased the 
triumph of Western capitalism, accelerating the development of global neoliberalism 
and the transnational market, women’s status and the feminist emancipatory 
vision of women’s liberation have steadily deteriorated. At the same time, however, 
brought together by transnational capitalist forces, particularly the multilevel crisis 
produced by neoliberalism  and marketisation at the global scale, feminist scholars 
and activists around  the world have begun to probe the dangerous liaison between 
contemporary (post–Second Wave) feminist practices, neoliberalism, and free 
market fundamentalism.5 This served to reactivate the socioeconomic insight and 
international legacy of the Second Wave feminist movement, particularly socialist 
feminism.6 At this critical juncture, it is important to reassess the history and legacy, 
as well as the limitations of Chinese socialist women’s liberation to renew systematic 
critiques of capitalism, to restore the integrated socialist emancipatory vision of the 
future, and to forge a transnational feminist alliance to confront global neoliberalism. 
A critical revisiting of the socialist theory and practice of women’s liberation in history 
should also inspire us to combine feminist concerns of culture and ethics with political-
economic structural practice, projecting an alternative model for the post–Cold War 
world.
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How Chinese Socialist Women’s Liberation Came to Be
The global spread of Western feminisms in the late nineteenth century, especially 
across China and other third world countries, was a direct result of Western imperialism, 
capitalist expansion, and colonial modernity. Not all feminist ideas and practices, 
however, would take root and grow under local conditions. A variety of feminisms, 
including liberal, anarchist, evolutionary and eugenic, and Marxist, appeared during 
China’s transition from a dynastic system to a modern nation-state, yet only those 
feminisms that were institutionalised locally, or Sinicised through political, social, and 
economic practices, would become an integrated force in modern Chinese history.
Chinese socialist women’s liberation developed from urban liberal and Marxist 
feminist discourses of the May Fourth Movement, embracing both individualist and 
socialist ideas about women’s liberation.7 As a critical cultural discourse, Marxist 
feminism in the early May Fourth Movement called for women’s participation 
in social production and political governance; the abolition of private property 
ownership and capitalism; transition from a middle class (bourgeois) women’s rights 
movement to working class women’s economic and gender liberation; and socialism 
as the sociopolitical foundation for women’s liberation.8 It was, however, not until the 
establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in July 1921 that Marxist and 
feminist ideas were adopted by a political organisation that unequivocally committed 
itself to socialist feminist practice. 
The CCP, at its Second Congress in 1922, passed a ‘Resolution on the Women’s 
Movement,’ formal guidelines for organised feminist activities that highlighted the 
Chinese women’s movement as an integral part of broader proletarian liberation as 
well as anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggles.9 The Party continuously pursued 
this basic policy of uniting struggles for women’s liberation with the socialist 
revolutionary movement.10 This theoretical and political clarification distinguished 
Chinese socialist feminism from all other feminist discourses imported into China 
at the time and paved the way for the institutional integration of Chinese women’s 
liberation into the Communist Revolution. The Chinese socialist women’s movement 
continued developing throughout the 1920s, directly engaging with the anti-imperialist 
movements, labour movements, and the Northern Expedition (1922–27), during which 
the Nationalists formed the First United Front with the CCP to exterminate regional 
warlords and reform political and economic institutions. In 1925, at the Fourth CCP 
Congress, a new ‘Resolution on the Women’s Movement’ was stipulated, stressing 
the central role of women workers and peasants in Party-led women’s movements.11 
In 1927, however, the Nationalists and the CCP split violently. The subsequent terror 
inflicted upon the CCP and women activists marked a dramatic turn in the history of 
socialist feminism in China. 
The late 1920s witnessed the Party’s most significant theoretical and practical 
transformations, including serious reflections on its feminist policy and affiliations. 
The CCP repositioned itself in relation to China’s large rural populations of women, 
rather than solely urban-based women workers. As part of the general Sinification of 
Marxist theory, this reflexive change ultimately reoriented Chinese socialist women’s 
liberation. 
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Mao Zedong’s 1927 ‘Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,’ 
provided the initial and most important theoretical argument for both peasant 
revolution and socialist feminism in the Chinese context. In this document, Mao 
famously described how Chinese men (peasants) are oppressed by political authority, 
clan authority, and religious authority, while women, in addition to these three 
authorities, ‘are also dominated by men [the authority of the husband].’ The political 
authority of the landlord, according to Mao, underpinned the three other systems of 
authority. Therefore, dismantling these economic relations and overthrowing the power 
of the landlord marked the first step in the process of breaking down the traditional 
social system. For the first time in Chinese history, peasant women were represented as 
those most oppressed in China’s political, economic, religious, and social systems, and 
were tied explicitly to the Chinese communist revolutionary cause. Moreover, being the 
most subjugated group, peasant women, together with peasant men, were perceived as 
historical agents in the proletarian revolution that would bring structural changes to 
China.
In 1928, the Sixth CCP Congress passed a resolution prioritising the development of 
a peasant women’s movement. According to this resolution, because female peasants 
remained at the bottom of China’s rural socioeconomic system, the CCP must 
‘recognise that peasant women were the most active revolutionary force’ and therefore 
must recruit them into general peasant organisations.12 The recognition among CCP 
leaders of the potential power of peasant women helped establish women’s liberation as 
a core component of future communist revolution. 
By the time the Jiangxi-Fujian Soviet Republic, a Chinese communist base, was 
established in 1931, certain CCP members had formed a relatively coherent platform to 
address the combined issues of nationalism, class, and gender in the Chinese context, 
while keeping with general Marxist tradition. At this early stage, women’s liberation 
began to be systematically institutionalised and integrated into the Chinese Communist 
Revolution. First and foremost, the Soviet Republic’s Constitution, proclaimed by the 
first All-China Congress in Ruijin, Jiangxi, guaranteed equal rights for the working 
masses and the complete emancipation of women: 
All workers, peasants, Red Army soldiers, and all toilers and their families, 
without distinction of sex, religion, or nationality shall be equal before the 
Soviet law, and shall be citizens of the Soviet Republic. 
It is the purpose of the Soviet government of China to guarantee the 
thorough emancipation of women; it recognises freedom of marriage and 
will put into operation various measures for the protection of women, 
to enable women gradually to attain the material basis required for their 
emancipation from the bondage of domestic work, and to give them the 
possibility of participating in the social, economic, political, and cultural life 
of the entire society.13 
The Soviet Republic also established concrete laws to enforce equality in status and 
participation. These new legal codes ‘specifically affected the position of women in 
marriage and the family, and in their relationship to the land, the factory, and new 
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political institutions.’14 For the first time in modern Chinese history, women’s social 
emancipation was promoted together with their economic and material emancipation. 
Implementation of these newly established laws was particularly emphasised, as the 
CCP fully understood ‘it was not enough just to introduce new legislation, it had 
to be put into practice.’15 Special women’s departments were established in all Party 
organisations, along with local women’s congresses to preside over women workers. 
Literacy classes and training courses were provided as well, to coach women activists in 
leadership techniques and to break down traditional gendered divisions of labour. Such 
opportunities enabled a significant number of women to step out of their homes and, 
for the first time, participate in political and economic activities.16 In short, the CCP’s 
policies of 1931 and their implementation set the course for the institutionalisation and 
integrated development of the peasant women’s movement in the soviet areas.17 
During this same Soviet Republic period, the CCP also developed intensive, periodic 
mass campaigns to directly confront local resistance to the women’s movement 
reinforcing its institutionalisation. The Jiangxi Soviet’s particular circumstances—
that is, the establishment of a radically new and modern political power base in an 
underdeveloped and relatively isolated agrarian area—were extremely irregular. 
Deeply ingrained Confucian family values rendered certain feminist ideas, especially 
women’s freedom to marry and divorce, completely alien even among peasant women 
themselves. The offensives of the Nationalist Party military further prevented long-term 
and orderly education and implementation of socialist feminist policies. As a result, 
short-term, intensive political campaigns and mass mobilisations were adopted as 
revolutionary practices, especially during politically and militarily unstable periods 
(see Li’s essay in the present volume).18 This mass mobilisation approach developed 
into the mass line organisation and governance of the late 1930s and 1940s, a signature 
style of CCP leadership, which continued into the socialist period (see Lin Chun’s essay 
in the present volume). Chinese socialist feminist institutionalisation from early on was 
accompanied by this unique mass mobilisation approach. Periodic mass campaigns 
might appear temporary and informal but in fact played a critical role in spreading 
socialist feminist ideas, challenging traditional gender perceptions among the rural 
masses and mobilising women to participate in the Party, politics, and production.19 
In addition, mass campaigns also resulted in the CCP recalibrating political ideology 
and organisational tactics in response to inspiration from the masses.20 They further 
helped the CCP battle dogmatism, bureaucratism, and commandism within the Party, 
adjusting and revising its policies based on concrete historical situations.
Socialist feminist practice in the Jiangxi Soviet Republic was in many aspects 
experimental, testing an array of ideas, policies, legal implementations, and local 
conditions in a particular rural area of southern China. Nevertheless, the Republic’s 
multilevel, institutional, and mass configuration created a model for feminist practice 
in socialist revolution that would continue after the People’s Republic of China was 
established in 1949.21
The recognition of the critical role of rural women in socialist revolution catalysed 
the Jiangxi Soviet’s integrated institutionalisation of socialist feminism and the CCP’s 
mass line, leading to the Party’s continued reflections on and revisions of its policy 
and practice of the women’s movement. To a large extent, Chinese women’s liberation 
became a crucial criterion for the CCP to measure the effect and success of Chinese 
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socialist revolution. In 1931, the Party conducted an extensive assessment of the 
women’s movement in the Soviet area and discovered a great number of issues caused 
mostly by the reluctance of local intermediate and lower-level leadership in promoting 
the interests of peasant women, as well as their political and economic participation. 
New policies were thus implemented to change the situation, including the facilitation 
of better organising and recruiting of women into local leadership positions.22 In 1934, 
Mao Zedong, after investigating women’s work in the Zhongyang district, criticised the 
local record. He concluded that women’s specific interests were ignored in the general 
policymaking, and attention to women’s education was insufficient, particularly with 
regard to efforts to explain new policies to peasant and working women. Mao then 
offered concrete suggestions for better attending to local women’s needs and connecting 
their interests to other political problems.23 
From 1937 to 1941, the women’s movement in the more conservative and less 
developed northwestern Shan-Gan-Ning Border Region experienced certain setbacks. 
With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War (7 July 1937) and the subsequent 
formation of the Second United Front (1937–45) between CCP and the Nationalist 
Government, the overall revolutionary policy prioritised the war effort as well as the 
unification of different social classes and forces.24 In the late 1930s, however, the CCP 
already noticed stagnation in women’s work and a 1939 Party resolution made an 
urgent request to recruit more women:
Women constitute half of the population of China. Without women’s 
participation in the revolution, the revolution cannot succeed. The number 
of women workers in the Party is too small at present, primarily because 
not enough attention has been paid by the Party. The Party must today 
emphasise the task of absorbing into its ranks revolutionary peasant women 
and women intellectuals in great numbers … .25
By mid-1941, Party leaders had discovered more problems in the women’s movement 
and the 1941 elections in the Shan-Gan-Ning Border Region were consequently 
coordinated with a campaign for women’s rights. On 26 February 1943, as a part of 
both the Rectification Campaign against Dogmatism within the CCP and the CCP’s 
effort to deploy the mass line approach to revolution, the Central Committee issued 
a new policy for women, actively addressing the existing problems and mobilising 
women to participate in economic production and war efforts. As Patricia Jackal wrote: 
‘There was a consistent effort throughout the Yan’an period to move women toward 
equality by bringing them out of the confines of their traditional lives and, in each 
stage, involving them in larger groups with broader concerns.’26 The CCP’s continued 
reflection and revision of its revolutionary and feminist policy showcased the Party’s 
recognition of the indispensability of the women’s movement to the overall revolution. 
The integration of women’s work into the socialist revolution was thus key to advancing 
both Chinese women’s causes and communist revolution in modern China.
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Interdependence between Chinese Socialist Revolution and Women’s Liberation
One fundamental topic that deserves additional emphasis in a critical review of 
Chinese socialist women’s liberation concerns the interdependence and integration 
of the socialist revolution and the proletarian women’s movement in modern China. 
This interdependence does not simply reflect the Marxist theoretical proposition that 
women’s liberation is part of the overall proletarian revolution; more importantly, it 
reveals the broader geopolitical and socioeconomic condition that entailed the mutual 
support between Chinese socialist revolution and feminism for their survival and future 
success. Of all the major, modern revolutionary ideas introduced to rural China by the 
CCP in the late 1920s, feminism and women’s liberation appeared most alien to Chinese 
peasants, both men and women.27 In the context of long-standing Confucian traditions, 
a devastated rural economy, and geographical and social isolation, granting women 
equal rights to social and public production, political participation, and governance 
was extremely radical. Local resistance first appeared as early as the beginning years 
of the Jiangxi Soviet period.28 Adjustments to the implementation of socialist feminist 
policies were not a choice or bargain the CCP negotiated, but rather the only option 
presented by the historical reality. This conflict clearly demonstrates how gender issues 
and feminist questions cannot be addressed in isolation from other social, political, 
and economic conditions. In the China of the 1920s to 1940s, especially in rural areas, 
to stress the ‘independence’ and ‘autonomy’ of feminist movements would further 
estrange feminism from local populations, destining women’s liberation to failure from 
the start.29 The integration of feminism into the Chinese socialist revolution, class 
struggle, nationalist revolution, and economic development, proved essential to the 
survival of feminism in the Chinese context. 
The other side of this interdependence requires emphasis as well. The success of 
the Chinese socialist revolution would be inconceivable without the CCP’s rigorous 
feminist policies and practice. Fully aware that the revolution needed both peasant 
men and women, rural-oriented CCP leaders at the turn of the 1920s and in the 1930s 
did not position themselves as external liberators of rural Chinese women. Rather, 
they reenvisioned male and female peasants as the Party’s core revolutionary subjects. 
As Kathy LeMons Walker points out: ‘The new direction in the women’s movement 
was an essential part of the Party’s general effort to integrate itself with the rural 
populace.’30 Chinese socialist revolution would not have succeeded without the CCP’s 
dedication to socialist women’s liberation. Those who argue that the CCP simply 
compromised its feminist stance when conflicts arose with (peasant) men have ignored 
the crucial fact that neither class nor gender was dispensable for the Chinese socialist 
revolution. Class and gender equality constitutes the very goal of socialist revolution, 
and peasant and working men and women served as the central force in carrying out 
the revolution. A CCP document published in 1930 explicitly argued for the Chinese 
women’s movement as ‘an indispensable arm of the revolutionary struggle as a whole.’31 
Pressured by national crises, the Nationalists’ military offensives, and conservative 
forces in various areas, the CCP sometimes had to ‘compromise’ on both class and 
gender issues, but such manoeuvrings do not suggest fundamental concessions.32 
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In practice, it was the CCP’s dogmatic faction, which ignored Chinese conditions by 
stubbornly insisting on Marxist theories of urban working class struggle and Russian 
experiences, which had risked destroying the revolutionary force in the Jiangxi Soviet.33 
While illustrating the interdependence between Chinese socialist feminism and 
socialist revolution, I also want to highlight the fact that Chinese socialist feminism 
had its own limitations. Theoretically, international socialist feminism has been both 
enabled and constrained by Marxist theory on gender, which stipulates that social 
production is key to women’s liberation and that the elimination of private property 
would automatically address both class and gender issues. As feminist scholars have 
already pointed out, structural transformation brought about by the capitalist mode 
of production did challenge and shake the traditional gender division of labour, but it 
generated a new public form of patriarchy and a different gender division of labour.34 
Even in the socialist period after the completion of nationalisation and collectivisation, 
traditional ideas and practices, although much reduced in the urban public and official 
space, remained active in some private and local rural areas. At the same time, Marxist 
theory’s dismissal of women’s roles in reproduction and domestic labour led to gender 
blindness in its materialist approach to history. This theoretical oversight resulted in the 
lack of adequate policies to address women’s double burden in socialist society. Finally, 
Marxist theory, based on the European model, is limited in providing guidelines for 
anti-colonial, socialist, and feminist revolutions taking place in third world areas. 
In the context of the Chinese socialist revolution, the combination of an 
underdeveloped agrarian economy, a largely illiterate rural population, and a deeply 
entrenched Confucian culture, all in a semicolonial state with endless wars and military 
conflicts, presented considerable local challenges to feminism in practice. The CCP 
encountered various kinds of obstacles and resistance including from its own members 
when it implemented certain policies to forward the women’s movement. Clearly, 
feminist practices do not transcend their historical conditions, nor can they stand alone, 
independent from China’s political, socioeconomic, and cultural transformations. 
Many of the limitations of socialist feminism, including those occurring in Mao’s China, 
are tied to the limits of China’s socialist revolution and the overall socioeconomic 
and geopolitical conditions. The idea that feminism(s) should independently address 
a universal set of issues across the globe, and the assumption that socialist revolution 
should solve all ‘women’s questions’ raised from the universalised Western perspective 
regardless of historical conditions, only manifest an imperialist Cold War stance in 
transnational studies of women and socialist revolution. 
Nationalisation of Gender Equality and Mainstream Proletarian Feminist Culture
With the consolidation of the communist victory in China after 1949, socialist 
women’s  liberation evolved into an officially promoted and mass participated 
mainstream  discourse and practice. On 24 March 1949, shortly after the CCP took 
control of Beijing, the First Chinese National Women’s Congress convened, and the 
formation of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women (ACDWF, later changed 
to ACWF in 1957) was announced. The Marxist materialist view of women’s liberation, 
which espouses women’s direct participation in social production, constituted one of 
the central principles of socialist China’s feminist policy.35 Radical changes also followed 
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the state’s nationalisation of gender and class equality, as well as the redefinition of 
women’s roles as socialist subjects in the early 1950s. More critically, Chinese socialist 
women’s liberation constituted a central force in advancing all aspects of the newly 
established socialist system. In addition to guiding the promulgation and implementation 
of new marriage laws (1950–53), and championing multidimensional gender equality 
and women’s special interests, socialist women’s liberation also integrated itself into 
other major state movements, such as land reform and collectivisation (1950–53), the 
Korean War (1950–53), early industrialisation (1950–55), literacy campaigns (1950–56), 
and the Great Leap Forward (1958–62). In 1955, Mao Zedong put forward the slogan 
‘Chinese women can hold up half the sky.’ The interconnectedness between feminism 
and other socialist practices also resulted in the emergence of a politically constructed 
proletarian public space that was essentially, and simultaneously, feminist and socialist.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom arising in the 1980s that claims Marxist or 
socialist feminism promotes socioeconomic redistribution and class equality at the 
expense of gender and cultural issues, Chinese socialist women’s liberation not only 
achieved socioeconomic gender equality but also sustained the blossoming of socialist 
feminist mass culture. Socialist feminist culture explicitly targeted feudalist and 
capitalist patriarchies and Chinese traditional culture, transforming social ethics and 
constructing proletarian and socialist female model figures in 1950s China and beyond. 
Chinese socialist feminist culture belonged to the political mainstream but grew 
from diverse international and domestic influences, changed over time, and produced 
various representations and aesthetics.36 In the widely circulated journal, Women in 
China (zhongguo funü), published by the All-China Women’s Federation, socialist 
women articulated varying senses of agency and critical concerns, incorporating and 
transforming the May Fourth and left-wing feminisms.37 But variations in Chinese 
socialist feminist culture do not suggest a lack of a coherent, central agenda. The idea 
and practice of ‘proletarianisation’ distinguished Chinese socialist feminism from 
earlier Chinese feminisms, as well as from feminism practiced in other countries.38 
Socialist public representation of new roles for working class women, such as tractor 
drivers, train dispatchers, and high pressure welders, illustrated ‘the arrival of a socialist 
modernity contingent upon shattering the fetters of Confucian, feudal, and capitalist 
worldviews and their attendant patriarchal forms.’39 The first group of working class 
women who embodied socialist gender equality, empowering themselves with modern 
knowledge of heavy machinery, also brought socialist Chinese women to ‘the forefront 
of new national, international, and world orders.’40 
It is true that despite the abolition of private ownership and strong cultural 
campaigns  against patriarchy, certain gender and class issues remained in socialist 
China. But this truth should in no way cancel out the extensive and unprecedented 
progress made in women’s and proletarian liberations in world history. The development 
of Chinese socialist feminism in the post-1949 era was naturally a complex process, 
continuously manifesting a geopolitically constrained, socioeconomically conditioned, 
and culturally negotiated practice. Not all initiatives succeeded. The  Cold War 
economic and technological sanctions launched against China, for example, directly 
led to structural inequality between rural and urban areas and the persistence of certain 
gendered divisions of labour. 
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Socialist China’s experience has clearly illustrated that women’s liberation can by no 
means be achieved overnight or independently. The historical limitations of Chinese 
socialist feminism called for a continued, integrated, and expanded revolution even 
after the establishment of a socialist system. Today, as feminist movements have 
moved to restore a structural assault on the capitalist socioeconomic system, to 
forge transnational alliances over different geopolitical regions, and to develop an 
integrated emancipatory vision and approach, the practice of Chinese socialist women’s 
liberation—both its achievements and limitations—can offer us critically relevant 
insights and alternative imaginations.





The common practice of deploying ‘work teams’ (gongzuodui or gongzuozu) to troubleshoot unexpected crises, implement developmental priorities, propagate official ideology, and monitor and discipline cadre corruption—
among other purposes—is a defining feature of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
governance. Perhaps because work teams straddle the boundary between formal and 
informal institutions, however, they have received scant analytical attention. Although 
work teams figure prominently in narratives of almost all the major mass campaigns 
of the Mao era—Land Reform, Thought Reform, Anti-rightist, Four Cleans, Cultural 
Revolution, and so on—their continued importance in the post-Mao era has seldom 
been emphasised. And even for the Mao period we lack a clear understanding of when, 
why, and how such units were differentially deployed. Yet, arguably it is this mechanism 
more than any other that exemplifies China’s uniquely dexterous brand of authoritarian 
governance from its revolutionary days through to the present.1 
Putting the Mass Line into Practice
Work teams are ad hoc units that are appointed and directed by higher-level Party 
and government organs to advance a specific mission and, following a stint of intensive 
training, are dispatched to lower levels of the political system for a limited period of 
time to carry out their assignment by means of mass mobilisation (see Li’s essay in 
the present volume). Work teams are regarded as a key instrument for practicing the 
‘mass line’—Mao Zedong’s injunction to involve ordinary people in the articulation 
and implementation of Party policy (see Lin Chun’s essay in the present volume). The 
membership of these task forces, typically comprised of half a dozen or fewer people 
(but occasionally as small as a single individual or as large as a hundred or more), 
is designed to cut across normal bureaucratic and geographical lines. Work team 
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members are supposed to be outsiders to the places where they operate, are usually 
drawn from a variety of different organisations, and generally possess a wide range of 
experiences and skills. In most cases they include a substantial representation of Party 
members from various official agencies along with a significant number of intellectuals 
(zhishifenzi, usually university students and professors) as well as grassroots activists 
(jijifenzi). After undergoing a training programme (often lasting several weeks or 
more), which includes the study of new policy documents, sharing of experiences from 
other work teams, and familiarisation with the problems and particulars of the place to 
which they will be sent, work team members decamp to a village, factory, university, or 
other targeted site of operation. One of their first onsite activities is to convene a mass 
meeting to introduce their centrally mandated assignment and to identify potential 
local activists to help achieve their mission. 
Some of the most popular novels of the early People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
such as Ding Ling’s The Sun Shines over the Sangkan River (1954) and Zhou Libo’s 
The  Hurricane  (1955), were based on the novelists’ own experiences as members of 
a land reform work team.2 Our most detailed and dramatic English-language eyewitness 
accounts of the Chinese Revolution, William Hinton’s Fanshen (1966) and Isabel 
and David Crook’s Ten Mile Inn (1979), were also drawn from the authors’ personal 
participation in work teams.3
These first-hand accounts by Chinese and foreigners alike suggest that work team 
members find their service to be a memorable—sometimes even transformative—
experience. Diaries, memoirs, novels, and other writings and interviews of former 
team members generally describe their stint in a village, school, or factory as an eye-
opening adventure that enhanced understanding and empathy for the problems of 
ordinary people, increased appreciation of central policy goals, and heightened their 
sense of political engagement and efficacy. With so many of China’s leading officials 
and intellectuals having participated in multiple work teams over the years, the positive 
contribution to regime loyalty and legitimacy would seem to be considerable.
But work teams are more than a means of generating support among the political and 
intellectual elites. The contributions of work teams to PRC governance are manifold. 
In addition to promoting a particular higher-level agenda, and enlisting grassroots 
participation in advancing it, the teams provide a direct (albeit temporary) channel 
of communication between state and society. Ordinary people gain awareness of state 
priorities and propaganda while upper-level officials in turn glean information and 
insight into the concerns of citizens at the grassroots. As outside emissaries who report 
directly to higher government and Party agencies, thereby bypassing local cadres, the 
work teams also act as a powerful check on grassroots officials. Often they are authorised 
not only to monitor, but also to reprimand local cadres. They therefore play a major role 
in Party rectification and anti-corruption campaigns as well as in initiatives to further 
economic and development objectives (see Mertha’s essay in the present volume). 
Historical Origins
First deployed on a massive scale in conjunction with the Land Reform Campaign 
of 1947–53, work teams have precedents that can be traced at least as far back as the 
1920s, when the CCP—under the aegis of the First United Front with the Nationalist 
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Party (guomindang, hereafter GMD) and in response to the encouragement of Soviet 
advisors—first began to develop a systematic strategy for rural mobilisation. At the 
Peasant Movement Training Institute (PMTI) in Guangzhou, established in the 
summer of 1923 as an official GMD entity reporting to its Peasant Bureau, early 
communist organisers such as Peng Pai and Mao Zedong instructed and assigned fellow 
revolutionaries in a manner that anticipated the later formation of work teams.4 After 
receiving several months of intensive classroom and infield training, successful PMTI 
graduates would be sent back to their native places as ‘special emissaries’ (tepaiyuan) 
whose mission was to incite the local peasants to revolutionary action. They were 
responsible for instigating much of the violence of the Red Terror that accompanied 
the joint CCP-GMD Northern Expedition of 1926–27. 
These special emissaries prefigured the later practice of work teams in that they were 
selected and directed by an official agency—namely the GMD’s Peasant Bureau—to 
carry out a specific, centrally designated mass mobilisation effort. They were expected 
to spend at least six hours a day in their assigned villages, conducting investigations, 
and undertaking propaganda and organisation work. They were required to submit 
weekly reports to the Peasant Bureau and to return to the bureau’s headquarters in 
Guangzhou after each deployment to await instructions for the next assignment. 
The special emissaries differed from later work teams, however, in that they were for 
the most part single-person operations conducted by an ‘insider’ who had been chosen 
precisely because of his or her personal connections to the target sites. 
The use of special emissaries was somewhat reminiscent of the ancient practice 
of imperial commissioners (qinchai dachen), in which the Chinese emperor might 
deputise a trusted official to handle a pressing matter in the provinces by exercising 
ad hoc powers that trumped those of the regular bureaucracy. However, the proximate 
origins of special emissaries more likely stemmed from Russian than Chinese roots. 
The Guangzhou PMTI had been founded on the suggestion of Mikhail Borodin and his 
fellow sovetniki (Soviet agents in China) who also lectured at the Institute on Russian 
revolutionary practices of agitation and propaganda.5 At the same time, hundreds 
of left-leaning Chinese were being trained at the Sun Yat-sen University of the Toilers of 
the East in Moscow. In short, there were multiple conduits for the transmission of Soviet 
mobilisation techniques to China. Among the most important Bolshevik methods was 
the use of so-called ‘plenipotentiaries,’ agent provocateurs who had played a key role in 
both the Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War that followed in its wake. In the Soviet 
Union, individual plenipotentiaries—augmented by mobile groups from the Youth 
League and Trade Union such as Komsomol brigades, 25,000ers, shock brigades, and 
the like—would again be deployed a decade later to carry out a brutal campaign of 
collectivisation and dekulakisation in the countryside. 
Transformation
Whatever their origins, Chinese work teams underwent significant change over the 
course of Mao’s revolution and its aftermath. During the 1930s, ‘armed work teams’ 
(wuzhuang gongzuodui) were dispatched from communist headquarters in Jiangxi 
and Yan’an to conduct grain confiscation and recruit soldiers for the Red Army. In the 
Land Reform of the late 1940s and early 1950s, work teams orchestrated the emotional 
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‘speak bitterness’ struggles that preceded the liquidation of millions of landlords and 
rich peasants (see Javed’s essay in the present volume). They also spearheaded attacks 
against alleged counterrevolutionaries in the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries 
(1950) and Three and Five Antis (1951–52) Campaigns. The violence of these early PRC 
campaigns was reminiscent of the ruthlessness with which collectivisation had been 
conducted in the Soviet Union, where plenipotentiaries were known for drunkenness, 
beatings, and a litany of other bad behaviours.6 Precisely because of their callous 
and uncontrolled conduct, however, plenipotentiaries and other mobile units were 
phased out of Soviet governance practice in the 1950s, in favour of adhering to regular 
bureaucratic procedures.7 In this same period, especially following the Sino-Soviet 
rift, the PRC further expanded and systematised its own use of work teams. Chinese 
work teams, in stark contrast to their Soviet counterparts, were subject to increasingly 
stringent training regimens designed to teach them how to stir up mass enthusiasm 
and engagement without allowing locales to descend into unbridled disorder. 
In the early years of the PRC, work teams were not only used for directing violence 
against designated ‘class enemies.’ They also successfully promoted a wide range of 
developmental efforts: public health initiatives such as small pox and schistosomiasis 
eradication, literacy campaigns, irrigation and flood control, and so forth. During the 
Four Cleans Campaign of the early 1960s, more than 3.5 million work team members 
were dispatched to villages across China to curb rural cadre corruption in the aftermath 
of the disastrous Great Leap Forward. In this period, virtually all upperclassmen 
at Chinese universities were mobilised to participate in Four Cleans teams. After 
undergoing a rigorous training programme, team members were sent to local sites to 
‘squat on a point’ (dundian) while practicing the ‘three togethers’ (santong) of living, 
eating, and working with the local residents.8 Even today, the Four Cleans teams are 
still remembered fondly by many elderly villagers for having acted as disciplined and 
empathetic ambassadors of Party central. By pointing the finger of blame for the terrible 
Great Leap Famine at ‘corrupt’ grassroots officials, work teams helped to convince 
ordinary villagers that the root cause of their suffering rested with the malfeasance of 
their own local leaders, rather than with Chairman Mao or the CCP. Thanks in part 
to the earnest efforts of dedicated Four Cleans team members, the PRC proved able to 
weather one of the worst famines in world history. 
The prominent role of work teams in the Four Cleans, operating under the aegis 
of then President Liu Shaoqi, became grounds for criticism a few years later during 
the Cultural Revolution. Work teams played a central part in the often violent ‘two-
line struggle’ between ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ factions that afflicted schools, 
universities, factories, and other state agencies at the outset of the Cultural Revolution. 
The introduction in 1968 of Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams, composed 
primarily of workers and soldiers, appeared for a time to have ended the practice of 
pragmatic Party-sponsored work teams in favour of a new ideological entity under 
the direct control of Mao and the military. Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams 
promptly demobilised the unruly student Red Guards and helped to restore social 
order.
In the early post-Mao period, Deng Xiaoping declared an end to mass campaigns, 
implying that—much as in the later years of the Soviet Union—ad hoc mobile units 
would no longer be used to supersede regular bureaucratic procedures in implementing 
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Party policy. In reality, however, work teams did not disappear from Chinese 
governance practice; they continued to play a key role in promoting a wide range of 
Party initiatives in post-Mao China. Family Planning Work Teams, Three Represents 
Work Teams, and New Socialist Countryside Work Teams, among others, served as 
critical conduits of policy implementation for Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu 
Jintao respectively. Under Xi Jinping, the deployment of work teams has been further 
expanded. Precision Poverty Alleviation Work Teams fan out across the countryside 
to deliver material and financial relief to impoverished villages while repeated rounds 
of Discipline Inspection Teams descend upon university campuses and government 
agencies to ferret out corruption and ideological impurity. In conducting their centrally 
mandated operations, work teams continue to circumvent the formal bureaucracy in 
favour of enlisting ordinary people to assist in advancing the Party’s agenda. Although 
feared by local officials, work teams are generally welcomed by the populace at large 
as an effective means of checking grassroots governance abuses. The practice is surely 
not unrelated to the many public opinion surveys which reveal an extraordinary level 
of trust and support among ordinary Chinese for the central (as opposed to local) 
Party leadership. 
Achievements and Adaptation
Scholars of Soviet and Central European communism such as Valerie Bunce have 
pointed to flaws in the institutional design of those political systems as a prime 
explanation for their collapse.9 In terms of formal political institutions, however, the 
contemporary PRC does not differ appreciably from the former Soviet Union and its 
client states. Like them, it is a generic communist party-state complete with a central 
committee, politburo, people’s congresses, and so forth. Why then has the PRC not 
only survived, but even thrived? How has the CCP continued to govern with a flair for 
flexibility and responsiveness that eluded the European communist party-states? 
In terms of governance, one of the most salient differences between the PRC and its 
erstwhile European counterparts is the CCP’s effective deployment of well-trained work 
teams, capable of successfully communicating both top-down policies and bottom-up 
priorities. The teams allow the central leadership to cut through bureaucratic red tape 
and to establish direct contact with the people. The result is to accelerate the speed 
and spread of policy implementation while at the same time amplifying the centre’s 
awareness of grassroots preferences. The Party is thus better able to calibrate its policies 
to match popular proclivities. And ordinary people, in turn, feel an unusually close 
connection with the central authorities that redounds to the legitimacy and longevity 
of the communist regime. 
A practice imported from the Russian Revolution, yet much modified by Mao and 
his comrades over the course of the Chinese Revolution and its aftermath, work teams 
remain today one of the most important weapons in the CCP’s governance arsenal. 
Their strategic and flexible application help explain the CCP’s surprising ability to elude 
the fate that befell most formerly communist states, whose extinction is often attributed 
to their rigid and unresponsive political institutions. If, as Robert Putnam argues, 
vigorous civic engagement is what ‘makes democracy work’ by involving ordinary 
citizens in public life, then perhaps robust work teams are what ‘make (Chinese) 
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communism work’ by incorporating the masses into the Party’s itinerary.10 Just as we 
debate whether American civil society is strong enough to withstand the formidable 
challenges that currently beset liberal democracy, so we may ponder whether the 
continued deployment of work teams will prove sufficient to sustain an otherwise 
ossified communist party-state. Whatever the future may hold, one cannot deny the 
contributions of Maoist-style ad hoc governance to the survival and success of the CCP 
over a century of surprising achievement and adaptation.





The work unit (danwei) was the quintessential urban institution of Chinese state socialism. For the generations living through the 1950s to the 1970s, the work unit was much more than simply a workplace. Most aspects of people’s lives 
were deeply embedded in, and intimately connected to, a danwei, which structured not 
only their work, but also their benefits, housing, movement, and often their behaviour 
and thoughts. For many of them, the structural reform and closure of the work units 
in the 1980s and 1990s proved to be a traumatic experience, upending not only the 
certainties associated with lifelong employment and guaranteed incomes—the so-called 
‘iron rice bowl’ (tiefanwan)—but in many cases also tearing apart the social fabric of 
their entire communities. However, to the surprise of many observers, and in contrast 
to the global trend of neoliberalism, some danwei have not only survived the demise 
of state socialism, but prospered in postsocialist China—reorganised into the powerful 
conglomerates known as ‘central enterprises’ (yangqi) that today dominate strategic 
sections of the Chinese economy. 
The Building Block of State Socialism
Taken literally, danwei means ‘unit,’ shorthand for ‘work unit’ (gongzuo danwei). 
Aptly named, it constituted the basic building block of economic organisation in 
urban China during the Mao era. In its broadest sense, danwei encompasses a diverse 
range of institutions, including industrial factories, public institutions such as schools 
and hospitals, government departments, and other workplaces. Among them, the 
industrial work units, especially those in heavy industry, stand out as the prototype 
of the socialist workplace and were privileged over all others for their role in building 
socialism through their contribution to state-led industrialisation. Despite the post-
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Mao reforms, the term has remained part of daily vocabulary; it is not uncommon for 
people to refer to their workplace as a danwei, even though the danwei of today barely 
resembles its predecessor from the Mao era.
As an institution of social and industrial organisation, work units emerged in the late 
1950s, after the new state nationalised industries and pursued centralised economic 
planning and heavy industrialisation under the First Five-year Plan. It thus has been 
identified closely with both the Chinese state and its model of state socialism. But the 
danwei did not emerge from thin air. Aspects of the danwei, such as its functions and 
its authority relations, can be traced back to institutions of the first half of the twentieth 
century. From this perspective, rather than being an entirely new post-1949 socialist 
creation, multiple historical origins of the danwei—or at least close parallels—can be 
located in pre-communist financial institutions in the Republican era of the 1930s, in 
the labour movement led by skilled artisans between the 1920s and 1940s, in the rural 
revolutionary models of organisation in the communist base areas in the 1940s, and in 
the dominant communist industrial model available at the time: the Soviet industrial 
organisation.1 What emerged in the 1950s can thus be seen as a composite institution 
that borrowed from a range of communist and non-communist sources.2 
Despite the resemblances to a variety of institutions across time and space, the 
formation of the danwei in the Mao era represents something distinct. It simultaneously 
served as an economic, social, and political-ideological institution. To elaborate 
on a  classic formulation of its functions, the work unit may be best understood 
as combining an economic role within a centrally planned economy by supplying 
public goods, services, and commodities; a non-market redistributive social role by 
administering labour insurance and social security provisions to employees; and 
a political role by representing and managing the interests of workers.3 In addition 
to this, we may also emphasise the ideological role of the danwei in monitoring and 
moulding workers’ thoughts and behaviours in accordance with the official ideology, 
and mobilising employees for political campaigns.
This configuration of the work units reflects a non-capitalist form of social and 
economic organisation. In Chinese state socialism, economic relations were socially 
embedded in, and organised by, political institutions of the Party-state, rather than 
mediated by the market. These political institutions determined and regulated 
economic exchanges between economic units, as well as between economic units and 
individuals. According to Karl Polanyi, in a socially embedded economy, economic 
activity and the market operate within social institutions rather than social institutions 
being dominated by the market.4 Chinese state socialism is an extreme variant of such 
embedded economies. In work units, labour was not commodified: workers did not sell 
their labour power in a labour market as a commodity. Instead, labour was socially, as 
well as physically, embedded in the institution of the danwei. Workers’ life-chances were 
neither determined by, nor dependent on, the market, but on the state and bureaucratic 
apparatus, and on the priorities governing the danwei and society at large. This held 
mixed blessings.
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A Hidden Abode of Coercion and Exploitation
In the work unit, non-capitalist social relations did not necessarily mean freedom 
from exploitation or coercion. Production processes in the industrial work units 
were hardly distinguishable from their counterparts in capitalist economies. Indeed, 
although everything else seemed to change around it, little needed to be reorganised in 
the production processes during the reform of the work units in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Even without management by capitalist bosses, workers in the danwei were under 
dual pressure from leaders who acted both as managers of a productive enterprise 
and political leaders enforcing political control and ideological norms. Furthermore, 
the lifetime tenure and the comprehensive benefits only ever applied to the core, 
permanent employees. While danwei did provide employment security, they also tied 
workers to their units. Jobs were assigned and employees were bound to their danwei, 
unable to voluntarily leave unless they obtained permission. 
Moreover, substantive workplace democracy did not exist in the danwei. The trade 
unions from the 1950s onwards were tamed and subservient to the needs of economic 
efficiency (see Franceschini’s essay in the present volume). The supposed organ of 
workplace democracy, the Staff and Workers’ Representative Congress (zhigong 
daibiao dahui), ostensibly designed for employee consultations, rarely functioned 
as a mechanism of worker self-management.5 This is not to say that there were no 
constraints on leadership, or that workers could not exercise some degree of control. 
The state socialist ethos that privileged the historical role of the working class set limits 
on the disciplining and firing of workers by work unit leaders. What emerged in the 
danwei was a form of paternalism in which workers were dependent on their work 
units and management.6 
Despite the high level of control in work units, it would be wrong to assume that 
there was never organised dissent. Throughout the Mao era, at least some groups of 
workers took advantage of political opportunities to raise their voices and, in some 
instances, pose serious challenges to both managers and Party leaders. Strikes and 
worker-led protests erupted in the mid-1950s during the Anti-rightist Campaign, then 
again during the Cultural Revolution (most prominently in Shanghai), and yet again 
in the wake of Mao’s death.7 These groups demanded both economic improvement and 
a degree of political democracy. But the state ultimately proved to be intolerant of, 
and too powerful for, any independent organisation of workers against the authorities, 
and repeatedly crushed all such movements. By the end of the Mao era, despite their 
previously elevated symbolic status and economic position, workers lacked their own 
industrial and political organisations, and were ill-prepared for the subsequent reforms 
that would weaken their economic and social positions through the restructuring 
of the danwei.
From Work Units to National Champions
China’s economic reforms fundamentally dismantled work units as an institution 
of state socialism. The state partially withdrew from direct control of the danwei, 
separating politics from economic management, and subjecting work units to 
competitive market pressures.8 Never designed to be an economic institution that 
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could compete in a market economy, in the 1990s, many danwei went bankrupt, closed 
down, or were privatised. The work units that survived onslaught—often with a heavy 
dose of state support—still had to undergo internal restructuring that fundamentally 
changed how they operated, and what it meant to work for them. Lifetime employment 
was replaced by employment contracts, in a process of a progressive commodification 
of labour. Management became considerably more coercive toward workers. The state 
came to maintain control over labour relations in work units only indirectly, by means 
of industrial and labour policies and legislation, with much less direct intervention 
over the economy and society in general.9 The paternalism and organised dependency 
characteristic of the danwei in the Mao era was disrupted, with a more disorganised 
and despotic set of relations taking hold in the process of reform.10
What remains of the work unit today? The danwei has been transformed from an 
all-encompassing social, economic, and political-ideological institution embedded in 
a planned economy to a primarily economic institution. But those that remain state-
owned and managed by state agencies —such as the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of the State Council—continue to serve the goals 
of the Party-state, and often receive preferential treatment and protection. There are 
also some traces of the former paternalism. In general, contemporary work units 
provide better employment benefits and job security in strategic sectors than their 
counterparts in the private sector, but have also sharply increased the use of casual 
workers. It remains difficult for management to arbitrarily dismiss employees, and the 
state acts to intervene to protect these units from market pressures—albeit, to varying 
degrees depending on the significance of the units and sectors. For these reasons, 
the new work unit has been compared to the organisation-oriented, ‘enterprise as 
community’ Japanese employment system,11 and the current formation is a result of 
a state-led strategy to turn danwei into national champions based on the model of the 
South Korean developmental state. As such, the largest work units, regrouped as central 
state-owned enterprises (yangqi), are some of the most dominant companies with 
monopolistic power in China. Four decades after the end of state socialism, the new 
work units continue to be central to the Chinese economy, and are developing global 
reach, contributing to China’s global strategy of infrastructure building and resource 
extraction. Yet, the danwei of state socialism is increasingly fading into the distance.
 AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM   335
Afterword
Jodi DEAN
Why is ‘communist’ unable to qualify political theory? We have democratic political theory, liberal political theory, republican political theory, conservative political theory, the indistinct placeholder ‘normative’ political 
theory—but communist political theory does not appear. Marxist political theory, 
Marxist-Leninist political theory, and even Marxist-Leninist-Maoist political theory 
are intelligible as types of inquiry, although in the twenty-first century they remain 
at the margins of most academic and activist discourse. The proper names Marx, 
Lenin, and Mao legitimate, to a degree, theorisations of political economy, concepts 
of political power, and analyses of the struggles of the oppressed—perhaps because 
their individuation of the knowledge gained through collective struggle makes them 
easier for those ensconced in the institutions and expectations of capitalist societies 
to swallow. Outputs of a man’s brain, his thinking and writing, are more palatable—
and more easily dismissed—than the revolutionary courage of hundreds of millions of 
people willing to kill and die to end their own exploitation and colonisation. Hence the 
radicality of an insistence on Chinese communism: the people and their struggles—
their heroic victories, lessons learned, excesses, and defeats—take centre stage as the 
subject and object of communist political theory. 
Radicality is risky. A specific challenge for communist political theory stems from 
the way its opponents (and some of its supporters) insist on reducing communist 
ideas to a few select historical examples. Inextricable from history, ‘communist’ fails to 
attain the level of abstraction necessary for a qualifier. It is inverted to refer to a state 
violence it aims to abolish. Gulags and famines take the place of the emancipatory 
egalitarian struggles of the oppressed. Pang Laikwan in this volume reminds us that 
Mao’s version of dialectical materialism emphasises humans’ struggle with history, so 
perhaps the stickiness of communism, its seemingly inescapable embeddedness in not 
just history but in a history written by the victors, its enemies, confirms Mao’s point. 
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Communists continue to battle with and over our histories. When anti-communists 
subsume working class victories under Cold War categories they inadvertently bear 
witness to the truth of communism. The struggle is real. 
Call Me by Your Name
Language is a weapon in the arsenal of struggle. Communist names present the world 
differently from the way it is given in capitalist ideology. What was natural or traditional 
becomes a crime demanding redress. What workers learn through collective struggle 
takes form in slogans, demands, and concepts. In an era when anti-communism is the 
norm, the air, a mobilising theme for conservatives and liberals, and when capitalist 
individualism, self-interest, and cynicism reign, the language of communism can feel 
strange in our mouths. The terms seem not just outmoded but inauthentic. Were they 
ever more than propaganda designed to deceive the masses? Rebecca Karl’s recovery 
of the emancipatory imperative of ‘serve the people’ in this volume illustrates this 
point. For Chinese communists ‘serve the people’ was a political injunction, social 
ideal, cultural expectation, economic norm, and concrete social practice, even if by 
the mid-1960s it had become rather empty and rote. By the 2000s, the phrase had lost 
its capacity to produce socialist meaning, more available for lampooning than ethical 
guidance. Karl excavates this capacity. She attends to Mao’s initial use of the phrase in 
a tribute for Zhang Side, a beloved comrade. Born a peasant, Zhang was a soldier on 
the Long March. He died in a mining accident during the war against Japan. Mao’s 
eulogy turned Zhang into an exemplar of socialist service. As Karl writes, ‘the phrase 
Zhang’s death inspired proposed a new form of social relation, a socialist organisation 
of time and society that was at once abstract and concrete, lived and “yet to be made,” 
remembered and “not yet existing.”’ To serve the people was to create the people, to 
enable the people to become present as a revolutionary unity. It was to undertake the 
work of dismantling old hierarchies and producing new kinds of social relations. Karl 
resurrects the theoretical and practical vitality of the expectation that socialists serve 
the people: only by serving the people are they part of the people; only by being served 
is the people revolutionary. 
Serving the people names a process of subjectification: the people become present 
as the revolutionary subject they are by being served.1 Karl demonstrates the way 
that communist language produces the structure—the relations, understandings, 
and expectations—that makes it intelligible. This productive capacity is not absolute; 
it is entangled in a broad array of economic, political, social, and cultural forces. 
These forces are often antagonistic. Sometimes they align. Communist names rely 
on the antagonisms and alignments that imbue them with mobilising capacity. If an 
organisation instructs its members (or cadres, soldiers, workers, or students) to serve 
the people even as it promotes hierarchy, enables corruption, and enriches the few, the 
efficacy of the phrase will decline. But it may persist, for a while, as an ideal against 
which failures to uphold it are assessed. It may retain a symbolic authority that testifies 
to the struggles and sacrifices that it inspired and that inspired it. Even its cynical 
evocation relies on this prior authority—why else mock it?
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So what do we make of Mao’s currency, the way he circulates as the face of Chinese 
capitalism, as money? The cynical response sees nothing but authoritarian capitalism, 
nothing but Foxconn and billionaires—even in the Party. Using Lacanian categories, 
one might say that in contemporary China capitalism is Real while communism 
is imaginary. But why not see the face of Mao as the sign of a struggle that cannot 
be erased, that lives on, that has social value? What could enable or support this 
properly symbolic perspective? The faces featured on money issued by the United 
States Treasury Department feature slave-owners. Their legacy lives on in the raced 
economic inequality, institutionalised white supremacy, and ongoing damage of racism 
that characterise US capitalism. That US money features slave-owners marks the fact 
that the wealth of the United States was produced by slaves as well as by exploited 
workers. US money registers how the value of labour in the US, like other commodities, 
is inseparable from slavery and its afterlives. Does the face of Mao make a mockery of 
the Foxconn workers assembling iPhones they cannot afford or does it haunt Chinese 
capitalism as a manifestation of an aspiration and a struggle that continues? The question 
is undecidable, which means political. So long as communist names have symbolic 
efficiency, they can touch the Real that ruptures them, keeping alive the possibility 
of its transformation. After all, capitalism is itself driven by and structured through 
class struggle. The Real of capitalism is the Real of a class antagonism that will lead 
to capitalism’s own abolition, that is to say, capitalism from a communist perspective.
Communism for Us
Close to a decade ago, a number of leading European intellectuals gathered together 
for a conference on the ‘Idea of Communism’ at Birkbeck University in London. Initiated 
by the philosophers Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou, the conference attracted over 
a thousand people. It generated subsequent conferences in New York, Berlin, and Seoul 
as well as edited collections and follow-up books and articles. A goal of this endeavour is 
the reinvigoration and imagining of communism as a philosophical ideal and political 
project. Against the anti-communism that pervades three decades after communism’s 
ostensible defeat, the desire for and affirmation of the truth of communism responds 
to the disaster of global capitalism, intensified economic inequality, rising fascism, and 
climate change. Emancipatory egalitarian struggle against the exploitation of people, 
nature, and the future is necessary for there to be a liveable future for most of the 
world’s people.
Although in large part a theoretical project, the project for a new communism cannot 
be reduced to academic politics. The structures and expectations of the neoliberal 
academy work against thinking communism. Sometimes funding can be secured for 
projects that give the appearance of being sufficiently critical, artistic, or historical—
sufficiently distant from politics, from the actuality of communism. Infiltration, using 
the meagre rewards of the university against its capitalist foundation, is better than 
nothing. Disciplinary norms regulate the production of what counts as knowledge, 
validating views that reinforce a capitalist status quo. Area studies reinforce borders: 
China separate from the so-called West, Latin America separate from Anglo America, 
the Middle East separate from everyone. In addition to supporting imperialism’s 
ongoing fragmentation of the world to suit its own interests, these separations present 
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real barriers to activists. They make it hard to learn from different experiences. They 
reinforce particularism and uniqueness—our struggle is like no other. They mitigate 
against the building of revolutionary international parties, organisations, and 
movements. 
How does the project of reinvigorating the idea of communism here and now suggest 
a position from which we can put to use and redeploy the knowledge generated through 
Chinese communist struggle? What terms and ideals, what knowledge generated and 
lessons learned by the courageous work of Chinese comrades do we need today? 
Four interconnected notions stand out with particular power: mass line, people, class 
struggle, and revolution. 
Mass Line
In its most fecund moments, Chinese communism has been vibrant and experimental, 
creating new modes of generating political energy and organising political being. 
Marxist-Leninist ideas took on new dimensions as Chinese communists made 
theoretical questions central to the practice of communism. ‘Mass line’ is the most 
significant of these conceptual innovations. A principle of participatory governance 
and political accountability, the mass line ties Party work to the people. The people 
have to be consulted; their will must be interpreted, and policies need to carry out this 
will—from the masses to the masses. As Lin Chun reminds us in this volume, not only 
does the mass line promote an ideal of popular sovereignty, but it also provides ‘a novel 
adaptation of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism.’ According to her, the 
mass line aims to balance deliberation and discipline while at the same time avoiding 
‘bureaucratic dogmatism and blind commandism.’ Mindful of our present context 
of generalised dispossession, immiseration, and political despair, Lin highlights the 
emancipatory power of the mass line: ‘Ordinary people can be proud of themselves as 
direct producers of both material and cultural wealth in the collective mastery of their 
own destiny.’
‘Ordinary people’ have today become a political cliché. Whether as voices of ‘common 
sense’ trotted out to symbolise that a given politician is in touch with the people or as 
‘slice of life’ style television interviewees whose opinions take the place of actual news, 
ordinary people are ubiquitous. The recent turn to populism is but the latest political 
deployment of ordinary people. The differences between this cynical populism and the 
mass line are significant. In late neoliberal societies, ordinary people do not appear 
primarily as producers. They appear as singular national subjects, instantiations of the 
nation, representatives of a national interest as voices from a particular demographic 
position. Their source of pride arises from the way their demographic position is 
incorporated in the nation. Likewise, rather than collective, their capacities are 
individual—individual successes and failures, individual gains or losses, individual 
hopes and dreams. Detached from collective strength, ordinary people forfeit any 
possibility of mastery over their own destiny. The question is how they can cope with 
what life brings them. Have they prepared? Are they trained? All responsibility is 
downloaded onto them as individuals. Politics is either a matter of personal ethics and 
identity or so far removed from everyday life as to have become post-politcal. In fact, 
everybody knows that ordinary people have no political impact in societies run by and 
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for billionaires. The presence of an ordinary person in a ‘man on the street’ interview 
or at an address by a US President is all for show, an instant of fame that vanishes at the 
moment it registers.
The mass line is indispensable to the return to communism, perhaps now more than 
it ever was. As Lin writes in this volume, against present individualism, it inspires 
a political vision that embeds ‘individual worth and glory’ in the work and struggle of 
a political collective. One is valuable as part of the revolutionary masses, as one of the 
people, and not for one’s own individual insight, effort, or hot take. Ideally, parties and 
organisations committed to the mass line would practice a politics that exceeds empty 
horizontalism and participationism. There are leaders—but the leaders are leaders 
only insofar as they attend to the needs of the people. Lin details how through the 
mass line leadership pools the wisdom of the masses as it ‘collects scattered views from 
below and turns them into systematic positions and experimental policies, the effects of 
which are then investigated, debated, and fed once again back into the system.’ Political 
discussion is more than talk, more than sharing. It is tied directly to action for the 
benefit of the people. The mass line is radical democracy as communist practice, that is, 
a strategically minded practice with communism as its horizon.
The People
‘The people’ is the second concept from Chinese communism crucial to any 
contemporary reenvisioning of communist futures. Guan Kai in this volume takes 
up the notion of the people in Chinese history. Traditionally, ‘ordinary people’ 
were understood in contrast to rulers and government officials. The people are the 
‘material foundation for rule’ even though they are not yet understood as themselves 
rulers, as sovereign. With the Chinese Communist Party’s rise to political power, the 
people retained its place as one side of an antagonism, naming those who supported 
socialism over and against those who did not—the enemies of the people. Situating 
Chinese communism within the revolutionary line of the French Revolution and Paris 
Commune, Guan presents the people as ‘the faintly discernible trace of revolutionary 
practice, a slogan that can be found everywhere, but the meaning of which is constantly 
changing.’ The idea of the people is transformed through people’s struggle, people’s war. 
The sea in which the revolutionary swims is turbulent. Navigating it requires winning 
the people’s hearts, which itself requires finding solutions to their problems. 
The Chinese communist view of the people contrasts with the people of contemporary 
populism. Rather than given as a unity at the basis of a national project, it is a force 
with its own dynamics. The people is productive, active, and internally contradictory. 
Their engagement is the struggle, their support decisive for victory: ‘The people, and 
the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history’ (quoted by 
Guan in the present volume). But they are not a unity and they are not invariable. 
Always comprised of contradictory elements, some of the people will be militant and 
disciplined. Others will not. The Party cannot take them for granted but must always 
be responsive, adaptive, and creative as it seeks to mobilise them—hence, the tight 
connection between the people and the mass line.
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Class Struggle
Chinese communism also provides an innovative view of class struggle. One objection 
that reappears in the contemporary discussion of communism turns on the idea of class. 
There is no working class in Europe and the United States, we are told. Instead we have 
multiple differentiated positions and identities with little relation to production. Class 
can no longer function as a revolutionary mode of political identity. This argument is not 
persuasive. Chinese communism lets us see why. First, as Wang Hui has observed, ‘the 
identification of the working class as the leading class is a political statement rather than 
a positivist conclusion.’2 As he emphasises, ‘class politics refers to movements against 
the contradictions created by the logic of capitalism and its derivative class inequality.’3 
From a communist perspective, the classes engaged in class struggle are irreducible 
to demographic categories. They are positions in the antagonistic relations at the core 
of a society’s mode of production. Second, in contrast to the workerist reductionism 
prevalent in European socialism and autonomist communism, the Chinese context 
gives us class struggle as creative experimentation. Work teams (Elizabeth Perry in this 
volume) and worker universities (Alessandro Russo in this volume) suggest new modes 
of developing accountability and subverting the technical division of labour. Third, class 
struggle has affective prerequisites; class consciousness cannot be reduced to a mindset 
that follows automatically from class position. Class feeling has to be engendered. 
Nourishing class feeling is itself a tactic of class struggle. Haiyan Lee in this volume 
brings out the ways Chinese cultural production sought to engineer a new structure of 
feeling whereby comradely love for one’s class brothers and sisters supplants the rivals 
of kinship, romance, and pity. Fourth, Chinese communism gives us a class struggle 
that operates not just through the Party but that occurs within the Party. The Party is 
not a pure voice of the oppressed. It embodies all the contradictions already within the 
people and must include in itself capacities for learning and change. Contrasting the 
Chinese with the Soviet approach, Mao emphasises that class struggle is undertaken 
from the bottom to the top as well as from the top to the bottom. Pun Ngai concludes: 
‘The mass line and class struggle were always intertwined as the essential ingredients of 
the construction of socialism.’4
Revolution
Finally, Chinese communism leaves a distinct legacy of revolution. Benjamin Kindler 
in this volume contrasts Lenin’s and Mao’s revolutionary temporalities. Lenin’s was that 
of the moment, the decisive instant of rupture, revolution as event. Mao takes the long 
view. Kindler writes: ‘For Mao, revolution is a moment of rupture within continuity 
and continuity amidst rupture—a transformation of the strategic terrain in which the 
nature of both the possibilities and the dangers undergo a marked change from one 
state to another, but where the conquest of power by no means marks the end of the 
revolutionary process.’ Cai Xiang in this volume also highlights the impossibility of 
finality; there can always be reversals. Insofar as history is always the working through 
of contradictions, no victory is ever certain. Absent the fetishism of completion, of 
an end to history, that long plagued European communism, Chinese communism 
remained attuned to ongoing problems, combinations of radical advance and tactical 
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retreat. To be sure, the long view brings its own challenges: when do compromises 
become betrayals? At what point do the measures designed to protect the revolution, by 
energising the economy, say, in fact defeat it? When can we say that counterrevolution 
has taken the place of people’s revolution? Might it be when the interests of corporations 
and investors take the place of the people? When the people’s own desires are too easily 
‘bound to the seductions of the commodity form,’ as Kindler writes in this volume. 
When communism no longer appears as the horizon of our politics because its struggles 
have become blocked, repressed, outlawed? 
And, perhaps, one final way Chinese communism may enable us to discern if our 
politics is revolutionary: it helps us ask whether ostensible efforts to serve the people 
fragment them into identity categories such that the people can no longer be seen as 
a revolutionary force. It compels us to consider whether our activists, organisers, and 
revolutionaries take the people as the way they are given under capitalism or work to 
transform them into agents of emancipatory egalitarian struggle.
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Li Jin, Red Sister Gives Relief to a Soldier (2007)
All men must die, but death can vary in its significance. The ancient 
Chinese writer Sima Qian said, ‘Though death befalls all men alike, it may 
be weightier than Mount Tai or lighter than a feather.’ To die for the people 
is weightier than Mount Tai, but to work for the fascists and die for the 
exploiters and oppressors is lighter than a feather.
Mao Zedong, ‘Serve the People,’ 1944
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